1. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 20041 Filling the gap between Requirements Engineering and Public Key/Trust Management Infrastructures Paolo Giorgini Department of Information and Comm. Tech. University of Trento (Italy) Joint work with Fabio Massacci, John Mylopoulos, and Nicola Zannone

2. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 20042 Summary Motivation Our approach –Secure aware-Tropos –Case study –Formalization –Axioms –Proprerties –Trust Management Implementation Conclusion and future work

3. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 20043 Trust Management and PKIs Trust Management and PKIs are hot topics in security research: –sophisticated policy languages, algorithms, and system for managing security credentials Solutions based on public-key cryptography and credential have been shown to be well suited in satisfying the security requirements of distributed systems However, there is big gap between solutions and the requirements of the entire system

4. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 20044 Security and Requirements No methodologies for linking security policy to the mainstream requirements analysis process The usual approach towards the inclusion of security within a system is to identify security requirements after system design Security mechanisms have to be fitted into a pre- existing design –may not be able to accommodate them –security requirements can generate conflicts functional requirements of the system

5. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 20045 Our goal There are proposals improving on secure engineering or architectures for trust management, but nobody has proposed a methodology that considers together both these approaches We want to introduce a trust management system into the requirements engineering framework –avoid designing an entire system and then retrofitting a PKI on its top, when it is already to late to make it fits snugly

6. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 20046 Our proposal A process that integrates trust, security and system engineering, using the same concepts and notations used for requirements specification –Three steps approach: 1.Functional Requirements modeling 2.Trust Requirements modeling 3.PKI/trust management implementation We use Tropos, an agent-oriented methodology, for requirements modeling and analysis

7. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 20047 Tropos Methodology Tropos is an agent-oriented software development methodology, tailored to describe both the organization and the system itself Tropos uses concepts of –Actor Intentional entity: role, position, agent (human or software) –Goal (softgoal) Strategic interest of an actor –Task Particular course of action that can be executed in order to satisfy a goal –Resource Physical or informational entity (without intentionality) –Social dependency (between two actors) One actor depends on another to accomplish a goal, execute a task, or deliver a resource

8. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 20048 Security-Aware Tropos Tropos has not been designed with security in mind We introduce four new relationships: –Trust,among two agents and a service –Delegation, among two agents and a service –Ownership, between an agent and a service –Offer, between an agent and a service And we refine the methodology by –Define functional dependencies of services among actors –Design a trust model among actors –Identify who owns services and who is able to fulfill them

9. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 20049 An illustrative Case Study A health care IS, in which –Patient, that depends on the hospital for receiving appropriate health care. Further, patients will refuse to share their data if they do not trust the system or do not have sufficient control over the use of their data; –Hospital, that provides medical treatment and depends on the patients for having their personal information. –Clinician, physician of the hospital that provides medical health advice and, whenever needed, provide accurate medical treatment; –Health Care Authority (HCA) that control and guarantee the fair resources allocation and a good quality of the delivered services. –Medical Information System (MIS), that, according the current privacy legislation, can share the patients medical data if and only if consent is obtained.

10. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200410 The Functional Requirements Model D: Dependency A: Aim S: Service

11. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200411 The Trust Requirements Model O: Ownership T: Trust

12. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200412 The Trust Management Implementation 2 forms of Delegation: P: Permission (deleg. for use) G: delegation for Grant

13. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200413 Formalization (1) Predicates for the functional requirements model offers(a,s) aims(a,s) has(a,s) depends(a,b,s1,s2) Predicates for the trust requirements model owns(a,s) trust(a,b,s1,s2,n)n: trust depth Predicates for the trust management implementation fulfills(a,s) delGrant(idC,a,b,s1,s2,n)idC: certificate identify n: delegation depth permission(idC,a,b,s1,s2)

14. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200414 Formalization (2) A way to see depth is the number of re-delegation; depth 1 means that no re-delegation is allowed, depth N that N-1 further step are allowed

15. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200415 Axioms using Datalog

16. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200416Properties We use the DLV system for automatic verification of security requirements

17. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200417 Negative Authorization (1) We use a closed world policy: the lack of an authorization is interpreted as a negative authorization This approach has a major problem in the lack of a given authorization for a given actor does not prevent this user from receiving this authorization later on We propose an explicit negative authorization, namely an explicit denial for an actor to access a service Negative authorizations are stronger than positive authorizations Two predicates: –delDenial(idC,a,b,s,n) –prohibition(idC,a,b,s) and analougsly for positive authorization –delDChain(A,B,S) –prohibitionChain(A,C,S)

18. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200418 Negative Authorization (2) Axioms Properties

19. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200419 Trust Management Implementation We use the RT framework (by Li et al.), which provides policy language, semantics, deduction engine, and pragmatic features RT includes a declarative, logic-based semantic foundation based on Datalog, support for vocabulary agreement, strongly-typed credential and policies, and flexible delegation structures In RT, an entity is a uniquely identified individual or process An entity can issue credentials and make requests RT uses the notion of role to represent attributes –Entity.Role

20. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200420 Roles in the RT framework Only the entity A has the authority to A.R, and A does so by issuing role-definition credentials An entity A can define A.R to contain A.R1, another role defined by A –A.R  A.R1, means that A defines that R1 dominates R A credential A.R  B.R is a delegation from A to B of authority over R. This can be used to decentralize the user-role assignment. A credential of the form A.R  B.R1 can be used to define role-mapping across multiple organizations The credential A.R  A.R1.R2 states that: A.R contains any B.R2 if A.R1 contains B.

21. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200421 Moving to the RT framework permission(ID,A,B,S1,S2) –A.S1  B.S2 delGrant(ID,A,B,S1,S2,N) –A.S1  B.r.S2 where B allows to use the service S1 to actors in the role B.r

22. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200422 Example 1 A patient allows his clinician to read his personal/medical data to provide accurate medical treatment. permission(id,Pat,Cli,Rec,MedTre):- isClinicianOf(Pat,Cli)^owns(Pat,Rec) In RT: Pat.recordAc(read,?F:Pat.record)  Pat.clinician.provide(?E:medTre) Given Pat.record  Rec and Pat.clinician  Cli, one can conclude that Pat.recordAc(read,Rec)  Cli.provide(?E:medTre)

23. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200423 Example 2 The Medical Information System allows the clinician to write on his patient records to upgrade them. permission(id,MIS,Cli,Rec,upgrade(Rec)):- isClinicianOf(Pat,Cli)^owns(Pat,Rec) In RT MIS.recordAc(write,?F:Pat.record)  Pat.clinician.upgrade(?F:Pat.record) Given Pat.record  Rec and Pat.clinician  Cli, one can conclude that MIS.recordAc(write,Rec)  Cli.upgrade(Rec)

24. Giorgini P., EuroPKI 200424 Conclusion and future work We have introduced a process that integrates security and requirements engineering –A clear separation of trust and delegation relationship Our framework supports the automatic verification of security requirements We have defined the trust management implementation of our framework into the RT framework Future work –incorporating explicitly roles adding time features –integration with the Formal Tropos tool