1. Secure Proactive Recovery – a Hardware Based Mission Assurance Scheme
Ruchika Mehresh1
Shambhu J. Upadhyaya1
Kevin Kwiat2
1Department of Computer Science and Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo, NY, USA
2Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome, NY, USA
Research Supported in Part by ITT Grant No J and NSF Grant No. DUE
6th International Conference on Information Warfare and Security, 2011

2. Outline Structure Motivation Threat model System design
Performance analysis
Conclusion

3. Motivation Mission assurance Goals Feasibility study
Survivability
Security
Fault tolerance
Low cost (Time overhead)
Adaptation and evolution
Feasibility study
Long running applications
Prevention  Detection  Recovery
Hardware-based
Smart defender

4. Outline Structure Motivation Threat model System design
Performance analysis
Conclusion

5. Byzantine fault tolerance
Threat Model
Time diversity
Spatial diversity
Reactive recovery
Proactive recovery
Byzantine fault tolerance

6. The Quiet Invader Smart attacker Quiet invader
Make decisions to maximize the potential of achieving their objectives based on dynamic information
Quiet invader
Camouflages to buy more time
Plan to attack mission during critical stage (Why?)
Example:
Long running countdown for a space shuttle launch that runs for several hours

7. Outline Structure Motivation Threat model System design
Performance analysis
Conclusion

8. Replica 3 Coordinator Replica 1 H C Replica 2 H C Replica 3 H C
Workload
Workload
Workload
Workload
Workload
Replica 1 H C
Replica 2 H C
Replica 3 H C
Replica n H C R R R R
Periodic checkpoint
Hardware Signature
Periodic checkpoint
Hardware Signature
Hardware Signature
Periodic checkpoint
Hardware Signature
Hardware Signature
Periodic checkpoint
Periodic checkpoint

9. Hardware Signature Generation
IDS
System reg

10. Outline Structure Motivation Threat model System design
Performance analysis
Conclusion

11. Performance Analysis Cases Workload
Case 1: Systems with no checkpointing
Case 2: Systems with checkpointing, no failures/attacks
Case 3: Systems with checkpointing, failures/attacks
Workload
Java SciMark 2.0 benchmark workloads: FFT, SOR, Sparse, LU
Multi-step simulation based evaluation approach [Reference: Mehresh, R., Upadhyaya, S. and Kwiat, K. (2010) “A Multi-Step Simulation Approach Toward Fault Tolerant system Evaluation”, Third International Workshop on Dependable Network Computing and Mobile Systems, October]

12. Results

13. Results FFT LU SOR Sparse Case 1 3421.09 222.69 13.6562 23.9479 Case 2
Table 1: Execution Times (in hours) for the Scimark workloads across three cases
Results
FFT LU
SOR
Sparse
Case 1
222.69
Case 2
226.36
Case 3 (M=10)
249.08
Case 3 (M=25)
233.83
Table : Execution times (in hours) for the Scimark workloads for the three cases

14. Results

15. Results

16. Results M=5 M=10 M=15 M=25 Optimal Checkpoint Interval (hours) 0.3 0.5
0.65
0.95
Execution Times(hours)
248.97
241.57
238.16
235.06
Table : Approximate optimal checkpoint interval values and their corresponding
workload execution times for LU (Case 3) at different values of M

17. Outline Structure Motivation Threat model System design
Performance analysis
Conclusion

18. Conclusion Low cost solution to secure proactive recovery
Mission survivability
Utilized redundant hardware
Small overhead in absence of failures
Effective preventive measure
Future work
To evaluate this scheme for a distributed system

19. Thank You !!