International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED International Maritime Security Network, LLC. MTSA/ISPS Code CSO/VSO Course.

Please remember to: Put cell phones on vibrate If you need to leave, please do so quietly If you are tired please feel free to stand Help yourself to coffee and snacks at any time. Bathrooms and fire exits are:

Welcome Please tell us a little about yourself –Where are you from? –What part of the Maritime industry do you work in? –How long have you been working in this industry? What do you hope to get out of this course?

Course Overview Provide Knowledge required for both CSO (Company Security Officer) & VSO (Vessel Security Officer) to perform their duties in accordance with; Amendment to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 as amended and; IMO’s (International Maritime Organization) ISPS Code parts A & B Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and 33 CFR, Subchapter H—Maritime Security

Competencies to be achieved See Handout (1) –Company Security Officer –Vessel Security Officer

The FBI defines terrorism as “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

Maritime Terrorism “Any person or group, acting outside the jurisdiction of a sovereign state, for a political motive, who (i) executes or plots to execute an attack against a ship, port facility or offshore facility or (ii) attempts to further their political motives by utilizing elements in the maritime environment to execute an act of terrorism.”

Guerrilla Warfare Terrorism Revolutionaries Anarchists Freedom Fighters Defining Terrorism Purposeful targeting of Military personnel and installations in order to achieve a political goal Purposeful targeting of Civilians in order to achieve a political goal The differences between guerrilla warfare and terrorism

USS Cole on 12-Oct-00 was attacked by 2 suicide bombers. 17 Sailors where killed 39 Sailors where injured By Al Qaeda

The Seaborne Spirit 5 – Nov - 05

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) Muhammad Abu Abbas, Oct 7 th, 1985 four PLF militants seized the “Achille-lauro”. These terrorist killed Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly, wheelchair bound, Jewish man, and threatened to blow up the ship. All of this was in effort to negotiate the release of 50 Palestine prisoners.

The Tamil Tigers The most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka, founded in 1976. Uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil state. Began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and relies on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics.

The Tamil Tigers The world's largest unregistered navy with approximately 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka; about 3,000 to 6,000 form a trained cadre of fighters. The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Activities: Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion payments to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines.

The attack of the “Limburg” Happened 2002 in Yemen Attack was done by Al Qaeda Same type of attack as the Cole

F.A.R.C. Established in 1964 as a rural- based, pro-Soviet guerrilla army. Has been anti-United States since its inception. Located in Columba

Attacks of 9-11

Potential maritime targets Nuclear waste carriers LNG tankers Oil Tankers Cargo ships OSC Platforms

Maritime Transportation Threats Piracy and armed attacks Terrorism Contraband smuggling Stowaways and refugees Cargo theft Collateral damage

Piracy defined: Shipping robbery on the high seas, especially the stealing of a ship’s cargo Air the hijacking of an aircraft or another form of transportation transport robbery committed on board any form of transportation, especially an aircraft. Murder on the high seas

Piracy is worldwide

Straits of Malacca One of the worlds hot spots

The Straits of Gibraltar Morocco & Tangiers Piracy

Reporting Piracy The Regional Piracy Centre –Receives and distributes information –Collates and analyzes information and issues consolidated reporting to relevant bodies. –Gives guidance on what ship owners and ships operators can do to prevent/suppress acts of piracy –Assists owners and crews of ships that have been attacked –Locates vessels that have been seized by pirates and recovers stolen cargoes –Check out www.iccwbo.org

The Goals of a Terrorists Invoke fear and panic Gain attention both politically and spiritually Change the world to their religious beliefs Rid the world of opposing beliefs. To gain recognition for their cause

Terrorist Patterns Use military type of development and deployment: –Terrorist will pick a target to attack that they feel has a good chance of success –Reconnaissance of the planned target. –Funding and recruiting. –Planning and testing. –Execution and hopeful success.

Current Security Threats and Patterns Example: Osama Bin Laden & Al- Qaeda used U.S. training, U.S. people, U.S. equipment & fuel to kill thousands of people from all over he world. And as you can see, it worked well.

Intermodal; “Door to Door”

Most everything in your home came to your doorstep by way of ship.

Intermodal scenario Container is loaded in Taiwan It has your cargo and the cargo of 10 others inside of it. It is placed on a truck and sent to a port facility It is loaded into a ship Ship crosses ocean and lands in Long Beach, California, U.S.A. It is off loaded and placed in a holding area It is then either loaded onto a railcar or truck The truck takes the container to St. Louis MO. to a distribution center. It is opened and your cargo is placed onto another smaller truck or van. Smaller truck brings it right to your door. So many hands and still so EZ to slip something through the system

Ship and facility operations Discussion about various operations Your specific operation and the inherent vulnerabilities No one knows your operation better than you—use this knowledge to carefully evaluate threats and corrective actions to mitigate them

International conventions, codes, and recommendations United Nations (UN) –Located in New York International Maritime Organization (IMO) –Branch of the U.N. –Located in London –Giving oversight to SOLAS –Controlling safety and security of the high seas

International conventions, codes, and recommendations Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments –Chapter V Reg. 19 –Chapter XI Regs. 3&5 –Chapter XI-2 Regs. 1-13

Regulations & Codes The ISPS Code –Part A Sec 1 - 19 –Part B Guidance given for Part A –Example of how sections are laid out in both parts A & B Part A –1 > 1.2 > 1.2.5 –Key words to remember: “Should & Shall” are mandatory “May” remains may, not absolute

MTSA Regulations 33 CFR—Navigation and Navigable Waters Parts 101-106 Maritime Security –Part 101—General –Part 103--Area Maritime Security –Part104—Vessels –Part 105—Facilities –Part 106—Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Facilities

Definitions SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 1 ISPS Code A/2 and B/2 33 CFR § 101.105

Legal Implications Action/non-action by security personnel –33 CFR § 101.400-420 –ISPS Code A/4, 6 –SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Entering foreign jurisdictions Clear grounds

Legal Implications Law Enforcement –Vessel, Facility & OCS owners and operators must permit law enforcement personal, in the performance of official duties, who show proper ID to enter/board without delay or obstruction. –Upon boarding or entering, will as soon as possible explain their mission to the master, operator, owner or designated agent. –This is found in 33 CFR § 101.515(c)

Sensitive Security Information Definition—49 CFR § 1520 ISPS Code—Records Documents / Communications

Handling SSI outside U.S. The provisions in the plan relating to ISPC Code, section 9.4 sub. sec..2,.4,.5,.7,.15,.17 and.18 of this Part of the Code are considered as confidential information, and cannot be subject to inspection unless otherwise agreed by the Contracting Governments concerned. Please turn in your ISPS Code to 9.4 and 9.8.1

Security Responsibilities Contracting Governments Recognized Security Organizations The Company The Ship The Facility Vessel Security Officer Company Security Officer Facility Security Officer Vessel and Facility personnel with specific security duties All other personnel

Contracting Governments Specific Responsibilities –ISPS Code A/4, B/1.6-1.8, B/4 –SOLAS, Chapter XI-2, Reg. 3 –33 CFR, Part 101, 102 U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC) Area Maritime Security (AMS)

Recognized Security Organizations Specific Responsibilities –ISPS Code B/4.3-4.6 USCG is the RSO in U.S.—No other entities or companies designated at this time.

The Company The Company shall ensure that the VSP contains a clear statement emphasizing the master’s authority The Company shall designate a CSO and a VSO and ensure they are given the necessary support to fulfill their duties and responsibilities 33 CFR § 104.200-205

The Vessel The Vessel shall comply with the requirements of the VSP as per the security level set—ISPS Part A/7.1 Compliance documentation— 33 CFR § 104.120

The Facility The facility shall comply with the relevant requirements of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS and the ISPS Code—ISPS Code Part A/14.1 Compliance documentation— 33 CFR § 105.105-150 Security Requirements— 33 CFR § 105.200

Security Personnel Vessel Security Officer Company Security Officer Facility Security Officer Vessel personnel with specific security duties Facility personnel with specific security duties All other personnel

Vessel Security Assessment A written document that is based on the collection of background information and the completion and analysis of an on- scene survey—see 33 CFR § 104.305a,b, and c Essential & integral part of developing the Vessel Security Plan Must be carried out by person(s) with appropriate skills/knowledge as identified in 33 CFR § 104.300d

On-Scene Survey Vessel owner/operator must ensure that an on-scene survey is conducted for each vessel Verify and collect background information Examines and evaluates existing vessel protective measures, procedures, and operations

On-scene Survey –On Scene Survey Supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship’s stores; and Ensuring that vessel security communication, information, and equipment are readily available. Using the ship’s GA’s to do the OSS should be done to make sure that parts of the vessel have not been changed and door ways turned into bulk heads.

Analysis and recommendations Analyzing background information, the on-scene survey, and other requirements of this part to provide recommendations for the security measures the vessel should include in the VSP—see 33 CFR § 104.305c Threat analysis (documentation)

Threat Assessment Methodology Reference NVIC 10-02 (hand-out) Select a scenario Use the information that you have compiled in the 1 st phase of your assessment Things to consider: –Your type of vessel –Your cargo –Your crew –Your route

Threat Assessment Methodology The evolution of Assessment process

Table 1 scenario selections

Score consequence as it relates to your vessel Note the fact that the consequence score will not change. You need to look at the big picture and understand where your consequence truly scores. Explanation: –Impact of 9-11 –Lose of life –Ecological damage

Table 2

Table 3

Table 4

Computing the scores Go to table 5 work sheet First, plug in the Consequence score Then, add both of the Accessibility scores together Take the Consequence score and the total Accessibility score and run them through the Threat Matrix. Find out what vulnerabilities you have to Mitigate, Consider, or Document.

Table 5

Mitigation definitions Mitigate: Mitigation strategies, such as security protective measures and/or procedures, may be developed to reduce risk for that scenario. An appendix to the VSP may contain the scenario(s) evaluated, the results of the evaluation, a description of the mitigation measures evaluated, and the reason mitigation measures were or were not chosen.

Mitigation definitions Consider: The scenario should be considered and mitigation strategies should be developed on a case-by-case basis. The VSP may contain the scenario(s) evaluated, the results of the evaluation, and the reason mitigation measures were or were not chosen.

Mitigation definitions Document: The scenario may not need a mitigation measure at this time and therefore needs only to be documented. However, mitigation measures having little cost may still merit consideration. The security plan may contain the scenario evaluated and the results. This will be beneficial in further revisions of the VSP, to know if the underlying assumptions have changed since the last edition of the security assessment.

Security Assessment Documentation Use of Assessment checklists NVIC 10-02 VSA Report—see 33 CFR § 104.305(d)

Security Equipment Personal Identification (ID Badges) –Laminated or secured against tampering –Contain: Individual’s full 1 st name and last names with middle initial An accurate passport type photo that is current Bear the name of the issuing authority A government authority or organization The person’s employer, union or trade association must also be on the card Watermark

Security Equipment ID scanners

Security Equipment Key pad entries

Security Equipment Screening equipment Body Scanner Shoe scanner Hand Held Scanners Letter scanner

Security Equipment Use of dogs not only works, but is a good deterrent to the would-be attackers that might be doing reconnaissance

Security Equipment Adequate lighting is one of the best ways to put up the air of security. Remember that bad guys don’t like light Also a very good counter swimmer device.

Security Equipment Good fencing and gates

Security Equipment Waterside Perimeter security

Security Equipment

Testing, Calibration, and Maintenance It is the duty of the VSO to ensure that the security equipment is properly working, operated, tested, maintained, and calibrated Records of all maintenance, calibration and testing of security equipment See 33 CFR 104.235(b)(5) This record must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure These records must be keep for a minimum of 2 years and must be made available to the USCG upon request

Purpose of the VSP Address each vulnerability identified in the VSA (VSAR) Describe security measures for each MARSEC Level Each vessel must have a VSP approved by the USCG (MSC) See 33 CFR § 104.400

Contents of the VSP General Sections of VSP are listed in 33 CFR 104.405 Specific details of content that must be included in all Sections, is listed in 33 CFR 104, Subpart B, §§ 104.200-104.297, as applicable SSAS plan for SOLAS vessels

Confidentiality Issues The VSP must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure! The VSP shall be considered Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and must conform to the handling requirements identified in NVIC 10-04 Contents of VSP are generally not subject to inspection by Port State Control (SOLAS vessels—ISPS A/9.8.1)

Development of the VSP The CSO is responsible for ensuring that the VSP is prepared and submitted for approval Security measured identified in the VSP must be in place by the time the plan is audited by the USCG (local COTP)

Development of the VSP Discussion and Review Of VSP Development 33 CFR 104.405(b) 33 CFR 104.200-104.297

Approval of the VSP The VSP must be written in English and submitted to MSC for approval 3 Stages of Approval: –General compliance of all main Sections –Compliance with detailed requirements of all Sections –Congruent with area Port Security Plan and practical for nature of vessel See 33 CFR § 104.410

Implementation of the VSP Ensure ALL personnel receive appropriate training and regular drills and exercises Ensure coordination of security issues takes place between facilities and vessels Ensure security communications are readily available and that security systems and equipment are installed and maintained See 33 CFR § 104.200—additional issues

Maintenance and Amendment of the VSP Amendments to the VSP Records and Documentation Annual Audit reviews See 33 CFR § 104.415

Beretta 9mm 9mm, Semi, Magazine Fed, Recoil Operated

Colt 1911.45 Cal, Semi, Magazine Fed, Recoil Operated

MP 5 9 MM, Semi & Auto, Gas operated, Mag Fed,

M 4 Carbine 5.56 MM, Mag Fed, Gas Operated,

AK 47 7.62 MM, Semi and Auto, Mag Fed, Gas Operated

P 90 5.56 MM,

Russian “AK” design, assassin's Weapon

Note easy way it breaks down

RealAir Soft Can you tell the real one?

RealAir Soft

Can you tell the real one? RealAir Soft

Can you tell the real one? Air Soft Real

Can you tell the real one? Real Air Soft

ALL The right answer is that they are ALL real in the dark!

Ammunitions

Chemical Bomb Chemical bomb

IED’s

Mail bombs Suspicious Mail –Hard or ridged –Oily marks on the outside –The feel of wires –Lots of postage –Directed to a specific person

Methods of Physical Screening and Inspections

Implementation and Coordinating Searches Planning and practicing searches Check-card system Necessary equipment –flashlights and batteries; –screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars; –mirrors and probes; –gloves, hard hats, overalls and non-slip footwear; –plastic bags and envelopes for collection of evidence; –forms on which to record activities and discoveries

Implementation and Coordinating Searches Systematic search procedures –Search teams –Dividing rooms/spaces into sections –Focused attention and clearing areas Crew members and facility personnel should not be allowed to search their own areas in recognition of the possibility that they may have concealed packages or devices in their own work or personal areas Known areas for concealment –(See Handout)

Implementation and Coordinating Searches Room searching 2 man teams ALWAYS There is a system: from the center up 90 degrees and then up another 90 degrees At HQ keep track of clear areas

Characteristics and behavioral patterns The Secret Service believes that inquiry should focus on an individual’s behaviors and communications to determine if the individual appears to be planning or preparing for an attack. Behavior, body- language and communication are more effective indicators to measure an aggressor’s escalation.

Characteristics and behavioral patterns The U.S. Secret Service reports that the use of profiles, particularly racial or ethnic profiles, is not effective either for identifying individuals who may pose a risk for targeted violence or – once an individual has been identified – for assessing the risk that a particular individual may pose for targeted violence.

Characteristics and behavioral patterns Profiling: –Ethnic back ground –Religion –Dress –Actions –Accents –Beliefs –Political following

Characteristics and behavioral patterns Profiling: the facts –You cannot tell by any means who might be a terrorist –In the Maritime Security field any person coming onto your vessel could posse a threat –Visitors Check ID’s for fakes –Venders Don’t assume they have not been approached –Persons taking pictures of vessel or facility –Note that the U.S. 33-CFR doesn’t refer to non- discriminatory bases

Characteristics and behavioral patterns Security personnel should understand and react to persons exhibiting unsafe appearance or behavior. Cues to unsafe appearance: –Inappropriate clothing for weather –Conscious and unconscious “re-adjusting” of clothing –Suspicious “bulges” in clothing –Unconscious “checking” for weapon Suspicious persons/activities (hand-out)

Techniques Used to Circumvent Security Measures In 2005, Al-Qaida trained over 200 divers. These are 2 that where caught in the Philippines

Techniques Used to Circumvent Security Measures Disabling alarm systems Lock picking equipment Glass cutting equipment Wire / Bolt cutters Fake ID badges / uniforms CCTV disabling spray Computer hacking

Crowd Management & Control VSO’s, FSO’s and CSO’s may find themselves conducting crowd control in very difficult situations. They may discover that some groups will not accept them. They may have to impose order in their area of jurisdiction to protect employees, passengers and the general public. Moreover, they will be under intense media and political scrutiny. Enlightened command and control techniques help to make decision-making more effective in an emergent crowd control situation.

Crowd Management & Control Scenarios that may require Crowd Control –Sporting/Social Events –Demonstrations –Humanitarian/Environmental Protests –Loading/Unloading of passengers –Civil War/Unrest

Crowd Management & Control Contributing Factors –Alcohol –Drug Abuse –Fear –Hooliganism –Poor Administration/Management –Employee/Union Disputes

Crowd Management & Control Important questions are as follows: –Who are they? What is the overarching identity of the crowd? –What are their goals? –What is the composition of the crowd and are there any known factions? –What are they capable of doing? –What are their traditional behaviors or cultural repertoires? –When and where will they assemble? –Where will they go? –What are the possible targets of violence? –What is the worst case scenario? –When and where will they disperse? –Are there plans for subsequent gatherings?

Crowd Management & Control For vessels and facilities, planning must include: –Organizing emergency procedures –Optimizing the use of resources –Controlling the response to emergencies by identifying, prioritizing and controlling the most critical threats. –Controlling crew, passengers and other personnel during emergency situations –Establishing and maintaining effective communications

Crowd Management & Control Training programs should be designed by to train crewmembers and security personnel in: –Vessel layout and familiarization –Location of safety and emergency equipment –Location of emergency exits –Use of personal lifesaving appliances –Compliance of the ship’s safety and emergency procedures –Crowd management and communications during an emergency situation

Crowd Management & Control Control and Management –Inner, Intermediate, and outer cordons –Enforcing cordons Access Control measures Manned Checkpoints Natural/Physical barriers Tapes “funneling persons” –Monitoring/Communication Equipment –Signage

Security levels—required actions The Commandant of the USCG will set the MARSEC level consistent with the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)

Homeland Security Advisory System Maritime Security Level LOW MARSEC LEVEL 1 GUARDED ELEVATED HIGHMARSEC LEVEL 2 SEVEREMARSEC LEVEL 3

Security levels—required actions MARSEC Level 1 –The level for which minimum Appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained at all times MARSEC Level 2 –Means the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of time as result of heightened risk of a transportation security MARSEC Level 3 –Means the level for which further specific protective security measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a transportation security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.

Security levels—required actions If a higher MARSEC Level is set for the COTP zone in which the vessel is located or are about to enter, they will comply, without undue delay, with all measures specified in the VSP for compliance with that higher MARSEC Level; The COTP is notified as required by 33 CFR 101.300(c) when compliance with the higher MARSEC Level has been implemented; and For vessels in port that compliance with the higher MARSEC Level has taken place within 12 Hours of notification; and

Security levels—required actions For MARSEC Levels 2 and 3, the VSO will implement additional security measures and notify all personnel of the change in Security Level, identified threats, and emphasize reporting procedures and stress the need for increased vigilance; For MARSEC Level 3, the VSO will implement further additional security measures as directed in this Vessel Security Plan (pursuant to 33 CFR part 6, 160, or 165) or as directed by the COPT, such as arrangements to ensure that the vessel can be towed or moved if deemed necessary by the Coast Guard; Non-compliance issues must be reported immediately.

Security levels—additional issues Unless otherwise directed each port, vessel, and facility shall operate at MARSEC Level 1; The COTP may temporarily raise the MARSEC Level for the port, a specific marine operation within the port or a specific industry within the port when necessary to address exigent circumstances

Maintaining Security of the Vessel/Facility Interface Definition of Interface (33 CFR 101.105) Security Measures during interfaces effected by MARSEC Levels Coordination of duties between CSO, VSO, and FSO Review of VSP and FSP

Declaration of Security (DoS) Definition of Declaration of Security (33 CFR 101.105) Contracting governments determine when a DoS shall be completed –Determined by type of vessel and current MARSEC Level –Continuing DoS’s –COTP request at any time Master, VSO, or designated representative must complete it

Declaration of Security (DoS) May be requested by vessel when: –Vessel is at higher MARSEC Level; –Agreements between Contracting Government’s for certain vessels or voyages; –Security threat or incident –Interfacing facility is not required to have an approved FSP –Interfacing vessel is not required to have an approved VSP

Implementation of Security Measures Security Measures to be taken at all three MARSEC Levels –Performance of all vessel security duties –Access Control –Restricted Areas –Handling Cargo –Delivering vessel stores and bunkers –Monitoring and Communication –Additional measures for cruise ships, passenger vessels, and ferries

Implementation of Security Measures Putting it all into action—an ongoing process –Defined security duties and responsibilities –Training, Drills, and Exercises –Security Challenges –Regular communication of security procedures, threats, and concerns

Contingency Planning Contingency plans are based on any security incident the vessel may encounter and are guidelines for the VSO to follow. Each security incident will merit its own evaluation, and the procedures and measures used will be based on several factors that only the VSO can decide at the time of the security incident. Any such actions taken shall always consider the safety of the crew, passengers, and vessel as priority.

Contingency Planning Action to take in the event of a security incident –All vessel personnel are familiar with the various types of security incidents through security training provided by the company, to include the appropriate communication lines of reporting; –Any personnel having knowledge of or witnessing a security incident, of any degree, will immediately notify the VSO or Master with particulars; –The VSO will notify, without delay, the CSO, National Response Center (NRC) and the local COTP, and take instructions as are available for responding to a given security incident;

Contingency Planning Action to take in the event of a security incident (cont.) –The VSO will ensure communication lines are maintained with the above entities and any other agencies involved in responding to a security incident; Pilot House will immediately be secured; –The VSO will convene a meeting and brief personnel; –The VSO will sound alarms as appropriate, to include the SSAS, depending on the immediacy and severity of the incident. –Implement measures for various contingency plans, as appropriate; –Prepare to evacuate all personnel and visitors from the vessel.

Contingency Planning Emergency Contact Information for the following incidents: –Notification of suspicious activities, persons, or packages; –Notification of breaches of security; –Notification of transportation security incident (TSI) (See enclosed contact information)

Contingency Planning Hijacking Bomb Threat Unidentified objects / explosives on vessel, in baggage, stores, or persons Damage to / destruction of port facility Piracy and other hostile boarding Stowaways Searching vessel

Security Drills and Exercises Must test proficiency of vessel personal in assigned security duties at all MARSEC Levels. Implementation of security measures due to a raise in MARSEC Level can be listed as a drill if the report is sent to the COTP. Will enable the VSO to Identify any related security deficiencies that need to be addressed.

Security Drills and Exercises Drills –Must be conducted every 3 months, except when the vessel is out of service due to repairs. –Must be repeated when crew change is 25% or greater (within one week). –Must test individual elements of the VSP –Each drill must be recorded. –These reports will be reviewed by the USCG upon inspections, and must have the date, description of drill, participants, lessons learned which may improve the VSP.

Security Drills and Exercises Example of Drills –Screening (reactive or preventative) of the vessel, persons, baggage and vehicles –Unauthorized entry to restricted areas –Response to alarms –Communications –Notification to law enforcement authorities

Security Drills and Exercises Exercises –Conducted at least once each calendar year, with no more than 18 months between exercises Full scale or live; Tabletop simulation or seminar format; Combined with other appropriate exercises; or Combined with elements of the above mentioned exercises. –Vessel-specific or may be part of a cooperative exercise –Tests communication and notification procedures, and elements of coordination, resource availability, and response.

Security Drills and Exercises Exercises are a full test of the security program and include the substantial and active participation of relevant company and ship security personnel, and include facility security personnel and government authorities depending on the scope and the nature of the exercises. A vessel while along side or moored at a facility it may participate in the Facility’s scheduled drill.

Assessment of Security Drills and Exercises Assessments of drills and exercises helps to identify areas of proficiency as well as areas of weakness. Review lessons learned with personnel participating. Documentation

Third-Party Due Diligence VSP reviews and audits Hard Security testing Crew Trainings

Coordinating Drill / Exercises With Response Agencies Local COTP Bomb Squad Contracted security and local law enforcement Emergency medical Port facility

Mock Drill and Evaluation (Screening and Searching)

Security Challenges Access to the vessel Access within the vessel to Restricted Areas 3 rd party due diligence Helps minimize or eliminate fines or penalties for non-compliance

Documentation and Records The VSO must retain all necessary security records for at least two years and make them available to the Coast Guard upon request. These records may be kept in electronic format, and if so must be protected against unauthorized deletion, destruction, or amendment. Security-related records will also be kept and protected by the VSO from unauthorized access or disclosure.

Documentation and Records Security Records – see handout International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) – Held onboard and valid for 5 years Continuous Synopsis Record – SOLAS Chapter XI-1, Regulation 5

Reporting Security Incidents Notification of suspicious activities, persons, or packages Notification of breaches of security Notification of transportation security incident (TSI) NOTE: Callers to the NRC should be prepared to provide the following information: –Their own name and contact information; –The name and contact information of the suspicious or responsible party; –The location of the incident as specifically as possible; and –The description of the incident or activity involved.

Monitoring and Control Proper administration of the VSP by the VSO and CSO –Security Inspections and audits –Records and documentation –Amendments to plan

Security Audits and Inspections The CSO or VSO must ensure an audit of the VSP is performed annually, beginning no later than one year from the initial date of approval, and attach a letter to the VSP certifying that the VSP meets the applicable requirements.

Security Audits and Inspections Unless impracticable due to the size and nature of the company or vessel, personnel conducting internal audits of the security measures specified in the VSP or evaluating it’s implementation must: –Have knowledge of methods for conducting audits and inspections, and security, control, and monitoring techniques; –Not have regularly assigned security duties; –Be independent of any security measures being implemented.

Reporting Nonconformities Change in the company’s or vessel’s ownership or operator Modifications to the vessel, including but not limited to physical structure, emergency response procedures, security measures, or operations Require amendments of either the VSA or VSP must be submitted to the MSC for review and approval no later than 30 days after completion of the audit and a letter certifying that the amended VSP meets the applicable requirements.

Training Requirements Company Security Officer Vessel Security Officer Personnel with Security Duties All Other Personnel (33 CFR 104.210, 215, 220, 225)

Instructional Techniques I nstructional –The CSO & VSO must train persons with and with out security duties. –The method of teaching must take into account social / cultural background of trainees –It is important to explain, show, and review every topic that you teach to ensure the student fully understands Lecture / Slide Shows Handouts / Quiz’s Group Discussions

Instructional Techniques Practical / Hands-on –Scenario-based training and case studies –Build scenarios with your students. This will help keep them always thinking about security –Screening and Searching Vessels, Persons, Baggage and stores Buildings, rooms Other unique areas

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