1. Is There Reason for Skepticism? Joe Cruz Williams College Philosophy and Cognitive Science Thanks to Jonathan Vogel, Melissa Barry, Alan White, Will Dudley, Tom Kelly, Joe Sheiber, Brad Armour-Garb, and Jonathan Greco for conversation on these issues.

2. Skepticism Skeptical arguments aim to be rationally persuasive.

3. Skepticism Skeptical arguments aim to be rationally persuasive. And therefore must appeal to epistemic principles.

4. Skepticism Skeptical arguments aim to be rationally persuasive. And therefore must appeal to epistemic principles; this has often been taken to show that skepticism must be limited.

5. Skepticism Seems to retain a potent repertoire of arguments even if a commitment to reason must be preserved.

6. My Project Show that skepticism is a result of tensions between individual epistemic principles.

7. My Project Show that skepticism is a result of tensions between individual epistemic principles; this might lead to a kind of pragmatic resignation.

8. My Project Show that skepticism is a result of tensions between individual epistemic principles; this might lead to a kind of pragmatic resignation. Explore a more confident response to skepticism by arguing that the way the skeptic uses epistemic principles undermines skepticism itself.

9. Epistemic principles Rules that state the conditions under which a set of inputs yields (epistemically) high-quality output.

10. Epistemic principles Rules that state the conditions under which a set of inputs yields (epistemically) high-quality output. Prescriptive (though they may retain significant debts to descriptive theories of cognition).

11. Epistemic principles Examples: “If a person has a clear sensory impression that x is F (or of x's being F) and on that basis believes that x is F, then this belief is prima facie justified” (Audi, 2001, p. 43). “If S believes that he perceives something to have a certain property F, then the proposition that he does perceive something to be F, as well as the proposition that there is something that is F, is one that is reasonable for S” (Chisholm, 1966, p. 45).

12. Epistemic principles Examples: “Having a percept at time t with the content P is a defeasible reason for the cognizer to believe P-at- t” (Pollock and Cruz, 1999, p. 201).

13. Epistemic principles Perception

14. Epistemic principles Perception Memory Induction Temporal Reasoning etc.

15. Epistemic principles Generic Schema: Being in mental states  1,...  (n-l) is a good (but defeasible) basis for an inference to mental state  n in the cognizer.

16. Epistemic principles Are content-neutral.

17. Epistemic principles Are content-neutral. But faculty-specific

18. Epistemic principles Are content-neutral. Are not consciously explicit.

19. Epistemic principles Are content-neutral. Are not consciously explicit. But can be made conscious

20. Epistemic principles Are content-neutral. Are not consciously explicit. Supervene on agent’s psychology.

21. Skepticism Reconsidered Skeptical arguments Offer the mere possibility of an alternate incompatible but equally explanatory hypothesis.

22. Skepticism Reconsidered Skeptical arguments Offer the mere possibility of an alternate incompatible but equally explanatory hypothesis. Are all such possibilities cogent?

23. Skepticism Reconsidered Conclusions can’t be rationally distinguished on the basis of collateral evidence.

24. Skepticism Reconsidered Conclusions can’t be rationally distinguished on the basis of collateral evidence. Cartesian (or external world) skepticism Skepticism about memory Humean skepticism

25. Skepticism Reconsidered What principle?

26. Skepticism Reconsidered What principle? If S possesses some evidence e, and if e does not discriminate between two or more conflicting conclusions, then it is not rational for S to believe one of those conclusions. Call this the discriminating evidence principle.

27. Skepticism Reconsidered Discriminating Evidence Principle Is it content-neutral?

28. Skepticism Reconsidered Discriminating Evidence Principle Is it content-neutral? If it is*, then DE can be applied to arguments that use other principles, and this is precisely what skepticism does. * Reflection, Generality of cognition

29. Skepticism Reconsidered An argument for Commonsense Realism (1) I appear to have two hands. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands.

30. Skepticism Reconsidered An argument for Commonsense Realism (1) I appear to have two hands. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. Perceptual Principle e.g., “If a person has a clear sensory impression that x is F …and on that basis believes that x is F, then this belief is prima facie justified” (Audi).

31. Skepticism Reconsidered Against Commonsense Realism (1) I appear to have two hands. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. (3) I may be deceived by an evil demon, therefore it is not reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. Perceptual Principle

32. Skepticism Reconsidered Against Commonsense Realism (1) I appear to have two hands. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. (3) I may be deceived by an evil demon, therefore it is not reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. Perceptual Principle Discriminating Evidence Principle

33. Skepticism Reconsidered Pragmatic Resignation

34. Skepticism Reconsidered Pragmatic Resignation Perceptual principle and DE are both constitutive of cognition.

35. Skepticism Reconsidered Pragmatic Resignation Perceptual principle and DE are both constitutive of cognition. In mundane contexts, they tend to conflict only locally.

36. Skepticism Reconsidered Pragmatic Resignation Perceptual principle and DE are both constitutive of cognition. In mundane contexts, they tend to conflict only locally, but once made conscious can conflict globally.

37. Skepticism Reconsidered Pragmatic Resignation So we must weigh our susceptibility to skeptical arguments against the value of our cognition.

38. Skepticism Reconsidered Discriminating Evidence Principle Is it content-neutral?

39. Skepticism Reconsidered Discriminating Evidence Principle Is it content-neutral? If it is not*, then skepticism itself may be in danger. * Domains of reason, evolution

40. Skepticism Imploded? Suppose DE is content-neutral

41. Skepticism Imploded? Suppose DE is content-neutral DE could then apply to itself.

42. Skepticism Imploded? Some cases (1) I remember clearly and vividly that my capacity for applying DE is defective. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that my capacity for applying DE is defective.

43. Skepticism Imploded? Some cases (1) I remember clearly and vividly that my capacity for applying DE is defective. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that my capacity for applying DE is defective. Memory Principle

44. Skepticism Imploded? Some cases (1) I have accumulated a lot of evidence that my capacity for applying DE is defective. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that my capacity for applying DE is defective.

45. Skepticism Imploded? Some cases (1) I have accumulated a lot of evidence that my capacity for applying DE is defective. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that my capacity for applying DE is defective. Inductive Principle

46. Skepticism Imploded? These cases show that it is possible for someone reasonably to believe that her capacity for deploying DE is defective.

47. Skepticism Imploded? These cases show that it is possible for someone reasonably to believe that her capacity for deploying DE is defective. The mere possibility of these cases can be used in a DE-based argument against skepticism.

48. Skepticism Imploded? (1) I appear to have two hands. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. (3) I may be deceived by an evil demon, therefore it is not reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. Perceptual Principle Discriminating Evidence Principle

49. Skepticism Imploded? (1) I appear to have two hands. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. (3) I may be deceived by an evil demon, therefore it is not reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. (4) I may be mis-applying DE, therefore it is not reasonable for me to retract my earlier argument. Perceptual Principle Discriminating Evidence Principle

50. Skepticism Imploded? (1) I appear to have two hands. (2) Therefore, it is reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. (3) I may be deceived by an evil demon, therefore it is not reasonable for me to believe that I have two hands. (4) I may be mis-applying DE, therefore it is not reasonable for me to retract my earlier argument. Perceptual Principle Discriminating Evidence Principle

51. Skepticism Imploded? But skepticism does not seem incoherent. What is going on?

52. Skepticism Imploded? But skepticism does not seem incoherent. What is going on? We can have a pragmatic resignation toward the apparent implosion of skepticism.

53. (But) Is There Reason for Skepticism?

54. (But) Is There Reason for Skepticism? No.