1. LEAKAGE and TAMPER Resilient Random Access Machine (LTRAM) Pratyay Mukherjee Aarhus University Joint work with Sebastian Faust, Jesper Buus Nielsen and Daniele Venturi

2. Provable security breaks down! Because…. The ModelReality

3. Provable security breaks down! Because…. The ModelReality More seriously ! Side channel attacks: Leakage/ Tampering Blakcbox Our main focus

4. Models of Tampering Tamper “only memory” Tamper “whole computation”

5. Models of Tampering Tamper “only memory” Tamper “whole computation” In the beginning…. We are STRONGERrrr !!!

6. Models of Tampering Tamper “only memory” Tamper “whole computation” Existing results suffer from limitation e.g. can tamper upto 1/poly(n) A number of strong positive results e.g. split-state tampering …..after a few years…. [IPSW 06, ….., DK 14] [GLMMR 04, ……………………………..,DPW 10,…..] I have better RESULTS !!!

7. Our approach Can we protect against more Tampering with computation if we consider RAM ? Instead of Protect me !

8. Our Result: RAM + NMC => TRAM TRAM TCC 2014 Idea: Encode locations with NMC. Note: The computation is stored as a program.

9. In fact we can get LTRAM LTRAM Caveat: We assume tamper-proof CPU. But, the CPU is small and universal i.e. independent of the functionality.

10. Our LTRAM CPU Secret Disk-1 Secret Disk-2 Public disk