1. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 FM 3-24 Principles, Imperatives, and Foundations of COIN 1

2. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 FM 3-24 Overview Manual provides principles & guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Manual designed to fill a 20 year doctrine gap. FM 3-24 Foreword “A counterinsurgency campaign is a mix of offensive, defensive and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operation”. – Chapter 1 – Insurgency and Counterinsurgency – Chapter 2 – Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities – Chapter 3 – Intelligence in Counterinsurgency – Chapter 4 – Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations – Chapter 5 – Executing Counterinsurgency – Chapter 6 – Developing Host-Nation Security Forces – Chapter 7 – Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency – Chapter 8 – Sustainment 2

3. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Historical Principles of COIN How is COIN different? 3

4. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 1. Legitimacy is the Main Objective 2. You Must Understand the Environment 3. Unity of Effort is Essential 4. Intelligence Drives Operations 5. Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment 6. Political Factors are Primary 7. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential 8. Insurgents Must be Separated from Their Cause and Support Historical Principles for COIN FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-20 4

5. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 1. Legitimacy is the Main Objective Historical Principles for COIN FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-21 5

6. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 2. You Must Understand the Environment Historical Principles for COIN FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-22 6

7. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 3. Unity of Effort is Essential Historical Principles for COIN FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-22 7

8. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 4. Intelligence Drives Operations Historical Principles for COIN FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-23 U.S. Air Force photo by SSgt. Jason Robertson 8

9. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 5. Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment Historical Principles for COIN FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-24 9

10. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Historical Principles for COIN FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-22 10 6. Political factors are Primary

11. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 7. Security Under Rule of Law is Essential Historical Principles for COIN FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-23 11

12. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 8. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support Historical Principles for COIN FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-23 12

13. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Imperatives of COIN Operations 13

14. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 COIN Imperatives 1.Manage Information & Expectations 2.Use the Appropriate Level of Force 3.Learn and Adapt 4.Empower the Lowest levels 5.Support the host nation FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-24 14

15. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 COIN Imperatives 1.Manage Information & Expectations FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-24 15

16. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 COIN Imperatives 2. Use the Appropriate Level of Force FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-25 16

17. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 COIN Imperatives 3. Learn and Adapt FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-26 17

18. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 COIN Imperatives 4. Empower the Lowest Levels Strategic Corporal Strategic Private FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-26 18

19. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes of COIN Operations 19

20. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes of COIN Operations 1.Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be 2.Sometimes, The More Force Is Used, The Less Effective It Is 3.The More Successful The Counterinsurgency Is, The Less Force Can Be Used And The More Risk Must Be Accepted 4.Sometimes Doing Nothing Is The Best Reaction 5.Some Of The Best Weapons For Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot 6.The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better Than Us Doing It Well 7.If A Tactic Works This Week, It Might Not Work Next Week: If It Works In This Province, It Might Not Work In The Next 8.Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing 9.Many Important Decisions Are Not Made By Generals FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-26 20

21. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes 1.Sometimes, the more you protect your forces, the less secure you may be FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 27 21

22. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes 2. Sometimes, The More Force Is Used, The Less Effective It Is FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-27 22

23. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Myth: Reality However, Force is NOT necessarily counterproductive if : – You kill the RIGHT people – There is a purpose to it that the people can understand – Your information engagement campaign is consistent with the action – You use appropriate force for the situation – It creates security as part of a nested plan 23

24. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes 3. The More Successful Counterinsurgency Is, The Less Force Can Be Used And The More Risk Must Be Accepted FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-27 24

25. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes 4. Sometimes Doing Nothing Is The Best Reaction FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-27 25

26. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes 5. Some Of The Best Weapons For Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot FM 3-24, Chap, pg 1-27 26

27. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes 6. The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better Than Us Doing It Well FM 3-24, Chap, pg 1-27 U.S. Air Force photo by TSgt. Jeremy T. Lock 27

28. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.” T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles”, The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917 Remember Article 15 28

29. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-28 7. If A Tactic Works This Week, It Might Not Work Next Week: If It Works In This Province, It Might Not Work In The Next 29

30. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes 8. Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-28 COL Harry Summers told a North Vietnamese counterpart in 1975 that, “You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield,” to which the reply was, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.” 30

31. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes 9. Many Important Decisions Are Not Made By Generals FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-28 “On a recent afternoon, he … checked on refurbished water pumps for farmers and approved money to connect the pumping station … there were soccer uniforms to be dropped off for a community team, heated disputes to resolve, an influential sheik to visit. "It is purely my fight in my area of operation," [CPT] Gilbert said.” - NYT 3/21/08 31

32. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 What Doesn’t Work? Unsuccessful COIN Practices Overemphasize killing and capturing the enemy rather than securing and engaging the populace. Conduct large-scale operations as the norm. Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection. Focus special forces primarily on raiding. Place low priority on assigning quality advisors to host nation forces. Build and train host-nation security forces in the U.S. military's image. Ignore peacetime government processes, including legal procedures. Allow open borders, airspace, and coastlines. FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-29 32

33. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 What Works? Successful COIN Practices Emphasize intelligence. Focus on population, its needs and security. Establish and expand secure areas. Isolate insurgents from the population. Conduct effective, pervasive and continuous information operations. Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government. Place host-nation police in the lead with military support as soon as the security situation permits. FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-29 33

34. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 What Works? Successful COIN Practices Expand and diversify the host-nation police force. Train military forces to conduct COIN operations. Embed quality advisors and special forces with host-nation forces Deny sanctuary to insurgents. Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing. Secure host-nation borders. Protect key infrastructure. FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-29 34

35. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Questions? 35

36. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 FM 3-24 Practical Exercise Task: Understand/Familiarize with FM 3-24 Conditions: Given 1h, FM 3-24 – 5 Breakout Sections – designated by cadre – Section 1: Chapter 2 – Section 2: Chapter 5, pp. 5-1 to 5-17 – Section 3: Chapter 5, pp. 5-18 to 5-31 – Section 4: Chapter 7 – Section 5: Appendix A Standard: 3 min brief back of key points to groups beginning 1600 36

37. US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 10 FEB 09 Paradoxes Sometimes, The More Force Is Used, The Less Effective It Is …. BUT …. FM 3-24, Chap 1, pg 1-27 37