1. The use of Force in Peace Keeping Operations Henri Boshoff Institute for Security Studies

2. 2 Scope Introduction Use of Force and the Protection of Civilians, the Case of DRC Lessons learned Mission and Force planning Mandate Rules of engagement Pre-deployment training Leadership Protection of civilians under imminent threat on the ground Conclusion

3. 3 Introduction Peacekeepers were in the past and continues accused of failing to use force to protect civilians under imminent threat. DRC, Darfur, Somalia and Afganistan This indicated that UN Peacekeeping must achieve greater clarity with respect to these key tasks and functions. The issue of the use of force and protection of civilians is a core function of peacekeeping and continues to be the subject of serious debate within the UN

4. Use of Force, the MONUC experience The UN Mission in DRC has been challenged at various occasions of not protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence MONUC was confronted with it at three occasions prior to 2005 to protect civilians –Kisangani 2002 –Bunia 2003 –Bukavu 2004 4

5. Continue After 2007 MONUC was under constant pressure to protect civilians in the Eastern DRC Ongoing conflict between FARDC/CNDP/FDLR/ LRA ect 5

6. Continue MONUC to MONUSCO New Mandate. –Chapter 7 (Use of Force –Protection of Civilians –Protection of the Mission New SRSG – Meece New Force Commander - Lieutenant General Chander Prakash 6

7. 7 Will somethings change Democratic Republic of Congo (25 August 2010) Ban sends top aide to Congo after mass rape UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sent a top official to Democratic Republic of Congo on Tuesday after a mass rape of women by rebels in the east that UN peacekeepers say they only heard about over a week later. The rebels from the Mai Mai militia and Rwandan Hutu FDLR, who occupied the town of Luvungi in North Kivu province from 30 July to 3 August, raped and assaulted at least 154 civilians, according to UN figures.

8. 8 Will somethings change Lindsey Hilsum blogs: UN peacekeepers 'failing' Sexual violence characterises the brutal confict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and UN peacekeepers are manifestly failing to stop it. Way out in the bush, about 50 miles from the jungle town of Walikale, 179 women were gang-raped allegedly by rebels of the FDLR, the remnants of the Hutu force which spearheaded the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. A UN peacekeepers' base is just 20 miles away, at Kibua, but they did not attempt to reach the scene until two days after the rebels had melted back into the jungle. What distinguishes this horrific attack from others is the large number of women raped, and the fact that many were assaulted by up to six men..

9. Lessons Learned Mission and Force planning In line with the Secretary-General’s decision, mission- planning processes need to be integrated. Any planning for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission should be based on an integrated strategic assessment led by DPKO. 9

10. Lessons Learned Mission and Force planning MONUC was and MONUSCO is currently a Integrated Mission and the Protection of Civilians is included in current mandate, planning and operations Protection Teams were established during the 2008 to 2009 violence in Eastern DRC Close coordination between humanitarian and military actors do exist 10

11. Mandate MONUCs mandate was very clear and MONUSCO’s mandate is very clear on PoC and is backed by a clear mandate to use force in terms of Chapter 7 The issue is on interpretation of certain phrases –“Where its units are deployed”, (use of reaction capabilities) – “imminent threat”, (clear guidelines to lowest level) –“without prejudice” (state still responsible) –“within capabilities” (Not to create expectations) Key to the successful implementation of the mandates. 11

12. Rules of Engagement MONUC’s Rules of engagement was in place Enough forces to be able to implement it TCCs to be willing to implement the ROEs 12

13. Rules of Engagement In case they do not accept the Mission ROE, which could significantly hamper the execution of tasks, and to command and control a UN force in volatile situations Leadership to guide commanders to implement 13

14. TCCs need to be prepared that they will operate in volatile situations. Training programme: –sexual gender based violence (SGBV), –addressing restrictions on freedom of movement (FOM), –use of force, –scenario training, – protection of civilians and integration 14 Pre–deployment Training

15. Leadership The lack of leadership explains a great deal of the lack of UN action to use force SRSGs and Force Commanders have substantial political and military power to be proactive and to effectively take action to use force to protect the mandate. 15

16. Leadership The concept of a divisional HQ was very successful in Eastern DRC. Guidance to the lowest level, made intent known 16

17. Protection of Civilians Practical Lessons –Conducts operations during dark hours, including conducting foot patrols talking to the local populations and long range multiple day patrols supported by military helicopters 17

18. Protection of Civilians Practical Lessons –Peacekeepers have a tendency to conduct patrols in APCs, they need to be more active on patrols by leaving their vehicles 18

19. –Units should be highly mobile in terms of organization and equipment. –They should have their own (assault) engineer capability, Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and a light airmobile reconnaissance unit with a sniper capability to reduce the risk of collateral damage. –There is also a pressing need to increase night vision capability. 19 Cont

20. Commanders at all levels must understand the principles that they are expected to take initiative and that they are responsible for their actions. Command and Control (C2) arrangements in a mission must be clearly articulated in mission specific SOPs. Clarification on C2 is needed with regard to the operational procedures for the use of military aircraft as they continue to operate under UN regulations for civilian aircraft. If not clarified, the procedures continue to hamper operations by seriously limiting the mobility of the troops as well as the timeliness of their deployment. 20 Cont

21. A Special Forces (SF) capability in missions to carry out special operations aimed at snatching notorious leaders and killers from their hideouts and rescuing UN personnel taken hostage. 21

22. Cont These are important specialized tasks and an added value to peacekeeping operations, SF is very limited in number and is not destined to replace infantry. Infantry remain the main force and therefore, should be prepared, able and willing to do robust peacekeeping. 22

23. Cont The concept of “Joint Protection Teams” that is used in MONUC proved to be very effective. The teams consist of military and civilian personnel preferably women, reach out to the local populations. 23

24. Cont The teams are a good confidence-building tool, increase trust between peacekeepers and the local population, increase knowledge of what is going on in the area. It also contributed to an enhanced coordination and cooperation between humanitarian and security agencies to implement the protection of civilians mandate. 24

25. The situation in MONUC has shown that protection of civilians is a core task of modern peacekeeping missions. This needs to be acknowledged by Member States, Troop and Police Contributors and peacekeepers in the field Clear guidance on the protection of civilians and is needed from the Secretariat and mission leadership in order to ensure effective mandate implementation on the ground. 25 Conclusion

26. TCCs must increase their willingness to use force when needed in order to ensure the protection of civilians. Strong leadership is crucial, the UN could improve its selection and training procedures in order to ensure that the key positions are filled with best people and proven ability to effectively work in a multinational environment 26 Cont

27. Thank You Questions?