1. Trade barriers Barrières dissipatives QuotasRestrictions volontaires aux exportations Sanitary & Phytosanitary standards Product standards Droits de douane Barrières à capture étrangère Barrières à capture nationale Classification des barrières douanières Non-tariff barriers (NTB)

2. Prix mondial Quantities Prices World price plus tariff Demande nationale Tarif (droit de douane) Offre domestique AB D C Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs 1.Perfect competition Tariff under competition Quantity imported

3. Offre mondiale Quantities Prices World supply plus tariff Domestic demand Tariff Domestic supply curve A B D C Leffet dun tarif pour un grand pays Quantity imported Augmentation du prix intérieur

4. World price Quantities Prices Prix intérieur Domestic demand Marginal cost A B D Quota C Residual (after-quota) demand Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs 1.Perfect competition Quota under competition

5. Prix mondial Quantities Prices Domestic demand Marginal cost Recette marginale Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs 2. Monopoly Tariff under monopoly Prix mondial plus tarif Tariff ABDC Quantity imported

6. World price Quantities Prices Domestic price Domestic demand Marginal cost B Demande résiduelle (diminuée des importations) Quota A C D Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs 2. Monopoly Quota under monopoly

7. B World price Quantities Prices Domestic price Domestic demand Quota Marginal cost A C D Residual (after-quota) domestic demand Equivalence and non-equivalence of tariffs & QRs 2. Monopoly Quota under monopoly

8. Source: Kee, Nicita & Olarreaga 2006a (a) Ad-valorem equivalent of core NTBs, by GDP/capita of using country (b) AVE of agricultural price-support measures Use of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)

9. OTRI and MA-OTRI by level of income (a) OTRI(b) MA-OTRI

10. Special-interest groups: The common-agency model Import- competing lobby 1 (intermediate) Import- competing lobby 2 (final good) Export lobby Consumers Competing principals Protection of sector 1 Protection of sector 2 but not 1 sell to Market access Free imports Government authorities Common agent Campaign contributions Welfare Information What they want What it is interested in

11. Transparency & access Why more lobbying may be good in the common-agency model Social welfare Proportion of population organized politically 0% (no special- interest interference) 100% (everyone organized) First best (free trade for a small economy) pessimum Unbalanced lobbying More access to policy