Intelligence Oversight for JFHQ-KS

Intelligence Oversight for JFHQ-KS
KS-J2 Intelligence Oversight Monitors LTC Charles Harriman (785) Maj John Lane (785) MAJ Nathan Bukowski (785)

Elements of a Good Program
Agenda Purpose History References Procedures Special Focus Areas Elements of a Good Program We will discuss the topics listed here.

Purpose To ensure the legality and propriety of all intelligence and intelligence-related activities Special emphasis on the protection of the Constitutional and privacy rights of US persons The purpose of the intelligence oversight program is to ensure the legality and propriety of all intelligence and intelligence-related activity, with an emphasis on protecting the privacy, civil liberties and Constitutional rights of US persons. A key consideration is ensuring that US persons information is properly collected, processed, retained and disseminated.

History Executive Order 12333
Provides clear guidelines on how to perform intelligence activities consistent with the legal rights guaranteed to all US persons by the Constitution. The Intelligence Oversight program is the result of abuses by DoD intelligence units collecting domestic intelligence on US persons during the Civil Rights movement and anti-Vietnam demonstrations of the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, President Reagan signed Executive Order in EO provides clear guidelines on how to perform intelligence activities consistent with the legal rights guaranteed to all US persons by the Constitution.

References DoD R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, 7 Dec 82 EO 12333, AR 20-1/AFI , AR 1-201, CNGBI , CNGBM Army Army Regulation , US Army Intelligence Activities, 3 May 2012 Air Force Air Force Instruction , Oversight of Intelligence Activities, 23 Apr 2012 Kansas KSNG SOP , Intelligence Oversight, 6 Dec 2009 (Update in work) Kansas National Guard IO Checklist, 1 Oct 2013 MAC LOI #2, IO Executive Order is implemented in the Department of Defense by DoD R, in the Army by Army Regulation , and in the Air Force by Air Force instruction All are currently under revision. The National Guard Bureau is also in the process of writing a National Guard regulation to implement it in the National Guard. Most states also have Standard Operating Procedures for intelligence oversight. All provide specific rules and limitations governing the COLLECTION, RETENTION and DISSEMINATION of US persons information.

DoD 5240.1-R Procedures PROCEDURE 1 General Provisions
PROCEDURE 2 Collection of Information about U.S Persons PROCEDURE 3 Retention of Information about U.S. Persons PROCEDURE 4 Dissemination of Information about U.S. Persons PROCEDURE 5 Electronic Surveillance in the United States for Intelligence Purposes PROCEDURE 6 Concealed Monitoring PROCEDURE 7 Physical Searches PROCEDURE 8 Searches and Examination of Mail PROCEDURE 9 Physical Surveillance PROCEDURE 10 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations PROCEDURE 11 Contracting for Goods and Services PROCEDURE 12 Provision of Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities PROCEDURE 13 Experimentation on Human Subjects for Intelligence Purposes PROCEDURE 14 Employee Conduct PROCEDURE 15 Identifying, Investigating, and Reporting Questionable Activities DoD R contains 15 procedures that govern intelligence and intelligence-related activity. By regulation, all personnel assigned to intelligence components must be familiar with the intelligence oversight rules in Procedures 1 through 4, 14 and 15. We’ll briefly discuss each of these, as well as Procedure 12 in today’s training.

Procedure 1 General Provisions: states the applicability of the regulation and the general principles governing intelligence and intelligence-related activities Procedure 1 states the applicability of the regulation and the general principles governing intelligence activities.

Procedure 1 IO applies to:
all personnel assigned to DoD Intelligence Components regardless of MOS/AFSC Military, civilian, contractors all personnel performing an intelligence or intelligence- related function regardless of MOS/AFSC Intelligence Oversight applies to all personnel assigned to DoD intelligence components, to include military personnel, civilians and contractors, as well as all personnel performing an intelligence or intelligence-related function regardless of military specialty (AFSC or MOS). It applies to all personnel with an intelligence MOS or AFSC regardless of assignment.

Procedure 1 Intelligence components must:
Not infringe on US persons’ Constitutional rights Protect privacy rights of US persons Collect, retain, and disseminate information based on a lawfully assigned mission and function Employ the least intrusive lawful techniques Comply with all regulatory requirements Intelligence components must not infringe on US persons’ Constitutional rights. They must protect privacy rights of US persons. All collection, retention and dissemination by an intelligence component must be based on a lawfully assigned mission and function. Intelligence components must employ the least intrusive lawful collection techniques and must comply with all regulatory requirements. DoD R specifically forbids intelligence components from participating in special activities unless approved by the President, Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Army or Air Force; from requesting any other parties to perform an act which is forbidden to the intelligence component; and from assassination.

What is a US Person? A US person is defined as:
- A US citizen born in the United States - A permanent resident alien in the US - A US corporation (except those directed or controlled by foreign governments) - An unincorporated association composed substantially of US citizens or permanent resident aliens We just threw out a lot of terms, so let’s take a few moments to define them. First and foremost, what is a US Person? US persons are defined as US citizens born in the United States, permanent resident aliens in the US, US corporations (except those directed or controlled by foreign governments), and unincorporated associations composed substantially of US citizens or permanent resident aliens.

What is a US Person? Assumptions:
- A person known to be in the US is presumed to be a US Person - A foreign national known to be in the US is presumed not to be a US Person - A person known to be outside of the US, is presumed not to be a US Person There are several assumptions intelligence components can make if the status of a person or corporation is unknown. First, if the person or corporation is known to be in the United States, is presumed to be a US person. Second, a foreign national known to be in the United States is presumed not to be a US Person. And third, a person or corporation known to be outside of the US is presumed not to be a US Person.

Applicability Title 10 and Title 32
Intelligence Component: subject to Intelligence Oversight rules Non-intelligence Personnel: subject to DoDD , Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense State Active Duty All personnel subject to state law, to include privacy laws Now that we have defined who or what a US person is, it is important to understand that there are two distinct groups of people who collect US persons information in the homeland. The first are Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components and the second are everyone else in the DoD. All National Guard personnel regardless of military specialty (MOS or AFSC) conducting intelligence or intelligence-related activities in Title 32 and Title 10 statuses are considered intelligence personnel subject to intelligence oversight rules. Everyone else, known as non-intelligence personnel, to include force protection, security forces and military police personnel, are subject to a different set of rules governed by DoD Directive (DoDD) All personnel are subject to state laws, to include privacy laws, in state active duty status. In most states, the collection, use, maintenance, and dissemination of information related to individuals by state agencies is strictly regulated; therefore, the practical effect is that even in a SAD status, NG intelligence component members cannot collect US persons information. Additionally, SAD personnel are prohibited from using DoD intelligence resources and equipment, to include SIPRNet and JWICS, while in a SAD status. NG personnel in a SAD status are not authorized to engage in DoD intelligence operations nor are they authorized to access DoD classified systems or equipment for a SAD mission without authorization from NGB/J2. Therefore, the incident commander must direct his need for information or intelligence to the right component—the component with the capability and authority to achieve his intent.

Forbidden Activities Participating in special collection activities without President, Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Army or Air Force approval Planning or carrying out assassinations Requesting any other parties perform an act which is forbidden to the intelligence component DoD R specifically forbids intelligence components from participating in special activities unless approved by the President, Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Army or Air Force; from requesting any other parties to perform an act which is forbidden to the intelligence component; and from assassination.

Procedure 2 Collection Specifies the kinds of information about US persons that may be collected and sets forth the general criteria governing the means used to collect such information Moving on Procedure 2, it specifies the kinds of information about US persons that may be collected, and sets forth the general criteria governing the means used to collect such information.

Collecting or Receiving?
Information is considered collected when: Received for use by an employee of an intelligence component in course of his/her official duties AND Affirmative action is taken that shows intent to use or retain that information * Informal files will not be kept to bypass this procedure Receiving: Intelligence personnel may receive information from anyone, anytime to determine its intelligence value and whether it can be collected, retained or disseminated Information is considered collected only when it has been received in the course of official duties by an employee of a National Guard intelligence component and is permanently retained for intelligence purposes; or is temporarily retained for intelligence use. US persons’ identifying information is permanently retained whenever an employee of a National Guard intelligence component takes an action that demonstrates intent to use the information, such as producing an intelligence information or incident report or adding the information to an intelligence database. Data acquired by electronic means (e.g., signals traffic analysis, telemetry, or measurement and signals intelligence) is collected only when is has been processed from digital form into a form intelligible to a human. Information downloaded or copied from the Internet and placed into an intelligence database or other data storing medium is deemed to have been collected. National Guard intelligence personnel may receive information from anyone, anytime in order to determine its intelligence value and to determine whether or not it can be collected, retained of disseminated.

Incidentally Collected Information
US Persons Information Retain and/or disseminate if you have legal authority to do so If not, redact or purge Criminal Intelligence Pass to appropriate law enforcement agency Evidence of criminal acts may be incidentally collected during an authorized mission using DoD intelligence component capabilities. In this circumstance, the data can be forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement agency (LEA); however, altering the course of an airborne sensor, such as a UAV, from an approved collection track to loiter over suspected criminal activities would no longer be incidental collection.

Collection of US Persons Information
Mission and Authority Necessity Approved Category of Information Least Intrusive Means National Guard intelligence components may collect US persons information if they have the mission and authority to do so, if it is necessary to do so, if it falls within an approved category of information, and if it done by the least intrusive means. Let’s run through each of these.

Intelligence Oversight Process Special Collection Techniques?
Mission (AR , Ch 1-5.d.): There must be a link between the U.S. person information to be collected and the element’s assigned mission and function. State J2 Missions (JFHQ-State Implementation Guidance (Draft) dated 01 AUG 2011, Ch 2): Monitoring worldwide threat trends, events, and enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) Support to NG troops deployed in support of State Partnership Program (SPP) missions Monitor threats to the homeland Evaluate terrorist TTPs Identify vulnerabilities to key infrastructure which might be targeted by terrorist groups Monitor for Indications and Warnings of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) weapons Lead and manage intelligence process during Domestic Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions U.S. Persons (AR , Glossary, Section II): A U.S. citizen An alien known by the intelligence component to be a permanent resident alien A corporation incorporated in the U.S. that is not directed or controlled by a foreign government A corporation incorporated abroad is NOT a U.S. person even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated in the U.S. Presumptions (AR , Ch 1-8.): A person or organization outside the United States is presumed not to be a U.S. person, unless the intelligence component obtains specific information to the contrary. An alien in the United States is presumed not to be a U.S. person, unless the intelligence component obtains specific information to the contrary. Mission and Authority? YES U.S. Person? Authorized Category? START Necessary? YES YES Authorized Categories (AR , Ch 2-2.): Consensual Publicly Available Foreign Intelligence Counterintelligence Potential sources of assistance Protecting intelligence sources and methods Physical Security Personnel Security Communications Security Narcotics Threats to Safety Overhead reconnaissance Administrative Purposes NO STOP NO NO NO YES STOP STOP GO Necessity (NGB-J2) Can you disregard the information or substitute the words “U.S. Person” and still complete the mission? Least Intrusive Means? YES NO “Necessity” and “U.S. Person” may need switched in the traditional order of operations (IF it is U.S. Person information, THEN necessity should be determined) Additional Approval? Special Collection Techniques? GO YES YES YES NO NO Revise Continuum of Intrusiveness (AR , Ch 2-3.): Publicly Available or with Consent From Cooperating Sources Lawful means not requiring a Warrant or Attorney General approval Lawful means requiring a Warrant or Attorney General approval Additional Approval Authority is dependent on the Special Technique employed. It may include (AR Ch. 5 thru 11&13): DCS G-2 MACOM Commander Commander, 650th MI Group US Attorney General Supreme Allied Commander Europe Army G-2X Secretary (or Under Secretary) of the Army SECDEF or Deputy SECDEF Special Techniques (AR Ch. 5 thru 11&13): Electronic Surveillance Concealed Monitoring Physical Searches Mail Searches and Examination Physical Surveillance Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Contracting for Goods and Services Experimentation on Human Subjects for Intelligence Purposes STOP GO Blue Text = Most applicable to State J2 Missions

Authority and Mission Mission (AR , Ch 1-5.d.): There must be a link between the U.S. person information to be collected and the element’s assigned mission and function. State J2 Missions (JFHQ-State Implementation Guidance (Draft) dated 01 AUG 2011, Ch 2): Monitoring worldwide threat trends, events, and enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) Support to NG troops deployed in support of State Partnership Program (SPP) missions Monitor threats to the homeland Evaluate terrorist TTPs Identify vulnerabilities to key infrastructure which might be targeted by terrorist groups Monitor for Indications and Warnings of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) weapons Lead and manage intelligence process during Domestic Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions The mission of the Joint Force Headquarters is to provide protection and response for your state. Your specific unit mission can be found in a variety of sources, to include those listed here. PLAN

Is it Necessary? Required to complete the National Guard’s mission?
Does the activity specifically support the CCIRs and PIRs? Is it necessary to make a decision or to determine a course of action? Can you disregard the information or substitute the words “U.S. Person” and still complete the mission? In order to determine whether or not the collection of US persons information necessary, ask yourself some of the questions depicted here.

DoD 5240.1-R Authorized Categories
Collection of Information about US Persons Information obtained with consent Publicly available information Foreign intelligence Counterintelligence Potential sources of assistance to intelligence activities Protection of intelligence sources and methods Physical security Personnel security Communications security Narcotics Threats to safety Overhead reconnaissance Administrative information When we say the information must fall within one of the approved categories, we mean the 13 categories authorized by Procedure 2 of DoD R , listed here.

DoD 5200.27 Authorized Categories
Protection of DoD Functions and Property Personnel Security Operations Related to Civil Disturbance IAW DoD , DoD Non-Intelligence Components are authorized to gather information essential to the accomplishment of the following defense missions: - Protection of DoD Functions and Property Personnel Security Operations Related to Civil Disturbance

Methods of Collection Methods of collection should be from the least to the most intrusive means: Collect first from publicly available sources or with US person’s consent Collect from cooperating sources Lawful means which do not require a warrant Lawful means which do require a warrant Least intrusive Means Least intrusive methods for JFHQ-State J2s include: monitoring open sources and intelligence reporting, and coordination with the intelligence or law enforcement communities. Most intrusive Means

Procedure 3 Retention Governs the kinds of information about US persons that may knowingly be retained by a DoD intelligence component without the consent of the person about whom the information concerns The term “retention” refers to data that can be retrieved by reference to the person’s name or other identifying data, such as their social security number. Procedure 3 governs the kinds of information about US persons that may knowingly be retained by a DoD intelligence component without the consent of the person about whom the information concerns. The term “retention” refers to data that can be retrieved by reference to the person’s name or other identifying data, such as their social security number.

What Information May be Retained
Information collected IAW Procedure 2 or collected incidentally but could have been collected IAW Procedure 2 Information necessary to accomplish assigned mission and function Temporary retention (up to 90 days) to determine if information is eligible for retention or in order to transmit the information to another agency with primary jurisdiction Information to be retained must have been legally collected and must be necessary to your assigned mission and function. The 90 days is an exception to determine not an exception to retain. So if it is determined that the information should not be retained, it should be purged, destroyed, or provided to the appropriate agencies immediately.

Access and Retention Information must have controlled access and limited to need-to-know Retained files must be reviewed annually; all unnecessary information will be destroyed Does NOT apply when information is retained for administrative purposes or is required by law to be maintained Shown here are some other considerations pertaining to access and retention of US persons information.

Procedure 4 Dissemination
Governs the kinds of information about US persons that may be disseminated without their consent outside of the DoD intelligence component that collected the information Moving on to the next procedure, Procedure 4 governs the kinds of information about US persons that may be disseminated without the US persons’ consent outside of the DoD intelligence component that collected the information.

Dissemination of US Persons Information
Must have been lawfully collected under Procedure 2 Recipient must be reasonably believed to have a need to receive information for a lawful governmental function and be a: DoD employee or contractor Federal, state or local law enforcement entity Agency within the intelligence community Agency of the federal government Information provided to a foreign government pursuant to an agreement or other understanding US persons information must have been legally collected and can only be released to those with a need to know listed here.

Procedure 12 Provision of Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities
Describes types of permissible assistance to law enforcement authorities and sets forth procedures for providing this assistance. Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities For investigating or preventing Clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers International narcotics activities International terrorist activities Protecting DoD employees, information, property, and facilities Preventing, detecting, or investigating other violations of law Procedure 12 describes types of permissible assistance to law enforcement authorities and sets forth procedures for providing this assistance. National Guard intelligence components are authorized to cooperate with LEAs for the purposes of: investigating or preventing clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, international narcotics activities, or international terrorist activities; protecting DoD employees, information, property, and facilities; or preventing, detecting, or investigating other violations of law.

Permissible Types of Assistance
Incidentally acquired information believed to indicate a violation of federal, state, tribal, or local law Personnel or specialized equipment and facilities may be provided to Federal law enforcement authorities Lives are endangered Consistent with DoDD , DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials Approved by NGB/J2 and the NGB/JA Procedure 12 Memorandum Shown here are the types of permissible assistance National Guard intelligence components may provide to law enforcement authorities. They may pass on incidentally acquired information reasonably believed to indicate a violation of federal, state, tribal or local law. NG intelligence component personnel or specialized equipment and facilities may be provided to Federal law enforcement authorities, and, when lives are endangered, to State and local law enforcement authorities, provided such assistance is consistent with DODD , has been approved by NGB/J2, and that the NGB/JA concurs with such use. Approval is sought through a Procedure 12 Memorandum.

Procedure 14 Employee Conduct
Sets forth the responsibilities of employees of DoD intelligence components to conduct themselves IAW applicable executive orders, laws, regulations/instructions and other applicable policy National Guard intelligence components must: Conduct intelligence activities IAW all relevant executive orders, regulations, policies and laws Be familiar with Procedures 1-4 and Procedures of DoD R and any other procedures employed by the intelligence component Report questionable intelligence activities and federal crimes Procedure 14 sets forth the responsibilities of employees of DoD intelligence components to conduct themselves IAW applicable Executive Orders, laws, regulations, instructions and policy. Intelligence component employees must conduct intelligence activities IAW all relevant executive orders, laws, regulations, instructions and other policy; be familiar with Procedures 1-4 and Procedures of DoD R and any other procedures employed by the intelligence component; and report questionable intelligence activities and federal crimes.

IO Training Requirements
Army Guardsmen subject to AR : Initial training within 30 days of assignment/ employment Refresher training as part of the routine command training program Training tailored to unit mission Air Guardsmen subject to AFI Initial training within 45 days of assignment/arrival to unit Annual refresher training Pre-deployment if training will expire during deployment **Effective 1 Oct 10: standardized Air Force training Located on ADLS and AFISRA website All intelligence personnel are required to receive intelligence oversight training.

Procedure 15 Identifying, Investigating, and Reporting Questionable Intelligence Activities and Other Intelligence-related Matters Provides for the identification, investigation and reporting of questionable activities The term “questionable activity” refers to any conduct related to an intelligence activity or personnel that may violate the law, any Executive Order or applicable DoD policy, regulation or instruction Procedure 15 provides for the identification, investigation and reporting of questionable activities. The term “questionable activity” refers to any conduct related to an intelligence activity or personnel that may violate the law, any Executive Order or applicable DoD policy, regulation or instruction.

Examples of Questionable Activity
Improper collection, retention, or dissemination of US persons information, such as: Incorporating US persons information into an intelligence product without determining if identifying the person is appropriate Collecting US persons information for force protection purposes without determining if the intelligence function related to it is authorized Misrepresentation, such as: Using the status as an intelligence member to gain access for non-mission-related purposes Claiming to be conducting a highly classified activity or an investigation, for personal gain, unauthorized access, or to impress or intimidate others Questionable intelligence activity constituting a crime, such as: Stealing a source’s payments Using intelligence funds for personal gain Misconduct in the performance of intelligence duties, such as: Falsifying investigative reports or personnel security investigation interviews Shown here are some examples of questionable activity that must be reported. Illegal or improper activities by intelligence personnel in their personal capacity which have no relationship to the intelligence mission (breach of discipline, simple security or ethics violations) are not normally subject to intelligence oversight reporting and should be handled through normal disciplinary and law enforcement channels.

Reporting Questionable Activities
You are required to report questionable intelligence activities Report questionable activities through your chain of command to unit/staff IG, JA, IO Monitor, Senior Intelligence Officer or to higher levels (NGB, ATSD(IO)) Whistle blowers are protected from retribution or adverse action Again, you are required to report questionable intelligence activities (QA) Report questionable activities through your chain of command to IG, JA, IO Monitor, Senior Intelligence Officer officer or higher levels (NGB, ATSD(IO)) Whistle blowers are protected from retribution or adverse action

Special Collection Techniques
Electronic and communications surveillance (Procedure 5) Concealed monitoring (Procedure 6) Physical searches (Procedure 7) Examination of US mail (Procedure 8) Physical surveillance (Procedure 9) Undisclosed participation in an organization (Procedure 10) Undisclosed contracting for goods and services for intelligence purposes (Procedure 11) Any other activity that could be perceived by the general public as covert surveillance and reconnaissance(NGB policy) The other procedures in DoD R concern special collection techniques, which are not that common in most National Guard units. ALL special collection activities of the National Guard’s intelligence components must be coordinated through the NGB/J2 for approval by CNGB, SecDef and the US Attorney General, even during emergency situations. Special collection activities include: • Electronic and communications surveillance (Procedure 5), • Concealed monitoring (Procedure 6), • Physical searches (Procedure 7), • Examination of US mail (Procedure 8) • Physical surveillance (Procedure 9), • Undisclosed participation in an organization (Procedure 10), • Undisclosed contracting for goods and services for intelligence purposes (Procedure 11), and • Any other activities that could be perceived by the general public as a covert surveillance and covert reconnaissance activity (NGB-Policy).

Intelligence Oversight Process Special Collection Techniques?
Mission (AR , Ch 1-5.d.): There must be a link between the U.S. person information to be collected and the element’s assigned mission and function. State J2 Missions (JFHQ-State Implementation Guidance (Draft) dated 01 AUG 2011, Ch 2): Monitoring worldwide threat trends, events, and enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) Support to NG troops deployed in support of State Partnership Program (SPP) missions Monitor threats to the homeland Evaluate terrorist TTPs Identify vulnerabilities to key infrastructure which might be targeted by terrorist groups Monitor for Indications and Warnings of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) weapons Lead and manage intelligence process during Domestic Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions U.S. Persons (AR , Glossary, Section II): A U.S. citizen An alien known by the intelligence component to be a permanent resident alien A corporation incorporated in the U.S. that is not directed or controlled by a foreign government A corporation incorporated abroad is NOT a U.S. person even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated in the U.S. Presumptions (AR , Ch 1-8.): A person or organization outside the United States is presumed not to be a U.S. person, unless the intelligence component obtains specific information to the contrary. An alien in the United States is presumed not to be a U.S. person, unless the intelligence component obtains specific information to the contrary. Mission and Authority? YES U.S. Person? Authorized Category? START Necessary? YES YES Authorized Categories (AR , Ch 2-2.): Consensual Publicly Available Foreign Intelligence Counterintelligence Potential sources of assistance Protecting intelligence sources and methods Physical Security Personnel Security Communications Security Narcotics Threats to Safety Overhead reconnaissance Administrative Purposes NO STOP NO NO NO YES STOP STOP GO Necessity (NGB-J2) Can you disregard the information or substitute the words “U.S. Person” and still complete the mission? Least Intrusive Means? YES NO “Necessity” and “U.S. Person” may need switched in the traditional order of operations (IF it is U.S. Person information, THEN necessity should be determined) Additional Approval? Special Collection Techniques? GO YES YES YES NO NO Revise Continuum of Intrusiveness (AR , Ch 2-3.): Publicly Available or with Consent From Cooperating Sources Lawful means not requiring a Warrant or Attorney General approval Lawful means requiring a Warrant or Attorney General approval Additional Approval Authority is dependent on the Special Technique employed. It may include (AR Ch. 5 thru 11&13): DCS G-2 MACOM Commander Commander, 650th MI Group US Attorney General Supreme Allied Commander Europe Army G-2X Secretary (or Under Secretary) of the Army SECDEF or Deputy SECDEF Special Techniques (AR Ch. 5 thru 11&13): Electronic Surveillance Concealed Monitoring Physical Searches Mail Searches and Examination Physical Surveillance Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Contracting for Goods and Services Experimentation on Human Subjects for Intelligence Purposes STOP GO Blue Text = Most applicable to State J2 Missions

Special Focus Areas Defense Support to Civil Authorities
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment Incident Awareness and Assessment Force Protection Counter Drug The Internet Now let’s talk about some special focus areas.

Defense Support to Civil Authorities
Counterdrug and Civil Support Teams (CST) do not have an intelligence mission Law enforcement provides criminal threat support (Procedure 12) Intelligence Oversight rules do NOT prohibit National Guard intelligence components from providing support to civil authorities when authorized to do so. In our Procedure 12 discussion, we talked about support to law enforcement agencies. Other common activities include foreign language interpretation; search and rescue, aerial damage assessments; reconnaissance to determine when and where to apply manpower and resources; and weather, terrain and civil considerations, otherwise known as Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment.

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
Purpose: to assist the commander in gaining situational awareness vs. intelligence Limit collection to information needed to accomplish mission Least intrusive means Redact unnecessary U.S. persons information Every National Guard operation conducted, even within the United States, regardless of size, must still have access to intelligence. The JFHQ-State J2 will need to perform all the functions of the J2 to support military decision making while protecting the rights of the citizens we serve. However, too often the J2 is prevented from performing the functions for fear of intelligence oversight violation and/or it is thought that the J34 will perform the intelligence functions. Antiterrorism/ Force Protection risk analysis is not equivalent to Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. The JFHQ-State J2 role is not merely to identify the threat nor is the biggest threat we face ever the US Population. When operating within the United States, the National Guard must gear its intelligence assets towards understanding the environment and providing information that will be necessary for the senior decision makers at the key decision and decisive points but do so in a legal way.

Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA)
Definition: The use of DoD intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) intelligence capabilities for domestic non-intelligence activities approved by the Secretary of Defense. Examples: search and rescue (SAR), damage assessment and situational awareness * Domestic imagery rules always apply to the collection, retention and dissemination of domestic imagery Although Incident Awareness and Assessment is a non-intelligence activity (it is conducted by or with DoD intelligence component assets and/or capabilities and does not (usually) involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence), it is important to remember that domestic imagery rules still apply.

Force Protection A law enforcement responsibility
J2 focus is transnational terrorist and opposing military force threat J2 and J34 must work closely together Intelligence and Force Protection must be handled separately through their respective channels, but can work together As a general rule, force protection operations within the United States are a law enforcement responsibility. National Guard intelligence components must focus on analyzing all-source intelligence information concerning threats to DoD missions, people, or resources arising from transnational terrorists and opposing military forces in support of force protection decisions and operations. Again, if during the course of routine intelligence activities and authorized missions, National Guard intelligence components receive information identifying US persons as an alleged threat to DoD or civilian individuals, entities or structures, they must report this information to the appropriate law enforcement entity through the J34 Force Protection cell. It is imperative that the J2 and the J34 work closely together.

Intelligence v. Force Protection
J2/Intelligence J34/ATFP Security DOMESTIC THREAT Military Intelligence FOREIGN THREAT Cross Talk Governing Regulation: DoD Directive R Governing Regulation: DoD Directive These functions should work together, but must act independently Intelligence components have an obligation to pass threat information to: Organization/commander responsible for protecting threatened persons, facilities or activities (Provost Marshall/ATFP/J34, etc) Appropriate LE organization We cannot emphasize enough the importance of cross-talk.

Force Protection Products
When the FPA briefs the information, it is an FP assessment briefing – no J2 logos, no presentation as an intelligence briefing, nothing that will give the customer the impression that this is an MI product. It is not your MOS that is the determining factor but your duty status. Intelligence personnel can be assigned to the J34 to perform an FP function FP products are NOT intelligence products!

Counterdrug Mission Criminal Analyst Mission
Current mission authorizes NG criminal analysts to assist local and federal law enforcement agencies in identifying drug dealers and sources of supply, collecting and organizing criminal records, and assisting officers with case management Another example of specific authorization from SecDef is the counterdrug mission. The current mission authorizes traditional intelligence capabilities to assist local and federal law enforcement agencies in identifying drug dealers and sources of supply, collecting and organizing criminal records, and assisting officers with case management.

Internet MI personnel must have an official mission before collecting, retaining, or disseminating even publicly available US persons information posted on the Internet. Certain Internet-based activities are restricted by the rules requiring disclosure of an individual's intelligence organization affiliation. Also applies to information on SIPRNET and JWICS. While much of the information posited on the internet is publicly available, MI personnel must have an official mission requiring it before collecting, retaining, or disseminating even publicly available US persons information. Certain Internet-based activities are restricted by the rules requiring disclosure of an individual's intelligence organization affiliation. This also applies to information on SIPRNET and JWICS.

Characteristics of an Effective IO Program
Command emphasis Designate IO Monitor and Alternate in writing Conduct initial, refresher and deployment training Tailor training to the specific mission of your organization Maintain training records Maintain copies of pertinent EO, directives and regulations/instructions Use a variety of training and awareness tools Ensure the Intelligence Oversight training program has command emphasis. Without this, no program will be effective. Formally designate an individual with the responsibility for overseeing the Intelligence Oversight program, and hold this person accountable. Duties should not be confused with security officer responsibilities. Provide Intelligence Oversight training to all new employees soon after coming on board as part of in-processing and provide refresher training for all employees at least annually and prior to deployments. Tailor training to the specific mission of your organization. Training may take many forms, but there are certain minimum requirements to which all organizations must adhere. First, familiarity with the provisions of Executive Order 12333, DoD Directive R, and any implementing instructions which apply to your service or agency is required. At a minimum, this entails an understanding of at least DOD Directive R procedures 1-4, 14, and 15, and those other procedures that pertain to activities performed by the organization. It should be emphasized in the training that reporting questionable activities is mandatory, and that no adverse action may be taken against employees for reporting questionable activities. Establish and maintain records to document when employees have received training, and to provide a mechanism to assure that those employees who missed training for operational or other reasons (e.g. leave, TDY) are trained at the earliest opportunity. "Employees" include assigned military and civilian government personnel as well as individuals detailed or TDY to your organization and contractor personnel; in overseas organizations it also includes foreign national personnel engaged in intelligence support, such as compiling and filing open source material. Require the Intelligence Oversight officer to maintain copies of Executive Order 12333, DoD Directive , DoD Regulation R, DoD Directive , and any service or organization specific implementing instructions. Encourage employees to review them periodically. It's a good idea to keep these documents in a folder separate from other documents or regulations. Use a variety of training and awareness tools. Many organizations develop a slide presentation followed by a question and answer period; others have implemented computer-based training and/or testing. The Air Force's 33rd Wing at Eglin Air Force Base has an IO briefing that can be used as a model. Of course, you should craft your briefing to focus on your particular service and mission, as they have done for theirs. There are video productions which are sometimes included, the most popular of which is a DIA production entitled "Intelligence Oversight" (order through official channels). It provides good history on why we have an intelligence oversight program in DOD. In addition to using these techniques, some organizations have developed and issued cards about the size of business cards (click here to view Naval Security Group card) highlighting basic Intelligence Oversight information and providing phone numbers to report problems or ask questions. Other techniques that can be used to raise awareness are poster campaigns and messages posted in newsletters or on bulletin boards.

Questions? NGB-J2 Intel Oversight Monitors LTC Charles Harriman
(785) Maj John Lane (785) MAJ Nathan Bukowski (785) NGB-J2 Intel Oversight Monitors That concludes our briefing. Are there any questions?

Intelligence Oversight for JFHQ-KS

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Intelligence Oversight for JFHQ-KS

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