1. “Ten Years Ago… on a cold dark night”

2. Welcome Acknowledgments and thanks Security Acronymny: then and now
What’s working
What’s proving hard

3. Acknowledgments NIH and NIST – Peter Alterman, Tim Polk and Bill Burr
NSF – Early Adopters and NSF Middleware Initiative
Internet2 Membership
PKI Labs, PKI Advisory Board, Neal McBurnett
Program Committee and Sean Smith

4. Security Acronymny circa 1998
PKI
X.500
X.509
CRL
RSA
PGP

5. Security Acronymny circa 2002
PKI
X.500
X.509
CRL
OCSP
LDAP
RSA
PGP
XKMS
SPKI
GXA
Liberty
Magic Carpet
SAML
Shibboleth
XML
HEBCA
FBCA

6. Security Acronymny circa 2002
E-authentication
OGSA
GSS
E-SIGN
E-LOCK
ACES
CAM
DAVE

7. Observations I was really ignorant in 1998 This is proving really hard
There are a lot more approaches, if only because there are lots more needs
Partitioning the problem space may be better than the unified solution

8. What’s working At the core, the math of PKI remains extremely elegant
The standards, protocols and processes of PKI are open
PKI attracts really smart people

9. What’s proving hard
Scaling: virtual organizations, federations, bridged hierarchies
Trust: collaborative versus legal
Integrating security and privacy
Mechanics: mobility, archiving, key escrow, identity
Authorization: role based versus atomic rights
Reconciling humans and lawyers

10. Interrealm Trust Structures
Federated administration
basic bilateral (origins and targets in web services)
complex bilateral (videoconferencing with external MCU’s, digital rights management with external rights holders)
multilateral
Hierarchies
may assert stronger or more formal trust
requires bridges and policy mappings to connect hierarchies
appear larger scale
Virtual organizations
Grids, digital library consortiums, Internet2 VideoCommons, etc.
Share real resources among a sparse set of users
Requirements for authentication and authorization, resource discovery, etc need to leverage federated and hierarchical infrastructures.

11. The Continuum of Trust Collaborative trust at one end…
can I videoconference with you?
you can look at my calendar
You can join this computer science workgroup and edit this computing code
Students in course Physics Brown can access this on-line sensor
Members of the UWash community can access this licensed resource
Legal trust at the other end…
Sign this document, and guarantee that what was signed was what I saw
Encrypt this file and save it
Identifiy yourself to this high security area

12. Dimensions of the Trust Continuum
Collaborative trust
handshake
consequences of breaking trust more political (ostracism, shame, etc.)
fluid (additions and deletions frequent)
shorter term
structures tend to clubs and federations
privacy issues more user-based
Legal trust
contractual
consequences of breaking trust more financial (liabilities, fines and penalties, indemnification, etc.)
more static (legal process time frames)
longer term (justify the overhead)
tends to hierarchies and bridges
privacy issues more laws and rules

13. The Trust Continuum, Applications and their Users
Applications and their user community must decide where their requirements fit on the trust continuum
Some apps can only be done at one end of the continuum, and that might suggest a particular technical approach.
Many applications fit somewhere in the middle and the user communities (those that trust each other) need to select a approach that works for them.

14. Integrating Security and Privacy
Balance between weak identity, strong identity, and attribute-based access (without identity)
Balance between privacy and accountability – keeping the identity known only within the security domain

15. Reconciling Humans and Lawyers
Non-repudiation has had a very high bar set…
Human nature has been “refined” over a long time
We tend to talk globally, think locally and act inconsistently…

16. Conference Outcomes Refine our understandings of security
Cross-pollinate PKI research
Identify experiments that should be conducted

17. Why PKI? Single infrastructure to provide all security services
Established technology standards, though little operational experience
Elegant technical underpinnings
Serves dozens of purposes - authentication, authorization, object encryption, digital signatures, communications channel encryption
Low cost in mass numbers

18. Why Not PKI? High legal barriers Lack of mobility support
Challenging user interfaces, especially with regard to privacy and scaling
Persistent technical incompatibilities
Overall complexity

19. D. Wasley’s PKI Puzzle

20. Federal Activities fBCA NIH Pilot ACES fPKI TWG
Others – federal S/MIME work
Internet2/NIH/NIST research conference
...

21. The Industry
What's the problem with PKI then? It all boils down to one thing: Complexity.
Wanted: PKI Experts By Scot Petersen
July 18, 2001

22. The Industry Baltimore in peril PKIforum slows down
OASIS-SAML work (XML to leaven PKI) gains buzz
RSA buys Securant

23. Ten Years Forward…
The issues here have become immensely important The cutting edge is being blunted by the demands of deployment It’s too important for us to be doing it…