1. Lessons Learned from Accident Investigation of Longer, Heavier Trains International Heavy Haul Association Jonathan Seymour, Board Member Transportation Safety Board of Canada Calgary, Alberta June 20, 2011

2. Outline TSB mandate Watchlist: Critical Safety Issues 2 Case Studies Other investigation findings Lessons learned Progress Looking ahead 2

3. About the TSB Mandate: To advance transportation safety in the air, marine, rail, and pipeline modes of transportation that are under federal jurisdiction by: conducting independent investigations identifying safety deficiencies identifying causes and contributing factors making recommendations publishing reports 3

4. Fishing vessel safety Emergency preparedness on ferries Passenger trains colliding with vehicles Operation of longer, heavier trains Risk of collisions on runways Controlled flight into terrain Landing accidents and runway overruns Safety Management Systems Data recorders WATCHLIST 4

5. Watchlist (cont’d) Nine Watchlist issues underpinned by:  41 recommendations  Many investigation findings “Inappropriate handling and marshalling can compromise the operation of longer, heavier trains.” 5

6. Why This Is An Issue Aerial photo of derailed cars, Cobourg. ON 6

7. Case Study #1: Brighton Eastbound Train  137 cars (11 845 tons, 8850 feet)  3 head-end locomotives  Over 50% cars – loads  Majority of loads marshalled on rear Territory  Undulating terrain  Multi-track – passenger and freight trains 7

8. Brighton: Train/Track Profile 8

9. Brighton: Findings Broken knuckle at 107 th car = emergency Rear collided with head-end portion Resultant in-train forces led to derailment Bail-off of independent brake did not reduce forces to a safe level Simulation: Different marshalling would have led to significantly reduced forces 9

10. Case Study #2: Drummondville Eastbound Train  105 cars (10 815 tons, 7006 feet)  5 head-end locomotives  50-car block of loaded grain cars on rear end  Broken knuckle at 75 th car Territory  Single track  Freight and passenger train operations daily 10

11. Drummondville: Train Profile 11

12. Drummondville Findings Marshalling was a factor Front portion was on ascending grade Rear portion was on relatively flat segment high buff forces from heavy rear marshalling plus late bail off of independent brake Simulation: Reverse marshalling would have meant minor buff forces. 12

13. Other Investigation Findings Inappropriate throttle, dynamic and automatic brake use Emergency braking initiated from head end only Non-alignment control couplers Long & Short car combinations Use of distributed power Technology can mitigate risks 13

14. Lessons Learned Size and tonnage not sole factors Key Lesson  Need to effectively manage in-train forces and how train interacts with track Systemic approach needed by operators 14

15. Progress by Industry Both major players taking action Computerized marshalling management systems Enhancement to train braking system Greater use of distributed power Enhanced training and job aids for locomotive engineers Growth in use of technology 15

16. Progress – Regulator Transport Canada:  Expressed support for TSB views  Sponsored research (Train separation on Kingston Subdivision)  Sponsored research (How to improve handling longer trains) 16

17. Progress: a TSB Perspective Many safety communications, including:  2004 Recommendation to TC  2007 Board Concern communicated  2010 TSB Watchlist 2011: Significant advances 17

18. What’s Next? Operators responsible for managing safety Regulators responsible for overseeing safety TSB will continue to:  monitor progress  investigate occurrences  publish our findings  make appropriate recommendations  advocate for necessary changes 18

19. Summary TSB Watchlist, concerns about LHT Key Lesson from Brighton, Drummondville  Need to effectively manage in-train forces and how train interacts with track Additional investigation findings Progress:  major players are taking action  TC supports our views TSB will monitor, report publically, advocate for change to address safety deficiencies 19

20. Questions? 20

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