1. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
The Role of Global Nuclear Detection Architecture in the Defense of the Homeland
May 11, 2012
Baltimore-Washington Health Physics Society Annual Meeting
Kevin G. Hart
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army
Deputy Assistant Director, Analysis Division

2. The Department of Homeland Security
In response to the attacks of September 11, the Department of Homeland security was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
DHS was established to coordinate the implementation of a national strategy to protect the U.S homeland from terrorist attacks, and to consolidate all the executive branch elements related to homeland security under one agency.
DHS is responsible for:
Guarding Against Terrorism
Security of US Borders
Enforcing US Immigration Laws
Improving America’s Readiness for, Response to and Recovery from Disasters
Guarding Against Terrorism through: Stronger International and Domestic Partnerships; Securing our Transportation Infrastructure and Making Travel Safer, Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, Enhancing Cybersecurity
Security of US Borders (examples): Better Security through our Ports of Entry; The Southwest Border Violence Initiative
Enforcing US Immigration Laws: Targeting Criminal Aliens Who Pose a Threat to Public Safety; Worksite Enforcement; Partnerships with Local Law Enforcement; Facilitating Legal Immigration
Maturing and Unifying the Department: Consolidating Facilities; Streamlining Operations; Transparency and Reform 2 2

3. DNDO as Part of DHS SECRETARY DEPUTY SECRETARY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY ADVISOR
UNDER SECRETARY, MANAGEMENT
UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION & PROGRAMS
UNDER SECRETARY, POLICY
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
INSPECTOR GENERAL
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, HEALTH AFFAIRS
UNDER SECRETARY, INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS
DIRECTOR,
OPERATIONS COORDINATION & PLANNING
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN
OFFICER,
CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES
CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER
DIRECTOR, COUNTER-NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT
-- The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is one of 16 “components” of DHS. It’s current director is Warren M. Stern
-- DNDO comprises 130 Federal employees and many contractors that support technical and administrative functions within the office.
ASSISTANT SCRETARY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER
ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
COMMISSIONER,
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION
DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES
DIRECTOR,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
DIRECTOR,
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD 3 3 3

4. The Nuclear and Radiological Threat
“…it is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security, to our collective security.”
– President Obama (Nuclear Security Summit, April 13, 2010)
Types of threats:
Nuclear Weapon
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) – (also referred to as “Dirty Bomb”)
Radiation Exposure Device (RED)
HEU intercepted by Republic of Georgia in smuggling sting
During the Cold War, the threat of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union hung like a pall over the conscience of the world. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the threat of a war between the superpowers waned, but a new concern arose: the use of nuclear or radioactive materials by terrorist groups.
In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared that it was a “religious duty” of his followers to obtain and use a nuclear weapon against the United States;
Sketches found in Afghanistan by NATO forces are believed to provide evidence of Al Qaida’s interest in developing a nuclear device;
American-born Jose Padilla, was arrested at O’Hare airport upon return from a tour of several Middle Eastern countries, where he was accused of having trained for and plotted a radioactive dispersal device attack
Several attempts to sell highly enriched uranium have been intercepted in the last twenty years; some of the intercepts involved materials suspected to be from former Soviet nuclear facilities.
The types of threats now faced by the United States and its allies entail the use of nuclear and radioactive materials in the form of:
A nuclear weapon or improvised nuclear device, both of which would result in catastrophic loss of life and infrastructure. An improvised nuclear device is one that is fabricated by a non-state actor from stolen or illicitly purchased materials and parts, whereas the term “nuclear weapon” refers to a bomb manufactured and assembled by a country;
A radiological dispersal device, which would use conventional explosives to spread nuclear material that could kill or render property unusable;
Or a radiation exposure device, which does not involve an explosion, but instead is designed to expose people to radiation without their knowledge (like under a seat in a subway or restaurant).
Crude sketch of nuclear device found in Afghanistan
Jose Padilla – convicted of plotting dirty bomb attack
RDD response exercise in New York 4 4

5. DNDO’s Mission and Objectives
DNDO was established on April 15, 2005 with the signing of NSPD 43 / HSPD 14 for the purpose of improving the Nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.
Develop the global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA)
Develop, acquire, and support the domestic nuclear detection and reporting system
Detect – Employ instruments and improve training in order to increase detection probability and establish operational protocols to ensure detection leads to effective response
Coordinate – Ensure that stakeholders with GNDA functions minimize gaps and overlaps in roles and responsibilities and facilitate situational awareness through information sharing and analysis
Conduct a transformational research and development program
Provide centralized planning, integration, and advancement of USG nuclear forensics programs 5 5

6. DNDO: An Interagency Office
DNDO is an interagency office composed of detailees and liaisons from the departments of Energy, Defense, Justice, State, the FBI and NRC
Other DHS components such as the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Transportation Security Administration provide detailees to DNDO.
DNDO relies upon the national laboratories, academia, and private industry to conduct research that directly supports its mission.
DNDO maintains strong relationships with Federal, State, Tribal and local entities to facilitate capabilities development. 6 6

7. DNDO Directorate Structure
Office of the Director
Red Team & Net Assessments
Chief of Staff
Systems Engineering & Evaluation
Product Acquisition & Deployment
Transformational & Applied Research
Architecture & Plans Directorate
Operations Support
National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center 7 7

8. Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
In order to strengthen the Nation’s layered defense, DNDO analyzes the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, and then formulates recommendations and plans to strengthen the architecture with stakeholder collaboration and cooperation.
The GNDA is a worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and personnel, with the supporting information exchanges, programs, and protocols that serve to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials that are out of regulatory control.
The term “out of regulatory control” refers to materials that are being imported, possessed, stored, transported, developed, or used without authorization by the appropriate regulatory authority, either inadvertently or deliberately.
Substantial risk reduction is the aim 8 8

9. Key Architecture and Plans Directorate Functions
Stakeholder Coordination of the GNDA
Comprehensive Capability Based Assessment of GNDA
Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Risk Analysis
GNDA Strategic Plan and Annual Review
Increase Detection Capabilities in Key Mission Areas
- Maritime - Aviation - Land Border - Interior
Develop Integrated Capability Developmental Plans and Solutions
- Solution Development Process (SDP)
APD focuses on Stage 0 through Stage 2a and ensures stakeholder requirements are met 9

10. GNDA Operational View-110 10

11. Development of an Adaptable Architecture
Problems associated with a static architecture
Cost
It is cost prohibitive to deploy enough detection capability across all nodes of the GNDA to a sufficient level to ensure a high probability of success
Technology
Limited in detection range due to physics, therefore with a static architecture threats must pass very close to assets
100% static architecture would have a negative impact on commerce
Fixed Assets
Much of the emphasis has been on the creation of a static architecture, and fixed assets cannot be redeployed in support of intelligence driven events
The Solution is the development of a flexible and adaptable architecture
Balanced Approach
Leveraging the existing static architecture to develop new capabilities with the capacity to surge based on intelligence
Technology
Uses advanced technologies on mobile platforms in order to increase the probability of encounter
Capabilities that conduct primary and secondary screening concurrently are critical
Focus on high risk nodes
Much of the emphasis on the creation of a static architecture has been on commercial/high traffic nodes. Re-locatable assets can be deployed in non-commercial high risk nodes based on intelligence, or used randomly to deter potential adversaries. 11

12. DNDO Commercial First Initiative
The rapid development of technology and innovation, along with constrained budgets and market forces has shifted DNDO focus from government development of material solutions to a “Commercial First” approach.
Intent of the approach will focus on determining best value solutions by utilizing modeling tools and verification and validation (V&V) of data and performance.
Approach does not eliminate need for government oversight and partnership.
Facilitates continuous feedback during the entire acquisition process between industry and user’s/stakeholders to refine requirements.
There is a potential that DHS may procure systems from vendors who successfully demonstrate that their systems/products meet the requirements.
DHS may establish Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA).
- Top Picture: RPM and SRPM in action
- Second picture: Campaign to test effectiveness of vessel to vessel detection on Dolphin at sea.
- Third picture: IGA (international general aviation) test campaign search of RN materials on general aviation aircraft.
Fourth picture. GA SETCP ASP-C Field Assessment
- The first bullet describes pilots. Development of an integrated pilot program that supports technical and operational assessments resulting in transition of new and improved operational capabilities for preventative rad/nuc detection.
Provide meaningful assessments of operational utility through a robust evaluation of campaigns/events in support of pilot programs.
Pilots Operating Guidelines – Decision to adopt by Department in process
DNDO Systems engineering is supporting the standards community.
- Setting of guidelines for standards. Of key importance to determine if equipment to be purchased can actually meet a minimum threshold for detection of RN materials but also will not fall apart in the field.
- Harmonization of standards is crucially important. The IAEA and the EU support the IEC standards. The US supports the ANSI standards. DNDO is a leading advocate to ensure that the two sets of standards are consistent with each other.
- Finally, the consensus standards may be consistent with the minimum threshold that a system should achieve. The technical capability standards is designed to establish detection and identification threshold against more difficult sources. 12 12

13. Maritime Mission Area Program Elements
Develop and deploy radiation detection equipment to the Nation’s seaports to scan arriving cargo
Develop and deploy radiation detection equipment to the U.S. Coast Guard to support boarding team inspections
Work with State and local partners to enhance radiation detection capabilities of current maritime law enforcement operations
Partners:
USCG, CBP, TSA, state and local, DOE, DoD
Example Activities:
West Coast Maritime Pilot
USCG Joint Acquisition Strategy
Small Vessel Stand-off Detection
Challenges:
Almost 32,000 seagoing containers arrive and are off loaded at United States seaports each day
Nearly 13 million registered U.S. recreational vessels, 282,000 fishing vessels, and 100,000 other commercial small vessels 13 13

14. Aviation Mission Area Program Elements
Deploy radiation detection equipment to scan all arriving private international general aviation flights
Pilot radiation detection solutions to scan passengers and baggage
Characterize airport-of-entry operations and enhance air cargo scanning
Partners
TSA, CBP, state and local
Example Activities
International General Aviation
Computed Tomography/Advanced Technology Scanning Evaluation
Air Port-of-Entry Deployments
Challenges:
Approximately 2 million passengers and 1.8 million pieces of checked baggage arrive on commercial aircraft every day
Approximately 200,000 general aviation aircraft and 19,000 landing facilities in the United States
Air cargo remains a challenge 14

15. Land Border Mission Area
Program Elements
Deploy radiation detection equipment to the Nation’s ports of entry to scan arriving cargo containers and vehicles
Develop and deploy radiation detection solutions between ports of entry along our borders
Partners
CBP, state and local
Example Activities
Study to Identify Potential Improvements in Maintaining Portal Monitors
International Rail
Study to Improve Probability of Encounter
Challenges:
Approximately 6,500 miles of border with Canada and Mexico
Over 1.1 million citizens legally cross the Northern and Southern borders every day
Over 12,000 trucks cross the Southern Border daily
Portal Monitor Sustainment Study – looking at how to more cost-effectively support the currently deployed RPMs at the fixed POEs (both land border and sea ports).
Probability of Encounter Study – looking at how to improve the detector coverage along the borders, in regions away from fixed POEs. Includes a look at the deterrence effects of increased deployments or improved technologies. 15 15

16. Domestic Interior Mission Area
Program Elements
Work with federal, state, and local law enforcement and emergency responders to expand domestic preventive radiation/nuclear detection capabilities
Provide operational support such as training, exercises, and technical reach-back
Partners
States and locals, TSA, FEMA, DOE, DoD, FBI, NRC
Example Activities
NIMS Resource Typing
Long Range Radiation Detection
Training and Exercise Support to Stakeholders
Challenges:
Over 87,000 local governments across 50 states
More than 800,000 State and local law enforcement officers spread over nearly 18,000 agencies 16 16

17. Next and Future Generation Technology
Product
Area
Current
Next Generation
Advanced Technology Demonstration
Exploratory Research
Non-Intrusive Inspection
(Radiography and Active Interrogation)
VACIS, single-energy x-ray, backscatter x-ray
Improved radiography
Automated detection of high-Z
Active systems for detection of shielded threats (SNAR)
Passive, automated detection of shielded SNM
Large standoff interrogation for SNM detection
Portal Monitors
PVT
Advanced Portal Technology (NaI and HPGe)
Imaging techniques – better signal (SORDS ATD)
Increased PD and range, decreased FAR
Improved materials- higher resolution, larger, lower cost
Detection “at speed,” virtual tagging of vehicles
Hand-Held Detectors
GR-135, Identifinder, Detective, others
HPRDS
Hand-helds and backpacks, lighter HPGe
Directional high-resolution spectroscopic handheld (IPRL)
Intelligent networked sensor systems (IRSS)
Improved materials – room temperature sensors approaching HPGe, improved electronics, solid state neutron sensors
Pocket Systems
Radiation pagers
Future commercial-off-the-shelf systems 17 17

18. DNDO Transformational R&D Program
Aggressive and expedited R&D programs that seek to develop break-through technologies that will have a dramatic positive impact on capabilities to detect nuclear threats.
Exploratory Research Program
Investigate promising concepts to show feasibility through laboratory Proof-of-Concept demonstrations
Advanced Technology Demonstration
Characterize Performance Test Units in a simulated operational environment to assess technology transition potential
Academic Research Initiative
Create next generation of scientists and engineers
Small Business Innovative Research
Strengthen the role of innovative small business concerns with federally-funded research and development
TlBr Semiconductor
Cs2LiYCl6 (CLYC)
Scintillator
SORDS Detector and Truck
SNAR Test Unit 18 18 18

19. DNDO R&D Program Progression
Technology Readiness Level (TRL)
Nuclear Detection Architecture Challenges
N/A
Feasibility Evaluation
TRL 1-3
Exploratory Research Project
Proof of Concept (POC)
TRL 3-4
Advanced Technology Demonstration
Performance Test Unit (PTU)
TRL 5-6
Prototype
TRL 7
Engineering Development Model (EDM)
TRL 7
Limited Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
TRL 8
Full Rate Production (FRP)
TRL 9 19 19 19

20. Product Acquisition & Deployment
Engineering development, production, developmental logistics, procurement, and deployment of current and next generation nuclear detection systems.
Radiation Portal Monitor Program
Joint Analysis Center Collaborative Information System
Ortec Microdevice: Human-Portable Radiation Detection Systems*
On Dock Rail
Joint Analysis Collaborative Info System (JACCIS) designs, develops, and implements an IT Service-Oriented Architecture construct for the Joint Analysis Center to provide situational awareness of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and ensure that detection leads to an appropriate response.
Human-Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS) focused on lightweight handheld devices for deliberate monitoring in Small Area Searches and Secondary Screening. Capabilities include radioisotope identification, localization, characterization, and communication to computer or satellite phone.
Radiation Portal Monitor Program and the Polyvinyl Toluene Improvement Improvement Program:
Deploys radiation detection systems at the nation’s land, sea, and air ports of entry. RPMs are passive, safe, and effective means to scan traffic and cargo entering the U.S. for nuclear and radioactive materials, while maintaining the efficient flow of commerce. The PVT Improvement Program is committed to extending the life of these systems via software and hardware upgrades.
Fixed Site Detection System (FSDS) Program develops and deploys a capability to detect and identify nuclear-threat-carrying vehicles approaching bridges and tunnels leading into New York City.
On-Dock Rail Program develops and deploys a capability to detect and identify nuclear threat materials in commercial cargo containers entering on ships and leaving by rail with acceptable impact to flow of commerce and manpower burdens. Develops both primary and secondary scan CONOPS.
Advanced Cargo Imaging (ACI) Program acquires Commercial-Off-The-Shelf equipment and demonstrates non-intrusive inspection technology for ports of departure and ports of entry that addresses the challenge of detecting special nuclear materials masked by shielding in cargo.
Algorithm Development improves overall mission performance of algorithms employed in Rad/Nuc detection and reporting systems. The current effort focuses on developing, deploying and maintaining the DHSIsotopeID Reach-back Analysis Tool, which enables field agents to quickly and easily engage on-call scientific experts in the identification of isotopes that cannot be identified on location.
Neutron Detector Replacement Project focused on the qualifying near-term technologies as suitable to replace 3He for Neutron Detection Modules (NDM) in Radiation Portal Monitoring Systems (RPMS).
International Rail (IRAIL) develops a solution to detect and identify illicit R/N materials entering the United States via freight rail cargo at railroad crossings. The solution will consider both materiel and non-materiel components and deploying capabilities in the United States, as well as, Canada and Mexico as part of the solution.
Human Portable Tripwire (HPT) develops small, wearable systems that provide a passive monitoring capability to increase the likelihood of detecting radiological and nuclear material through constant, non-deliberate rad/nuc scans. It may also be integrated with other equipment already worn by law enforcement officers. HPT will build on lessons learned from the Intelligent Personal Radiation Locator (IPRL) Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD).
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS) Procurements COTS procurements support multiple users and programs within DNDO, CBP, USCG, and TSA designed to detect and report nuclear and radiological threats. Has supported West Coast Marine Pilot ; joint strategies between DNDO and USCG and DNDO and CBP; and TSA’s Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams. This effort is gradually being replaced or reduced by the procurement and deployment of more advanced handheld systems as they become available through other DNDO acquisition programs.
Radseeker: Human-Portable Radiation Detection Systems*
Programs not pictured:
International Rail (IRail)
Human Portable Tripwire (HPT)
Neutron Detection Replacement Program 20
* PADD also procures a variety of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) systems deployed by users

21. Systems Engineering & Evaluation
Operational Analysis and Systems Engineering Support
Work with federal, state, and local stakeholders to evaluate the feasibility and performance of new or emerging capabilities in an operational environment
Provide systems engineering support for DNDO Solution Development Process throughout the systems engineering life cycle
Lead development, in coordination National Institute of Standards and Technology, of Technical Capability Standards for radiological/nuclear detection equipment.
- Top Picture: RPM and SRPM in action
- Second picture: Campaign to test effectiveness of vessel to vessel detection on Dolphin at sea.
- Third picture: IGA (international general aviation) test campaign search of RN materials on general aviation aircraft.
Fourth picture. GA SETCP ASP-C Field Assessment
- The first bullet describes pilots. Development of an integrated pilot program that supports technical and operational assessments resulting in transition of new and improved operational capabilities for preventative rad/nuc detection.
Provide meaningful assessments of operational utility through a robust evaluation of campaigns/events in support of pilot programs.
Pilots Operating Guidelines – Decision to adopt by Department in process
DNDO Systems engineering is supporting the standards community.
- Setting of guidelines for standards. Of key importance to determine if equipment to be purchased can actually meet a minimum threshold for detection of RN materials but also will not fall apart in the field.
- Harmonization of standards is crucially important. The IAEA and the EU support the IEC standards. The US supports the ANSI standards. DNDO is a leading advocate to ensure that the two sets of standards are consistent with each other.
- Finally, the consensus standards may be consistent with the minimum threshold that a system should achieve. The technical capability standards is designed to establish detection and identification threshold against more difficult sources. 21 21

22. Recent and On-Going Test Campaigns and Pilots
On-Dock Rail Program
(Straddle Portal Prototype)
Dolphin Test Campaign
(Boat Mounted Systems)
Eland Test Campaign
(Mobile Systems)
Alternative Neutron Detection Systems
On-Dock Rail Program
(Radiation Detection Straddle Carrier)
Gryphon Test Campaign
(Aerial Mounted Systems)
ITRAP+10 22

23. Systems Engineering & Evaluation
Test and Evaluation Support
Conduct test & evaluation campaigns.
Establish and maintain T&E infrastructure of facilities, equipment, processes and personnel.
Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, located at the Nevada National Security Site.
Rail Test Center located at the Port of Tacoma, Washington
GRaDER® Program
- Top Right Picture: Paxbag Test in Las Vegas. Example of a test large campaign where classes of equipment are tested in scenarios to determine use and effectiveness in the field. Results from this effort were used in the field during the conduct of the paxbag pilots at airport of entries at Seattle (SEATAC) and Charlotte.
- Second picture on right is example of ELAND. Test campaign to test effectiveness of mobile detection systems.
- Third picture on right is a picture of RNCTec were numerous test campaigns have been performed. It’s located at NNSS.
- Fourth picture. Picture taken at the RTC. This was a data collection for HPRDs development.
Principal purpose of the T&E division is to test and evaluate equipment.
- Characterization studies of the equipment to establish the response of the system as a function of source strength, type, placement etc.
- Scenario tests that are designed to mimic the operational environment and inform possible uses of the equipment.
- Test against standards. Use the very specific requirements detailed in the standards to determine if a piece of equipment or a category of equipment meets or even can meet the standards.
- Rapid testing. T&E support rapid testing which is a short duration test to answer a very specific question. The He3 replacement campaign is a good example of a quick turn-around to determine if other sensors types can be used to effectively detect neutrons in the field.
- Tests can be small in magnitude such as the He-3 replacement to very large such as dolphin which involved the simultaneous movement of 8 vessels at sea with rad sources . To do this T&E has established an infrastructure and identified experts to design, conduct and analyze the results from theses tests. RNCTec is a facility at the NNSS where complex tests against all sort of sources can be conducted.
The rail test center is more of a virtual laboratory. It is a mobile capability that is based out of the port of Tacoma (WA). The virtual laboratory can be located anywhere on the Port to perform measurements. To date, it has directly supported the spreader bar tests, and HPRDS. The on-dock rail solution will also be tested at RTC.
GRaDERSM is a capability that is being developed to help determine which instruments meet standards. An agreement has been reached with FEMA whereby equipment to be purchased with grant money should be on the GRaDER database. It’s a fee for service program where manufacturer will pay accredited laboratories to conduct testing. These labs are ORNL, PNNL and SRNL.
While testing can be conducted with standard sources, it is important to realize that testing in operational situations requires use of specific sources. Also, in order to avoid manufacturers gaming the tests, the source list and configuration does need to be modified regularly. T&E is managing development and procurement of a test source program. 23 23

24. Coordinate the implementation of the domestic portion of the GNDA
Operations Support
Coordinate the implementation of the domestic portion of the GNDA
Securing the Cities
Training, Exercise and Assistance
Federal Capabilities Integration
State and Local Capabilities Integration
Training and Exercise Assistance
Joint Analysis Center
GNDA Situational Awareness
Information Sharing and Analysis
The Mission of the Operations Support Directorate is clear, and is supported by its Vision to “Prevent domestic radiological nuclear terrorism by having integrated, sustainable PRND capabilities throughout the U.S.”
To do so, the Directorate is organized into three distinct areas. The Capabilities Development Division is focused on partnering with Federal, State, local and Tribal entities to develop PRND capabilities across the United States.
Once these capabilities are initiated, the Training, Exercise and Sustainment organization assists Federal, State, local and Tribal agencies develop PRND training programs, facilitates a variety of training venues for law enforcement and public safety professionals, conducts exercises of these new PRND capabilities, and assists the partners to self-sustain these capabilities.
The Joint Analysis Center assists Federal, State, local and Tribal agencies by providing a suite of PRND products and services. These include resolving radiation detection alarms, providing intelligence assessments on events or threats, and reference materials. The JAC also routinely monitors rad/nuc activities and events and shares information to develop situational awareness of the domestic rad/nuc environment. 24 24

25. Operations Support Securing the Cities Training, Exercise & Assistance
New York City Region is first to participate
Future Urban Area Security Initiative Tier 1 regions to be selected
Training, Exercise & Assistance
Federal programs
TSA Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams
Mobile Detection Deployment Program
State and Local Programs
Program Assistance
State and Local Stakeholders Working Group and Executive Steering Council
Radiological/Nuclear Challenge
Training and Exercise
Training course development and quality assurance
Exercise design, development, and standards
JAC
GNDA situational awareness
Information analysis and information sharing
Here is a current view of key initiatives and programs that the Operations Support Directorate is engaged in. Each contributes to developing and sustaining Preventative Radiological and Nuclear Detection capabilities domestically and throughout the Nation. 25 25 25 25

26. Red Team and Net Assessments (RTNA)
Independently assess the operational performance of planned and deployed capabilities.
Conduct adversarial-based assessments from an outside perspective without "inside" information of current or planned capabilities
Use overt and covert tests to intentionally introduce radioactive sources against known defenses to assess the performance of fielded technology, training, and protocols.
Assess the effectiveness of concepts of operation, protocols, training, technologies, communications, and technical support for nuclear detection programs and capabilities
Build models that integrate lessons learned from operations intelligence estimates, expert elicitation, and workshops to determine the effect of implemented capabilities on adversary decision making.
Red Team talking points:
The RT assesses deployed PRND systems. Not just the technology but also the effectiveness of training and existing procedures. As RT Covert Tests are conducted without the knowledge of the frontline operators, they provide owners of detection systems a unique look at how their equipment and personnel perform in a live environment. Adversary-based red teaming is conducted from an enemy’s perspective.
Net Assessments talking points:
Current Net Assessments: West Coast Maritime Pilot, Pax/Bag Pilot Program, TSA VIPR Training and Pilot  Program and Vehicle-based Detection Capabilities Assessment.
Future Net Assessments: STC Data Documentation and Evaluation, and Capabilities Development Initiative 26 26

27. National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center
NTNFC has three primary mission areas
Operational Readiness:
Provide centralized planning and integration of USG nuclear forensics programs and activities through interagency working groups, joint exercises, assessments, and foundational document development.
Interagency Stewardship and Coordination
Pre-Det Materials Capability Development
Technology Advancement:
Advance the Nation’s capability to rapidly, accurately, and credibly identify the origin and history of interdicted radioactive/nuclear materials.
Operational
Readiness
Technology
Advancement
Restoration and maintenance of scientific expertise
Expertise
Development
-Technical Nuclear Forensics is the collection, analysis and evaluation of pre-detonation (intact) and post- detonation (exploded) radiological or nuclear (RN) materials, devices, and debris, as well as the immediate effects created by a nuclear detonation. TNF interprets signatures to identify the type of material, how the material was produced, and linkages to other samples, data, and processes.
TNF is one of three pillars that support attribution. Attribution, in turn, supports deterrence, prevention, and prosecution efforts and informs national decision making and formulation and implementation of appropriate responses.
TNF does NOT equal attribution, but rather feeds into it: The fusion of TNF results with law enforcement investigation and intelligence information may help to identify those responsible for the planned or actual attack.
NTNFC has three primary mission areas:
Operational Readiness:
Serves as the national-level “program integrator:” centralized planning, assessments and reviews, exercising, advocacy, and stewardship.
Leads the development, coordination, and review of foundational planning documents that establish interagency-agreed-upon strategic goals, objectives, processes, plans, and operational procedures for the USG NTNF mission.
Ensures integration of USG NTNF program and facilitates consistent coordination through chairing and participating in various interagency working groups (Nuclear Forensics Executive Council, NTNF Steering Committee, NTNF Communications WG, Collections WG, R&D WG, etc).
Serves as the USG coordinator of technical nuclear forensics exercises; participates in exercise planning and execution, and tracks corrective actions and lessons learned.
Advances international nuclear forensics collaboration through the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism NF Working Group, Nuclear Security Summit, and other forums. These efforts facilitate the development of a TNF lexicon, national nuclear forensics libraries, investigative best practices, and international materials forensics exercises.
Technology Advancement:
- Serves as the USG capability developer for the pre-detonation materials mission through its Technology Advancement portfolio: Develops capabilities to perform rad/nuc materials forensic analysis and evaluation (e.g. isotopic and chemical composition and physical structure,); develops materials reference standards, new signatures, and validated methodologies for analysis of rad/nuc materials; and performs R&D to address gaps and shortfalls in the capabilities.
Expertise Development:
- As mandated in the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act, NTNFC is leading a joint effort (with DOE, DoD, and others) to restore the expertise pipeline and provide a stable foundation to cultivate and maintain a highly qualified TNF workforce; goal is to fill specific gaps within the nuclear forensics field – focus on cutting-edge research and development related to nuclear forensics – a crucial national security priority for the United States.
Leads the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program (NNFEDP), interagency effort to maintain a vibrant and enduring academic pathway from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in TNF-related specialties.
- Includes undergraduate outreach, scholarships, and summer school; Graduate fellowships, internships, and mentoring; Post-doctorate fellowships at national labs; Junior faculty awards at universities; University education awards.
Leads the Expertise Development Committee under the NNFEDP: guides interagency nuclear forensics expertise development planning and assesses expertise development initiatives, and workforce needs and trends. The committee also serves as a selection board for graduate fellowship, junior faculty, and university awards.
Expertise Development:
Provide scholarships, fellowships, internships, post- graduate, and university awards for studies and research in specialties relevant to nuclear forensics.

28. Summary
DNDO is supporting the development and deployment a global nuclear detection and nuclear forensics capabilities to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism
DNDO has coordinated USG identification of critical vulnerabilities in the existing architecture
Maintains an aggressive research development and system acquisition process to address these vulnerabilities
Has conducted several test series as well as red teaming operations to evaluate the effectiveness of nuclear detection technologies and deployed systems.
Provides on-going operational support to Federal, State, Tribal, and local mission partners
Provides centralized planning, stewardship, and integration of USG R/N forensics activities
Developing advanced pre-detonation R/N forensics capability and recreating an enduring technical nuclear forensics workforce 28 28