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Gary Orr Manager Compliance Investigations

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1 Gary Orr Manager Compliance Investigations
Transhipment at Sea The Weakest Link? Gary Orr Manager Compliance Investigations Most countries now have systems in place to record catch by licenced fishing vessels in their EEZ’s and on the high seas. In the main, these systems rely on the vessel operator to accurately report catch and these figures are largely unchallenged other than where a fisheries observer is embarked or an inspection is undertaken, be it in port or at sea. One of the most significant weaknesses in any catch monitoring or recording scheme is transhipment, especially where that activity takes place other than in port

2 Transhipment Transhipment-at-sea allows many vessels to stay at sea for months, even years at a time, without ever entering port, thereby avoiding effective regulatory scrutiny. In the absence of checks and balances, this provides a real opportunity for illegality such as catch reporting, the smuggling of illicit goods, human trafficking and labour abuse. Transhipment creates uncertainty around the accuracy or credibility of reported catch, be it by volume or species, which has significant flow on effects for stock assessments and sustainability. This is particularly the case in some RFMOs where there are significant gaps on the high seas. For example, transhipment of CCAMLR species occurs across the globe but the regulation of it stops outside the CCAMLR convention area, a clear weakness in an otherwise robust system.

3 Misreporting or Theft? Where countries have licenced foreign vessels to fish within their EEZ, depending upon the terms and conditions of the licence, the misreporting or non-reporting of catch when transhipped should be regarded as theft of a valuable and often limited natural resource, rather than the softer label of misreporting.

4 Risk mitigation Prohibition Observers Electronic Monitoring
At-sea patrolling There are number of ways in which the risk associated with transhipment can be mitigated, including but not limited to; Prohibition of transhipment-at-sea for all licenced vessels fishing within an EEZ Mandatory observer coverage where operators intend to tranship Electronic monitoring on both the fishing vessel and the reefer At sea patrolling & inspection Stronger transhipment regulation by RFMOs on the high seas Stronger RFMO regulation

5 EEZ Prohibition A prohibition on transhipment within an EEZ would likely be resisted by the fishing industry as imposing greater cost on their fishing operation. This must be balanced against the even greater cost of the depletion of the resource, the loss of economic value to the licencing state and the long term sustainability of the fishery. Requiring vessels to enter port to tranship provides a cost effective opportunity to inspect catch records and reconcile those against actual catch, eliminating any opportunity to misreport. The port itself may not be one within the EEZ of the licencing state, rather it could by condition of the licence, be a port within the jurisdiction of another coastal state, with the agreement of that state. The FAO Port State Measures Agreement in fact allows for this very situation whereby one party to the Agreement can request another party to carry out that port inspection on their behalf.

6 Port Inspections With the fishing vessel in port, it becomes subject to the full range of regulatory oversight of the state such as the opportunity to ensure that there is no evidence of document fraud, human trafficking or labour abuse.

7 FAO Port State Measures Agreement
At the time I prepared this presentation, nearly sixty nations were party to the FAO Port State Measures Agreement which is a major achievement and provides us all with a genuine opportunity to reduce the levels of IUU fishing and to work collaboratively towards that goal. The agreement is a cost-effective tool for ensuring compliance with national law and RFMO conservation and management measures as well as providing for better and more effective cooperation and information exchange among coastal States, flag States and RFMO’s. There is however, a risk of displacement where effective MCS&E regimes drive illegal behaviour into other jurisdictions. That is a compelling reason for all nations to become parties to this agreement.

8 Observers Observer programmes have proven to be very effective with a very good example being that operated within CCAMLR where authorised vessels are required to carry two observers with one from the flag state and the second from another CCAMLR member state. This has provided a high degree of confidence in the accuracy of catch reporting and enhanced levels of compliance.

9 Electronic Monitoring
Developments in technology have seen the cost of implementing electronic monitoring of fishing vessels reduce significantly. Many countries, including my own, have either implemented or are in the process of doing so, wide ranging electronic monitoring measures which include position and catch reporting supported by video recording. As with prohibiting transhipment within the EEZ, the cost of implementing electronic monitoring has to be weighed against the cost of not doing so.

10 Patrolling For those of us who have worked in fisheries enforcement for many years, experience has taught that when a vessel comes into port, particular care is taken by the operators to ensure that everything is in order because of a greater chance of inspection. This is why it is so important to ensure that at-sea patrols involving boarding and inspection are undertaken, as frequently as possible. Patrols should be planned based on known or assessed risk and where there are joint EEZ boundaries, look to utilise sea-riders from the adjoining coastal state. A good example of how this can be achieved can be found in the Forum Fisheries Agency Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement. Likewise, nations that are able to provide maritime patrol assets for sustained periods of time, deploying them across both high seas areas and EEZ’s, should do so in conjunction with the coastal and flag states by either embarking sea-riders and/or sharing intelligence.

11 PROHIBITED? Transhipment
The most powerful tool however and probably the most controversial, is for all flag and coastal states to prohibit transhipment-at-sea, regardless of whether it is on the high seas or within the EEZ, other than where there are appropriate measures in place to mitigate the risk associated with this activity. The immediate benefit of such a prohibition is that analysis of fishing patterns and vessel movements will have a greater chance of detecting unauthorised transhipment. Such analysis is already succeeding in identifying anomalous fishing behaviour, providing authorities with an ability to focus their limited resources on high risk vessels.

12 Reefers When it comes to transhipment-at-sea there is no credible data on which we can rely when determining the scale of activity or the actual levels of non-compliance. A recent study of IUU fishing estimated the number of illegal transhipments in the southern Pacific longline fishery as anywhere between 200 to 1,000 per annum. Every nation present at this workshop must place a greater focus on those vessels that support fishing vessels at sea by way of transhipment. Of particular concern to us all should be those reefers that operate under flags of non-compliance.

13 Options It is essential that we as fishing nations, acknowledge the fact that when we work as individual nations, we are able to be exploited by those who seek out weaknesses in regulatory arrangements or limited MCS&E capacity. We must work harder to gain agreement across nations to employ consistent regulatory practices that work to ensure the sustainability of fish stocks and the associated economic benefits to the nations relying on those fish stocks, rather than permitting fishing practices that undermine these goals. We need to commit to working more closely with one another and sharing resources and information. As nations, we are limited by jurisdiction. Those exploiting fisheries have no such limitation. We therefore need to look to find ways to enable us to work collaboratively and across those very boundaries we created in the first place. Thank you for your time.


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