2. Some implications by 2050 - or earlier Two problems at once in the 21 st century: rapid increase in poorest countries; rapid ageing and (?) decline in richer ones. Most rapid increase in poorest-poor, environmentally vulnerable populations. New world order – Indian population overtakes Chinese. US only developed country left in global top ten. Demographic eclipse of Europe. UK and France overtake Germany, Russia? Population decline in Japan, Korea, parts of Europe.

3. The longer-term future of population: what we know we dont know. Effects of global warming on population and migration. Is ethnic transformation inevitable in the developed world? Why does anyone ever have any children? What are the limits to lifespan, if any?

4. Variant world population projections, 2008- based. Source: United Nations

5. Population projections, major world regions to 2050 according to level of development.

6. The demographic future is not European….

7. The US: the only (relatively) large developed country by 2050.

8. No such thing as Europe? Major European regional trends, and US, 1950-2050

9. A closer view – selected European populations 1950-2050

10. Migration paramount

11. Projection of UK population to 2081, Principal Projection and alternative migration assumptions, 2008-based. Source: GAD 2009.

12. Immigration can go down as well as up: Germany 1954 - 2007

14. UK population broken down by age and sex, 2006, 2056 (percent). Source: GAD Principal Projections 2008.

15. From demographic bonus to demographic onus: China and India in 2050

16. Japan population pyramid 2000, 2050. source http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-newest/e/ppfj02/suikei_g_e.html

17. Why worry about Europes ageing or population decline? Issue is growth in UK, Sweden, Netherlands, France etc as well as ageing. Population change will change balance of international order in medium term. Nothing that European countries can do about it Military, economic power related to population. GDP per head not related to population growth or size in Western developed world. Little known about modern economics of decline. Usually assumed axiomatically to be bad. Modest, very slow decline might be welcome (as long as it stops). Rapid, substantial decline harmful: population ageing, investment and labour force, confidence. Tthreatens economic viability (e.g. Southern Europe, Bulgaria), may not be manageable.

18. No fertility decline. Total fertility trends, groups of Western countries, 1950-2006.

19. Fertility can go up as well as down

20. Managing population ageing Improve the actual support rate (a) increase workforce participation retraining unemployed, discouraging early retirement and perpetual students, more flexible labour market arrangements help women to combine work with childcare (part-time work, school hours) (b) increase the average age of retirement increase pension entitlement age remove tax and other disincentives for working pensioners end of cliff-edge retirement. Moderate financial burden limit state pension, 'second and third pillar' funded pensions. Increase labour productivity

21. Concluding points Some important demographic changes predictable. Re-arrangement of demographic rank-order: major losers (Europe, espec. FSU) and winners (Asia, Africa, USA). In long run economic and strategic rank follows population size (cf. India and China), as in the past. Western consumption levels cannot be globalised. Fastest growth in the poorest countries risks serious security and environmental problems. Global warming on a collision course with population growth. Migration pressure on Western countries will persist for decades, may lead to ethnic transformation. In the long run, equilibrium position of birth and death rates (if any) is unknown.