Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control"— Presentation transcript:

1 Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control
SITE Annual Meeting 10 June, 2010 Budapest, Hungary Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control Professor Luke Froeb Owen Graduate School of Management Vanderbilt University Vanderbilt University

2 How to Analyze a Merger When Firms Compete by Bargaining
Theory Multilateral bargaining has multiple cooperative and non-cooperative solutions In many of them, the division of the surplus depends on the concavity of the surplus function Traditional Application of Theory Look for evidence of concavity Look for evidence that firms act strategically Alternative to Reliance on Theory … Run a laboratory experiment Vanderbilt University

3 Three Player Experiments
Conducted at Vanderbilt’s “eLab” Participants quizzed to make sure they understood the rules, then “tripled” up Structure: Player B bargains with N and X. Concavity: First agreement is worth $20; second is worth only $10 Theory: The least core, pre-nucleolus, and pre-kernel all predict surplus splits of {$20, $5, $5} for {B, N, X} Vanderbilt University

4 Dashboard of Player B Vanderbilt University

5 Dashboard of Player B (cont.)
Vanderbilt University

6 What Happened? Most triplets used the “chat” box to argue for a “fair” split of the total surplus Player B went so far as to “give” Player N or X more surplus than was generated by second agreement A small minority of B players acted strategically Vanderbilt University

7 Extrapolating from the Laboratory to Large Business Organizations
Firms do not randomly select individuals to make important decisions Organizations design mechanisms to correct biases they cannot screen for Firms make decisions within specific industry contexts (codes, committees, cultures) Firms adopt heuristics that work well in the contexts for which they are developed Vanderbilt University

8 Extrapolating from the Laboratory to Impersonal Market Settings
Vernon Smith has observed that: [H]uman subjects in the laboratory frequently violate the canons of rational choice when tested as isolated individuals, but in the social context of exchange institutions serve up decisions that are consistent (as though by magic) with predictive models based on individual rationality. Vanderbilt University

9 Policy Dichotomy: Consumers vs. Firms and Markets
Predictable consumer irrationality can be incorporated into demand models e.g., hyperbolic discounting Departing from the assumption of profit maximization is not (yet?) warranted Vanderbilt University


Download ppt "Behavioral Antitrust and Merger Control"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google