1. Small Wars & Insurgencies Iain Spence UNE UNE The Ancient World

2. Aims—examineAims—examine  effects of small wars within a big one  effectiveness of dealing with insurgency  Peloponnesian War  effects of small wars within a big one  effectiveness of dealing with insurgency  Peloponnesian War

3. why ancient?  less complex  fewer emotions  human face/nature  more honest over motive (?)  less complex  fewer emotions  human face/nature  more honest over motive (?)

4. USMC SWM 1940 p. 1 … operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

5. USMC SWM 1940 p. 1 … operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

6. Peloponnesian War  431-421 & 413-404  Athens & allies (naval)  Sparta & allies (land)  431-421 & 413-404  Athens & allies (naval)  Sparta & allies (land)

7. Peloponnesian War  Athens = democracy  Athens = imperial power  Athens = democracy  Athens = imperial power

16. Thuc. 1.144 I could give you many other reasons why you should feel confident in ultimate victory, if only you will make up your minds not to add to the empire while the war is in progress, and not to go out of your way to involve yourselves in new perils. What I fear is not the enemy’s strategy but our own mistakes.

17. Thuc. 5.84 … had refused to join the Athenian empire like the other islanders, and at first had remained neutral without helping either side (i.e. in the Peloponnesian War); but afterwards, when the Athenians had brought force to bear on them by laying waste their land, they had become open enemies of Athens.

18. Thuc. 5.116 the Athenians … put to death all men of military age whom they took, and sold the women and children as slaves. Melos itself they took over for themselves, sending out later a colony of 500 men.

19. Thuc. 5.98 … will make enemies of all states which are at present neutral, when they see what is happening here and naturally conclude that in the course of time you will attack them too.

20. Thuc. 8.2 Those who had not been allied with either side thought that, even though they were not asked, they ought not keep out of the war any longer and should go against the Athenians of their own accord, since the Athenians, in the view of each state, would have gone against them, if they had been successful in Sicily …

21. ‘Small Wars’  can be distraction from main aim  problem predicting size  assess political and military risk  keep own population on side  can be distraction from main aim  problem predicting size  assess political and military risk  keep own population on side

22. InsurgenciesInsurgencies  no single proven method  keep own population on side  no single proven method  keep own population on side