1. Radiation To Electronics 2x1033 - A Brief Look
Very Quick
M. Brugger on behalf of the R2E Project
!!! Many Thanks To Everybody !!! (Specials to: Marco, Giovanni, Ketil!)

2. Questions SEE failures, status today?
Are higher peak luminosities more penalizing (for SEEs)?
Efficiency of what has already been done ?
What mitigation measures are planned within the R2E Project?

3. Very Preliminary! (many things were done during the last 24h!)

4. Risk of Low Statistics Appearance: Correlation: Likelihood: Impact:
Stochastic distribution of failures can lead to wrong conclusions. (e.g. collimation control racks being most critical for UJ14/16)
Correlation:
Radiation levels depend not only on luminosity (and intensity), also residual gas pressures can matter (e.g. some [more] events after the technical stop)
Likelihood:
Grouping of ‘events’ can occur within fluctuations (e.g. 3 or 4 SEE caused dumps in a row, then several fill no SEEs)
Impact:
Some failures lead to longer down-times (not because of the SEE nature, but due to the affected equipment) while failure xSection can be similar (e.g. Cryo PLC failures)
Improvement:
Mitigation measures are partly implemented in the shadow, focusing on most critical equipment (e.g. shielding & relocations)

5. Radiation Levels (we agree that SEE failures are caused by radiation?)

6. Measured & Expected Rad-Levels
2011 Operation up to Week 30 (2010 excluded): -> ~1,8 fb-1 (nominal: x30 for lumi scaling)
Luminosity Dominant
Intensity Dominant
Luminosity Dominant
Intensity Dominant
Luminosity Dominant
Intensity Dominant
Luminosity Dominant
Scaling might be non-linear for areas being dominated by direct losses (& distributions) and/or vacuum contributions!

7. Radiation Levels & Luminosity

8. Luminosity versus Time
Luminosity is main source of radiation in P1/5/8
Other Cases:
Collimation (P7)
Vacuum (All)
Except…
Very similar slope (so far)

9. Failures & Correlations
!!! Only Physics Fills !!!
Shorter fills with higher luminosity
-> ‘more’ likely to have SEEs ending the fill since some other failure modes depend rather on time?
In terms of behavior with time the failures reflect the cumulative luminosity (see slide before)

10. SEE Failures Mini-Chamonix Status & Today

11. Observed SEE Failures (~1fb-1)
G. Spiezia LBOC (link) + Updates (not easy)
Except QPS, only failures leading to dump?
How to Scale to Nominal Operation?
Luminosity: P1/5 (x50), P8: (x3-5)
Energy: P1/5/7/8: (x1.5)
Intensity: P7: Losses & Distribution (x ??? [10-50])
Beam-Gas: P1/5/7/8 + & Scrubbing (x ???)
!!! STILL NOT AN EASY EXERCISE !!!

12. & Today
!!! MANY EVENTS STILL TO BE DIGESTED !!!
!!! All Fills !!!

13. & Tomorrow (Scaling) UJ14/16/56, RR13/17/53/57: US85: UJ76, RR73/77:
Failures scale with accumulated luminosity
2011: x2-3, 2012: x5-10 (theoretical with no actions!) (BUT: shielding + relocation) -> aim, not worse than now!
US85:
2011: x2, 2012: x4? (BUT: some additional relocations)
UJ76, RR73/77:
Failures scale with collimation losses
2011: x2?, 2012: x5-10? (BUT: some additional relocations)
BUT:
TS and xMasBreak Actions improve situation (see later)
Vacuum (25ns) & loss distribution to be kept in mind!

14. What’s to be done (prepared and partly already implemented)

15. Roadmap for 2011
Detailed radiation field analysis (Monitoring, TLDs, MD)
Additional radiation tests (H4IRRAD, CNRAD)
Provision/preparation of mitigation actions
xMasBreak (shielding P1, some relocations, preparations)
LS1 (shielding P1/5/8, relocations: P1/5/7/8)
Development of RadTol Power Converters (also for patches!)
TS & xMasBreak improvements
Additional patch-solutions
Evaluation of additional weak points (P4, REs)
R2E Review in November

16. Mitigation Options What Can Be Done (in general) Solve & Gain Time
Improve & Gain Time
RELOCATION
SHIELDING
Mitigation Options
Solve & Remain Flexible
No Major CE
RAD-TOL DESIGN
CIVIL ENGINEERING

17. Mitigation Strategy Immediate Relocation “Fast” & Global Improvement
1st Safety Critical
Immediate Relocation
2nd Shielding
“Fast” & Global Improvement
Highest Impact on Operation:
Relocation
Shielding
3rd Most Sensitive
Relocation
Shielding
New Design
4th Remaining

18. Performed R2E Mitigation Actions
Shielding:
P6 (RA63/UA63 and RA67/UA67) (gain ~factor 5-10)
UJ22/23/76/88/87 (gain ~factor 10)
RR77/73 (gain ~factor 10)
US85 Safe-Room (gain ~factor 10)
Relocations:
Fire-Control Racks UJ56/76, US85 (safe)
RTU relocated from safe room in UJ56/76 (safe)
Cryo-relocations/valve replacement in UX85 (safe)
UPS from UJ76 (safe)
Fire-Detectors: US85, other points prepared (safe)
PLCs from US85 (safe)
Replacements & Upgrades:
QPS Firmware Upgrade (ISO150 failures) (transparent)
US85 24V Power Supply -> replaced by old model (more robust)

19. xMasBreak - Shielding/Relocation
Point 8
US85: Cryogenics relocation (under study)
US85: Relocation of 24VDC distribution
All points
Relocation/Shielding preparations
Point 1
UJ14/16 shielding (gain factor 5-10)
UJ/RRs: Fire detection relocation
UJ14/16 Cabling Preparations
Point 5
UJ56 Relocation Preparations
UJ56 Civil engineering Phase I
RRs Fire detection preparation

20. Equipment “Patches” QPS ISO150: Cryogenics control:
Firmware upgrade will be finished during xMasBreak
Cryogenics control:
Current lead temperature: hardware mod. (xMasBreak)
Communication: reset possibility investigated
Collimation control:
Software update investigated
Cryogenics PLCs:
Redundant PLC system studied (to be tested in CNRAD)
Cryogenics Power Supply:
Old model (robust) in place, only part-time solution
uFIP -> “brico-FIP”

21. LS1 Mitigation Actions Point 1 UJ14/16: relocation (+ some shielding?)
RR13/17: shielding
Point 5
UJ56: relocation
RR53/57: shielding
Point 7
UJ76: Relocation
RR73/77: tbd
Point 8
US85: Relocation
US85: Shielding
Power-Converters: RRs P1/5/7
Radiation tolerant development
Also important for patches

22. Conclusion
SEE failures are a function of accumulated luminosity (and losses) [+vacuum!]
Higher accumulated luminosity per fill makes a dump due to SEE more ‘likely’ to appear (coupled with origin of ‘failures’ other than SEEs)
Number of SEE failures within R2E predictions
but they will continue to appear until in 2011/2012!
A clear R2E Mitigation plan is available
xMasBreak actions will improve the situation
LS1 is required for large scale
Optimization is constantly applied (Input/Information is crucial)

23. Backup

24. Measured & Expected Rad-Levels
Weekly Report
Detailed Analysis
Comparison & Extrapolation
x50
Link1 & Link2

25. Measured & Expected Rad-Levels
2011 Operation up to Week 25 (2010 excluded): -> 1fb-1 (nominal: x50 for lumi scaling)
OLD ESTIMATE
Luminosity Dominant
Intensity Dominant
Luminosity Dominant
Intensity Dominant
Luminosity Dominant
Intensity Dominant
Luminosity Dominant
Scaling might be non-linear for areas being dominated by direct losses (& distributions)

26. Equipment Failures Sources of Information eLogBook 8:30h meetings
RadWG list (see link)
Cryogenics List (see link)
QPS analysis/list (see intermediate summary)
TE/EPC List (updated log)
s and discussions
Your observations/input !
!!! NOT AN EASY EXERCISE !!!

27. Equipment Failures ??? Definition of Failure linked to SEE ???
One or several (ideally all) of the following conditions:
Failure occurs during beam-on/ collisions/losses (source of radiation)
Failure is not reproducible in the lab
Failure signature was already observed during radiation tests (CNRAD and others)
Failure frequency increases with higher radiation (hopefully we don’t get there)

28. Limitations in Analysis
Limitation-1: SEEs which are not SEEs?
Limitation-2: Hidden failures ! (not related to SEEs, caused by 3rd party equipment with indirect impact, e.g. Ethernet Switches)?
Limitation-3: High probability to miss those not causing a dump!

29. Power-Converters & Tolerance
Parts have been tested at CNRAD
Expected sensitivity ~1x10-8 (= one failure every ~1x108cm2 per converter)
LHC Observations
so far four failures confirmed as SEE (sensitive module: AC/DC part)
+ few cases of 2nd failure ‘signature’
New Test-Area H4IRRAD:
LHC-like conditions (spectra)
About 1 year of nominal LHC within one week of test
Final results after the summer!
What will we learn:
confirm LHC observations
verify weak links and investigate patch-solutions (important for 2012 and 2014/15/16 operation)
optimize global mitigation strategy
North Area:
Jura Side
SPS Beam
Saleve Side
Power-Converter’s are the Key Point for the final R2E Mitigation Strategy

30. What it Means in Reality
TEST THIS:
AND AFTER …
BEFORE …
HERE
(W)HOW ???
DANGEROUS LIQUID:

31. Equipment Failures
Low (weekly) statistics, but correlation visible

32. IR7 Performed Mitigation Actions
Shielding installed: [ECRs: and ]
RR73/77 (we gained ~factor 10 in radiation levels)
UJ76 (we gained ~factor 10 for safe-room, 3-4 for the 1st floor)
Relocation of UPS from UJ76 (safe) [ECR: ] (safety critical at that time!)
Relocation of fire control racks (safe) (possible impact on safety not excluded):
UJ76 -> TZ76 [ECR ]
Relocation of EN/EL control equipment (safe)
RTU relocated from safe room in UJ76 -> TZ76
Relocation of fire detectors (possible impact on safety redundancy):
Prepared for UJ76 and RR73/77 (see ECR )
Rack installation & cabling preparations: UJ76 -> TZ76

33. Mitigation Actions Already Done
Shielding installed:
Ducts in P6 (RA63/UA63 and RA67/UA67) (gain ~factor 5-10)
UJ22/23 and UJ88/87 (gain ~factor 10)
US85 Safe-Room (gain ~factor 10) [ECR: ]
Cryo-relocations/valve replacement in UX85 (safe)
Relocation of fire control racks (possible impact on safety):
US85, UJ56 [ECR: ] (safe)
Relocation of fire detectors (possible impact on safety):
US85 (other points prepared) [ECR: ] (safe)
Relocation of EN/EL control equipment
RTU safe room UJ56 (safe)
Cabling preparations: P1, P7, P8

34. Possible SEE Failures Observed in 2010
CONFIRMED or very LIKELY
WIC crate failure in TI8
Observed in 2009
Known problem with moderate x-section
CRYO tunnel card SEE in 8L2
1 Fault in uFip (as observed in CNRAD 2010)
SEE confirmed
QPS Tunnel Card Failures
(2x in 9L7 [ions], 2x in 8R8 [inj.], + others)
ISO150 -> permanent PM trigger SEE confirmed (EMC has same effect)
TE/EPC power supply burnout in UA87
Same effect observed in CNRAD
SEE is very likely the cause (Streaming through Maze)
QPS tunnel Card Failures
in 9R7 & 9L7
uFip communication lost (2x) SEE confirmed (seen in CNRAD)
NOT CONFIRMED (unlikely)
VAC power supply burn out
In UA23 between maze and duct
(TDI losses + TCDI losses )
SEE rather unlikely
PXI power supply burnout in UJ16
To be confirmed by producer (comparison with CNRAD burnouts)
SEE unlikely (early 2010 operation)

35. Failures 2011 [Mitigation]
Collimation Control (3x, confirmed) [Soft + Relocation]
Cryogenics UJ14/16/56/76 (several confirmed) [Relocation]
Biometry UJ14/16 (2x, likely) [Operation + Rel.?]
US85 PLCs (Cryo, 3x, confirmed) [Relocation]
Power Converters (4x, TE/EPC) [New Develop.]
UPS UJ56/US85?(unlikely, but possible) [Relocation]
QPS Control UJ14/16 (few, corrector circuits) [Relocation]
QPS ISO-150 (many, tunnel & shielded areas) [Soft + New Develop.]
uFIP as used in QPS/Cryo (few times, tunnel + shielded areas) [Soft + New Develop.]
Limitation-1: SEEs which are not SEEs?
Limitation-2: hidden failures (not related to SEEs, caused by 3rd party equipment with indirect impact, e.g. Ethernet Switches)?

36. Power Converter Failures
© TE/EPC

37. LHC POWER CONVERTERs © V. Montabonnet, Y. Thurel
Minimize the number of converter types:
Only the LHC60A-08V was specified for a radioactive environment !
3 other converter types are part now of the radioactive sensitive areas!
LHC120A-10V 4-Quadrant 300 Units
LHC600A-10V 4-Quadrant 400 Units
LHC4..6kA-08V 1-Quadrant 200 Units
LHC60A-08V 4-Quadrant 752 Units
Units : Quantity in all machine (UA, RR, UJ, tunnel)

38. IR7 Critical Areas & Equipment
Equipment Inventory (EDMS # )
Equipment UJ76
Fire/ODH control & detectors
Cryogenics Instrumentation (Profibus)
AUG control
Vacuum
UPS
Beam Television Monitor
Electrical Distribution & Control
Ramses
Remote-Reset & Timing
GSM Diagnostics
Access System Control
Beam Loss Monitors
Power Converter
Beam Position Monitors (temporary)
Ethernet
Optical Fiber
Cooling and Ventilation
WorldFip
Equipment RR73/77
Fire/ODH detectors
Beam Position Monitors
Power Converter
Cryogenics Instrumentation (FIP)
QPS
WorldFip
Cooling and Ventilation
Current Lead Heaters
Power Interlock
Electrical Distribution
Various critical equipments
Several tested at CNGS and shown high radiation sensitivity
Few cases allow for ‘patch’ solutions
Less radiation critical equipment
Fire/ODH detectos to be relocated
Current Lead Heaters ok for the levels
QPS known patch solution
Power Converters – Big Unknown
Global Solution Required

39. IR7 Radiation: Today?
Combined Loss Analysis (BLMs & Injected/Dumped Intensities):
IR3 lost in 2011: ~6E13 protons (per beam)
IR7 lost in 2011: ~2E14 protons (per beam)
We’re a factor of ~50x below nominal (~1x1016p/b/y)
Can nominal operation lead to ‘relatively’ higher losses?
© A. Nordt, A. Thornton
Latest Weekly Report (
RR73/77: ~2-3x106cm-2
UJ76: ~1x106cm-2
Scaling: x75 (Energy!)
Nominal Year:
RR73/77: ~2x108cm-2
UJ76: ~8x107cm-2

40. Collimation Review Performed mitigation options very efficient
2011/12 Operation
UJ76 relocation
Power-converter tests & R&D for RadTol Dev.
Betatron collimation in IR3
very efficient
not limited by IR7
next step (safety)
high-importance to judge for RRs
Would provide additional flexibility

41. RRs: Power-Converter R&D
TE-EPC Planning for Rad Tolerant Converter Project
© Y. Thurel
Link: R2E Power Converter R&D

42. RRs Additional/Alternative Options
Betatron Collimation in IR3
No significant SEE impact for IR3
Low radiation levels in IR7
Additional flexibility
Standard collimators to be added
R&D for Superconducting Links
© R. Assmann et al.
© A. Ballarino et al.

43. IR7 FLUKA Application Benchmark
© K. Roeed
Loss-Term (SixTrack [R. Assmann et al.])
TCP
TCAP
MBW
TCS
MQW
TCLA
Assumptions
FLUKA Calculations
Normalisation
>500m
2010 Operation
Summary (Protons) In
6.02E+15
Dumped
5.82E+15
96.70%
Lost in Machine
1.99E+14
3.30%
Of Lost protons
Collisions
2.33E+13
11.73%
Elsewhere
1.76E+14
88.27%
RR73
RR77
UJ76
LM01
LM02
LM03
RM03
RM04
RM05
RM06
RadMon
Dcum
Rth
SEU (3V) Measured
Beam contribution
SEU (FLUKA) Expected
Error [%]
Stat. only
Exp./Mes.
6L7.7LM03S
19846 5
14401 B1
15015 3
1.04
5L7.7LM02S
19904
5253
9765
1.86
4L7.7LM01S
19991
2689
B1+B2
3116 6
1.16
4R7.7RM03S
20045
950
401
0.42
5R7.7RM04S
20133
18727 B2
13032 4
0.70
6R7.7RM05S
20208 31
303
962 8
3.17
RR77.7RM06S
20241 1 13 17 22
1.33
BLM ratio IR7 / IR3
Ratio
% Loss in IR7
TCSG.A6L7.B1 / TCSG.5L3.B1
3.1 76
TCSG.A6R7.B2 / TCSG.5R3.B2
5.6 85

44. Tracking/BeamGas/etc. Operation Assumptions
Radiation Levels 2010
Source terms, operational conditions as well as monitor readings have to be carefully evaluated
Tracking/BeamGas/etc.
FLUKA Predictions
Operation Assumptions
Rad-Level Estimate
Monitor Readings
Calibration
Assumptions
Final Values
Threshold of monitors is ~106!
(lower values only by ‘trick’ [big uncertainties!])
VERY GOOD AGREEMENT (given the underlying uncertainties)

45. 2010/2011/2012 Radiation Levels !!! Amazing !!! Close to ‘Threshold’
2011/2012/Nominal/+++ ???
!!! Amazing !!!
Close to ‘Threshold’
Critical
Dramatic?

46. IP8/TI8 Radiation Detectors
© V. Boccone
5RM07S
PMIL8812
Current location not known in full detail of the Radmon and RAMSES positions
PMIL8811
5RM05S
Large Gradient: 4-5 orders of magnitude
PATL8711
5RM06S
5RM08S

47. TED Loss: RadMon Downstream
© V. Boccone

48. UJ87: Loss on TCDIH.87904
© V. Boccone

49. Point-8 Application Benchmark
© M. Calviani
FLUKA/RAMSES benchmark
Detector
Measured dose
Ratio
(meas/simu)
PMI8501 (UX85)
24.0
1.1
PMI8511
(UX85)
120.0
0.8
PAT8511
(US85)
36.7
0.6
US85
UX85
UW85
FLUKA Simulations provide high energy hadron fluence, dose and 1 MeV Si equivalent in the LHCb cavern according to the Phase-2 shielding implementation proposed in the R2E Project
FLUKA/RadMon benchmark
Detector
Ratio
(FLUKA exp/measure)
8LE10S
1.6
8LE07S
2.0
8LE04S
8LE08S
2.2
Very good agreement with PMIs and PATs RAMSES detectors
RadMons set at 3V more difficult (at low count rates)
Significant uncertainties to be considered (thermal neutron contribution, detector geometry, etc…)
Uncertainty at least a factor of 2