1. 1 Safety Culture: Management Strategies Anticipating & Preventing Harassment & Retaliation in the Work Place Professionally prepared presentation materials ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde

2. 2 Presented By: Billie Pirner Garde, Esq. Clifford & Garde Washington, D.C. June 2007 Authoritative insights and perspective ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde

3. Course Objectives  Understand an employee’s right to express concerns about compliance with state or federal rules, regulations and requirements, the environment, public health and safety, or work place safety;  Understand every manager’s responsibilities to maintain an environment in which employees will raise concerns without fear of harassment or retaliation; Clearly outlined course objectives ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde

4. 4 What is Safety Culture and Why is it Important? Methodical & straightforward organization ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde

5. 5 Safety Culture is the critical barrier that protects workers, the public, and the environment from the inherent risks or dangers in the organizations’ work or product. Clear definitions of essential concepts ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde

6. Challenger - 1986 “Obviously A Major Malfunction” Compelling examples to underscore importance of topic ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde

7. Learning From Disasters “In most disasters there was obvious prior warning of what could occur but management failed to act. Of course, with the benefit of hindsight we are amazed that management failed to act.” “In most disasters there was obvious prior warning of what could occur but management failed to act. Of course, with the benefit of hindsight we are amazed that management failed to act.” Lecture 40.3 Learning From Disasters. Safety Line Institute. Summaries of lessons learned from other incidents …

8. ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde Lessons Not Learned In neither [the Challenger or Columbia] impending crisis did management recognize how [organization] structure and hierarchy can silence employees, and take appropriate mitigating actions, such as polling participants, soliciting dissenting opinions, or bringing in outsiders who might have a different perspective or useful information, to overcome the organizational constraints. - Columbia Accident Investigation Board … And of lessons NOT learned Columbia, February 2003

9. Davis-Besse 2002 Incident Davis-Besse incident was the result of a lack of safety culture. Industry-specific examples … ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde

10. Refocusing Efforts on Safety Culture The discovery of the reactor head degradation at Davis-Besse provided new insights that the effective management of safety culture at nuclear plants could still prove elusive. This event served as a call to action for both the nuclear industry, the regulatory agencies, and the U.S. Congress. … And key takeaway messages

11. ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde Climb the Safety Culture Ladder Generative Proactive Calculative Reactive Pathological “Safety is how we do our business – it’s who we are” “We work on the problems that we still find” “We have systems in place to manage all hazards” “Safety is important – we do a lot every time we have an accident” “Who cares as long as we don’t caught” Internally Driven Process Driven Externally Driven A restless passion for continuous improvement Safety seen as a profit center Striving for new ideas and innovation The lawyers said it was OK Of course we have incidents – it’s a dangerous business Yep, did my safety observations Punish the person who had the accident Safety is high on the agenda after an incident Obsessive focus on the classification of incidents Why don’t they do as told? We’ve got a process Lots and lots of statistics Leaders and safety teams chasing statistics Resources available to fix things before an event Management is open-minded, but still strongly focused on process Workforce ownership of process Reference: International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (www.ogp.org.uk) Building a case for improvement

12. ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde How are you going to achieve culture change?  Operational Management System (OMS);  Safety Culture and Leadership;  Process Safety Management;  Technical Authority and review;  Employee involvement;  Establishing Expectations Call to action — and specific steps involved

13. ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde The “At Will” Doctrine  The master can fire the servant for any reason at all, whether that reason is fair, unfair, a good reason, a bad reason, or for no reason whatsoever;  Likewise, the servant can quit at any time for any reason or no reason at all. Clear explanations of basic legal concepts involved The Law

14. ABRIDGED PRESENTATION — FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY © 2009, Clifford & Garde The Ultimate Concern Has the incident caused a “chilling effect” in the organization? Congress recognized the need to protect the free flow of information from employees to the government: “…this complete freedom is necessary to prevent the [agency’s] channels of information from being dried up by employer intimidation....” NLRB v. Scrivener, U.S. Supreme Court Bottom-line summaries of key points

15. 15 Good Afternoon and GOOD LUCK !