1. “The Path Not Taken …yet”
Transforming Defense
“The Path Not Taken
…yet”
The Role of Defense in National Security
The Management of Defense
The Force
Arthur K. Cebrowski
Director, Force Transformation
23 July 2003
Vision: Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage

2. Connecting the Present to Our Future
Expanding Competition Power and Principle
Strategic Posture Shrinking the Dysfunctional, Disconnected Gap of Globalization
Operational Maneuver Creating a one-two punch
Mapping Future Challenges Risk
Issues:
How to make near-term actions robust across alternative futures?
How to create on-ramps for capabilities?

3. Trends in Security Competition
Short Cycle Time
New Competencies
Adaptive Planning
Integrated Joint
Interdependent
Information Age
Developed Rules
Mature Markets
Narrowing Customer Base
Security=Defense
Globalization II
Emerging Rules
Market Opportunities
New Customer Base Emerging
Security=All Else+Defense
Globalization III
Long Cycle Time
Well Developed Tools/Processes
Deliberate Planning
Deconflicted Joint
Tortured Interoperability
Industrial Age

4. Expanding Competition
Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}
Decisively Defeat
Duration
Assure, Dissuade, Deter
Intensity
U.S. power is unmatched
Therefore, U.S. policy will be attacked through its moral principles (legitimacy, international law, etc.)
If the frontiers of National Security can be everywhere and are not territorial borders but fault lines within societies, then …
The nexus of foreign and domestic security policy is intelligence
We must be able to look and operate deeply within societies
Assured Access includes the domains of political victory
Speed of modern warfare creates a continuum, not a succession of phases

5. Security System Balance? … Major Movements
Strategic Maneuver/Balance
Forces forward
Strategic deploy from home
Allies
Operational Maneuver
From forward garrison
From the sea
From strategic distances
Deter Forward
2d derivative force
Sustaining force
Constabulary/Nation-building force

6. Strategic Posture … Exporting security
The Red Zone … … Our Response

7. Global Trends … Military Response
The Emerging American Military:
More expeditionary (including lighter, more lethal)
More networked (more interoperability at the JTF level)
Designed to leverage the exterior positions (precision from distance as sensors move in)
Leverages increasingly persistent ISR
Tighter sensor-shooter timelines (sensing, C2, fly-out)
Values Information Superiority (information operations)
Expanded unmanned capabilities (UAV, UCAV, UUV, robotics)
Information Age
Iraq 2
Globalization II
Globalization III
Iraq 1
Industrial Age

8. Global Trends…Threats …Strategic Response
Strategic Capabilities:
More Preventative - Less Punitive
Achieve unambiguous warning earlier
More SOF-Like characteristics
A Deter Forward Force
An Intel/Surveillance-based force
Coping with system perturbations
Information Age
Globalization II
Globalization III
-----[Great Power War?]-----
Political Ideology
Hated Dictator
Hated Dictator w/Nukes
Nuclear Nationalists
Narco-terrorists
Regional Terrorists
International Terrorists
SEI w/Bugs
System
State
Individual
Industrial Age

9. Top Level Issues …Culture: Values, Beliefs, Attitudes
Citizen Soldier
Volunteer (Recruited) Force
Professional
Warrior + Enforcer + “Systems Administrator”
Projecting Power
Exporting Security
Event Focused
Continuous
Punitive
Preventative
Access to Battlespace
Access to Political Victory
Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}

10. Candidates for Action Now …Identify issues of regret
Warfare Elements
Fire - Non-lethals, Directed Energy, Redirected Energy
Maneuver - Sea basing, vertical battlefield, lift for operational maneuver
Protection - Urban Operations, “Bug-to-Drug” Cycle Time
C2&C – Joint Interdependency vs. Interoperability
ISR - Demand-centered Intel, Tactically Responsive Space
Logistics - Joint demand-centered logistics
Risk Management Areas (creating on-ramps)
Joint S&T
Joint Experimentation
Modern Warfare Modeling Tools
People: cost or resource
Precision Deterrence
Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}
Warfare Elements – modify sub-bullets
Multi-nodal lift?
Replace “bug-to-drug” with “biomedical countermeasures”
Add “Cognitive Interoperability” but does not fit under C2, the context is Joint and Combined
Risk Management – add sub-bullet
Expanded alliances with industry and academia

11. System Perturbations and Consequences
Transforming Defense
Global Homeland Interests Security
MAD Containment
Surrogate Wars
=>
1990
2000
Global Homeland Interests Security
Precision Deterrence?
System Perturbations and Consequences
=>

12. Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against fixed targets
B Tons
1960s
F-4D 200 Tons
1970s
F-4D LGB 12.5 Tons
1990s
F-117 LGB 4 Tons
2000s
All weather B-1 JDAM 4 Tons
250
200
150
100 50
Tons Required
Then & Now: One-sixtieth the tonnage required to drop a bridge span
Slide Source: AF/XPXT 20 Sep 2001 Transformation Briefing
The difference between the F-117 and an LGB and a B-1 with a JDAM is the all-weather capability the JDAM brings to the fight.
OIF, the F-117 used EGBU-27s, LGBs with a GPS/INS backup which gave the F-117 an all-weather capability. Several types of LGBs are being modified to provide this capability for other platforms.
Tons of bombs required to drop a bridge span (90% confidence)

13. Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against mobile targets
Then & Now: Sorties required to neutralize 10 mobile armored battalions *
Unguided
Unitary
Bombs
1940s
Sorties required
1960s
Cluster
Weapons
1970s
Maverick
1990s
SFW
2000s
WCMD/SFW/P3I
Slide Source: AF/XPXT 20 Sep 2001 Transformation Briefing
Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) is an anti-armor sub-munition which is delivered in a tactical munitions dispenser (TMD) that holds 40 “skeet.” Each skeet has a sensor and a shaped metal slug. When SFW detects the thermal signature, it fires the shaped metal slug at the object.
Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) is a tail kit that goes on a TMD that enables the pilot to direct where the TMD goes. Guidance is provided by an INS. Prior to release, WCMD communicates with the aircraft through the 1760 data bus, similar to GPS weapons.
SFW PrePlanned Product Improvement (P3I) adds a microwave sensor to the skeet as well as rods to be fired with the shaped slug. The additional sensor makes SFW resistant to countermeasures and the rods increase the number of soft target kills an individual skeet can achieve. Soft targets include things such as APCs, trucks, TELS and humans.
* Damage 15 out of 30 armored vehicles per battalion

14. Evolution of Precision Strike: … Quantity of bombs assigned for 90% Probability of Kill
Then & Now: Over Three Orders of Magnitude reduction in weapons required to destroy a fixed target
9,000 Bombs 1,500 B-17 Sorties 3,300' CEP
176 Bombs 88 F-4 Sorties 400' CEP
2 Bombs 1 F-16 Sortie 10' CEP
1 Bomb 1 B-2 Sortie < 10' CEP
Data Source: AF/XPXT and NDU 1996 Strategic Assessment
1940s
1970s
1990s
2000s
Advanced weapons systems armed with precision munitions are extremely accurate but are highly dependent on quality information

15. Paradigm Changes … To Enable Precision Deterrence
Precision Deterrence = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}
Ours & Ours & Ours & Theirs Theirs Theirs
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Nukes)
Weapons of Precision Deterrence
Large Area Affected Makes up for Lack of Precise Weapon and Target Location
Non-Linear Political Consequences
Self Deterring
Precise Weapon and Target Location Allows Focused Effects
Militarily Relevant
Operationally Useful

16. û  Deterrence is … Context Dependent An Effects Based Operation
Highly reliant on intelligence
A state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction relevant to those we wish to deter
An Effects Based Operation
Precision Deterrence: creating a precise local effect in the cognitive domain
Ways can be military, financial, economic or diplomatic
The Duality of Means … û
Context Dependent
Highly reliant on intelligence
A state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction relevant to those we wish to deter
The ability to deter one opponent does not imply the ability to deter others
To deter is to reduce/eliminate the motivation to commit a proscribed act so that “nothing bad happens”
An Effects Based Operation
Precision Deterrence: creating a precise effect in the cognitive domain
Ways can be military, financial, economic or diplomatic
The Duality of Means …
In the eyes of our adversaries, the means we use to deter must be disproportionate to the effects they seek to achieve against us
In the eyes of the world, the means we use to deter must be proportionate to the effects we seek to prevent
Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}
Viewed as Viewed as Disproportionate Proportionate by the Target by the World
Precision Effect 
Precision Deterrence must have a local effect – it can have a global impact

17. Military Options … for Precision Deterrence
Directed Energy Weapons
Lasers
Covert engagement at a safe distance
All aspect engagement and re-targeting capability
Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint
Adjustable delivered energy
High Powered Microwaves
Deter belligerents
Deny an area to personnel
Control crowds
Operational Commonality?
Non-Lethal Weapons
Counter-Personnel
Counter-Material
Counter-Capability
Need for decision space and time
Ability to act while discriminating intent
Increase engagement time and range
Need to satisfy policy and operational constraints
Target
Non-combatants
Own force
- Military options for precision deterrence must be able to hold at risk that which our adversaries hold dear
-- Directed Energy Weapons
---
-- Non-Lethal Weapons
Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment
Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, non-lethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning
Non-lethal weapons are intended to have one, or both, of the following characteristics:
They have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel
They affect objects differently within their area of influence

18. Precision Deterrence … Issues and Choices
How do we balance local (tactical) deterrence and global (strategic) deterrence?
What kind of JWAC-like process is required to create cognitive effects?
Can our intelligence community identify that which our adversaries hold most dear?
What are the new tools of deterrence that support our moral principles and strategic interests and how do they interact?
What are the new concepts for deterrence?