Combined Lecture Slides: Weeks

Combined Lecture Slides: Weeks 08 - 10
Psychology 355: Cognitive Psychology Spring 2018 Instructor: John Miyamoto Combined Slide File = <\p355\lec cmb.p355.spr18.pptm> Note: This Powerpoint presentation may contain macros that I wrote to help me create the slides. The macros aren’t needed to view the slides. You can disable or delete the macros without any change to the presentation.

Lecture 08-1 This file does not exist because Midterm 2 was on day 1 of Week 8. Therefore there are no lecture slides for this date. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '15

Next: Lecture Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '15

Introduction to Categorization Theory (Goldstein Ch 9: Knowledge)
Psychology 355: Cognitive Psychology Instructor: John Miyamoto 05/15/2018: Lecture 08-2 Note: This Powerpoint presentation may contain macros that I wrote to help me create the slides. The macros aren’t needed to view the slides. You can disable or delete the macros without any change to the presentation.

Outline Categorization – what is it?
Discussed Last Week Categorization – what is it? How are objects placed into categories? The definitional theory of categorization Problems with the definitional theory of categorization Prototype theory of categorization Exemplar theory of categorization Today Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 ##

Definitional Approach to Categorization Has Problems as a Basis for a Psychological Model
How do we discover the definitions? For many categories, it is doubtful that necessary and sufficient features exist. Example: If we call someone "friendly," what are necessary and sufficient features for calling someone friendly? The definitional approach cannot explain typicality effects in categorization. E.g., it does not explain typicality effects in categorization response time. See the Rosch color priming study to be described later. E.g., it does not explain typicality effects in semantic memory experiments (Goldstein calls this the "sentence verification technique"). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Prototype Theory of Categorization

Prototype Theory of Categorization
Cognitive psychologists were dissatisfied with the definitional approach to representing cognitive categories. Eleanor Rosch: Categories are organized around a category prototype. Category prototype represents typical features of category members. Family resemblances. Next: Digression regarding family resemblances Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Family Resemblance Idea - Background

Family Resemblance Idea - Background
Composite A "family resemblance" photograph – popular in late 19th & early 20th century. Take multiple exposure photo of all family members. Only the common features are retained. The photo looks like everyone in the family, but is not any one person. Images downloaded from: Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Continuation of Present Slide with Composite Image

Family Resemblance Idea - Background
Composite A "family resemblance" photograph – popular in late 19th & early 20th century. Take multiple exposure photo of all family members. Only the common features are retained. The photo looks like everyone in the family, but is not any one person. Ludwig Wittgenstein – early 20th century philosopher. Proposed that the structure of a concept is like a family resemblance photo. Images downloaded from: Paul Wittgenstein Concert pianist Lost right arm in WW I Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Family Resemblance in Concept Theory

Family Resemblance & Concepts
Famous example: Wittgenstein says that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a "game", but there is a family resemblance among games. Playing checkers or bridge; playing football; skipping rope; children play acting as if, e.g., having a tea party; trash talking Similarly, there are no necessary & sufficient conditions for something to be a chair, but there is a family resemblance among chairs. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Return to Slide Showing the Prototype Theory of Categorization

Prototype Theory of Categorization
Eleanor Rosch proposed: cognitive representations of categories are like family resemblances. categories have prototypes – category structure is created by the relationship between category members and the category prototype. Prototypes (mental representation of a concept) are like family resemblance photographs – they retain the typical characteristics of many particular examples. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Examples of Birds & the Prototypical Bird Image

A Prototypical "Bird" Image (for an Urban American)
The prototypical "bird" image is simililar to the average of many bird images. Not Prototypical "Bird" Image Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Basic Claim of Prototype Theory

Basic Claim of Prototype Theory
Categorization decisions are based on the similarity of a specific instance to the prototype of a category. Is it a bird? compare compare Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Two Basic Questions (Not Answered in Psych 355)

Two Basic Questions (not answered in Psych 355)
"Similarity to the Prototype" – What does this mean? What does it mean to "mentally compute" the similarity between two things? How do we (psychologists) figure out the properties of a category prototype? There is no single best method. Here are two ways. Typicality Ratings: Subjects rate how typical various objects are of a category, e.g., rate the degree to which robins (or penguins) are typical birds. Prototypical objects are high in rated typicality. Property listing: Ask subjects to list the properties of category members, e.g., list the properties of "robin", "penguin", "eagle", "ostrich" "hawk", "sparrow", etc. Assumption: The commonly listed properties are the properties of the prototype. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summarize Evidence for Prototype Theory

Evidence for a Prototype Theory of Categorization
Semantic memory experiment: (Goldstein calls this the sentence verification technique) Dependent variable = response time for deciding whether a sentence is true or false. Subjects are faster to verify that prototypical objects are in a category than non-prototypical objects. “A sparrow is a bird" – FAST; "A penguin is a bird" – SLOW Prototypical objects have high family resemblance (share many properties) with other category members. List features of sparrows – share many features with other birds List features of penguins – share fewer features with other birds Prototypical objects are named first if subjects are asked to list examples of a category. List types of birds: Robin, sparrow, hawk, eagle, ....., penguin, ostrich, ... Category names prime prototypical objects more than non-prototypical objects. (See next slides.) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Digression – What Is Priming?

Digression – What is Priming?
Definition: Priming is the facilitation of the response to Stimulus B by prior exposure to a similar Stimulus A. How is priming used in the study of cognitive processes? Priming can be used to measure the degree to which two stimuli, A and B, are psychologically similar. Priming can be used to measure the degree to which two cognitive tasks, X and Y, require overlapping cognitive processes. (Example is given on the following slides.) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Rosch's Color Priming Experiment

Rosch – Priming with Color Matching Task
Task: Say "yes" if I present two identical colors Say "no" if I present two non-identical colors. Unprimed Condition (no priming stimulus) Prime Stimulus Response "yes" "no" Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Primed Condition in the Color Matching Task

Rosch – Priming with Color Matching Task (cont.)
Task: Say "yes" if I present two identical colors Say "no" if I present two non-identical colors. Primed Condition (the priming stimulus is logically irrelevant) Prime Stimulus Response "green" spoken aloud "yes" "pink" spoken aloud "no" Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Results for Priming with Color Matching

Results: Priming with Color Matching Task
Effect of Priming is measured as the difference in RT between the unprimed and the primed stimulus Finding: The word "green" primes the "yes" response for matching greens, but it does this more for prototypical greens than for less typical greens. "green" spoken aloud primes "yes" for more than: priming helps a lot priming helps, but not as much Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Theoretical Interpretation of Results for Priming & Color Matching

Theoretical Interpretation of Priming in Color Matching
Step 1. Subject hears the prime word "green" Theory: Subject automatically thinks of a prototypical version of the color, e.g., Step 2. Subject sees the target pair: If the target pair is close in color to the prototype, e.g., is close to , then the subject is primed to see the color of the target pair, so the subject is very fast to see that the colors match. If it is not close in color to the prototype, e.g., is not close to , then the subject is less primed to see the color of the target pair, so the subject is slower to see that the colors match. Conclusion: The spoken category name, "green", causes the subject to produce a mental representation of the prototype of "green." or Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Schematic Diagram of this Theoretical Interpretation

Theoretical Model for the Priming in Color Matching (cont.)
Target Stimulus Priming Stimulus Prime Other Colors that are Similar to the Prototype of Green Access the Prototype for the Green Color Hear "Green" Spoken Aloud Main Point: Categorizations activate prototypes. Prototypes prime judgments for stimuli that are similar to the prototype. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary of Prototype Theory

Summary of the Prototype Theory of Categorization
Basic claim: Categorization judgments are based on the similarity of an object to a prototype. EVIDENCE Semantic memory experiment (Goldstein calls this the sentence verification technique) Prototypical objects have high family resemblance (share many properties) with other category members. Prototypical objects are named first if subjects are asked to list examples of a category. Category names prime prototypical objects more than non-prototypical objects. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Exemplar Theory of Categorization

Exemplar Theories of Categorization – Basic Idea
Exemplar theory is a competitor to prototype theory. Main claims of exemplar (instance) theories: Category judgments are not based on a process of prototype abstraction and similarity of new objects to a prototype. Category judgments are based on the similarity of new objects to a sample of previously encountered exemplars. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Example of Categorization by Exemplar Model – Am I Looking at a Dog?

How Exemplars Lead to Categorization
Retrieve 3 Non-Dog Exemplars Retrieve 4 Dog Exemplars What is it? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Idea Written Out Verbally

Exemplar Theory of Categorization - Example
Suppose we are trying to decide whether object A is a member of category X. E.g., X is a shaggy, four-legged creature. Is X a dog? Exemplar theory says we do the following: Retrieve memories of specific dogs (exemplars) that we have encountered. Retrieve memories of relevant non-dogs, e.g., memory of a cat; memory of a stuffed animal; memory of a raccoon; etc. Mentally compute the total similarity of the current instance to memories of positive and negative exemplars (exemplars of dogs and non-dogs). Decide that X is a dog if X is more similar to the memories of dogs than to memories of relevant non-dogs. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary of Exemplar Theory

Prototype Theory and Exemplar Theory Both Predict the Main Findings in Categorization Studies
Semantic memory experiment (sentence verification) Which statements are easier or harder to verify? (Faster or slower RT) Prototypical objects have high family resemblance with other category members. I.e., prototypical objects share many features with other category members. Prototypical objects are named first if subjects are asked to list examples of a category. Category names prime prototypical objects more than non-prototypical objects. All of the above can be predicted by prototype theory and exemplar theory. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Comparison of Prototype Theory to Exemplar Theory - END

Contrast Between Prototype Theory and Exemplar Theory
Both theories claim that categorization judgments are based on a judgment of similarity. Prototype theory – categorization based on similarity of object to the prototype of a category. Exemplar theory – categorization based on total similarity of object to exemplars of the category and contrast categories. Prototype theory – Category structure base on prototypes Exemplar theory assumes only that we can retrieve memories of specific instances of a category. Categorization based on similarity to these remembered instances. Exemplar theory – no abstraction of prototypes Maybe both theories are true but for different situations. Some evidence suggests that exemplar theory is better for small categories (U.S. presidents) than for large categories (birds). Also exemplar theory may be better for categories with lots of variation (games). Some evidence suggests that prototype theories are better as descriptions of early learning of categories, but later use of category begins to accumulate special case exceptions (exemplars). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 END - OR Time Permitting, Present Example of Race Priming

Time Permitting: Case of Amadou Diallo
Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Case of Amadou Diallo

Case of Amadou Diallo Source: Events took place 2/4/1999. Amadou Diallo – 23 year old immigrant from Guinea. Diallo matched description of a dangerous serial rapist in NY city. 4 plain-clothes NY police officers shout at Diallo to stop & show hands Diallo ignored officers; ran up steps to porch in front of apartment; lighting on porch was bad One police officer thought Diallo had pulled out a gun, so he yelled “gun”. Officers shot at Diallo. During the shooting, one officer slipped and fell backwards, causing other officers to think he had been shot. Later it was found that Diallo was not holding a gun. He was holding his brown wallet. Officers fired 41 shot; Diallo was hit 19 times and died. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Payne’s Study of Race Priming of Weapons Identification

Race Priming of Weapons Categorization
Payne, B. K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, Payne (2001): Weapon versus non-weapon identification. Dependent variable = response time. Subjects: 24 women, 7 men (all white) Question: Is there an automatic association between black faces and weapons? * Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 2 x 2 Design: {Priming Stimulus} x {Test Stimulus}

Payne, B. K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, Priming Stimulus Test Stimuli X X * TASK: Decide whether the test stimulus is a weapon or a tool. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Response Time Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Arrangement of Results in a 2 x 2 Table

Payne, B. K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, Prime is White Prime is Black RT? Test Stimulus is a Weapon * Test Stimulus is a Tool TASK: Decide whether the test stimulus is a weapon or a tool. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Response Time Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Results for Race Priming

Payne, B. K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, Prime is White Prime is Black 441 423 446 454 > Test Stimulus is a Weapon * < Test Stimulus is a Tool Weapon identification is faster when the prime is black. Non-weapon identification is faster when the prime is white. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Results for Race Priming

Theoretical Model for the Race Priming Experiment
Target Stimulus (Object in Hand) Priming Stimulus (Face) Access the Prototype for the Race & Gender of Individual Prime Other Judgments About the Individual Perceiving the Race of an Individual Main Point: Categorizations can affect important decisions. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 END

Representational Hypotheses in Cognitive Psychology

Lecture probably ends here
Outline Representational hypotheses - what are they? The centrality of human language capacity in the theory of cognition Semantic network models - a very brief discussion Is there a basic level in human conceptual representations? Neuropsychological representations of categories and concepts Lecture probably ends here Cognitive Theory = { Representational Hypotheses + Processing Hypotheses } Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr ‘18

Representational Hypotheses in Cog Psych
Assumption: Cognitive ability is based on the ability to create, store, retrieve and manipulate a variety of mental representations. Representational Hypotheses Cognitive Theory = Plus Processing Hypotheses Example: Phonological Loop Representational Hypothesis: Speech sounds Processing Hypotheses: Rehearsal, capacity limits, interference Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '15 Mental Representations & Their Uses

Levels of Representation in Language
Theories of human language capacity propose representational hypotheses at many levels. Articulatory and acoustical phonetics - the study of the muscular coordination in speech and acoustical patterns in the speech signal. Phonology - the study of the sound structures of languages. Syntax - theories of sentence structure and its relation to speech context and meaning. Semantics - theories of the relation between language structure and meaning. Psych 355,, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Language-Like Representations in Cognition

Symbolic Representations in Cognition
The motor theory of speech comprehension: A link between speech production and speech comprehension. Models of language syntax Cognitive, computational and/or neuropsych models of language processing with emphasis on sentence structure. Inference in language use - is it a logic? is it a computer program? The modeling of human language capacity is a major concern of cognitive science. Cognitive psychology is part of cognitive science; Other parts include philosophy, linguistics, computer science, neuroscience, anthropology. Psych 355,, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Semantic Networks & Connectionist Models

Semantic Networks & Connectionist Models
SKIM Semantic networks & connectionist models – Two different approaches to modeling concept structure. Semantic networks & connectionist models use different formalisms. Spreading activation – activation of some concepts causes activation in associated concepts. Connectionist models focus on learning concept structure. [This topic will be omitted from Psych 355 this quarter.] Semantic networks focus on modeling human concept structure without modeling how we learn this structure. Psych 355 will briefly discuss semantic network models and ignore connectionist models. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Semantic Network Models

Semantic Network Models
Concepts are arranged in networks that represent the way concepts are organized in the mind. Any specific network model must explain: what is the relationship between the structure of the network and human thinking or behavior; what are the rules by which representations are constructed within the model; how to derive predictions from the model to different aspects of human behavior. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Example of a Semantic Network

Example of a Semantic Network
SKIM Goldstein Figure 9.12 Collins and Quillian (1969) Model for how concepts and properties are associated in the mind Node = category/concept Concepts are linked Cognitive economy: shared properties are only stored at higher-level nodes Exceptions are stored at lower nodes Inheritance Lower-level items share properties of higher-level items Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Using a Semantic Network to Predict Sentence Verification
Goldstein Figure 9.13 (top) & 9.14 (bottom) Collins & Quillian (1969) Measure response time to verify whether sentence is TRUE or FALSE ("sentence verification" or "semantic memory") Spreading Activation Theory: Activation is the arousal level of a node When a node is activated, activity spreads out along all connected links Concepts that receive activation are primed and more easily accessed from memory SKIM Summary re Semantic Networks Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Summary re Semantic Network Models
Concepts are represented as nodes in a semantic network. What do semantic network models (SNM's) do? SNM's explain the relationship between the network structure and human reasoning and behavior. SNM's yield predictions for cognitive experiments like semantic memory experiments, categorization judgments and causal inferences. SNM's can be part of a learning model that predict how a learner learns new concepts and conceptual relationships. There are many different SNM's that are devised for different research problems. They tend to be complicated. Psych 355,, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Is There a Basic Level of Categorization?

Is There a Basic Level in Categorization?
Categories can often be arranged from higher-level superordinate categories (more inclusive) to lower-level subordinate categories (less inclusive; more specific). Eleanor Rosch asked: Is there a basic level of categorization at which we habitually categorize the objects in our experience? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Basic Level Versus Superordinate Level: Amount of Feature Sharing

What Defines the Basic Level of Categorization?
Hypothesis: The basic level is the highest level at which category members share many features within the category while also being very different from objects in other categories at the same level. Two Factors that Determine the Basic Level: Within a basic level category, objects share many features with each other. Between different categories at the basic level, objects are very different from each other. Basic Level Versus Subordinate Level: Amount of Feature Sharing Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Hypothesis: The basic level is the highest level at which category members share many features within the category while also being very different from objects in other categories at the same level. Two Factors that Determine the Basic Level: Within a basic level category, objects share many features with each other. Between different categories at the basic level, objects are very different from each other. Same Slide Without Emphasis Rectangles Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Hypothesis: The basic level is the highest level at which category members share many features within the category while also being very different from objects in other categories at the same level. Two Factors that Determine the Basic Level: Within a basic level category, objects share many features with each other. Between different categories at the basic level, objects are very different from each other. Information Gain at Different Levels of Categorization Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Information Provided by Categorizations at Different Levels
If you categorize something at the superordinate level, e.g., "furniture," instead of at the basic level, e.g., "table," you lose a lot of information about the object. If you categorize something at a subordinate level, e.g., "kitchen table," instead of at the basic level, e.g., "table," you don't gain a lot of information about the object. Concrete Example with Images of a Bull Do and a Pickup Truck Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

What Is It? Possible Answers Possible Answers An animal
Superordinate level A vehicle Superordinate level A dog Basic level A car Basic level A bulldog Subordinate level A Toyota Camry Subordinate level Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Return to Diagram Showing Superordinate, Basic & Subordinate Levels

Information Provided by Categorizations at Different Levels
The basic level is the level at which we routinely categorize objects. We are capable of categorizing objects at superordinate or subordinate levels, if required to do so by a situation or task. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Criteria for Basic Level: Feature Listing

Behavioral Criteria for Basic Level Categories
SKIM Criterion 1 (Feature-Listing): Ask subjects to list features of objects in a category Category Name = (fill in the blank, e.g., “furniture” or “chair”) Instruction: “List as many characteristics or attributes that you can think of which describe the object.” Examples Categorization: FURNITURE “List as many characteristics or attributes that you can think of which describe furniture.” Categorization: CHAIR “List as many characteristics or attributes that you can think of which describe chairs.” Categorization: ARMCHAIR Superordinate Level Basic Level Subordinate Level The instructions for the feature listing task were taken from Exp 1 of Tanaka & Taylor (1991), cited in the notes to the next slide. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Behavioral Criteria: Basic Level has Greatest Gain in Features

Behavioral Criteria for Basic Level Categories (cont.)
SKIM Criterion 1 (Feature-Listing): Ask subjects to list features of objects in a category Category Name = (fill in the blank, e.g., “furniture” or “chair”) Instruction: “List as many characteristics or attributes that you can think of which describe the object.” Characteristic of the basic level: Superordinate level – relatively few features are listed (not many features of “furniture”) Basic level – many features are listed (Many features associated with “chairs”) Subordinate level – may have more features than the basic level but the increase is relatively small. (Features listed for “armchair” are not many more than features listed for “chair”) The instructions for the feature listing task were taken from Exp 1 of Tanaka & Taylor (1991), cited in the notes to the next slide. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Behavioral Criteria: Free Naming

Behavioral Criteria for Basic Level Categories (cont.)
SKIM Criterion 2 (Free Naming): Ask subjects to name a picture of an object Instruction: “What would you call this?” [show image of an object] Characteristics of the Basic Level: The basic level is the most commonly used category label. Example Show subject a picture of an armchair. The response “chair” is more likely than the response “furniture”. The response “chair” is more likely than the response “armchair”. The instructions for the feature listing task were taken from Exp 1 of Tanaka & Taylor (1991), cited in the notes to the next slide. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Behavioral Criteria: Category Verification Time

SKIM Criterion 3 (Category Verification): Measure response time for deciding whether an image is an example of a given category Examples 1st subject hears “FURNITURE” Next subject sees picture of an armchair. Correct response = TRUE 1st subject hears “CHAIR” 1st subject hears “ARMCHAIR” Superordinate Level Basic Level Subordinate Level The instructions for the feature listing task were taken from Exp 1 of Tanaka & Taylor (1991), cited in the notes to the next slide. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Behavioral Criteria: Category Verification Time – Basic level Fastest

SKIM Criterion 3 (Category Verification): Measure response time for deciding whether an image is an example of a given category Categorization decisions are fastest at the basic level. 1st subject hears “FURNITURE” Next subject sees picture of an armchair. Correct response = TRUE 1st subject hears “CHAIR” 1st subject hears “ARMCHAIR” Superordinate Level Basic Level Subordinate Level The instructions for the feature listing task were taken from Exp 1 of Tanaka & Taylor (1991), cited in the notes to the next slide. Slower Categorization Response Fastest Categorization Response Slower Categorization Response Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Behavioral Criteria: Summary

Summary: Behavioral Criteria for Basic Level Categories .
SKIM Criterion 1 (Feature-Listing) Criterion 2 (Free Naming) Criterion 3 (Category Verification) The instructions for the feature listing task were taken from Exp 1 of Tanaka & Taylor (1991), cited in the notes to the next slide. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Expert Versus Non-Experts

The Basic Level May Not Be the Same for Experts & Non-Experts
Tanaka and Taylor (1991): Bird experts use specific bird species, e.g., "eagle", "hawk", etc., as if they are the basic level. For the average person, "bird" is basic level, but not for bird experts. Experts Non-Experts Tanaka, J. W., & Taylor, M. (1991). Object categories and expertise: Is the basic level in the eye of the beholder? Cognitive Psychology, 23, basic specific Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide Without Emphasis Rectangles

The Basic Level May Not Be the Same for Experts & Non-Experts
Tanaka and Taylor (1991): Bird experts use specific bird species, e.g., "eagle", "hawk", etc., as if they are the basic level. For the average person, "bird" is basic level, but not for bird experts. basic specific Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 There May Be Cultural Differences in Categorization

There can be systematic cultural differences in category knowledge
Medin et al. compared Native American (Menominee Indian) and Euro-American fish experts (fisherman). Euro-American experts tended to sort fish into goal-related categories, e.g., game fish and non-game fish. "Native American fish experts ... tended to sort ecologically and were more likely to see positive and reciprocal ecological relations," e.g., fish that live together or live in predator-prey relations. Itza Maya in Guatemala categorize birds at a lower level than do typical Americans. Basic level for Itza Maya is the subordinate level for Americans. E.g., Itza Maya would say "red hawk" where an American would say "bird." Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary re Category Structure

Summary re Category Structure
The "basic level" of categorization is the level of category structure that is used habitually by members of a given culture. The objects that are grouped together in a basic level category .... share many properties with other objects in the category, i.e., different chairs share many important properties with each other, and .... differ in important ways from objects in other categories at the same level, e.g., chairs differ in important ways from tables, lamps, cars, etc. The basic level can differ between experts and non-experts in a domain, or between members of different cultures. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 What Is the Neural Representation of Category Knowledge?

Wednesday, 16 May, 2018: The Lecture Ended Here
Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

What Is the Neural Representation of Category Knowledge?
Are there object-specific or person-specific neural representations? Are there specific neurons that are sensitive to specific objects or persons? Are there grandmother cells? How is knowledge of categories of objects represented at the neural level? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Category Specific Neurons

Evidence for Category-Specific Neurons
Kreiman, G., Koch, C., & Fried, I. (2000). Single-cell recordings from 11 epilepsy patients awaiting surgery. Neurons found in the temporal lobe that respond best to specific classes of objects. Category-specific neurons for: faces; famous faces; animals; cars; buildings; spatial layouts; abstract patterns Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Multimodal Category Representations

Multimodal Category Representations
Category knowledge includes knowledge of .... an object's visual appearance, e.g., what a dog looks like; typical sounds, e.g., what kinds of sounds you would expect from a dog; function, e.g., what you would use a hammer for; smell, e.g., what a dog smells like; what a flower smells like; what a fire smells like; taste, especially true of foods typical body actions that relate to it, e.g., we have a representation of the body actions with respect to a hammer, a chair, a chest of drawers Multimodal representations involve multiple sensory modes, vision, audition, touch, kinesthesis, and so forth. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Example: The Grasping Circuit

Example of a Multimodal Category Representation: The Grasping Circuit for Manipulable Objects
The Grasping Circuit – a neural circuit associated with use of manipulable objects, like hammers, screwdrivers, tennis rackets, etc. Involves pathways in parietal cortex Question: Are the neural circuits involved in handling a hammer part of the category representation of "hammer"? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 fMRI Images While Viewing Hammers, Buildings, Animals & People,

Neural Evidence for Multimodal Representations of Category Knowledge
Hammer use activates the left ventral premotor cortex & left posterior parietal cortex (grasping circuit). Subjects are immobile in the scanner so they could not grasp anything. Nevertheless, viewing a hammer activated the grasping circuit. Supports the hypothesis that we activate object-appropriate motor association areas when we access category knowledge. Supports the view that category knowledge is multimodal. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary: Neural Representations of Category Knowledge – END

Summary – Neural Representations of Category Knowledge
Some neurons may be specific to particular people or objects. (Controversial Issue) Some neural mechanisms are specific to particular kinds of objects. Not necessarily single neurons – the mechanism may involve distributed processing. Neural category representations are multimodal. As yet, we only have a preliminary understanding of neural representations of category knowledge. This is a good field for someone with a scientific pioneering spirit. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 END

1st: Neuropsychological Evidence for Category Structure 2nd: The Functional Role of Mental Imagery

Outline What parts of Chapters 9 and 10 are required for Quiz 6 (Monday May 21)? Neuropsychological evidence for category representations. Mental Imagery Imagery Debate – Do mental images play a functional role in human cognition? Evidence in favor of the functional role of imagery. Are perception and mental imagery similar processes? Behavioral evidence Neuropsychological evidence Lecture probably ends here Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr ‘18 What Parts of Chapters 9 and 10 are Required on Quiz 6?

Which topics will be on Quiz 6 (Monday May 21)?
Answer is given on a pdf document on the Psych 355 webpage: A link to this document has been placed under the Week 8 section of the Psych 355 webpage. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 What Is the Neural Representation of Category Knowledge?

What Is the Neural Representation of Category Knowledge?
Are there object-specific or person-specific neural representations? Are there specific neurons that are sensitive to specific objects or persons? Are there grandmother cells? How is knowledge of categories of objects represented at the neural level? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Category Specific Neurons

Evidence for Category-Specific Neurons
Kreiman, G., Koch, C., & Fried, I. (2000). Single-cell recordings from 11 epilepsy patients awaiting surgery. Neurons found in the temporal lobe that respond best to specific classes of objects. Category-specific neurons for: faces; famous faces; animals; cars; buildings; spatial layouts; abstract patterns Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Multimodal Category Representations

Multimodal Category Representations
Category knowledge includes knowledge of .... an object's visual appearance, e.g., what a dog looks like; typical sounds, e.g., what kinds of sounds you would expect from a dog; function, e.g., what you would use a hammer for; smell, e.g., what a dog smells like; what a flower smells like; what a fire smells like; taste, especially true of foods typical body actions that relate to it, e.g., we have a representation of the body actions with respect to a hammer, a chair, a chest of drawers Multimodal representations involve multiple sensory modes, vision, audition, touch, kinesthesis, and so forth. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Example: The Grasping Circuit

Example of a Multimodal Category Representation: The Grasping Circuit for Manipulable Objects
The Grasping Circuit – a neural circuit associated with use of manipulable objects, like hammers, screwdrivers, tennis rackets, etc. Involves pathways in parietal cortex Question: Are the neural circuits involved in handling a hammer part of the category representation of "hammer"? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 fMRI Images While Viewing Hammers, Buildings, Animals & People

Neural Evidence for Multimodal Representations of Category Knowledge
Hammer use activates the left ventral premotor cortex & left posterior parietal cortex (grasping circuit). Subjects are immobile in the scanner so they could not grasp anything. Nevertheless, viewing a hammer activated the grasping circuit. Supports the hypothesis that we activate object-appropriate motor association areas when we access category knowledge. Supports the view that category knowledge is multimodal. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary: Neural Representations of Category Knowledge

Summary – Neural Representations of Category Knowledge
Some neurons may be specific to particular people or objects. (Controversial Issue) Some neural mechanisms are specific to particular kinds of objects. Not necessarily single neurons – the mechanism may involve distributed processing. Neural category representations are multimodal. As yet, we only have a preliminary understanding of neural representations of category knowledge. This is a good field for someone with a scientific pioneering spirit. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Mental Images - What Are They?

Mental Images – What Are They?
Mental Imagery: Experiencing a sensory impression in the absence of sensory input Visual imagery: “seeing” in the absence of a visual stimulus Auditory imagery: "hearing" in the absense of an auditory stimulus e.g., hearing music in your head. Tactile imagery: Imagining what something feels like, e.g., petting a cat. Olfactory imagery: Imagining what something smells like, e.g., smelling a rose. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Table Showing the Pro and Con View of the Functional Importance of Imagery

The Debate Over Mental Imagery
Pro-Mental Imagery Anti-Mental Imagery Mental images play a functional role in human cognition – they play an important role in memory, problem solving and reasoning. Advocated by Stephen Kosslyn Mental images are epiphenomenal; Mental images accompany real mechanism but play no functional role. Cognitive theory does not need a theory of mental images. Advocated by Zenon Pylyshyn Human cognition makes use of mental images and propositional representations. All cognitive representations are propositional representation. Same Slide with Emphasis Rectangles Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

The Debate Over Mental Imagery
Pro-Mental Imagery Anti-Mental Imagery Mental images play a functional role in human cognition – they play an important role in memory, problem solving and reasoning. Advocated by Stephen Kosslyn Mental images are epiphenomenal; Mental images accompany real mechanism but play no functional role. Cognitive theory does not need a theory of mental images. Advocated by Zenon Pylyshyn Human cognition makes use of mental images and propositional representations. All cognitive representations are propositional representation. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Review: Basic Pattern of Argument in the Imagery Debate

Basic Approach to Arguing for the Functional Role of Mental Imagery
Find behavioral or neuropsychological evidence that is ... easy to explain if we assume that humans possess and use perception- based representations, but ... hard to explain if we assume that we have only propositional representations. In general, these arguments are not air tight, but they can be strong and convincing. Example of Ptolmaic circles in astronomy Related Hypothesis: Humans use analog representations. I.e., Humans use representations that are analogous to working with real physical objects. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Review: Shepard's Mental Rotation Study

Shepard's Mental Rotation Experiments
TASK: As quickly as possible, decide whether the two figures have the same shape or different shapes. Mental rotation experiments: Influential argument for the importance of mental imagery in cognitive processes. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Review: Mental Rotation Experiment - Results

Mental Rotation - Results
2-D Rotation 3-D Rotation Angle of Rotation (Degrees) Mean Reaction Time (sec.) Response time for "identical" figures is a linear (straight-line) function of the angle of rotation between the figures. Result is easy to explain if subjects are rotating a mental image. Result is hard to explain if mental representation is exclusively propositional. Image Scanning – Kosslyn's Experiment with Island Map Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Mental Scanning (Image Scanning)
Distance (cm) Response Time (sec) Figure 10.4: Image scanning is discussed in Goldstein, pp Subjects study the map of the island. Then take it away. Using only the mental image of the island, imagine a dot moving from one point to another, e.g., from the mountain to the tree. Push a button when you are done. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Zooming In or Zooming Out on a Mental Image

Zooming In and Zooming Out on a Mental Image
Top: Imagine a rabbit next to an elephant. Yes or No: Does the rabbit have whiskers? Bottom: Imagine a rabbit next to a fly. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide with Results Added

Zooming In and Zooming Out on a Mental Image
Top: Imagine a rabbit next to an elephant. Yes or No: Does the rabbit have whiskers? Bottom: Imagine a rabbit next to a fly. RT result is hard to explain if you assume that information is retrieved from a semantic network without imagery. RT = 2,020 ms slower RT = 1,870 ms faster Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Can Imagery Prime Perception

Can Imagery Prime Perception?
Priming – Stimulus A can prime Stimulus B if A is similar to B. Why? Theoretical reason is that A and B activate similar brain areas or processes, so the recent activation by A facilitates the processing of Stimulus B. Question: Can imagining a visual representation prime the perception of a real visual stimulus? Farah, M. J. (1985). Psychophysical evidence for a shared representational medium for mental images and percepts. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114, Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Farah's Demonstration that Imagery Can Prime Perception

Images Can Act as Primes for Real Visual Displays
H Step (a): Create mental image of H or T while staring at a blank screen. Step (b): After forming a good image, subject presses a button that causes 2 screens to be displayed one after the other. One screen has an H or a T, the other screen is blank. Task: Say whether the letter was on the 1st or the 2nd screen. "1" "2" "1" "2" Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Will Priming Occur?

Images Can Act as Primes for Real Visual Displays
H Will priming occur? Will these responses be less accurate? Will these responses be more accurate? Results of Farah's Experiment Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Results: Images Act as Primes for Real Visual Displays
% Correct Detection Results: When mental image is same as target, percent correct is higher. Interpretation: Forming the mental image requires similar brain activity to actual perception. Therefore forming the mental image primes the perception of the target. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Conclusion: Imagery Plays a Functional Role in Cognition

Yes – Mental Imagery Plays a Functional Role in Cognition
Lots of evidence – Image scanning (RT pattern consistent with mental image) Zooming in or out with image (RT pattern consistent with mental image) Image can prime detection task Evidence is easy to explain if we postulate that people use mental imagery; Evidence is hard to explain if we claim that people only use propositional representations. Next Question: How similar are perception and imagery? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Neuropsych Evidence for Similarity Between Perception & Mental Imagery

Neuropsychological Evidence for Similarity Between Perception & Mental Imagery
Neural response is similar when perceiving an object or imagining the object. Single cell studies Look for single neurons that respond to perceiving or imagining an object. fMRI studies Look for similar brain activity when perceiving an object or imagining the object. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) Check whether TMS has a similar effect on tasks based on perception and on imagery. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Single-Cell Evidence for Similarity Between Perception & Imagery

Single-Cell Studies of Perception & Imagery
Kreiman, Koch & Fried (2000) Single-cell recording in medial temporal lobe as precursor to surgery for epilepsy. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Add Baseball & Face Stimulus & Neural Recording

Imagine the Baseball Perceive the Baseball Kreiman, Koch & Fried (2000) Single-cell recording in medial temporal lobe as precursor to surgery for epilepsy. See Imagine Kreiman et al. found a cell that is sensitive to perception and mental image of baseballs, but not to faces. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide with Emphasis on Face Stimuli

Perceive the Face Imagine the Face Kreiman, Koch & Fried (2000) Single-cell recording in medial temporal lobe as precursor to surgery for epilepsy. Cell is sensitive to perception and mental image of baseballs, but not to faces. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Similarity in fMRI Activation During Perception & Imagery

fMRI Studies of Perception and Imagery
Perception of objects and imagining an object produces similar activation in visual cortex. Goldstein Figure 10.13 Results are from: Le Bihan, D., Turner, R., Zeffiro, T. A., Cuenod, A., Jezzard, P., & Bonnerdot, V. (1993). Activation of human primary visual cortex during visual recall: A magnetic resonance imaging study. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 90, 11802–11805. Goldstein Figure 10.13 fMRI study alternates perception of an object with imagining the object. NEXT: JM prefers the analogous O'Craven & Kanwisher study Same idea but the data are even prettier. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 O'Craven & Kanwisher Study - Better Evidence of the Same Type

Location of the fusiform face area and parahippocampal gyrus
Parahippocampal place area (PPA) and Fusiform face area (FFA) Diagram of Brain From the Side Facing Left Graphic from the article: Haynes, J-D., & Rees, G. (2006). Decoding mental states from brain activity in humans. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7, Next: fMRI Results for Face & Place Recognition P 355, Miyamoto, Winter '09

fMRI Study of Face and Place Perception/Imagery
% Signal Change FFA: Fusiform face area. Specialized for faces. PPA: Parahippocampal place area. Specialized for representing location info. % Signal Change Perception Imagine Subjects either view or imagine a face or place Next: Look at Just the Upper Left Quadrant of this Graph P 355, Miyamoto, Winter '09

% Signal Change FFA: Fusiform face area. Specialized for faces. PPA: Parahippocampal place area. Specialized for representing location info. % Signal Change Perception Imagine Subjects view a face or place Face stimulus activates FFA; place stimulus does not. Next: Look at Just the Lower Left Quadrant of this Graph P 355, Miyamoto, Winter '09

% Signal Change FFA: Fusiform face area. Specialized for faces. PPA: Parahippocampal place area. Specialized for representing location info. % Signal Change Perception Imagine Subjects view a face or place Place stimulus activates PPA; face stimulus does not. Next: Discuss Results for the Left Half of this Graph P 355, Miyamoto, Winter '09

% Signal Change FFA: Fusiform face area. Specialized for faces. PPA: Parahippocampal place area. Specialized for representing location info. % Signal Change Perception Imagine Subjects view a face or place Face stimulus activates FFA; place stimulus does not. Next: Look at Just the Upper Right Quadrant of this Graph P 355, Miyamoto, Winter '09

% Signal Change FFA: Fusiform face area. Specialized for faces. PPA: Parahippocampal place area. Specialized for representing location info. % Signal Change Perception Imagine Subjects view a face or place Place stimulus activates PPA; face stimulus does not. Next: Discuss Results for the Left Half of this Graph P 355, Miyamoto, Winter '09

% Signal Change FFA: Fusiform face area. Specialized for faces. PPA: Parahippocampal place area. Specialized for representing location info. % Signal Change Perception Imagine Face and place stimuli have opposite effects on FFA and PPA. Double dissociation when perceiving faces or places. P 355, Miyamoto, Winter '09 Next: Discuss the Right Half of the Graph

% Signal Change FFA: Fusiform face area. Specialized for faces. PPA: Parahippocampal place area. Specialized for representing location info. % Signal Change Perception Imagine Face and place stimuli have opposite effects on FFA and PPA. Double dissociation when imagining faces or places. Do Neurological Impairments Have Equivalent Effects on Perception & Imagination? P 355, Miyamoto, Winter '09

Do Neurological Impairments Have Similar Effects on Perception and Imagery?
Kosslyn's TMS study supports this hypothesis. (See Goldstein, p. 287 and Figure on p. 288) What about permanent neurological impairments due to lesions or strokes? Reminder re Hemispatial Neglect – Transition to HemiSpatial Neglect in Imagery Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Thursday, 17 May, 2018: The Lecture Ended Here
I will finish the discussion of the remaining slides on Monday. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Hemispatial Neglect (Goldstein calls this "unilateral neglect")
Hemispatial Neglect (Unilateral Neglect): A deficit of attention in which one entire half of a visual scene is simply ignored. The cause of unilateral neglect is often a stroke that has interrupted the flow of blood to the right parietal lobe. Figure to the right: Patient’s copy of an image (model) shows systematic deficits. This slide is based on instructional material that was downloaded from the Pearson Publishers website ( for Smith & Kosslyn (2006; ISBN ). The patient’s copy in the right column neglects the left side of the visual field (opposite to the side of brain damage). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Unilateral Neglect in Perception & Images

Left Unilateral Neglect in Perception & Images
Bisiach, E., & Luzzatti, C. (1978). Unilateral neglect of representational space. Cortex, 14, Patient with left unilateral neglect. Neglect occurs when patient is looking at a scene. Neglect occurs when patient imagines a scene. (Scene was the Piazza del Duomo in Milan, viewed from a particular location) “Duomo” is pronounced do-mo. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Transition to Question: Are Perception & Imagery Always Similar?

Are Perception & Imagery Always Similar?
Due to brain injury, Patient CK has visual agnosia (inability to recognize objects) Figure (a) – incorrect identifications Asparagus labeled “rose twig with thorns” Dart labeled “feather duster” Tennis racquet labeled “fencer’s mask” Figure (b) – drawings from memory Outline of England Guitar Figure (b) – If you show CK his drawings at a later time, he cannot recognize (label) what they are. Figure (p. 284). (a) Pictures incorrectly labeled by CK who had visual agnosia. (b) Drawings from memory by CK. From study by Behrmann, Moscovitch, & Winocur (1994). (a) (b) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Dissociations Between Perception & Imagery

Dissociations Between Imagery & Perception
Case Perception Imagery Guariglia (1993) OK Unilateral neglect Farah et al. (1993): Patient RM OK: Recognizes objects & can draw pictures of objects POOR: Can't draw objects from memory or answer questions that require mental imagery Behrmann et al. (1994): Patient CK POOR: Visual agnosia (can't recognize objects) OK: Can draw objects from memory Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide without Emphasis Rectangles

Case Perception Imagery Guariglia (1993) OK Unilateral neglect Farah et al. (1993): Patient RM OK: Recognizes objects & can draw pictures of objects POOR: Can't draw objects from memory or answer questions that require mental imagery Behrmann et al. (1994): Patient CK POOR: Visual agnosia (can't recognize objects) OK: Can draw objects from memory Diagram Showing Bottom Up & Top Down Processing of Images Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

When Are Perception & Imagery Similar? When Are They Different?
Behrmann et al. (1994) point out that perception is more bottom up; Imagery is more top down. Same Slide with Explanation of Behrmann’s Hypothesis Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Hypothesis: CK's injury blocks the bottom up input for object perception. RM injury blocks the top down construction of a mental image. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Conclusion - END

Conclusion Mental manipulation of images is similar to perception of scenes as they undergo the analogous physical alterations. Perception and imagery engage similar cognitive processes, but they are not perfectly equivalent. Perception has more bottom-up influence than imagery. Imagery has more top-down influence than perception. END Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Next: Section 8 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '15

Hub-and-Spoke Model & Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS)
Psychology 355: Cognitive Psychology Instructor: Brianna Yamasaki and Roy Seo 05/18/2018: Section Week 8

Outline Anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and the Hub-and-Spoke Model
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) What is it? Test of Hub-and-Spoke model using TMS Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr ‘18

General & Specific Impairments to Cognitive Function
Semantic dementia: General loss of knowledge for all concepts. Semantic dementia is associated with damage to anterior temporal lobe (ATL). Damage to specific areas (colored circles) have specific effects. Damage to blue circles impairs knowledge of actions. Damage to orange areas impairs knowledge of words. Damage to purple areas impairs knowledge of sounds. Etc. Goldstein Figure 9.26 (Source: Adapted from K. Patterson, P. J. Nestor, & T. T. Rogers, Where do you know what you know? The representation of semantic knowledge in the human brain, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8, 976–987, Figure 1, 2007.) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Hub-and-Spoke Model Anterior Temporal Lobe (ATL) is the hub.
ATL integrates information from multiple areas. Colored circles indicate spokes. Goldstein Figure 9.26 (Source: Adapted from K. Patterson, P. J. Nestor, & T. T. Rogers, Where do you know what you know? The representation of semantic knowledge in the human brain, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 8, 976–987, Figure 1, 2007.) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS)
Very strong magnetic fields are created by electrical currents run through a pair of coils. The magnetic fields cause a severe temporary disruption of nerve signals in a targeted part of the brain. Experimenter can control when and where to disrupt the nerve signals. TMS can be used to test hub-and-spoke model. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Test of Hub-and-Spoke Model
Goldstein Figure 9.28 (Source: Pobric, G., Jefferies, E., & Lambon Ralph, M. A. (2010). Category-specific versus category-general semantic impairment induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation. Current Biology, 20, 964–968.) Response time for naming pictures of living things and artifacts (especially tools). Red ( ) bars = NO TMS. Blue ( ) bars = WITH TMS Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Test of Hub-and-Spoke Model
Goldstein Figure 9.28 (Source: Pobric, G., Jefferies, E., & Lambon Ralph, M. A. (2010). Category-specific versus category-general semantic impairment induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation. Current Biology, 20, 964–968.) ATL stimulation slows down naming of both artifacts and living things. Parietal stimulation slows down naming of artifacts but not living things. Results are consistent with hypothesis that ATL is a hub (TMS produces general slowing) whereas the parietal site is on a spoke (produces selective slowing for artifact naming). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Summary Many concepts have multi-modal representations, i.e., the representation of concepts can include appearance, associated motor programs (e.g., grasping), associated sounds, typical functions, etc. TMS provides experimental evidence for the causal/functional role of brain activity when performing cognitive tasks. fMRI, ERP and studies of brain damage generally produce only correlational evidence, i.e., we know that brain activity or brain injuries correlate with effects on behavior, but these methods don't provide support for the causal/functional significance of the brain activity or brain injury. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

1st: Do Perception & Imagery Involve the Same Brain Mechanisms
1st: Do Perception & Imagery Involve the Same Brain Mechanisms? 2nd: Introduction to Problem Solving Psychology 355: Cognitive Psychology Instructor: John Miyamoto 05/21/2018: Lecture 09-1 Note: This Powerpoint presentation may contain macros that I wrote to help me create the slides. The macros aren’t needed to view the slides. You can disable or delete the macros without any change to the presentation.

Outline Do perception and mental imagery involve the same brain mechanisms? Review evidence from last week Present evidence that sometimes perception and mental imagery do NOT involve the same brain mechanisms. Introduction to problem solving What is a problem (according to cognitive psychology)? Basic concepts: Problem representation, moves and transformations Algorithmic and insight problems Restructuring a problem Problem constraints Lecture probably ends here Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Review: Do Perception & Imagery Involve the Same Brain Mechanisms?

Do Perception & Imagery Involve Similar Brain Mechanisms?
Mental imagery plays a functional role in cognitive processing. Evidence that the Answer is "Yes" Perception of "H" and mental image of "H" are both able to prime the processing of a target letter "H" (Farah's experiment with image priming) Single cell studies find cells in temporal lobe that are excited by perception of a baseball and a mental image of a baseball. fMRI study of faces and places finds double dissociation between: FFA and PPA responses to perception of faces and places. FFA and PPA responses to imagining faces and places. Kosslyn found that TMS causes similar disruption of judgments based on perception of shapes and mental images of shapes. (See Goldstein, p. 287 and Figure on p. 288) This assumption is an important background assumption, but does not directly pertain to whether perception and imagery involve similar brain mechanisms. Same pattern of double dissociation in both cases. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide without Sequenced Entry

Do Perception & Imagery Involve Similar Brain Mechanisms?
Mental imagery plays a functional role in cognitive processing. Evidence that the Answer is "Yes" Perception of "H" and mental image of "H" are both able to prime the processing of a target letter "H" (Farah's experiment with image priming) Single cell studies find cells in temporal lobe that are excited by perception of a baseball and a mental image of a baseball. fMRI study of faces and places finds double dissociation between: FFA and PPA responses to perception of faces and places. FFA and PPA responses to imagining faces and places. Kosslyn found that TMS causes similar disruption of judgments based on perception of shapes and mental images of shapes. (See Goldstein, p. 287 and Figure on p. 288) This assumption is an important background assumption, but does not directly pertain to whether perception and imagery involve similar brain mechanisms. Same pattern of double dissociation in both cases. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Transition to Question: Do Neuro-Impairments have Similar Effects on P & I?

Do Neurological Impairments Have Similar Effects on Perception and Imagery?
Before discussing the evidence, a brief reminder about unilateral neglect. Evidence for "No" Answer: Then, puzzling evidence that neurological impairments do NOT always have similar effects on perception and mental imagery. Reminder re Unilateral Neglect – Transition to Unilateral Neglect in Imagery Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Hemispatial Neglect (Goldstein calls this "unilateral neglect")
Hemispatial Neglect (Unilateral Neglect): A deficit of attention in which one entire half of a visual scene is simply ignored. The cause of unilateral neglect is often a stroke that has interrupted the flow of blood to the right parietal lobe. Figure to the right: Patient’s copy of an image (model) shows systematic deficits. This slide is based on instructional material that was downloaded from the Pearson Publishers website ( for Smith & Kosslyn (2006; ISBN ). The patient’s copy neglects the left side of the visual field (opposite to the side of brain damage). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Unilateral Neglect in Perception & Images

Left Unilateral Neglect in Perception & Images
Bisiach, E., & Luzzatti, C. (1978). Unilateral neglect of representational space. Cortex, 14, (Scene was the Piazza del Duomo in Milan, viewed from a particular location) Patient with left unilateral neglect. Neglect occurs when patient is looking at a scene. Neglect occurs when patient imagines a scene. In this case, the pattern is the same for perception and mental images. “Duomo” is pronounced do-mo. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Transition to Question: Are Perception & Imagery Always Similar?

Are Perception & Imagery Always Similar?
Figure (p. 284). (a) Pictures incorrectly labeled by CK who had visual agnosia. (b) Drawings from memory by CK. From study by Behrmann, Moscovitch, & Winocur (1994). Due to brain injury, Patient CK has visual agnosia (inability to recognize objects) Figure (a) – incorrect identifications Asparagus labeled “rose twig with thorns” Dart labeled “feather duster” Tennis racquet labeled “fencer’s mask” Figure (b) – drawings from memory Outline of England Guitar If you show CK his drawings at a later time, he cannot recognize (label) what they are. (a) (b) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Dissociations Between Perception & Imagery

Case Perception Imagery Guariglia (1993) OK Unilateral neglect Farah et al. (1993): Patient RM OK: Recognizes objects & can draw pictures of objects POOR: Can't draw objects from memory or answer questions that require mental imagery Behrmann et al. (1994): Patient CK POOR: Visual agnosia (can't recognize objects) OK: Can draw objects from memory Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide without Emphasis Rectangles

Case Perception Imagery Guariglia (1993) OK Unilateral neglect Farah et al. (1993): Patient RM OK: Recognizes objects & can draw pictures of objects POOR: Can't draw objects from memory or answer questions that require mental imagery Behrmann et al. (1994): Patient CK POOR: Visual agnosia (can't recognize objects) OK: Can draw objects from memory Diagram Showing Bottom Up & Top Down Processing of Images Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Behrmann et al. (1994) point out that perception is more bottom up; Imagery is more top down. Same Slide with Explanation of Behrmann’s Hypothesis Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Hypothesis: CK's injury blocks the bottom up input for object perception. RM injury blocks the top down construction of a mental image. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Conclusion - END

Conclusion Mental manipulation of images is similar to perception of scenes as they undergo the analogous physical alterations. Perception and imagery engage similar cognitive processes, but they are not perfectly equivalent. Perception has more bottom-up influence than imagery. Imagery has more top-down influence than perception. Introduction to Problem Solving Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Introduction to Problem Solving
What is a “problem” (according to the cognitive psychology)? Information processing versus Gestalt approach to problem solving. Algorithmic problems & insight problems Tower of Hanoi – an example of an algorithmic problem Insight problems Problem representation Problem restructuring Problem isomorphs Lecture probably ends here Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Definition of Problem Solving

Definition of Problem Solving
A problem exists when the present state differs from a goal state. The problem is to change the present state into the goal state. Initial state Goal state Permissible "moves" – ways to change the problem state from the initial state towards the goal state. Interesting problems are situations where it is not obvious how to change the initial state into the goal state. Cognitive psychology of problem solving – How do people solve problems? What causes difficulties in problem solving? Can cognitive psychology help people become better problem solvers? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Examples of Problem Solving Situations

Problem Solving - Examples
Math problems, physics problems, science problems generally. Initial state: The given information in the problem. Goal state: The “answer” or solution to the problem. Practical problems, e.g., arranging furniture, building a mechanical device. Winning strategies in games, business, public health, law & war. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Key Ideas in Theory of Problem Solving

Key Ideas in the Psychology of Problem Solving
Problem representation – The mental representation of the problem that the problem solver manipulates while trying to solve the problem. Initial state Goal state Moves or transformations. Constraints and rules. Insight problems & algorithmic problems Restructuring a problem representation Set Functional fixedness Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Algorithmic vs Insight Problems

Algorithmic Problems versus Insight Problems
Algorithmic problems: The initial problem state can be transformed to the goal state by a systematic procedure. Example: The Tower of Hanoi Example: Solving a long division problem Insight problems require mental restructuring of the problem representation to get a solution. Circle problem Mutilated checkerboard problem Algorithmic and insight problems require somewhat different psychological processes to solve them. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Tower of Hanoi – Example of an Algorithmic Problem

The Tower of Hanoi (A Problem with an Algorithmic Solution)
We will discuss algorithmic problems tomorrow. Long division is an example of an algorithmic problem Multiplying two numbers is an algorithmic problem. Finding the square root of a positive number is an algorithmic problem. Tower of Hanoi is an algorithmic problem – there is a logically adequate strategy that will always solve this problem. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 General Idea of an Insight Problem

General Idea of an Insight Problem
The solution of insight problems usually depends on finding a new way to represent the problem. Ideas from Gestalt Psychology The mind searches for structure in perception The mind searches for structure in problem solving Mental Representation of a Problem The Problem Representation = Finding a New Way to Represent a Problem Restructuring the Problem Representation = Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Solving the Circle Problem by Restructuring the Problem Representation

The Circle Problem: An Example of an Insight Problem
Given: radius r = 1 length of a = 0.9 line b is perpendicular to line a Question: What is the length of x? Hint: Change the problem representation. #Section: plot.jm(x=c(-100, 100), y = c(-100, 120), axes=F) ellipse(c(0,0), width=160, ht = 160, lwd=2) lines(c(0,0), c(-80, 80), lwd=2) lines(c(-80, 80), c(0,0), lwd=2) tt <- pi/6 rr <- 80 aa <- -cos(tt)*rr bb <- sin(tt)*rr #lines(c(0, aa), c(0, bb), lwd=2) lines(c(aa,aa), c(0, bb), lwd=2) lines(c(aa, 0), c(bb,bb), lwd=2) lines(c(aa, 0), c(0,bb), lwd=2) text(x = aa + 5, y = bb/1.95, "a", cex=1.5) text(x = -2 + aa/2, y = bb/2 - 7, "x", cex=1.5) text(x = 40, y = -7, "r", cex=1.5) text(x = c(-80), y = (95), c(paste("r = 1.0, a = ", round(aa/80 , dig=1))), cex=2, adj=0) text(x = c(-80), y = (120), "What is the length of x?", cex=2, adj=0) #lines(c(0, aa), c(0, bb), lwd=2, lty=2) #EndSection: Initial Representation Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Restructuring the Representation of the Circle Problem

Restructuring the Representation of the Circle Problem
If r = 1, a = 0.9, and a and b are perpendicular, what is the length of x? Solution: Add dashed line that connects the opposite corners. Alternative representation: The answer is obvious: x = r = 1. Alternative problem representation makes the solution obvious. Solutions to insight problems often depend on a “trick”. Here the trick is to change the problem representation. #Section: plot.jm(x=c(-100, 100), y = c(-100, 120), axes=F) ellipse(c(0,0), width=160, ht = 160, lwd=2) lines(c(0,0), c(-80, 80), lwd=2) lines(c(-80, 80), c(0,0), lwd=2) tt <- pi/6 rr <- 80 aa <- -cos(tt)*rr bb <- sin(tt)*rr #lines(c(0, aa), c(0, bb), lwd=2) lines(c(aa,aa), c(0, bb), lwd=2) lines(c(aa, 0), c(bb,bb), lwd=2) lines(c(aa, 0), c(0,bb), lwd=2) text(x = aa + 5, y = bb/1.95, "a", cex=1.5) text(x = -2 + aa/2, y = bb/2 - 7, "x", cex=1.5) text(x = 40, y = -7, "r", cex=1.5) text(x = c(-80), y = (95), c(paste("r = 1.0, a = ", round(aa/80 , dig=1))), cex=2, adj=0) text(x = c(-80), y = (120), "What is the length of x?", cex=2, adj=0) #lines(c(0, aa), c(0, bb), lwd=2, lty=2) #EndSection: Alternate Representation for the Circle Problem Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Another Insight Problem – the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem - Probable END

Another Insight Problem – Mutilated Checkerboard Problem
End lecture here? Problem: Cover the mutilated checkerboard with domino pieces so that every domino covers two squares OR if this is impossible, explain why it is impossible. The domino pieces must always be perpendicular or parallel to the sides of the board - they cannot be placed in a diagonal position. See ‘e:\p355\hnd10-1a.doc’ and ‘e:\p355\hnd10-1b.doc’ for code for making mutilated checkerboards. #Section: plot.jm(c(-1, 9), c(-1, 10), axes=F) j.dark <- colors()[82] j.light <- 8 for (i in 1:4) for (j in 1:8) { II <- (i - 1)*2 + .5 JJ <- j - .5 if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (i != 1 | j != 8) rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) } II <- (i - 1)* if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (i != 4 | j != 1) rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) lines(c(0,0), c(0, 7), lwd=3) lines(c(0,1), c(7, 7), lwd=3) lines(c(1,1), c(7, 8), lwd=3) lines(c(1,8), c(8, 8), lwd=3) lines(c(8,8), c(8, 1), lwd=3) lines(c(8,7), c(1, 1), lwd=3) lines(c(7,7), c(1, 0), lwd=3) lines(c(7,0), c(0, 0), lwd=3) rectan(c(1,9), width = 1.6, ht=.6, col = colors()[chip.col]) text(2, 9, "= domino piece", cex=2,adj=0) #EndSection: Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Failed Attempt to Solve the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Failed Attempt at Solving the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem
Problem: Cover the mutilated checkerboard with domino pieces so that every domino covers two squares OR if this is impossible, explain why it is impossible. Failure! This is not a solution! FACT: It is impossible to cover the mutilated checkerboard with dominoes. Why is it impossible? #Section: plot.jm(c(-1, 9), c(-1, 10), axes=F) j.dark <- colors()[82] j.light <- 8 for (i in 1:4) for (j in 1:8) { II <- (i - 1)*2 + .5 JJ <- j - .5 if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (i != 1 | j != 8) rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) } II <- (i - 1)* if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (i != 4 | j != 1) rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) lines(c(0,0), c(0, 7), lwd=3) lines(c(0,1), c(7, 7), lwd=3) lines(c(1,1), c(7, 8), lwd=3) lines(c(1,8), c(8, 8), lwd=3) lines(c(8,8), c(8, 1), lwd=3) lines(c(8,7), c(1, 1), lwd=3) lines(c(7,7), c(1, 0), lwd=3) lines(c(7,0), c(0, 0), lwd=3) rectan(c(1,9), width = 1.6, ht=.6, col = colors()[chip.col]) text(2, 9, "= domino piece", cex=2,adj=0) #EndSection: Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Solution to the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Solution to the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem
Problem: Cover the checkerboard with domino pieces so that every domino covers two squares OR if this is impossible, explain why it is impossible. A Solution is Impossible! A domino piece always covers one dark square and one light square. Therefore any solution covers an equal number of dark and light squares. The mutilated checkerboard has 30 dark squares and 32 light squares so it is impossible to cover an equal number of dark and light squares. Easy Version of the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem – The Matchmaker Problem Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Easy Version of the Mutilate Checkerboard Problem The Russian Marriage Problem (a.k.a. the Matchmaker Problem) Hayes, 1978: [wording slightly altered below] In a small Russian village, there were 32 bachelors and 32 unmarried women. A matchmaker arranges 32 highly satisfactory marriages. The village was happy and proud. One night, two bachelors got drunk and killed each other. Can the matchmaker come up with heterosexual marriages (one man, one woman) among the 62 survivors? #Section: plot.jm(c(-1, 9), c(-1, 10), axes=F) j.dark <- 8 #colors()[82] j.light <- 8 for (i in 1:4) for (j in 1:8) { II <- (i - 1)*2 + .5 JJ <- j - .5 if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.tx <- "Woman" else j.tx <- "Man" rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) text(JJ, II, j.tx) } II <- (i - 1)* if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.tx <- "Woman" else j.tx <- "Man" rectan(center=c(4,4), width=8, ht=8, lwd=3) rectan(c(1* , ), width=1, ht=1, col="darkblue", density = 25, angle = 0) rectan(c(1* , ), width=1, ht=1, col="darkblue", density = 25, angle = 0) #EndSection: There are 30 men and 32 women. Obviously there is no way to match them into a complete set of heterosexual couples. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Mutilated Checkerboard Problem & Russian Marriage Problem Are Isomorphs

Monday, 21 May, 2018: The Lecture Ended Here

Mutilated Checkerboard Problem & Russian Marriage Problem
#Section: plot.jm(c(-1, 9), c(-1, 10), axes=F) j.dark <- 8 #colors()[82] j.light <- 8 for (i in 1:4) for (j in 1:8) { II <- (i - 1)*2 + .5 JJ <- j - .5 if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.tx <- "Woman" else j.tx <- "Man" rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) text(JJ, II, j.tx) } II <- (i - 1)* if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.tx <- "Woman" else j.tx <- "Man" rectan(center=c(4,4), width=8, ht=8, lwd=3) rectan(c(1* , ), width=1, ht=1, col="darkblue", density = 25, angle = 0) rectan(c(1* , ), width=1, ht=1, col="darkblue", density = 25, angle = 0) #EndSection: The multilated checkerboard problem and the Russian marriage problem are problem isomorphs. Problem Isomorphs: Problems that differ superficially but have identical logical structure. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Concept of Problem Isomorphs

Concept of Problem Isomorphs
Problem isomorphs – structurally identical versions of a problem. Basic fact about problem isomorphs: Some versions of a problem are harder to solve than other versions of the problem. What is the psychological difference between the mutilated checkerboard problem and the matchmaker problem? Kaplan and Simon: It is easier to solve the Russian marriage problem than the mutilated checkerboard problem, presumably because the Russian marriage version makes the importance of pairing men with women obvious. (See next slide) Basic meaning of “morph” is “form” or “shape”. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Four Isomorphic Versions of the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Kaplan & Simon: Four Isomorphic Versions of the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem
Blank board is hardest problem. “Bread”/“Butter” word labels are easiest problem. Colored & “Pink”/“Black” word labels are intermediate difficulty. The salience of the pairing affects difficulty. Blank (hardest) Colored (intermediate) See ‘e:\p355\rcode\mutilated checkerboard.doc’ for the R-code. “Pink” & “Black” Word Labels (intermediate) “Bread” & “Butter” (easiest) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Conclusions re Problem Representation

Conclusion re Problem Representation
Some problem representations make problem solving easier than other problem representations. Solving an insight problem often depends on finding a problem representation that make it obvious how to find the solution. Examples that support these claims: Mutilated checkerboard problem; Russian marriage problem; other isomorphic versions. Circle problem. . Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Cheap Necklace Problem – An Example of a False Constraint

Obstacles to Problem Solving and How to Overcome Them

Lecture possibly ends here
Outline Solving problems by restructuring the problem Problem isomorphs False constraints create obstacles to problem solving Incubation effects in problem solving Lecture possibly ends here Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Review: Distinction Between Algorithmic Problems and Insight Problems

Algorithmic Problems versus Insight Problems
Algorithmic problems: The initial problem state can be transformed to the goal state by a systematic procedure. Example: The Tower of Hanoi Example: Solving a long division problem Insight problems require mental restructuring of the problem representation to get a solution. Circle problem Mutilated checkerboard problem Algorithmic and insight problems require somewhat different psychological processes to solve them. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Review: General Idea of an Insight Problem

General Idea of an Insight Problem
The solution of insight problems usually depends on finding a new way to represent the problem. Ideas from Gestalt Psychology The mind searches for structure in perception The mind searches for structure in problem solving Mental Representation of a Problem The Problem Representation = Finding a New Way to Represent a Problem Restructuring the Problem Representation = Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Review: Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Another Insight Problem – Mutilated Checkerboard Problem
End lecture here? Problem: Cover the mutilated checkerboard with domino pieces so that every domino covers two squares OR if this is impossible, explain why it is impossible. The domino pieces must always be perpendicular or parallel to the sides of the board - they cannot be placed in a diagonal position. See ‘e:\p355\hnd10-1a.doc’ and ‘e:\p355\hnd10-1b.doc’ for code for making mutilated checkerboards. #Section: plot.jm(c(-1, 9), c(-1, 10), axes=F) j.dark <- colors()[82] j.light <- 8 for (i in 1:4) for (j in 1:8) { II <- (i - 1)*2 + .5 JJ <- j - .5 if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (i != 1 | j != 8) rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) } II <- (i - 1)* if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (i != 4 | j != 1) rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) lines(c(0,0), c(0, 7), lwd=3) lines(c(0,1), c(7, 7), lwd=3) lines(c(1,1), c(7, 8), lwd=3) lines(c(1,8), c(8, 8), lwd=3) lines(c(8,8), c(8, 1), lwd=3) lines(c(8,7), c(1, 1), lwd=3) lines(c(7,7), c(1, 0), lwd=3) lines(c(7,0), c(0, 0), lwd=3) rectan(c(1,9), width = 1.6, ht=.6, col = colors()[chip.col]) text(2, 9, "= domino piece", cex=2,adj=0) #EndSection: Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Answer: The Mutilated Checkerboard Problem is Impossible to Solve

Solution to the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem
Problem: Cover the checkerboard with domino pieces so that every domino covers two squares OR if this is impossible, explain why it is impossible. A Solution is Impossible! A domino piece always covers one dark square and one light square. Therefore any solution covers an equal number of dark and light squares. The mutilated checkerboard has 30 dark squares and 32 light squares so it is impossible to cover an equal number of dark and light squares. Easy Version of the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem – The Matchmaker Problem Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Easy Version of the Mutilate Checkerboard Problem The Russian Marriage Problem (a.k.a. the Matchmaker Problem) Hayes, 1978: [wording slightly altered below] In a small Russian village, there were 32 bachelors and 32 unmarried women. A matchmaker arranges 32 highly satisfactory marriages. The village was happy and proud. One night, two bachelors got drunk and killed each other. Can the matchmaker come up with heterosexual marriages (one man, one woman) among the 62 survivors? #Section: plot.jm(c(-1, 9), c(-1, 10), axes=F) j.dark <- 8 #colors()[82] j.light <- 8 for (i in 1:4) for (j in 1:8) { II <- (i - 1)*2 + .5 JJ <- j - .5 if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.tx <- "Woman" else j.tx <- "Man" rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) text(JJ, II, j.tx) } II <- (i - 1)* if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.tx <- "Woman" else j.tx <- "Man" rectan(center=c(4,4), width=8, ht=8, lwd=3) rectan(c(1* , ), width=1, ht=1, col="darkblue", density = 25, angle = 0) rectan(c(1* , ), width=1, ht=1, col="darkblue", density = 25, angle = 0) #EndSection: There are 30 men and 32 women. Obviously there is no way to match them into a complete set of heterosexual couples. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Mutilated Checkerboard Problem & Russian Marriage Problem Are Isomorphs

Mutilated Checkerboard Problem & Russian Marriage Problem
#Section: plot.jm(c(-1, 9), c(-1, 10), axes=F) j.dark <- 8 #colors()[82] j.light <- 8 for (i in 1:4) for (j in 1:8) { II <- (i - 1)*2 + .5 JJ <- j - .5 if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (j %in% c(1,3,5,7)) j.tx <- "Woman" else j.tx <- "Man" rectan(c(JJ,II), width=1, ht=1, col=j.col) text(JJ, II, j.tx) } II <- (i - 1)* if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.col <- j.light else j.col <- j.dark if (j %in% c(2,4,6,8)) j.tx <- "Woman" else j.tx <- "Man" rectan(center=c(4,4), width=8, ht=8, lwd=3) rectan(c(1* , ), width=1, ht=1, col="darkblue", density = 25, angle = 0) rectan(c(1* , ), width=1, ht=1, col="darkblue", density = 25, angle = 0) #EndSection: The multilated checkerboard problem and the Russian marriage problem are problem isomorphs. Problem Isomorphs: Problems that differ superficially but have identical logical structure. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Concept of Problem Isomorphs

Problem Isomorphs Problem isomorphs – structurally identical versions of a problem. Basic fact about problem isomorphs: Some versions of a problem are harder to solve than other versions of the problem. What is the psychological difference between the mutilated checkerboard problem and the matchmaker problem? Hypothesis (Kaplan and Simon): The Russian marriage problem is easier to solve than the mutilated checkerboard problem, because the Russian marriage version makes the importance of pairing men with women obvious (See next slide) Basic meaning of “morph” is “form” or “shape”. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Four Isomorphic Versions of the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Kaplan & Simon: Four Isomorphic Versions of the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem
Blank board is hardest problem. “Bread”/“Butter” word labels are easiest problem. Colored & “Pink”/“Black” word labels are intermediate difficulty. The salience of the pairing affects difficulty. Blank (hardest) Colored (intermediate) See ‘e:\p355\rcode\mutilated checkerboard.doc’ for the R-code. “Pink” & “Black” Word Labels (intermediate) “Bread” & “Butter” (easiest) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Conclusions re Problem Representation

Conclusion re Problem Representation
Some problem representations make problem solving easier than other problem representations. Solving an insight problem often depends on finding a problem representation that make it obvious how to find the solution. Examples that support these claims: Mutilated checkerboard problem; Russian marriage problem; other isomorphic versions. Circle problem. . Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Cheap Necklace Problem – An Example of a False Constraint

Cheap Necklace Problem (Chain Problem)
Cheap Necklace Problem: Convert these 4 strands of chains into a single loop by opening and closing only 3 links. (Insight problem) This is an example of a problem that is difficult because people apply a false constraint to the problem representation. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Problem Definition of the Cheap Necklace Problem

Problem Definition for the Chain Problem
Initial state: 4 strands of chains, initially separated. Goal state: One unbroken loop. Moves: Open and close links. Constraint: Only 3 links can be opened and closed. Initial State Goal State What series of permissible moves will transform the initial state into the goal state? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Solution to the Chain Problem

Solution to the Chain Problem
Open all three links of one strand. Use these open links to link together the other three strands. (Next – see how this would work) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Show How to Visualize the Solution

Open all three links of one strand. Use these open links to link together the other three strands. Show how to visualize the solution Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Open all three links of one strand. Use these open links to link together the other three strands. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary re Solution to the Cheap Necklace Problem

Summary re Solution to the Chain Problem
Open all three links of one strand. Use these open links to link together the other three strands. Why is this solution hard to discover? False constraint: People implicitly assume that they can only open the links at the ends of chains. Often we have difficulty solving a problem because we add a requirement to the solution that is not truly a requirement (false constraint). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Nine Dot Problem

Nine-Dot Problem Make a diagram that has 9 dots as shown below. Draw 4 straight lines that connect all of the dots without lifting the pencil or pen from the paper. The Nine-Dot Problem is difficult because people tend to assume a false constraint. (Same difficulty as with the Cheap Necklace Problem.) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Failed Attempt at a Solution to the Nine-Dot Problem

Nine-Dot Problem (cont.)
Dead-end thinking. This is NOT a solution (5 lines are used). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Solution to the Nine-Dot Problem

Solution to the Nine-Dot Problem
"Thinking inside the box" – People impose constraints on the problem that aren't there. To solve this problem, you have to “think outside the box.” False constraint: In a failed solution, people implicitly assume that they must stay within the boundaries of the square. It can be useful to "think outside the box" – discard false constraints on the problem solution. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 So Far: Two Obstacles to Problem Solving

Common Obstacles to Successful Problem Solving
Obstacle #1: A poor initial problem representation makes it difficult to solve a problem. Remedy: Try changing the problem representation Obstacle #2: People sometimes place a false constraint on the possible ways to solve the problem. Remedy: Examine the constraints – are you imposing a false constraint? Circle Problem Mutilated Checkerboard Problem Cheap Necklace Problem 9 Dot Problem Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 END Here - Or Tell Fishing Story

Time Permitting: An Example of a Real-Life False Constraint – A Fishing Story
Time permitting, give practical example of a false constraint. Alternatively, proceed to discussion of incubation effects. JM was stuck on a rock in the middle of a deep rapid river (Middle Fork of the Snoqualmie River). Problem: How to get from the rock to the shore (alive)? False Constraint: JM only considered routes through the rapids that would get him to the shore dry and alive. These routes were all very dangerous. Solution: Choose a route that would get JM to the shore wet but alive. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 END Here - Or Continue to Incubation Effects

TIME Incubation Effects
Incubation effect – discovery of problem solution after a period during which one does not think about the problem. Temporal pattern of an incubation effect. Problem solver has sudden insight; solves the problem.. Problem solver spends some time doing something completely different. Problem solver initially works unsuccessfully on a problem. TIME Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide without the Emphasis Comment Bubbles

TIME Incubation Effects
Incubation effect – discovery of problem solution after a period during which one does not think about the problem. Temporal pattern of an incubation effect. Problem solver has sudden insight; solves the problem.. Problem solver spends some time doing something completely different. Problem solver initially works unsuccessfully on a problem. TIME Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Incubation Effects on the Cheap Necklace Problem – Silveira's (1971) Study

Study of Incubation Effects on the Cheap Necklace Problem (Silveira, 1971)
Preceding slide presents the subjective impression that is reported by many problem solvers. Is it real, or some kind of illusion? Control Group: Worked on problem for 30 minutes. Exp Group 1: Work on problem for 15 minutes. Perform other activities for 30 minutes. Return to problem for 15 minutes. Exp Group 2: Perform other activities for 4 hours. Control Group 55% solve the Circle Problem Exp Group 1 64% solve the Circle Problem Exp Group 2 85% solve the Circle Problem Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Conclusions re Incubation & Cheap Necklace Problem

Conclusions re Incubation Effects on the Cheap Necklace Problem (Silveira, 1971)
Conclusion 1: Incubation effects can be demonstrated in a controlled experiment. Benefit of incubation period can be demonstrated. Conclusion 2: Protocol analysis suggested that people don't work on the problem unconsciously while thinking about something else. After incubation period, subjects returned to the problem at the same stage at which they had stopped, but they make more progress from that stage. Why do incubation effects occur? Why is it helpful to stop working on a problem for awhile? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why is Incubation Helpful?

Why Is Incubation Helpful for Problem Solving?
One benefit of incubation comes from forgetting inappropriate strategies or problem representations, i.e., a break down of an unhelpful set. Incubation weakens adverse priming of an ineffective problem solving strategy, thereby making it easier to activate alternative problem solving strategies. Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Activation Strength While Thinking About Strategy 1 Activation Strength During Incubation Activation Strength While Thinking About Strategy 2 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide - Emphasis on Left Panel

One benefit of incubation comes from forgetting inappropriate strategies or problem representations, i.e., a break down of an unhelpful set. Incubation weakens adverse priming of an ineffective problem solving strategy, thereby making it easier to activate alternative problem solving strategies. Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Activation Strength While Thinking About Strategy 1 (Suppose Strategy 1 is Ineffective) Activation Strength During Incubation Activation Strength While Thinking About Strategy 2 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide - Emphasis on Middle Panel

One benefit of incubation comes from forgetting inappropriate strategies or problem representations, i.e., a break down of an unhelpful set. Incubation weakens adverse priming of an ineffective problem solving strategy, thereby making it easier to activate alternative problem solving strategies. Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Activation Strength While Thinking About Strategy 1 (Suppose Strategy 1 is Ineffective) Activation Strength During Incubation Activation Strength While Thinking About Strategy 2 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide - Emphasis on Right Panel

One benefit of incubation comes from forgetting inappropriate strategies or problem representations, i.e., a break down of an unhelpful set. Incubation weakens adverse priming of an ineffective problem solving strategy, thereby making it easier to activate alternative problem solving strategies. Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Strength Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Activation Strength While Thinking About Strategy 1 (Suppose Strategy 1 is Ineffective) Activation Strength During Incubation Activation Strength While Thinking About Strategy 2 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Return to Enumeration of Reasons Why Incubation is Helpful

One benefit of incubation comes from forgetting inappropriate strategies or problem representations, i.e., a break down of an unhelpful set. Incubation weakens adverse priming of an ineffective problem solving strategy, thereby making it easier to activate alternative problem solving strategies. Another benefit comes from consolidation of the memory of problem structure. Analogous to the effects of spaced practice on recall from LTM. Another benefit comes from sleep and dreaming (not yet known how this benefit occurs). Another benefit of incubation: Exposure to helpful hints (next slide) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Exposure to Helpful Hints – Kaplan's Study

Exposure to Helpful Hints Can Help to Solve a Problem
Kaplan (1989) dissertation experiment. Subjects were given a list of insight problems. Sample Problem: On this hill there is a green house And inside the green house there is a white house And inside the white house, there is a red house And inside the red house there are a lot of little blacks and whites sitting there What place is this? Subjects worked on similar problems over many days. Subjects were given pagers, a small microphone and tape recorder. Periodically, subjects were beeped – they had to describe their progress on the problems. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Effect of Helpful Hints

Exposure to Helpful Hints Can Help to Solve a Problem
Sample Problem: On this hill there was a green house. And inside the green house there was a white house. And inside the white house, there was a red house. And inside the red house there were a lot of little blacks and whites sitting there. What place is this? Every so often, Kaplan would put up a hint for a problem in the form of graffitti. For example, something like this image was posted in the men’s bathroom in the psychology department. Finding: Subjects would suddenly discover solutions to problems shortly after the posting of hints without being aware that they had been given a hint. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary re Incubation Effects

Summary re Incubation Effects
Incubation effect – discovery of problem solution after spending time thinking about something else. Incubation can be beneficial. One benefit of incubation comes from forgetting of inappropriate strategies or problem representations, i.e., a break down of an unhelpful set. Another benefits of incubation: Consolidation of problem structure. Sleep and dreaming contributes to problem solving. Another benefit of incubation: Exposure to helpful hints – even accidental hints provided by daily experience. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary – Obstacles to Problem Solving. END

Summary: Obstacles to Problem Solving
Misleading or uninformative problem representation. Recommendation: Look for alternative problem representations. Adopting unnecessary assumptions (false constraints). Recommendation: Check your assumptions. Are they really necessary? Inappropriate Set: Recommendation: If you are stuck on a problem, look for alternative strategies. General Advice: Incubation can be helpful. Recommendation: Get away from the problem, then return to it. Sleep on it (problems can be solved after sleeping on it). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 END

Analogical Reasoning Psychology 355: Cognitive Psychology Instructor: John Miyamoto 05/23/2018: Lecture 09-3 Note: This Powerpoint presentation may contain macros that I wrote to help me create the slides. The macros aren’t needed to view the slides. You can disable or delete the macros without any change to the presentation.

Outline of the Analogical Reasoning Topic
What are analogies? Why are they useful in problem solving? Structural definition of an analogy Discovery of analogies: What are the cognitive processes during discovery of useful analogies? Influence of analogies on decisions Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Examples of Analogical Reasoning

Examples of Analogical Reasoning
Is the current international political instability analogous to the political situation that preceded World War I? Is a successful business analogous to a successful football team? Is the mutilated checkerboard problem analogous to the Russian marriage problem? Is the structure of an atom analogous to the structure of the solar system? "pony" is to "horse" as ____ is to "cow" "bird" is to "air" as "fish" is to _____. Seeing useful analogies is one of the basic mechanisms of problem solving. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Are We Interested in Analogical Reasoning?

Why Are We Interested In Analogical Reasoning?
Seeing useful analogies is one of the basic mechanisms of problem solving. Analogies influence decisions. Is the current instability in Ukraine and Crimea analogous to the German annexation of Austria in 1938? Maureen Dowd writing in the New York Times (January 17, 2010) about President Obama’s reluctance to support gay marriage: “Obama sees himself as such a huge change that he can be cautious about other societal changes. But what he doesn’t realize is that legalizing gay marriage is like electing a black president. Before you do it, it seems inconceivable. Once it’s done, you can’t remember what all the fuss was about.” [Italics added to the quotation] Structure of an Analogy Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

The Structure of an Analogy
Example: The structure of an atom is analogous to the structure of the solar system. Source Target Atom Solar System Source (Base Problem): Typically, a well understood problem or system to which an analogy is made. E.g., structure of the solar system Target (Test Problem): Typically, a less understood problem or system about which we can learn by analogy to the source. E.g., structure of the atom Representation: The structure of the source and the target. Mapping: A correspondence between the source structure and the target structure Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Main Steps in the Mental Construction of an Analogy

Main Steps in the Mental Construction of an Analogy
Create representations of the source and target. Noticing: Noticing that a potential analogy exists. Mapping: Constructing a correspondence between the representations of the source and the target. Application: Applying the mapping from source to target, i.e., drawing inferences about the target based on what is known about the source. Dunker’s Radiation Problem - Outline Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Dunker's Radiation Problem - Outline
Doctor must kill a tumor in a patient's stomach. Surgery is not possible. There is a ray that can kill the tumor. In high dosages it will kill the tumor, but it will also kill healthy tissue in front of the tumor. In low dosages, it won't harm the healthy tissue, but it also won't kill the tumor. Question: How can the doctor kill the tumor without killing the healthy tissue? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 The Convergence Solution

Convergence Solution for the Radiation Problem
Beam the ray at the tumor from many different angles. All rays should have low intensity, but the combination of rays at point of intersection (at the tumor) will have high intensity. The convergence solution respects the constraint that the ray cannot be high intensity. Gick & Holyoak (1983): With no other hints, about 10% of subjects (University of Michigan undergrads) produced the convergence solution. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Analogical Transfer

Analogical Transfer Analogical transfer – seeing analogies and using the analogies to solve a new problem. Gick and Holyoak studied whether exposure to analogous problems and their solutions would help people solve the radiation problem. Train subjects on one problem. (Referred to as the "base problem.") Test subjects on another problem that is analogous to the first problem. (Referred to as the "target" or "test" problem.) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Gick & Holyoak on Analogical Transfer – Basic Idea

Gick & Holyoak's Study of Analogical Transfer
Step 1: Train subjects to solve (or at least think about) one or more base problems (source for an analogy). Step 2: Subjects are asked to solve the Radiation Problem (target problem). Compare the following two measures: How many subjects (%) solve the target problem without seeing the base problem first? How many subjects (%) solve the target problem after seeing the base problem? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Base Problem: The Fortress Problem

Base Problem: Duncker's Fortress Problem
A general needs to capture a fortress with his army. An attack by his entire army would capture the fortress, but the roads are mined. Since the dictator needs to move his workers to and from the fortress, the mines are set to let small bodies of men pass over them safely, Any large force would detonate the mines. How can the general attack the fortress with all of his army? Convergence solution: Attack the fortress with multiple smaller forces from many different directions. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Other Base Problems – Red Adair & Arrow Diagram

Other Base Problems Red Adair Problem: (Red Adair was famous for being able to put out burning oil wells) Need to put out a burning oil well but can't deliver enough water from any one position. Convergence Solution: Direct streams of water at the well from many directions. Arrow Diagram: In some conditions, subjects were given an arrow diagram to see if that would be helpful. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Three Conditions in the Experiment on Analogical Transfer

Gick & Holyoak: Study of Analogical Transfer
Base Problem: The Fortress Problem Target Problem: The Radiation Problem Three Experimental Conditions Subjects are not shown the base problem. Subject attempt to solve the target problem. This condition tests for the rate of spontaneous solutions to the target problem. Similar findings with other base problems or the arrow diagram. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide with Condition 2 Added

Base Problem: The Fortress Problem Target Problem: The Radiation Problem Three Experimental Conditions Subjects are not shown the base problem. Subject attempt to solve the target problem. Subjects are shown the base problem. Subject attempt to solve the target problem. This condition tests for the rate of spontaneous use of the analogy of the base problem when attempting to solve the target problem. Similar findings with other base problems or the arrow diagram. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide with Condition 3 Added

Base Problem: The Fortress Problem Target Problem: The Radiation Problem Three Experimental Conditions Subjects are not shown the base problem. Subject attempt to solve the target problem. Subjects are shown the base problem. Subject attempt to solve the target problem. Subjects are shown the base problem plus a hint that the base problem may be useful when working on the next problem.. Subject attempt to solve the target problem. This condition tests for the rate of using the analogy when the subjects are informed that it may be useful. Similar findings with other base problems or the arrow diagram. Results of Gick & Holyoak's Study Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Summary of Results (Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983)
% Solutions Three Conditions 10% 1. Control: No base problem, no hint 30% 2. Base problem, no hint 75% 3. Base problem + hint These results show that noticing the analogy is a separate step from constructing the analogy. (Condition 3 is better than Condition 2.) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide with Emphasis Rectangles

Summary of Results (Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983)
% Solutions Three Conditions 10% 1. Control: No base problem, no hint 30% 2. Base problem, no hint 75% 3. Base problem + hint These results show that noticing the analogy is a separate step from constructing the analogy. (Condition 3 is much better than Condition 2.) Noticing Analogies: Effects of Superficial Similarities Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Noticing Analogies: The Effects of Superficial Similarities
How to increase the rate at which people notice an analogy? Hypothesis: People are more likely to notice an analogy if the base and target problem share superficial features. Evidence for this is given by the Lightbulb Problem (next). Lightbulb Problem – Standard Version Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Effect of Superficial Features
Lightbulb Problem (Fragile Glass Version; see Goldstein, pp. 352) Ruth must repair an expensive lightbulb. The filament is broken. A high intensity laser can repair the filament, but it will break the glass. Solution: Beam many low intensity lasers at the filament from many different directions. Holyoak & Koh (1987): Subjects who were only given the Lightbulb Problem solved it 10% of the time. Subjects who were first saw the Radiation Problem and its solution solved the Lightbulb Problem 81% of the time. Excellent transfer! Recall that the Fortress Problem transferred to the Radiation Problem 30% of the time. Why is transfer from the Radiation Problem to the Lightbulb Problem much better than transfer from the Radiation Problem to the Lightbulb Problem? Radiation Problem and Lightbulb problem are similar w.r.t. both superficial features and structural features. Radiation Problem and Fortress Problem are similar w.r.t. structural features, but not w.r.t. superficial features. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Comparing Effects of Superficial Features & Structural Features

Effects of Superficial Features versus Structural Features
Subjects first saw the Radiation Problem and its solution. They then tried to solve a version of the Lightbulb Problem. Lightbulb Problem (Fragile Glass Version) – shares both superficial & structural features with the Radiation Problem: Ruth must repair an expensive lightbulb. The filament is broken. A high intensity laser can repair the filament, but it will break the glass. (Same as scenario on preceding slide.) Lightbulb Problem (Insufficient Intensity Version) – shares superficial BUT NOT structural features with the Radiation Problem: Ruth must repair an expensive lightbulb. The filament is broken. A high intensity laser can repair the filament, but she doesn’t have one. She only has low intensity lasers available to her. Solution for both versions: Beam many low intensity lasers at the filament from many different directions. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Results for Two Versions of the Lightbulb Problem

Results: Superficial Features versus Structural Features
Subjects first saw the Radiation Problem and its solution. They then tried to solve one version of the Lightbulb Problem. Lightbulb Problem (Fragile Glass Version) – shares both superficial & structural features with the Radiation Problem: Lightbulb Problem (Insufficient Intensity Version) – shares superficial BUT NOT structural features with the Radiation Problem: Results: % Solution Version 69% Fragile Glass Version 33% Insufficient Intensity Version Superficial Similarities + Structural Similarities Analogical Transfer Comparison of Features for Different Problems Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Comparison of Features Among the Problems
Superficial Feature Structural Feature Problem Medium of Action Why One Strong Beam/Attack Not Possible Analogical Transfer Successful? Radiation Problem X-ray beam One strong x-ray beam will injure the intervening tissue. Radiation problem is the source problem Fortress Problem Attack by troops One strong attacking army will detonate mines on roads. poor Lightbulb Problem (Insufficient Intensity Version) Laser beam High intensity laser not available Lightbulb Problem (Fragile Glass Version) High intensity laser will break the glass. good Same Slide with Emphasis Rectangles Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Comparison of Features Among the Problems
Superficial Feature Structural Feature Problem Medium of Action Why One Strong Beam/Line of Attack Not Possible Analogical Transfer Successful? Radiation Problem X-ray beam One strong x-ray beam will injure the intervening tissue. Radiation problem is the source problem Fortress Problem Attack by troops One strong attacking army will detonate mines on roads. poor Lightbulb Problem (Insufficient Intensity Version) Laser beam High intensity laser not available Lightbulb Problem (Fragile Glass Version) High intensity laser will break the glass. good What Influences the Likelihood of Analogical Transfer? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

What Influences the Likelihood of Analogical Transfer?
Superficial Similarities + Structural Similarities Analogical Transfer The relationship depicted on this slide needs to be modified. See diagram below that includes the effect of schema induction. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Schema Induction in Problem Solving

Schema Induction in Problem Solving
A problem schema is an abstraction of the similarities between many problem solutions. It is a general description of how problems of a given kind can be solved. Does having a good problem schema makes it more likely that one will see an analogy? Schema induction is not discussed in Goldstein, but it is an important concept in the study of analogical reasoning. Gick and Holyoak (1983) introduced idea of schema induction in analogical reasoning. Gentner and Goldin-Meadow (2003) developed similar idea of analogical encoding (discussed in Goldstein, pp ). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Experiment on Schema Induction + Results

Schema Induction in Problem Solving
Gick and Holyoak (1983): Subjects read the fortress story and the "Red Adair" story. Subjects were asked to write a brief summary describing as clearly as possible the ways in which the stories were similar. Subjects' problem summaries were rated by independent raters for quality of the description of the convergence schema. Subjects then attempted to solve the radiation problem. RESULTS: % Successful Solutions Rated Quality of Schema to the Radiation Problem "good" 91% "intermediate" 40% "poor" 30% Having a good problem schema correlates with seeing the analogy between the source problems and the target problem. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary re Schema Induction

What Influences the Likelihood of Analogical Transfer?
Superficial Similarities + Structural Similarities + Induction of a Problem Schema Analogical Transfer Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary re Analogical Transfer

Summary re Analogical Transfer
Noticing that a potential analogy exists is more difficult than applying an analogy once it has been noticed. Superficial features and deeper structural relationships influence the likelihood of noticing an analogy. Discovering a schema for an analogy is promoted by seeing multiple examples of the base problem. Examples: Gick and Holyoak (1983) described in preceding slides; Gentner and Goldin-Meadow (2003) as discussed in Goldstein, pp Possibly end lecture here? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Gilovich – Superficial Associations Influence Judgment

Gilovich – Superficial Associations Influence Judgment
Gilovich, T. (1981). Seeing the past in the present: The effect of associations to familiar events on judgments and decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, Basic argument: Superficial associations to past experience influence judgment. Experiment: Subjects were 20 male sportswriters (the Oakland Tribune; the San Jose Mercury News; the Merced Sun Star; the Palo Alto Time). Subjects read a description of a hypothetical player. Subjects predicted the future success of college players in pro football on a 9-point scale from: = fails to make a pro team to 9 = star/superstar FYI: The Gilovich study was not discussed on the Goldstein textbook. Example of a Player Description and Experimental Results Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Example of a Player Description in Gilovich’s Study
Offensive Guard: Tim B. 6'3". 260 lbs. 5.0 speed in the 40. Good strength and body control. Has a quick, strong charge that enables him to move opponents off the line of scrimmage. Will need to learn to pass block since his college ran the Veer. Tim won the award for football excellence. FYI: Drew Pearson was a famous wide receiver (different position) Gene Upshaw was a famous offensive guard (same position). Results: Average Ratings of Tim B's Chances in Pro Football Rating Award named for famous player who played the SAME position. 6.44 Award named for famous player who played DIFFERENT position. 4.80 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Gilovich – Superficial Features Influence Policy Analogies

Do Superficial Features Affect Availability of Analogies?
Gilovich, T. (1981). Seeing the past in the present: The effect of associations to familiar events on judgments and decisions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, Basic structure of the scenarios: Country A is threatening to invade its peaceful neighbor, Country B. Neither country is strategically important. Country B has asked the U.S. for help. Question: Should the U.S. intervene to help Country B? FYI: This Gilovich study was not discussed in the Goldstein textbook. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Two Prototypes of American Military Intervention

Question: Should the U.S. intervene to help Country B?
Two prototypes of US military intervention World War II: Appeasement of Hitler leads to genocide & terrible war. Vietnam: Intervention leads to long, painful war. Research Question: Can we manipulate the description of the situation to make the WW II or Vietnam analogy more available? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Gilovich Experiment: Phrases Manipulated Across Conditions 1, 2 & 3

Phrases Manipulated Across Condition 1, 2 & 3
WW II Neutral Vietnam The decision was made in _____ (location). Winston Churchill Hall Abraham Lincoln Hall Dean Rusk Hall The current U.S. president was from _____, the same state as _____. New York; FDR Virginia; William H. Harrison Texas; LBJ The impending invasion was referred to as a _____. blitzkrieg quickstrike A pact between Country A and Country F was called a _____ nonaggression pact pact In an emergency, U.S. troops stationed in Country D could be flown to Country B in _____. troop transports Chinook helicopters Minorities in Country A were fleeing _____. via boxcars on freight trains to Country G to Country G via small boats up the coast to Country G Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide Without Emphasis Rectangles

Phrases Manipulated Across Condition 1, 2 & 3
WW II Neutral Vietnam The decision was made in _____ (location). Winston Churchill Hall Abraham Lincoln Hall Dean Rusk Hall The current U.S. president was from _____, the same state as _____. New York; FDR Virginia; William H. Harrison Texas; LBJ The impending invasion was referred to as a _____. blitzkrieg quickstrike A pact between Country A and Country F was called a _____ nonaggression pact pact In an emergency, U.S. troops stationed in Country D could be flown to Country B in _____. troop transports Chinook helicopters Minorities in Country A were fleeing _____. via boxcars on freight trains to Country G to Country G via small boats up the coast to Country G Dependent Variables (Ratings) & Results Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Results: Superficial Features Affect Availability of Analogies
Subjects were 42 Stanford undergraduates who were enrolled in a political science course. Rate: How successful would a US military intervention be in preventing a takeover if a limited number of U.S. troops were sent to Country B. Rate: How likely is it that the crisis would turn into a major world problem involving more countries than A, B, and the US. Rate your preferred policy on a scale from = "hands off; appeal to U.N." to = intervention. Results: Ratings were significantly more interventionist when scenario contained WW II features than when it contained neutral or Vietnam features. (Neutral & Vietnam conditions did not differ). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Interpretation of Results

Interpretation of Results
Result: Non-relevant features that are associated with WW II or Vietnam had an impact on subjects' judgments about what to do. Interpretation: The non-relevant features affected whether subjects drew an analogy between WW II or Vietnam when deciding a course of action. Note: The scenario never made a direct reference to “World War II” or to “Vietnam.” Remember Gick & Holyoak found that superficial features affect whether subjects notice an analogy. Recall that shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, there was an intense debate in the U.S. whether the task of reconstruction in Iraq would be analogous to the post-WW II reconstruction of Germany and Japan. Whether or not policy makers thought the analogy was strong or very weak affected the policies that they advocated. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Ubiquity of Analogies in Real-World Problem Solving

Analogies in Real-World Problem Solving Contexts
"In-vivo" problem solving research = naturalistic studies of problem solving, e.g., in a microbiology lab or a design engineering group. Finding: Scientists and engineers often use analogies in their discussions. Question: Why are analogies often used by problem solvers in real-world situations, but not by psychology subjects in cognitive laboratory situations? True answer not known Notice that real-world problem solvers often have a lot of practice looking for useful analogies in their area of expertise. Perhaps in the real world, many people use analogies but only a few people discover the analogies. Applying an analogy is easier than discovering the analogy. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary re Analogical Reasoning – END

Summary of Analogical Reasoning
Analogies facilitate problem solving. Basic structure of an analogy: Source or base problem, target problem, problem representation, noticing, mapping, application Subjects do not readily recognize the existence of analogies without hints or suggestions. Subjects are influenced by superficial similarities, but also by structural similarities. Schema induction facilitates analogical problem solving. Schema induction requires exposure to two or more instances of a problem structure. Analogies occur often in the problem solving activities of scientists when they are working on their research. END Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

The Psychology of Inductive Inference

Outline Deductive and inductive reasoning Expected utility theory - the normative theory of rational action The heuristics & biases research program The availability heuristic – What is it? The representativeness heuristic – What is it? Lecture probably ends here Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr ‘18 Introduction to Reasoning

Introduction to Reasoning
Deductive & inductive inference - what are they? Expected utility theory - the normative theory of rational action The heuristics & biases research program - what is it? The availability heuristic – What is it? The representativeness heuristic – What is it? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 2 x 2 Table Showing Contrast between Deductive & Inductive Inference

Deductive and Inductive Inference
Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Focus on Deductive Inference

Deductive Reasoning Examples of deductive reasoning:
Math problem solving Logic problems Some aspects of physics problem solving; and other natural science problem solving Four Card Problem Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Definition of Inductive Reasoning

Inductive Reasoning Examples of inductive reasoning:
How likely is it that it will rain tomorrow in Seattle? How likely is it that the defendant in a criminal trial is guilty? What do the results of an experiment imply about a hypothesis that is tested in the experiment? Economic forecasts: How likely is a recession in Europe during 2019/2020? Based on what we know about American history, politics and culture, what is likely to happen in the next national elections? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Psychologists Are Interested in Inductive Reasoning

Why Psychologists Are Interested in Inductive Reasoning
Most real-world questions involve uncertainties. How do people make decisions when faced with risk and uncertainty? Rational decision model: Expected utility theory Bayesian decision theory Central assumption of economic theory & business decision making: Rational decision makers obey the Bayesian decision theory. Heuristics & biases research: Cognitive critique of the rational agent model. Modern behavioral economics General issue of how humans acquire knowledge from uncertain information. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Psychology of Risk – What Are Basic Issues?

Psychology of Risk and Likelihood – What Are Basic Issues?
How do people make decisions when faced with risk and uncertainty? Example: Deciding whether to buy a house. Deciding which house to buy among the available choices. Example: Deciding what medical treatment is best for a given patient (maybe yourself; maybe for someone else). How do people judge the likelihood of events? Example: How likely is it that North Korea will sell nuclear technology to other terrorists? Example: How likely is it that you will find a good job if you pursue a career in X, e.g., marketing? How do people judge how much they like or dislike particular possibilities? How do people predict their future preferences? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Basic Elements of a Rational Decision Model

Basic Elements of a Rational Decision Model
All decisions can/should be represented as choices between gambles. Every possible action should be represented as a specific gamble. Mathematicians, economists and philosophers have identified rules of reasoning that govern how a rational agent would choose a best course of action (best gamble) from the available actions. Psychological Issues in the Critique of Rational Decision Models How do humans perceive risks? How do humans respond to risks? How do humans evaluate uncertainties? How do humans evaluate the relative strength of preference for different outcomes. Psych 355,, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Rational Decision Model & JDM

Rational Decision Model & JDM
Rational decision model: Expected utility theory Bayesian decision theory Central assumption of economic theory & business decision making: Rational decision makers obey the Bayesian decision theory. Judgment & Decision Making (JDM) – a branch of cognitive psychology; generally critical of the rational decision model Human cognitive processes lead to counterproductive (suboptimal) judgments and decisions Heuristics & biases research: Cognitive critique of the rational agent model. Heuristics & biases research program is a major part of JDM research. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Definition - Heuristic Reasoning Strategies

Heuristic Reasoning Strategies
Heuristic reasoning strategies – reasoning strategies that are useful because they are easy and generally effective, even though they can sometimes lead to errors. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Main Claims of the Heuristics & Biases Movement

Main Claims of the Heuristics & Biases (H&B) Movement
Human cognitive processes do not follow the pattern of a rational model. (Rational model = expected utility theory & Bayesian decision model) Human decision making uses heuristic strategies that are useful, but they can lead to systematic errors. Heuristic reasoning strategies .... .... are often fast and effective, .... place low demands on cognitive resources. .... but they can lead to errors in particular situations. Behavioral economics – the application of cognitive psychology to the analysis of economic behavior. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Heuristic Reasoning Strategies - Definition

Some Heuristics in Inductive Reasoning
Availability Representativeness Anchoring & Adjustment Confirmation bias Focusing illusion Framing effects Mental accounting More heuristics that have been proposed than are listed here. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Availability Heuristic

Availability Heuristic
Frequency of Experience Other Factors Availability of Memory for an Event Learning Judged Likelihood of a Similar Event Judgment Availability heuristic – events are judged more probable if similar events are easy to recall or easy to imagine. In general, frequently encountered events are easier to recall. The availability heuristic exploits the converse of this relationship: Events that are easy to recall are thought to be frequent in occurrence. Availability heuristic causes biased probability judgments when other factors that influence availability are not taken into account. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide Without Emphasis Rectangles

Frequency of Experience Other Factors Availability of Memory for an Event Learning Judged Likelihood of a Similar Event Judgment Availability heuristic – events are judged more probable if similar events are easy to recall or easy to imagine. In general, frequently encountered events are easier to recall. The availability heuristic exploits the converse of this relationship: Events that are easy to recall are thought to be frequent in occurrence. Availability heuristic causes biased probability judgments when other factors that influence availability are not taken into account. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Availability: Lists of Famous & Non-Famous Names

Condition I: Famous Male Non-Famous Female
Availability Bias Due to Ease of Encoding Famous/Non-Famous Names x Male/Female Condition I: Famous Male Non-Famous Female Bill Clinton Tom Hanks Michael Jordan Mary Brooks Andrea Forbus Leanne Faris Condition II: Famous Female Non-Famous Male William Hale Murray Jencks Lionel Worley Michelle Obama Angelina Jolie Sarah Palin Subjects saw a list of names, one at a time, that mixed famous males with non-famous females, or vice versa. There were 18 famous and 19 non-famous names in the list. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Next: Same Slide with No Barriers & Results

Results: Famous/Non-Famous Names x Male/Female
Condition I: Famous Male Non-Famous Female Bill Clinton Tom Hanks Michael Jordan Mary Brooks Andrea Forbus Leanne Faris Condition II: Famous Female Non-Famous Male William Hale Murray Jencks Lionel Worley Michelle Obama Angelina Jolie Sarah Palin Results: Subjects reported that the list had more males than females, if the males were famous; Subjects reported that the list had more females than males, if the females were famous; Availability influences perceived frequency. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Reminder of Link to Memory Model

Frequency of Experience Other Factors Availability of Memory for an Event Learning Judged Likelihood of a Similar Event Judgment “Other Factors” that influence availability of a memory Famous names are easy to encode and easy to retrieve. Non-famous names are harder to encode and harder to retrieve. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Egocentric Bias - Intro

Egocentric Bias (Example of Availability Heuristic)
Egocentric bias: People overestimate the proportion of the total work that they have contributed to a project. Ross & Sicoly (1979): Subjects were 37 married couples. Working separately, husband and wife rated self and spouse for their work on 20 activities: making breakfast; cleaning dishes; cleaning house; making important decisions; ... ; causing arguments between themselves; making the house messy; irritating spouse. primarily primarily husband wife Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Predicted Response Pattern If No Bias Existed

Rating Procedure in Egocentric Bias Study
Husband and wife rated self and spouse for their work on 20 activities primarily primarily husband wife Subjects rated their responsibility on a line as shown above. Husband's rating measured as distance from the right end; wife's ratings measured as distance from the left end. If husband and wife have accurate perceptions of responsibility, the sum of their ratings should equal the length of the line. Wife's Mark Husband's Mark Husband's Rating of Self Wife's Rating of Self Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Predicted Response Pattern If No Bias Existed

Example: Suppose that Husband & Wife's Ratings Are Consistent With Each Other
Husband and wife agree as to contribution of each to a task like washing dishes: primarily primarily husband wife If husband and wife were not egocentric, the couple's ratings would sum to +100. ▐ + 25 in husband's scoring ▐ + 75 in wife's scoring +100 total of husband & wife _________________________ Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Predicted Response Pattern If Egocentric Bias Exists

Example: Suppose that Husband & Wife's Ratings Are Inconsistent With Each Other
Husband and wife disagree about their contributions to washing dishes. primarily primarily husband wife If husband and wife are egocentric, the couple's ratings would sum to more than 100. ▐ + 45 in husband's scoring ▐ + 75 in wife's scoring +120 total of husband & wife _________________________ Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Results for Egocentric Bias Study

Results for Egocentric Bias Study
The inconsistent pattern is typical: On many activities, .... The result holds for both good things (wash the dishes) and bad things (buy unnecessary things). This pattern suggests an excessive attribution to the self of both credit and blame. Husband’s Rating + Wife’s Rating > 100 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Do Couples Have an Egocentric Bias?

Why Do Couples Have an Egocentric Bias?
Is egocentric bias due to some aspect of male/female relations? Or is it due to something specific to male/female couples? Probably not. Self versus supervisor focus in attributing responsibility for BA thesis work. Basketball players attributing responsibility for wins or losses. Egocentric bias is probably due to the greater availability of self-actions than partner actions. Death from asthma more likely than death from tornado, but people make opposite prediction. Death from appendicitus more likely than death from pregnancy, but people make opposite prediction. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Sampling Bias in Everyday Media

Thursday, 24 May, 2018: The Lecture Ended Here

Sampling Bias in Everyday Media
Biases in Information Sources Biases in Availability Biases in Perceived Likelihood of Events Things we all know: TV ads do not give an accurate picture of the value of products. Political spin doctors are trying to manipulate our beliefs. TV news is emphasizes dramatic events; it ignores undramatic events. The portrayal of men/women, black/whites, rich/poor, gay/straight, on TV is not a representative presentation of these groups. Our own experiences are not typical of everybody’s experience. Etc. We all know that these information sources are biased, but can we really correct for these biases when forming beliefs? Doubtful. Insensitivity to sampling bias (exposure bias) is not strictly a cognitive bias. The world is biased, but we have difficulty taking this into account. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Return to the Diagram of the Availability Heuristic & List of “Other Factors”

“Other Factors” that Influence the Availability of Events
Egocentric bias. Dramatic events seem more common than non-dramatic events. Biases in the media create biases in the availability of stereotypes. Recent events seem more common than earlier events. Anything that makes events easier to encode or retrieve can make the events seem more frequent than they are. Conclude with remarks re the importance of probability judgment in decision making. Tomorrow: Representativeness heuristic Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary re the Availability Heuristic - END

Summary re the Availability Heuristic
Judging probability in terms of availability is a heuristic. I.e., it is generally a reasonable way to estimate likelihood, but it can lead to certain systematic errors. Factors that are not related to experienced frequency can make make particular events more available. E.g., the perceived probability of being killed by a random crazy person will tend to be exaggerated if biased news and cognitive biases make this kind of event more available than more mundane events. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 END

Next: Section 9 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '15

Novice versus Expert Problem Solving
Psychology 355: Cognitive Psychology Instructor: Roy Seo and Brianna Yamasaki 05/25/2018: Section Week 9

Outline The difference between experts and novices in problem solving
Creative problem solving Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

How Experts Solve Problems
Basic Facts: Experts solve problems in their field faster and with a higher success rate than beginners. Experts possess more knowledge about their fields. Both points are obvious, but we shouldn't forget these facts when interpreting other findings. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

How Experts Solve Problems
Experts spend more time analyzing problems Slower to start, but ultimately use more effective strategies than novice Experts’ knowledge is organized fundamentally differently from novices’ knowledge Knowledge is organized so it can be accessed when needed to work on a problem. Novice: surface features Expert: deep structure Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

How Experts Solve Problems (cont.)
Example: Chi et al. (1981) Physics experts (professors) and novices (students) were presented with 24 physics problems and had to sort them based on their similarities Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Figure 12.19: The kinds of physics problems that were grouped together by novices (left) and experts (right; Chi et al., 1981). Left: Physics novices group problems according to surface features – e.g., all inclined plane problems go together. Right: Physics experts group problems according to principles involved – e.g., problems that deal with conservation of energy go together. 272 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

How Experts Solve Problems (cont.)
Experts are no better than novices when given problems outside of their field People with expertise are not necessarily smarter or better at reasoning in general. They do approach problems in their field in a way different from novices Experts less likely to be open to new ways of looking at problems Consider functional fixedness, thinking outside the box, etc. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Expertise: Summary Experts Novices Focus on problem structure
Focus on surface features Spend time understanding problem Immediately try to solve Better knowledge organization = better access Poorly organized knowledge Better ONLY at solving problems in area of expertise Just as good as experts if experts are out of their domain Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Creative Problem-Solving
What is creativity? Innovative thinking Novel ideas New connections between existing ideas Divergent thinking: open-ended; large number of potential “solutions”

What is creativity? Innovative thinking Novel ideas New connections between existing ideas Divergent thinking: open-ended; large number of potential “solutions” How can you promote creativity? Creative cognition Preinventive forms: ideas that precede creation of finished creative product

What is creativity? Innovative thinking Novel ideas New connections between existing ideas Divergent thinking: open-ended; large number of potential “solutions” How can you promote creativity? Creative cognition Preinventive forms: ideas that precede creation of finished creative product How does knowledge interact with creativity?

Lecture 10-1 This file does not exist because 10-1 would be Monday May 28, and this date was Memorial Day (a holiday). Therefore there are no lecture slides for this date. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '15

Heuristics & Biases: The Availability Heuristic and The Representativeness Heuristic

Lecture probably ends within this topic
Outline Reminder about the heuristics & biases program in judgment and decision making (JDM) The availability heuristics - definition and examples The representativeness heuristic Definition Some examples Discussion of why people tend to judge probability based on similarity Lecture probably ends within this topic Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr ‘18 Heuristic Reasoning Strategies - Definition

Heuristic Reasoning Strategies
Heuristic reasoning strategies – reasoning strategies that are useful because they are easy and generally effective, even though they can sometimes lead to errors. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Main Claims of the Heuristics & Biases Movement

Main Claims of the Heuristics & Biases (H&B) Movement
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky Human cognitive processes do not follow the pattern of a rational model. (Rational model = expected utility theory & Bayesian decision model) Human decision making uses heuristic strategies. Heuristic reasoning strategies .... .... are often fast and effective, .... place low demands on cognitive resources. .... but they can lead to errors in particular situations. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Heuristic Reasoning Strategies - Definition

Some Heuristics in Inductive Reasoning
Availability Representativeness Anchoring & Adjustment Confirmation bias Focusing illusion Framing effects Mental accounting There are many more heuristics than are listed here. Brief review from last week Main focus of today's lecture Not discussed in today's lecture Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Availability Heuristic

Frequency of Experience Other Factors Availability of Memory for an Event Learning Judged Likelihood of a Similar Event Judgment Availability heuristic – events are judged more probable if similar events are easy to recall or easy to imagine. Perceived likelihood of events are biased when "other factors" strongly influence the availability of a memory Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide - No Grey Barriers

Frequency of Experience Other Factors Availability of Memory for an Event Learning Judged Likelihood of a Similar Event Judgment Availability heuristic – events are judged more probable if similar events are easy to recall or easy to imagine. Perceived likelihood of events are biased when "other factors" strongly influence the availability of a memory Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Sampling Bias in Public Media

Sampling Bias in Everyday Media
𝐁𝐢𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐈𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐒𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐁𝐢𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐀𝐯𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐁𝐢𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐞𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐝 𝐋𝐢𝐤𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐡𝐨𝐨𝐝 𝐨𝐟 𝐄𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬 Things we all know: TV ads do not give an accurate picture of the value of products. Political spin doctors are trying to manipulate our beliefs. TV news is emphasizes dramatic events; it ignores undramatic events. The portrayal of men/women, black/whites, rich/poor, gay/straight, on TV is not a representative presentation of these groups. Our own experiences are not typical of everybody’s experience. Etc. We all know that these information sources are biased, but can we really correct for these biases when forming beliefs? Doubtful. Insensitivity to sampling bias (exposure bias) is not strictly a cognitive bias. The world is biased, but we have difficulty taking this into account. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Return to the Diagram of the Availability Heuristic & List of “Other Factors”

“Other Factors” that Influence the Availability of Events
Egocentric bias. Dramatic events seem more common than non-dramatic events. Biases in the media create biases in the availability of stereotypes. Recent events seem more common than earlier events. Conclude with remarks re the importance of probability judgment in decision making. Tomorrow: Representativeness heuristic Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary re the Availability Heuristic

Summary re the Availability Heuristic
Judging probability in terms of availability is a heuristic. It is generally a reasonable way to estimate likelihood, but it can lead to certain systematic errors. Factors that are not related to experienced frequency can make make particular events more available. E.g., the perceived probability of being killed by a random crazy person will tend to be exaggerated if biased news and cognitive biases make this kind of event more available than more mundane events. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Representativeness Heuristic

Representativeness Heuristic
Event A is more representative than Event B Event A is more probable than Event B "more representative" means "more similar to a stereotype of a class or to a typical member of a class." Representativeness Heuristic: Judge the probability of an event E by the representativeness of the event E. We need some example to make this idea more clear (see next). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Example of Jim: An Athletic, Muscular & Competitive Guy

Representativeness Heuristic – An Example
Question: Jim is tall and very muscular. He's also very competitive He drives an expensive car and wears flashy clothing Which is more probable? Jim is a professional athlete. Jim is a lawyer or financial analyst. People predict that Jim is a professional athlete because Jim is similar to a stereotype of a professional athlete. It is a better bet that Jim is a lawyer or financial analyst because there are many more lawyers and financial analysts than professional athletes. This response is predicted by the Representativeness Heuristic This is the better bet. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Return to Slide with Diagram of Representativeness Heuristic

Event A is more representative than Event B Event A is more probable than Event B Representativeness Heuristic: Events that are more representative are regarded as more probable. Example: Jim is muscular/athletic/competitive/likes flashy things. Judging probability based on the similarity to a stereotype overlooks the equally relevant base rate information: There are many more lawyers and financial analysts than professional athletes. Clarify meaning of “representativeness.” a professional athlete? a lawyer or financial analyst? Is he ..... Jim is similar to a stereotype. Jim is less similar to the stereotype. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Intro to the Lawyer/Engineer Problem

Lawyer/Engineer Problem (K&T, 1973)
DESCRIPTION OF JACK: Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social issues. (This description is designed to fit the stereotype of an engineer more than the stereotype of a lawyer.) 30:70 Condition: High Base Rate for Engineer If Jack's description were drawn at random from a set of lawyers and 70 engineers, what would be the probability that Jack is one of the engineers? 70:30 Condition: Low Base Rate for Engineer If Jack's description were drawn at random from a set of lawyers and 30 engineers, what would be the probability that Jack is one of the engineers? Findings re Lawyer/Engineer Problem Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Results re Lawyer/Engineer Problem
Probability of "engineer" was rated to be about the same in the low and high base rate conditions (Subjects exhibit insensitivity to base rate, a.k.a. base rate neglect) High base rate condition = 30:70 Condition Low base rate condition = 70:30 Condition Probability theory implies that Jack is much more likely to be an engineer in the high base rate condition than in the low base rate condition. Why do people ignore base rates? See next slide Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Do People Ignore Base Rates? The Representativeness Explanation

Why Do People Often Ignore Base Rates?
The Representativeness Heuristic: People judge probability based on the similarity of the current case to a stereotype. Jack is equally similar to a typical engineer in the low and high base rate conditions. People ignore the base rate because the base rate is irrelevant to the judgment of how similar Jack is to a typical engineer. Probability theory shows that the base rate is very relevant to judging the probability that Jack is an engineer. Cognitive theory shows that the base rate is often not psychologically relevant to judging the probability that Jack is an engineer. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 When Does It Matter Whether People Ignore Base Rates?

When Does It Matter Whether People Ignore Base Rates?
Evidence shows that physicians sometimes overlook base rates when attempting to diagnose a disease. Evidence suggests that investors are overly influenced by short-term information regarding the value of stocks. Business decisions tend to be overly influenced by short-term trends. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Criticism of Goldstein’s Description of the Lawyer/Engineer Problem

Criticism of Goldstein’s Description of the Lawyer/Engineer Problem
The Goldstein description of this study is inadequate because it does not contrast the 30:70 condition with the 70:30 condition. It only mentions the 70:30 condition. The important finding is that subjects in the 30:70 and 70:30 conditions are equally confident that Jack is an engineer. If subjects were taking account of the base rate, they would state a higher probability that Jack is an engineer in the 70/30 condition than in the 30/70 condition. Knowing only the result for the 70:30 condition does not establish that subjects ignore base rates. See Goldstein p. 374. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Conjunction Fallacies

Conjunction Fallacies – The Famous Linda Problem
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. F: Judge the probability that Linda is a feminist. T: Judge the probability that Linda is a bank teller. F & T: Judge the probability that Linda is a feminist and a bank teller. Probability Theory: P(F) ≥ P(F & T), P(T) ≥ P(F & T) Typical Judgment: P(F) > P(F & T) > P(T) This is the typical pattern of a conjunction fallacy. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Are Conjunction Fallacies Psychologically Interesting?

Why Conjunction Fallacies Are Psychologically Interesting?
Conjunction fallacies strongly support the claim: Human reasoning with uncertainty violates principles of probability theory. Human reasoning with uncertainty is based on a various heuristics – the conjunction fallacy is caused by the use of a representativeness heuristic. Two Question Regarding Conjunction Fallacies: What is wrong with the judgment pattern: P(F) > P(F & T) > P(T)? Why do people's judgments have this pattern? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Probability & the Set Inclusion Principle

Tuesday, 29 May, 2018: The Lecture Ended Here

1st: Representativeness Heuristic and Conjunction Errors 2nd: Risk Attitude and Framing Effects

Outline The Representativeness Heuristic
Conjunction errors - one consequence of people's use of the representativeness heuristic. Risk attitude Framing effects - the Asian Disease Problem Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Definition of the Representativeness Heuristic

Event A is more representative than Event B Event A is more probable than Event B "more representative" means "more similar to a stereotype of a class or to a typical member of a class." Representativeness Heuristic: Judge the probability of an event E by the representativeness of the event E. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Does the Representativeness Heuristic Cause Reasoning Errors?

Representativeness Heuristic (cont.)
Event A is more representative than Event B Event A is more probable than Event B Representativeness Heuristic: Judge the probability of an event E by the representativeness of the event E. Why does this cause reasoning errors? People make reasoning errors when they focus only on similarity, and overlook other factors that are also relevant to the probability of an event. Example: Base rate neglect as demonstrated in the lawyer/engineer problem. People focus on the similarity of the description of Jack to the stereotypes of a lawyer and of an engineer. They fail to take into account the base rate of lawyers and engineers (30/70 or 70/30). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Conjunction Fallacies - The Linda Problem

Conjunction Fallacies – The Famous Linda Problem
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. F: Judge the probability that Linda is a feminist. T: Judge the probability that Linda is a bank teller. F & T: Judge the probability that Linda is a feminist and a bank teller. Probability Theory: P(F) ≥ P(F & T), P(T) ≥ P(F & T) Typical Judgment: P(F) > P(F & T) > P(T) This is the typical pattern of a conjunction fallacy. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Are Conjunction Fallacies Psychologically Interesting?

Why Conjunction Fallacies Are Psychologically Interesting?
Conjunction fallacies strongly support the claim: Human reasoning with uncertainty violates principles of probability theory. Conjunction fallacies also support the claim that people make conjunction errors because they use the representativeness heuristic to judge the probabilities of propositions, F, T and F&T. (Need to provide evidence for these two claims in the following slides) Two Question Regarding Conjunction Fallacies: What is wrong with the judgment pattern: P(F) > P(F & T) > P(T)? How does use of the representativeness heuristic cause people to make conjunction errors? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Probability & the Set Inclusion Principle

Probability and the Set Inclusion Principle
Sample Space (set of all possibilities) If set B is a subset of set A, then the probability of B must be equal or less than the probability of A. B  A  P(B) < P(A) Rationale: When B occurs, A also occurs, so the probability of B cannot exceed the probability of A. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Interpretation of Linda Problem in terms of Set Inclusion

Conjunction Fallacy F F & T T
Sample Space F F & T T Linda Problem: Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. F: Judge the probability that Linda is a feminist. T: Judge the probability that Linda is a bank teller. F & T: Judge the probability that Linda is a feminist and a bank teller. Probability Theory: P(F) ≥ P(F & T), P(T) ≥ P(F & T) Typical Judgment: P(F) > P(F & T) > P(T) Conjunction Fallacy Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide - No Annotation

Conjunction Fallacy F F & T T
Sample Space F F & T T Linda Problem: Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. F: Judge the probability that Linda is a feminist. T: Judge the probability that Linda is a bank teller. F & T: Judge the probability that Linda is a feminist and a bank teller. Probability Theory: P(F) ≥ P(F & T), P(T) ≥ P(F & T) Typical Judgment: P(F) > P(F & T) > P(T) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Do People Make Conjunction Errors?

Why Do People Make Conjunction Errors?
Remember: The representativeness heuristic predicts that people judge the probability based on how similar the individual case is to a typical member (stereotype) of a group. The description of Linda sounds more similar to someone who is a feminist and a bank teller, than to someone who is only a bank teller. Representativeness Heuristic: People judge probability based on similarity to typical case; they overlook role of set inclusion. stronger similarity Description of Linda Bank Teller Prototype Feminist Bank Teller Prototype weaker similarity Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Criticisms of the Representativeness Explanation of Conjunction Fallacies

Criticisms of This Interpretation
Criticism: The Linda problem is just one problem. Reply: Same pattern is found with many similar problems. Criticism: Maybe people think “bank teller” means someone who is a bank teller and not a feminist. Criticism: Conjunction errors can be eliminated by stating the question in terms of frequencies instead of probabilities. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Summary re Representativeness Heuristic

Summary re Representativeness Heuristic
There is nothing wrong with using similarity as a factor in judging a probability. The problem is that attention to similarity causes people to ignore other factors, like base rates, regression effects and set inclusion, that are also relevant to judging probability. Consequences of the Use of the Representativeness Heuristic Base rate neglect - overlooking relevance of base rate to prediction of outcomes. Conjunction errors - overlooking relevance of set relations to judgments of probabiltiy. Overlooking the importance of sample size to reliability of statistics. Overlooking regression effects in predictions of outcomes. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Two Major Issues in the Psych of Decision Making - Probability & Value

Two Major Issues in Psychology of Decision Making
Judgments of likelihood What outcomes are likely? Which are unlikely? How likely? Slightly possible? Almost certain? Etc. Judgments of preference & making choices How strongly do you like or dislike different possible outcomes? How risky are different choices? What risks are worth taking? When should you avoid a risk? We’ve been talking briefly about this topic. Next topic. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Digression re Risk Attitude

Risk Attitude Risk Aversion: A choice is risk averse if a person chooses a sure-thing X over a gamble G where X is less than the expected value of G. Example of a Risk Averse Decision Prefer a sure win of $500 over a gamble for $1,010 or $ (Note: Expected value of gamble = $505) Risk Seeking: A choice is risk seeking if a person chooses a gamble G over a sure thing X where the expected value of G is less than X. Example of a Risk Seeking Decision Prefer a gamble for $1000 or $0 over a sure win of $ (Note: Expected value of gamble = +$500) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide With All Content Displayed

Risk Attitude Risk Aversion: A choice is risk averse if a person chooses a sure-thing X over a gamble G where X is less than the expected value of G. Example of a Risk Averse Decision Prefer a sure win of $500 over a gamble for $1,010 or $ (Note: Expected value of gamble = $505) Risk Seeking: A choice is risk seeking if a person chooses a gamble G over a sure thing X where the expected value of G is less than X. Example of a Risk Seeking Decision Prefer a gamble for $1000 or $0 over a sure win of $ (Note: Expected value of gamble = +$500) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Examples of Risk Aversion & Risk Seeking

Examples of Risk Aversion & Risk Seeking
Whenever you buy insurance, you are acting in a risk averse way. The cost of car insurance is a sure loss that is a bigger loss than the expected value of the gamble of driving an uninsured car. Whenever you gamble at a professional casino or in state lottery, you are acting in a risk seeking way. The cost of the lottery ticket is greater than the expected value of the lottery ticket. In a casino, all of the mechanical gambles (roulette or slot machine) have a negative expected gamble. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Is It More Rational to be Risk Averse or Risk Seeking?

Is It More Rational to be Risk Averse or Risk Seeking?
There is no rational requirement to be risk averse. It is equally rational to be generally risk averse or generally risk seeking. It is also rational to be risk seeking for some money quantities, e.g., small amounts of money, and risk averse for other money quantities, e.g., large amounts of money. It is also rational to be risk averse in some domains, e.g., gambles for the health of your children, and risk seeking in other domains, e.g., gambles for business profit and loss. Before the work of Kahneman & Tversky, many theorists thought that people were generally risk averse. Next slide: Reflection effect shows that people are risk averse for some kinds of gambles, and risk seeking for other types of gambles. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Reflection Effect Example

Reflection Effect – Example
Choice 1: Which would you prefer? Option A: .80 chance to win $4,000; chance to win $0 Option B: chance to win $3,000. Choice 2: Which would you prefer? Option C: .80 chance to lose $4,000; chance to lose $0 Option D: 1.0 chance to lose $3,000. People are typically risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses. This pattern is called the reflection effect. Typical preference  when gambling for gains Example: Bettors at at horse track bet on long shots at the end of the day (many bettors are in a state of trying to recoup losses at the end of the day).  Typical preference when gambling for losses Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Reflection Effect - Definition

Reflection Effect (not a framing effect)
Reflection Effect: People are generally risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses. (This statement is generally true, although there are exceptions to it.) Example: Bettors at horse track bet on long shots at the end of the day (many are in a state of trying to recoup losses). By itself, reflection effect is not a framing effect (to be defined next), but it plays a role in preferences that exhibit framing effects. When the reflection effect is combined with changes in the framing of a choice (examples to be described next), it is possible to produce paradoxical patterns of preference that are called framing effects. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Framing Effects

Framing Effects Definition: A framing effect has occurred if people’s preferences change when: the description of the choice problem is changed, and ... the content of the choice problem is not changed By “content” I mean the logical structure of the problem. If two problems are logically equivalent, they have the same content. The content is the same if different versions of the problem have the same probabilities and the same outcomes – only the wording or "framing" of the problem changes. Basic Principle of Rational Choice: The framing of a problem should not affect the decisions of a rational agent (preference should not change as a function of problem description). When a framing effect is found, it is a violation of this principle of rational choice. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Comment on Goldstein's Definition of Framing Effects

Comment on Goldstein's Definition of "Framing Effects"
Definition: A framing effect has occurred if people’s preferences change when: the description of the choice problem is changed, and ... the content of the choice problem is not changed Goldstein (p. 384) defines a framing effect only in terms of condition (a); he omitted any mention of condition (b). This omission is a mistake, i.e., my definition in terms of conditions (a) and (b) is better on theoretical grounds and it is closer to the usage of this term, "framing effect", in the literature of judgment and decision making. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Reflection Effects and Framing Effects

Wednesday, 30 May, 2018: The Lecture Ended Here

Reflection Effects and Framing Effects
By itself, a reflection effect is not a framing effect, but .... reflection effects can be part of what causes a framing effect. How to create a framing effect: Change the wording of the choices to emphasize gains or to emphasize losses. Emphasize gains in the options Become more risk averse Emphasize losses in the options Become more risk seeking Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Asian Disease Problem - Gain Frame

Framing Effects and Affective Forecasting

Outline Risky choice - the study of people's decisions when choosing among courses of action that involve uncertainty and risk. Risk attitude - people tend to be risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses. Framing effect - people's choices among risky options is affected by the way that the options are described, even if the objective choices remain the same. Affective forecasting - the study of how people attempt to predict their feelings if particular outcomes occur. The Focusing Illusion: How focusing on an issue exaggerates the importance of the issue. This lecture will present one example from the study of risky choice (framing effects) and one example from the study of affective forecasting (the focusing illusion). Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Review: Definition of Framing Effects

Framing Effects Definition: A framing effect has occurred if people’s preferences change when: the description of the choice problem is changed, and ... the content of the choice problem is not changed By “content” I mean the logical structure of the problem. If two problems are logically equivalent, they have the same content. The content is the same if different versions of the problem have the same probabilities and the same outcomes – only the wording or "framing" of the problem changes. Basic Principle of Rational Choice: The framing of a problem should not affect the decisions of a rational agent (preference should not change as a function of problem description). When a framing effect is found, it is a violation of this principle of rational choice. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Reflection Effects and Framing Effects

Reflection Effects and Framing Effects
Reflection Effect (not a framing effect): People are generally risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses. By itself, a reflection effect is not a framing effect, but .... reflection effects can be part of what causes a framing effect. How to create a framing effect: Change the wording of the choices to emphasize gains or to emphasize losses. Emphasize gains in the options Become more risk averse Emphasize losses in the options Become more risk seeking Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Asian Disease Problem - Gain Frame

Asian Disease Problem: Gain Frame
Problem 1: Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and /3 probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs would you favor? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Asian Disease Problem – Loss Frame

Asian Disease Problem: Loss Frame
Problem 2: Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and /3 probability that 600 people will die. Which of the two programs would you favor? Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Results – Asian Disease Problem

Asian Disease Problem: Results
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science. 211 (4481), 453–58. Problem 1 [N = 152]: (Gain Frame  Risk Averse Choice) If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. [72 %] If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability [28 %] that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. Problem 2 [N = 155]: (Loss Frame  Risk Seeking Choice) If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. [22 %] If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability [78 % ] that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that people will die. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 The Asian Disease Problem Is an Example of a Framing Effect

The Asian Disease Problem Is an Example of a Framing Effect
A framing effects is a change in preference that is due only to the way that the options are described. The logical structure of the choice remains the same in the different frames. In the Asian disease problem: The gain frame and loss frame versions of the problem are logically identical but ... People have different preferences depending on whether the outcomes are described as potential gains or potential losses. An emphasis on gains elicits risk averse behavior. An emphasis on losses elicits risk seeking behavior. (Remember: People tend to be risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses.) This pattern of behavior constitutes a framing effect. Preferences differ depending on whether potential gains or potential losses are emphasized. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Comment on the Name "Asian Disease Problem"

Comment on the Name: "The Asian Disease Problem"
Goldstein discusses the Asian Disease Problem, but the textbook does not refer to it by this name. See the Demonstration on p. 384 and Figure 13.7 (p. 385). The most common name for this problem in the cog psych literature is the "Asian Disease Problem." Goldstein points out that the typical results for the Asian Disease Problem exhibits a framing effect, but the textbook does not discuss the relationship between this framing effect and the reflection effect (as was done in this lecture.) Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Are Preference Anomalies Important?

Why Are Preference Anomalies Important?
To make better decisions, we need to understand what influences our decisions. Preference anomalies are situations where people's preferences systematically violate norms for rational decisions. Preference anomalies are found in the decisions of policy makers, medical professionals, financial analysts, and other people with important decision making roles. Cog psych experiments have demonstrated that decisions are influenced by: ..... emphasis on gains or emphasis on losses. ..... mental accounting – the way that the costs & payoffs are presented loss aversion – the inordinate pain of relinquishing a possession sunk costs – over-commitment to previous investments. Not discussed in Psych 355; not on the final exam Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Introduction to Affective Forecasting

Affective Forecasting
Affective forecasting – predicting how we will feel if different outcomes were to occur. Brickman et al. – Small differences in life satisfaction between paraplegics and lottery winners. Sackett & Torrance report that the general public rated life on chronic dialysis as 39 whereas patients who were treated with chronic dialysis rated it as 56 (100 point scale). Mellers & McGraw – Women who did not want to be pregnant, awaiting pregnancy test results at a Planned Parenthood clinic, anticipated more negative affect if they found out they were pregnant than they actually did feel if they turned out to be pregnant. The study of affective forecasting is part of a more general area of research, the psychology of happiness. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Why Do People Have Difficulty with Affective Forecasting?

Why Do People Have Difficulty With Affective Forecasting?
People have incomplete or inaccurate self-theories. Response to novel experiences is hard to anticipate. Affective set point – overall happiness/unhappiness is determined by internal personal factors. People sometimes fail to take this into account. Possible biases: Focusing illusion Impact bias Duration neglect Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Focusing Illusion

Focusing Illusion Focusing illusion – if attention is focused on some but not all of attributesa of an option, these attributes will have greater influence over the predicted affective outcome than they will if the outcome is actually experienced. a An "attribute" is a discernable quality of the option; other words for the same idea would be "aspects of an option" or "issues regarding an option." Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Study of Working Women – Ratings of Self and Predictions for Others

How Would You Feel If You Were ______ ?
Kahneman, D., Krueger, A. B., Schkade, D., Schwarz, N., & Stone, A. A. (2006). Would you be happier if you were richer? A focusing illusion. Science, 312, Participants were working women. Participants were asked .... to state the percentage of time they were in a bad mood on the preceding day, and .... to predict the percentage of time a woman similar to themselves would be in a bad mood if she were in specific social categories Contrasting social categories: income < $20,000 income > $100,000 40 yrs & living alone 40 yrs & married no health insurance has health insurance Since some women were in each of these categories, we can compare predicted differences to actual differences. Since some of the women did have income < $20,000 or > $100,000, or were alone or married, etc., we also have the actual self-rating of time in a bad mood. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 How Would You Feel If You Were ____? - Results

Would You Feel If You Were ______? - Results
Sample sizes for different groups were at least n = 59, and for most cases were 75 – 225. Mean sample size of all groups = 107. Median sample size = 84 Minimum sample size = 59 Total sample size = 1,719 In general, ACTUAL difference < PREDICTED difference The effects of good or bad circumstances were exaggerated. Good or bad circumstances do have an effect, but not as much as predicted. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Same Slide Without Emphasis Rectangles

Would You Feel If You Were ______? - Results
Sample sizes for different groups were at least n = 59, and for most cases were 75 – 225. Focalism (a.k.a. the focusing illusion) – people tend to overestimate the impact of variables that that they focus on. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Focusing Illusion - Thinking About a Possibility Makes It Seem More Influencial

Focusing Illusion - Summary
Focusing on any one aspect of a larger situation exaggerates its perceived impact on quality of life. Schkade and Kahneman (1998), "Nothing in life is quite as important as you think it is while you are thinking about it." Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Comments Regarding the Final Exam

Comments Regarding the Final Exam
Bring a scantron form; bring a pencil for the scantron form. One essay question You do not need to bring a blue book to the exam. Obviously bring a pen if you prefer to write with a pen. All other questions will be multiple choice, or true/false, or short answer (fill in a few words) Approximate distribution of questions: 50% Chapters 1 – 8 50% Chapters 9, 10, 12, 13 +1 essay question Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 What Are Available Materials for Studying for the Final Exam

Materials for Studying for the Final Exam
Obviously, look at the lecture slides, your section notes, and the textbook. Available on the Psych 355 webpage: What will be covered on the Final Exam? Study questions for all chapters ( See the Spring 2016 Psych 355 exams. Use the version without answer key as well as with the answer key. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Suggestions for Studying for the Final Exam

Suggestions for Studying for the Final Exam
Spaced practice is better than massed practice. Generate your own ideas with respect to the course material – they will serve as retrieval cues. Create good associative links to information that you want to remember. E.g., does the study material remind you of anything else that you know? E.g., does the study material help to explain something about your own experience? Test yourself without an answer key in front of you. Memory tricks: Create interactive images that capture ideas that you want to remember. Try to relate facts or ideas to yourself. Study in an environment that is similar to the test environment. Memorization (maintenance rehearsal) is an ineffective memory aid. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18 Good Luck!

Best of Luck Don’t overstress for the exam.
Focusing illusion – your exam performance seems more important than it really is (for your future happiness). Have a good break END Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '18

Section 10 I created this set of combined slides before the day of Section 10, so I don’t have the Section 10 slides. You will have to download them from the Psych 355 Canvas website. Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '15

End of Lectures: 08–2 to 10-4 Psych 355, Miyamoto, Spr '15

Combined Lecture Slides: Weeks

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