1. International Trade and WTO
Prof. Sohn, Taewoo

2. (2-1) AD Agreement (a) Introduction
The Anti-Dumping Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), commonly known as the AD Agreement, governs the application of anti-dumping measures by WTO member countries.
A product is considered to be "dumped" if it is exported to another country at a price below the normal price of a like product in the exporting country. Anti-dumping measures are unilateral remedies (the imposition of anti-dumping duties on the product in question) that the government of the importing country may apply after a thorough investigation has determined that the product is, in fact, being dumped, and that sales of the dumped product are causing material injury to a domestic industry that produces a like product.
All members of the WTO are parties to this Agreement, whose full name is the "Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994". It went into effect on January 1, Pursuant to the Doha Ministerial Declaration, negotiations for the Anti-Dumping Agreement are currently underway. The agreement has no expiration date.
The AD Agreement ensures that WTO members will not apply anti-dumping measures arbitrarily. It provides detailed substantive requirements for determining whether dumping and injury are, in fact, taking place, and sets forth elaborate procedures that governments must follow when they conduct anti-dumping investigations and impose anti-dumping duties. The Agreement ensures that all proceedings will be transparent and that all interested parties have a full opportunity to defend their interests.

3. (2-1) AD Agreement (b) Substantive Requirements
Since a determination of dumping requires a comparison between the export price of a product and its normal value in the exporting country, the AD Agreement sets forth rules for the calculation of export price and normal value. It then explains how a "fair comparison" is made between the two. The government conducting an anti-dumping investigation uses this fair comparison as the basis for determining the "margin of dumping".
The Agreement then sets forth rules for determining whether dumped imports are causing injury to a domestic industry that produces a like product. Injury is defined to mean material injury itself, the threat of material injury or material retardation in the establishment of a domestic industry. The government authorities must establish injury to the domestic industry and that the dumped imports are a cause of that injury. The AD Agreement provides for "cumulative assessments" of the effects of imports on a domestic industry when imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations.

4. (2-1) AD Agreement (c) Investigations
A government normally initiates an anti-dumping investigation on the basis of a written application by a domestic industry, although in special circumstances the government itself can initiate the investigation on the industry's behalf. The application must provide evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link between the two. It must include a complete description of the allegedly dumped product, information on the like product produced by the applicant, evidence regarding export price and normal value, an assessment of the impact of the imports on the domestic industry and information concerning industry support for the application.
The rules set forth in the Agreement for the collection of evidence state that as soon as government authorities initiate an investigation, they must provide the full text of the written application to all known exporters. All interested parties are given access to non-confidential information and the opportunity to meet with the parties that have adverse interests, so that opposing views can be presented and rebuttal arguments offered. Before they make a final determination of whether dumping has occurred, the government authorities must inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration, giving them sufficient time to defend their interests.
An application will be rejected, according to the Agreement, and an investigation promptly terminated if the government authorities conclude that there is insufficient evidence of either dumping or injury. The Agreement provides that unless there are special circumstances, investigations will be concluded within one year and will continue in no case more than 18 months after their initiation.

5. (2-1) AD Agreement (d) Price Undertakings
The Agreement provides that government authorities can suspend or terminate an anti-dumping proceeding if they receive voluntary undertakings from an exporter that it will revise its prices or cease exporting to the area in question at dumped prices. Investigating authorities have the option of accepting price increases that are less than the margin of dumping if they are adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.
(e) Imposition of Anti-dumping Duties
Under the Agreement, it is up to the government of the importing country to decide whether or not to impose anti-dumping duties. (The Agreement provides an option of not imposing duties in cases where all requirements for imposing such duties have been fulfilled, but not all authorities allow such an option.) The amount of the duty set by the government cannot exceed the margin of dumping, but the Agreement permits it to be lower if it is adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.
Normally anti-dumping duties are applied to all imports of the subject merchandise made on or after the date on which there is a preliminary determination of dumping, injury and causality.
The Agreement states that an anti-dumping duty shall remain in force as long as necessary to counteract dumping that is causing injury. It contains a "sunset" provision that provides that the duty will be terminated five years from the date of its imposition unless the government authorities determine in a review that termination of the duty would lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.

6. (2-1) AD Agreement (f) The Committee; Notifications
The Agreement established a Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, composed of representatives of each WTO member country. This Committee meets not less than twice a year and affords members the opportunity to consult on any matters relating to the operation of the Agreement. Member countries are required to notify this Committee of their anti-dumping legislation and/or regulations, their anti-dumping actions and the names, addresses and contact numbers of officials responsible for anti-dumping matters.

7. 7. Safety valves for domestic pressures
(2-2) Anti-dumping actions
There are many different ways of calculating whether a particular product is being dumped heavily or only lightly. The agreement narrows down the range of possible options. It provides three methods to calculate a product’s “normal value”. The main one is based on the price in the exporter’s domestic market. When this cannot be used, two alternatives are available — the price charged by the exporter in another country, or a calculation based on the combination of the exporter’s production costs, other expenses and normal profit margins. And the agreement also specifies how a fair comparison can be made between the export price and what would be a normal price.
Calculating the extent of dumping on a product is not enough. Anti-dumping measures can only be applied if the dumping is hurting the industry in the importing country. Therefore, a detailed investigation has to be conducted according to specified rules first. The investigation must evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a bearing on the state of the industry in question. If the investigation shows dumping is taking place and domestic industry is being hurt, the exporting company can undertake to raise its price to an agreed level in order to avoid anti-dumping import duty.

8. 7. Safety valves for domestic pressures
(2-3) Anti-dumping actions
Detailed procedures are set out on how anti-dumping cases are to be initiated, how the investigations are to be conducted, and the conditions for ensuring that all interested parties are given an opportunity to present evidence. Anti-dumping measures must expire five years after the date of imposition, unless an investigation shows that ending the measure would lead to injury.
Anti-dumping investigations are to end immediately in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is insignificantly small (defined as less than 2% of the export price of the product). Other conditions are also set. For example, the investigations also have to end if the volume of dumped imports is negligible (i.e. if the volume from one country is less than 3% of total imports of that product — although investigations can proceed if several countries, each supplying less than 3% of the imports, together account for 7% or more of total imports).
The agreement says member countries must inform the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices about all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions, promptly and in detail. They must also report on all investigations twice a year. When differences arise, members are encouraged to consult each other. They can also use the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure.

9. (1) Antidumping duties and Countervailing subsidies: GATT Article VI
(Q1) Suppose the United States enacts a system of “reference prices” for computer
accessories. A reference price is assigned to each accessory. For 3½ inch
computer disks, that price is $2.25. If an imported disk is sold in the United
States at a price below this reference price, and injury to an American disk
manufacturer is shown, then an AD duty is imposed. The amount of the duty
equals the difference between the reference price and the “dumped” price. Is
the reference price system consistent with GATT Article VI?
(A) The 1955 GATT Panel Report in the Swedish Antidumping Duties case suggests
the reference price system is consistent with Article VI. See Report of the
GATT Panel, Swedish Antidumping Duties, GATT B.I.S.D. (3rd Supp.) at 81
(1955) (adopted 26 February 1955).
The Swedish government imposed basic prices on imports of nylon stockings.
These prices served as fixed minimum prices, and Sweden imposed an
AD duty whenever the importer’s invoice price was below the minimum price.
When establishing the basic prices, Sweden did not consider differential costs
of production in Italy and Sweden, nor did it ensure the basic prices were
related to the actual price of nylons in Italy.
Nevertheless, the basic price system was held to be consistent with Article VI
as long as the basic price of nylons was equal to or below the actual price of nylons
in the market of the lowest cost producer. Thus, if the reference price of $2.25 is
equal to or below the price of 3½ computer disks in the market of the lowest cost
producer of such disks, then that reference price does not violate Article VI.

10. Videoclip1: 인도도 중국에 무역전쟁카드-반덤핑관세부과 (2017.8.17)(2 min)

11. 7. Safety valves for domestic pressures
(3) Subsidies and countervailing measures [ Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”)]
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”) addresses two separate but closely related topics: multilateral disciplines regulating the provision of subsidies, and the use of countervailing measures to offset injury caused by subsidized imports.
Multilateral disciplines are the rules regarding whether or not a subsidy may be provided by a Member. They are enforced through invocation of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Countervailing duties are a unilateral instrument, which may be applied by a Member after an investigation by that Member and a determination that the criteria set forth in the SCM Agreement are satisfied.

12. Structure of the Agreement
7. Safety valves for domestic pressures
(3) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”)
Structure of the Agreement
Part I provides that the SCM Agreement applies only to subsidies that are specifically provided to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries, and defines both the term “subsidy” and the concept of “specificity.” Parts II and III divide all specific subsidies into one of two categories: prohibited and actionable, and establish certain rules and procedures with respect to each category. Part V establishes the substantive and procedural requirements that must be fulfilled before a Member may apply a countervailing measure against subsidized imports. Parts VI and VII establish the institutional structure and notification/surveillance modalities for implementation of the SCM Agreement. Part VIII contains special and differential treatment rules for various categories of developing country Members. Part IX contains transition rules for developed country and former centrally-planned economy Members. Parts X and XI contain dispute settlement and final provisions.

13. (b) Coverage of the Agreement
7. Safety valves for domestic pressures
(3) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”)
(b) Coverage of the Agreement
Part I of the Agreement defines the coverage of the Agreement. Specifically, it establishes a definition of the term “subsidy” and an explanation of the concept of “specificity”. Only a measure which is a “specific subsidy” within the meaning of Part I is subject to multilateral disciplines and can be subject to countervailing measures.
Definition of subsidy Unlike the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, the WTO SCM Agreement contains a definition of the term “subsidy”. The definition contains three basic elements: (i) a financial contribution (ii) by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (iii) which confers a benefit. All three of these elements must be satisfied in order for a subsidy to exist.
The concept of “financial contribution” was included in the SCM Agreement only after a protracted negotiation. Some Members argued that there could be no subsidy unless there was a charge on the public account. Other Members considered that forms of government intervention that did not involve an expense to the government nevertheless distorted competition and should thus be considered to be subsidies. The SCM Agreement basically adopted the former approach. The Agreement requires a financial contribution and contains a list of the types of measures that represent a financial contribution, e.g., grants, loans, equity infusions, loan guarantees, fiscal incentives, the provision of goods or services, the purchase of goods.

14. (b) Coverage of the Agreement
7. Safety valves for domestic pressures
(3) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”)
(b) Coverage of the Agreement
In order for a financial contribution to be a subsidy, it must be made by or at the direction of a government or any public body within the territory of a Member. Thus, the SCM Agreement applies not only to measures of national governments, but also to measures of sub-national governments and of such public bodies as state-owned companies.
A financial contribution by a government is not a subsidy unless it confers a “benefit.” In many cases, as in the case of a cash grant, the existence of a benefit and its valuation will be clear. In some cases, however, the issue of benefit will be more complex. For example, when does a loan, an equity infusion or the purchase by a government of a good confer a benefit? Although the SCM Agreement does not provide complete guidance on these issues, the Appellate Body has ruled (Canada – Aircraft) that the existence of a benefit is to be determined by comparison with the market-place (i.e., on the basis of what the recipient could have received in the market). In the context of countervailing duties, Article 14 of the SCM Agreement provides some guidance with respect to determining whether certain types of measures confer a benefit. In the context of multilateral disciplines, however, the issue of the meaning of “benefit” is not fully resolved.

15. 7. Safety valves for domestic pressures
(3) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”)
(c) Specificity. Assuming that a measure is a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, it nevertheless is not subject to the SCM Agreement unless it has been specifically provided to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries. The basic principle is that a subsidy that distorts the allocation of resources within an economy should be subject to discipline. Where a subsidy is widely available within an economy, such a distortion in the allocation of resources is presumed not to occur. Thus, only “specific” subsidies are subject to the SCM Agreement disciplines. There are four types of “specificity” within the meaning of the SCM Agreement:
Enterprise-specificity. A government targets a particular company or companies for subsidization; Industry-specificity. A government targets a particular sector or sectors for subsidization. Regional specificity. A government targets producers in specified parts of its territory for subsidization. Prohibited subsidies. A government targets export goods or goods using domestic inputs for subsidization.

16. (d) Categories of Subsidies
(3) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”)
(d) Categories of Subsidies
The SCM Agreement creates two basic categories of subsidies: those that are prohibited, those that are actionable (i.e., subject to challenge in the WTO or to countervailing measures). All specific subsidies fall into one of these categories.
Prohibited subsidies: subsidies that require recipients to meet certain export targets, or to use domestic goods instead of imported goods. They are prohibited because they are specifically designed to distort international trade, and are therefore likely to hurt other countries’ trade. They can be challenged in the WTO dispute settlement procedure where they are handled under an accelerated timetable. If the dispute settlement procedure confirms that the subsidy is prohibited, it must be withdrawn immediately. Otherwise, the complaining country can take counter measures. If domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.
* Actionable subsidies: in this category the complaining country has to show that the subsidy has an adverse effect on its interests. Otherwise the subsidy is permitted. The agreement defines three types of damage they can cause. One country’s subsidies can hurt a domestic industry in an importing country. They can hurt rival exporters from another country when the two compete in third markets. And domestic subsidies in one country can hurt exporters trying to compete in the subsidizing country’s domestic market. If the Dispute Settlement Body rules that the subsidy does have an adverse effect, the subsidy must be withdrawn or its adverse effect must be removed. Again, if domestic producers are hurt by imports of subsidized products, countervailing duty can be imposed.

17. (e) Subsidies and countervailing measures
Some of the disciplines are similar to those of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Countervailing duty (the parallel of anti-dumping duty) can only be charged after the importing country has conducted a detailed investigation similar to that required for anti-dumping action. There are detailed rules for deciding whether a product is being subsidized (not always an easy calculation), criteria for determining whether imports of subsidized products are hurting (“causing injury to”) domestic industry, procedures for initiating and conducting investigations, and rules on the implementation and duration (normally five years) of countervailing measures. The subsidized exporter can also agree to raise its export prices as an alternative to its exports being charged countervailing duty.
Subsidies may play an important role in developing countries and in the transformation of centrally-planned economies to market economies. Least-developed countries and developing countries with less than $1,000 per capita GNP are exempted from disciplines on prohibited export subsidies. Other developing countries are given until 2003 to get rid of their export subsidies. Least-developed countries must eliminate import-substitution subsidies (i.e. subsidies designed to help domestic production and avoid importing) by 2003 — for other developing countries the deadline was Developing countries also receive preferential treatment if their exports are subject to countervailing duty investigations. For transition economies, prohibited subsidies had to be phased out by 2002.

18. * videoclip: U.S. Auto dumping case (1:34 min)
(4) AD-CVD’?
People sometimes refer to the two together — “AD-CVD” — but there are fundamental differences
Dumping and subsidies — together with anti-dumping (AD) measures and countervailing duties (CVD) — share a number of similarities. Many countries handle the two under a single law, apply a similar process to deal with them and give a single authority responsibility for investigations. Occasionally, the two WTO committees responsible for these issues meet jointly.
The reaction to dumping and subsidies is often a special offsetting import tax (countervailing duty in the case of a subsidy). This is charged on products from specific countries and therefore it breaks the GATT principles of binding a tariff and treating trading partners equally (MFN). The agreements provide an escape clause, but they both also say that before imposing a duty, the importing country must conduct a detailed investigation that shows properly that domestic industry is hurt.
But there are also fundamental differences, and these are reflected in the agreements.
Dumping is an action by a company. With subsidies, it is the government or a government agency that acts, either by paying out subsidies directly or by requiring companies to subsidize certain customers.
But the WTO is an organization of countries and their governments. The WTO does not deal with companies and cannot regulate companies’ actions such as dumping. Therefore the Anti-Dumping Agreement only concerns the actions governments may take against dumping. With subsidies, governments act on both sides: they subsidize and they act against each others’ subsidies. Therefore the subsidies agreement disciplines both the subsidies and the reactions.
* videoclip: U.S. Auto dumping case (1:34 min)

19. (5) Safeguards: GATT Article XIX
7. Safety valves for domestic pressures
(5) Safeguards: GATT Article XIX
Safeguard measures are defined as “emergency” actions with respect to increased imports of particular products, where such imports have caused or threaten to cause serious injury to the importing Member's domestic industry.
Article XIX Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of
the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement,
including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the
contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the
extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such
injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or
modify the concession.

20. Article XIX Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with
respect to a preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting
party in the circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph,
so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or
directly competitive products in the territory of a contracting party which
receives or received such preference, the importing contracting party shall
be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant
obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession in
respect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary
to prevent or remedy such injury.
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to
the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and
shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties
having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an
opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action. When
such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a preference,
the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action.

21. Article XIX Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with
respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes
to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if
such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall
then be free, not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to
suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written
notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the
application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in
the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the
contracting party requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent
concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of
which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this
paragraph, where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article
without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in the
territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers of products
affected by the action, that contracting party shall, where delay would
cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the
action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions or
other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.

22. (4) Safeguards: GATT Article XIX
7. Safety valves for domestic pressures
(4) Safeguards: GATT Article XIX
Safeguard measures are defined as “emergency” actions with respect to increased imports of particular products, where such imports have caused or threaten to cause serious injury to the importing Member's domestic industry.
Article XIX Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the
territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the
contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or
modify the concession.
제19조 특정상품의 수입에 대한 긴급조치 1. (a) 예견하지 못한 사태의 발전과 관세양허를 포함하여 이 협정 하에서 체약당사자가 지는 의무의 효과의 결과로 상품이 그 영토에서 동종 또는 직접적으로 경쟁적인 상품의 그 영토 내에서의 국내생산자에게 심각한 피해를 야기하거나 그 우려가 있을 정도로 증가된 물량과 조건하에서 동 체약당사자의 영토 내로 수입되고 있는 경우 동 체약당사자는 동 상품에 관하여, 그리고 이러한 피해를 방지하거나 구제하기 위하여 필요한 정도로 그리고 그 기간 동안 동 의무를 전부 또는 일부 정지하거나 양허를 철회하거나 수정할 자유가 있다

23. (b) 특혜에 관한 양허의 대상인 상품이 동 특혜를 받거나 받았던 체약당사자의 영토 내의 동종 또는 직접적으로 경쟁적인 상품의 국내생산자에게 심각한 피해를 야기하거나 그 우려가 있을 정도로 이 항 (a)호에 명시된 상황에서 체약당사자의 영토 내로 수입되고 있는 경우 동 수입체약당사자는 그 다른 체약당사자가 요청하면 이러한 피해를 방지하거나 구제하기 위하여 필요한 정도로 그리고 그 기간 동안 관련의무를 전부 또는 일부 정지하거나 양허를 철회하거나 수정할 자유가 있다. 2. 체약당사자는 이 조 제1항의 규정에 따라 조치를 취하기에 앞서 실행가능한 한 훨씬 이전에 서면으로 체약당사자단에 통보하고 체약당사자단과 당해 상품의 수출국으로서 실질적인 이해관계를 가지는 체약당사자에게 그 제의된 조치에 관하여 자신과 협의할 기회를 부여한다. 특혜에 관한 양허와 관련하여 이러한 통보가 행하여지는 때에는 동 통보에는 동 조치를 요청한 체약당사자가 거명되어야 한다. 지연시 회복하기 어려운 손상을 초래할 중대한 상황에서는, 이 조 제1항 하에서의 조치는 동 조치를 취한 후 즉시 협의가 이루어진다는 조건하에 사전협의 없이 잠정적으로 취하여질 수 있다
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of a contracting party which receives or received such preference, the importing contracting party shall
be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and
shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an
opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a preference,
the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action.

24. 3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with
3. (a) 이해관계를 가지는 체약당사자간에 동 조치에 관하여 합의가 이루어지지 아니하는 경우 동 조치를 취하거나 계속하겠다고 제의하는 체약당사자는 그럼에도 불구하고 그렇게 할 자유가 있으며, 동 조치가 취하여지거나 계속될 경우 영향을 받은 체약당사자는 동 조치가 취하여진 후 90일 이내에, 동 조치를 취하는 체약당사자의 무역에 대하여 또는 이 조 제1항(b)에서 예견된 경우에는 동 조치를 요청하는 체약당사자의 무역에 대하여, 그 정지를 체약당사자단이 불승인하지 아니하는 이 협정 하의 실질적으로 동등한 양허 또는 그밖의 의무의 적용을 체약당사자단이 동 정지에 대한 서면통보를 접수한 날로부터 30일이 만료된 때에 정지할 자유가 있다. (b) 이 항 (a)호의 규정에도 불구하고, 조치가 사전협의 없이 이 조 제2항 하에서 취하여지고 또한 동 조치에 의하여 영향을 받은 상품의 국내생산자에게 체약당사자의 영토 내에서 심각한 피해를 야기하거나 야기할 우려가 있는 경우, 동 체약당사자는 지연시 회복하기 어려운 손상을 초래할 경우에는 동 조치를 취할 때와 협의기간 내내 이러한 피해를 방지하거나 구제하는 데 필요할 수 있는 양허 또는 그밖의 의무를 정지할 자유가 있다
3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with
respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written
notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent
concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this
paragraph, where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall, where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the
action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.

25. (4) Safeguards: GATT Article XIX
In the technical language of WTO system, a safeguard is used to restrain international trade in order to protect a certain home industry from foreign competition. A member may take a “safeguard” action (e.g. restrict importation of a product temporarily) to protect a specific domestic industry from an increase in imports of any product which is causing, or which is threatening to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.
Safeguard measures were always available under GATT Article XIX. However, they were infrequently used, and some governments preferred to protect their industries through “grey area” measures (“voluntary” export restraint arrangements on products such as cars, steel and semiconductors). As part of the WTO deal, members gave up these “grey area” measures and adopted a specific WTO Safeguards Agreement which disciplines the use of safeguard measures.

26. (4) Safeguards: GATT Article XIX
Safeguards are usually seen as responses to fair trade behaviour, as opposed to unfair trade practices such as Dumping Subsidy
As such they are supposed to be used only in very specific circumstances, with compensation, and on a universal basis, i.e., a member restricting imports for safeguard purposes will have to restrict imports from all other countries. However, exceptions to this non-discriminatory rule are provided for in the Agreement on Safeguards itself as well as in some ad hoc agreements. In this last respect it is worthwhile noting that the People's Republic of China has accepted that discriminatory safeguards may be imposed on its exports to other WTO members until 2013.
Regional trading arrangements have their own rules relating to safeguards. Some safeguard measures can be resorted to in the area of services, as provided for in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

27. What Does Voluntary Export Restraint - VER Mean?
A trade restriction on the quantity of a good that an exporting country is allowed to export to another country. This limit is self-imposed by the exporting country. Typically, VERs are a result of requests made by the importing country to provide a measure of protection for its domestic businesses that produce substitute goods. VERs are often created because the exporting countries would prefer to impose their own restrictions than risk sustaining worse terms from tariffs and/or quotas. The most notable example of VERs is when Japan imposed a VER on its auto exports into the U.S. as a result of American pressure in the 1980s. The VER subsequently  gave the U.S. auto industry some protection against a flood of foreign competition. However, there are ways in which a company can avoid a VER. For example, the exporting country's company can always build a manufacturing plant in the country to which exports would be directed. By doing so, the company will no longer need to export goods, and should not be bound by its country's VER VERs are typically implemented on a bilateral basis, that is, on exports from one exporter to one importing country. VERs have been used since the 1930s at least, and have been applied to products ranging from textiles and footwear to steel, machine tools and automobiles. They became a popular form of protection during the 1980s, perhaps in part because they did not violate countries' agreements under the GATT. As a result of the Uruguay round in 1994, WTO members agreed not to implement any new VERs and to phase out any existing VERs over a four year period. Exceptions can be granted for one sector in each importing country.