1. PATRON-CLIENT POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN NEPAL By: Shiva Hari Adhikari

2. Acknowledgements  Government of Nepal  Nepal Administrative Staff College  Seoul National University  Prof. Dr. Kil Kon Ko

3. Patron-Client Relation  Establishes and promotes informal governance  Creates unauthorized transactions  Holds control over policy decision and implementation  Applies rules with partiality and some citizens get preferential treatment  Encourages favouritism, nepotism and corrupt practices  “Aafno manchhe” – one’s own people  “Chakari”- serving, offering or appeasing big man

4. Statement of the Problem  Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2011  Informal practices more prevalent  Corruption  Bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patronage  Dix, Hussmann, and Walton, 2012  Patronage system is apparent in society, economy and politics  Corruption However, both are  Silent on level of patronage  Influence of patronage in governance system

5. Literature Review  No unique understanding of patron-client relation  The form of patron-client relation may differ across regions and countries  Patron-client relation as interpersonal exchange and its negative consequences  Patron-client relation and its not-negative consequences  All levels of patronage are not equally harmful ( Dix, Hussmann, and Walton, 2012; and Johnston, 2010)  Patron-client cluster vs pyramid (Scott, 1972)  Formal and informal governance system (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002)

6. Framework: Deductive model for theory construction

7. Objectives  The general objective of this study is to analyze the patron-client relation prevailed in Nepal and its effect on governance system. The specific objectives are:  to assess the level of patronage related corruption in Nepal,  to seek the relationship among the patron-client related components, and  to evaluate the effect of patron-client relation in the governance system of Nepal.

8. Research Question/Hypothesis  R.Q.: What is the effect of patron-client relation in governance system?  Hypothesis 1: There is a difference in perceived level of corruption between public officials and students  Hypothesis 2: Higher the patrimonialism is, the more unfair the civil service will be  Hypothesis 3: Clientelism is positively correlated with corruption  Hypothesis 4: Patron-client relation worsens the governance

9. Methodology  Sample selection: NASC and TU  Research Design: descriptive, explanatory and mixed  Data collection period: 7 – 22 August 2014  Sample size: 106 (public officials), and 167 (students)  Peer review and pretest of questionnaire  Data collection: mixed (questionnaire and face-to-face interview {2 Students + 3 Public officials})  Data processing: 380 distributed, 324 returned (51 have quitted or incomplete), 273 fully complete and usable, 85% return rate, 72% response rate

10. Methodology: Summary of Variables (newly created) Type of Variable Newly Created Variable Number of Items Included Measurement Question Number Dependent Poor Governance5 Five response Likert Scale 211, 212, 324, 325 and 326 Corruption6 Five response Likert Scale 201, 202, 206, and 304 to 306 Unfair Civil Service Practice 3 Five response Likert Scale 301 to 303 Independent Patrimonialism 5 (but after factor analysis only 4) Five response Likert Scale 207 to 210, and 311 (311 is omitted) Clientelism7 Five response Likert Scale 203 to 205 and 307 to 310 Opaque Procurement 5 Five response Likert Scale 312 to 316 Pork Barrelling3 Five response Likert Scale 317 to 319 Rent Seeking Behaviour 4Five response Likert Scale 320 to 323

11. Methodology: Summary of Variables Type of Variable VariableQuestion TypeMeasurement Question Number Control Experience of bribery Yes/No questionNominal (Yes=1)406 Future intention of bribery Yes/No questionNominal (Yes=1)408 Family member government employee Yes/No questionNominal (Yes=1)611 Study groupYes/No question Nominal (Public officer=1) 601 Family member a politician Yes/No questionNominal (Yes=1)612 Political affiliation Yes/No questionNominal (Yes=1)613

12. Methodology  Data analysis:  Mixed (verbatim and uni-, bi-, and multi-variate analysis)  Inter-correlation and reliability test (Cronbach’s Alpha test)  Factor analysis  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (>0.5)  Check of the assumptions of the regression model

13. Findings Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis3Hypothesis3 Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 2: Supported as Beta value (0.261) is positive, and is significant (p <0.01, t = 5.143)

14. Summary and Conclusion  All the four types of patronage related corruption – Influence Market, Elite Cartel, Oligarch and Clan, and Official Mogul- apparent in society, politics and economy.  Low integrity of state institutions  Tax collection and land management offices are the most corrupt state institutions.  Low level of public trust  Students- the future leaders- less knowledgeable about corruption  Public officials- the executors- know less about their code of conduct

15. Summary and Conclusion  There are significant percentage of respondents who believe that patronage related corruption is tolerable.  About 45% respondents have experienced bribery.  About 72% think that service providers are corrupt.  About 18% have future intention of corruption  About 88% think that ‘chakari/aafno manchhe’ has helped in promoting corruption in Nepal.  All the hypotheses are significant (except POB variable)

16. Policy Implication  Collaborative action: public administration, government, market and civil society  Service providers: accountable, responsive and ethical.  Promotional action: level of awareness need to be raised on corruption related matters and issues  Preventive and punitive action: sharp detection mechanism, robust prosecution and recovery action should be needed for effective control.  Special mechanism need to be developed and act immediately to break the tie between patrons and their clients.

17. Limitation and Further Research  Respondents:  Public officials attending a training program at NASC during 7 to 22 August 2014 (relatively small in size n=106), however, diverse in working organizations and years of experience.  Students who have completed Bachelor’s degree, non probability techniques (snow-ball sampling), may lack representation, however, diverse in background and location.  Conflict of Interests: inherent problem of reporting and perceiving corruption, however, voluntary participation has helped in reducing response bias

18. Limitation and Further Research  Governance and Patron-client relation study demands more in-depth study- direct and indirect observation, KII, FGD-, study heavily relied on quantitative data and information, however, qualitative information was collected through face-to-face interview, and analysis has been made using verbatim reporting.  Further research should focus on country level analysis with targeting public officials of all region, I/NGO officials, politicians (local and national level), service receivers, private sector, business groups, elites, interest groups, civil society, and trade unions.

19. References  Brinkerhoff, D. W. and Goldsmith, A. A. (2002). Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming. Bethesda: U.S. Agency for International Development.  Dix, S., Hussmann, K. and Walton, G. (2012). Risks of Corruption to State Legitimacy and Stability in Fragile Situations, U4 Issue, No 3. U4 is a web based reserch centre: Chr. Michelsen Institute.  Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. (2011). Corruption and Anti-corruption in Nepal: Lessons Learned and Possible Future Initiatives. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.