1. Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 11 Freedom of the Will
By David Kelsey

2. What is freedom of the will?
An ability or capacity to choose a course of action from among various alternatives
This is not the ability to act but to choose. Freedom of action is often constrained by factors beyond our control, for example what other people do.
The question is: can our will carry to action more than one of the available alternatives?

3. Freedom of the Will Freedom of the will, Key Questions:
Do we have freedom of the will?
Determinists say that all of our choices are wholly and completely determined by past events and the causal laws that operate on this universe.
What is freedom of the will? What is the definition of freedom of the will?
There are lots of proposals…
What kinds of creatures do or can have freedom of the will?
We want to say that we have freedom of the will of course. But is it possible that other animals do? Presumably, to be free a creature must be rational, so it seems certainly that other non-human rational creatures could, theoretically, be free.

4. Determinism
Some philosophers believe that our freedom can be pulled away from us by various determinisms.
A determinism is a constraint on our action, something that coerces, forces or determines our choice.
Examples of determinisms include: Physical/causal, psychological, biological and theological…

5. The Minimalist Desire account
On a minimalist account, free will is the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire.
So on this account I act freely so long as I act on what I desire.
David Hume’s account is this type. For Hume freedom of the will is “a power of acting or of not acting, according to the determination of the will.”

6. Counterarguments to the minimalist desire account
It follows from this view that some non-rational animal behavior is free.
But non-rational animals lack a conception of self as agent and they lack the ability to reflect on the consequences, moral or otherwise, of their choices.
It is also hard to see how a non-rational animal can be free when it is at least arguable that they aren’t conscious…

7. The Goodness Account The Goodness account:
Says one is free just in case she wills what she consider overall best for herself, even if this conflicts with some other animal or base desire.
We might say freedom on this account is just our willing what we view as the good, or what is best, or what has the most value…

8. Counterarguments to the Goodness account of freedom of the will
This would be unduly restrictive for it would mean that we wouldn’t be free when we choose to will what we desire instead of the good…
And isn’t this right? If I choose to go out drinking with the buddies instead of visiting my sick grandmother in the hospital I am immoral maybe, but unfree? Isn’t freedom just in my ability to do other than what’s best on occasion?

9. The reflective deliberation account
The reflective deliberation account of freedom of the will:
Says one’s will is free when one’s deliberations prior to willing are sensitive to one’s own judgments about what is best in the circumstances, whether or not one wills what one judges best.
Thus, on this account it is simply deliberation about what is best that accounts for freedom. So long as one’s deliberates she is acting freely.

10. Counterarguments to the reflective deliberation account
It seems deliberation isn’t quite enough for freedom of the will for such deliberation could be beyond one’s control. It could be determined by a neurological implant or some external stimulus for example…
You might have an agent deliberate about something but be compelled to will something by compulsion or something entirely out of their control. For example, the smoker may deliberate about quitting but be compelled to continue…
Responses:
In the first case, if one’s deliberation is being controlled or manipulated then it doesn’t really seem to be true deliberation, at least not one’s own…
In the second case, seems the deliberation is a façade to mask the compulsion and so again this doesn’t seem true deliberation…

11. Freedom as liberation from base or animal desires
Some think that true freedom of the will involves both freedom from the animal appetites (and base desires) and the acquisition of desires for the Good.
Here we can put the view as a kind of negative restriction on the process leading up to and including the willing itself.
We can say: free willing are those that are not in part explicable by episodes of external manipulation which bypass the critical and deliberative faculties.
So we are free so long as there isn’t any external manipulation of either the deliberation process or of the willing itself…

12. Frankfurt’s account of free will preliminaries
Frankfurt’s account of freedom of the will, preliminaries:
Harry Frankfurt thinks the difference between a free human act and an action performed by an un-free and non-rational animal, is our human capacity to reflect upon our desires and beliefs
Human beings can reflect upon which of our desires are good or bad or best for us.

13. First and Second order desires
Frankfurt distinguishes between 2 types of desires.
First order desires:
base desires for things.
For example I might be hungry and so form a desire to eat a hamburger.
Second order desires:
formed out of reflection on our first order desires.
For example I might reflect and realize that the hamburger I desire is the perfect way to hit the spot, to quench my hunger. And so I might want to have this desire for the burger.
Or I might form the first order desire for a candy bar. But after reflection I realize that this is a bad idea because I don’t need extra sugar right now.

14. Frankfurt’s definition of freedom
Frankfurt’s account of freedom of the will:
For Frankfurt, I act freely when the desire on which I act is one that I desire to be effective.
I act freely when I form a second order desire for my first order desire, the one upon which I act, to be realized.
In this case my second order desire is one with which I identify, one which reflects my true self.
Compare this to an addict:
He acts upon a first order desire that upon reflection he doesn’t desire.
His first order desire and second order desires are conflicted.
He has a second order desire to make ineffective or unrealized the first order desire upon which he acts.

15. Counterarguments to Frankfurt’s account
Counterarguments to Frankfurt’s account of freedom:
1. What’s so special about second order desires?
Why must we assume that second order desires are a truer reflection of my identity than are my first order desires?
Consider acting on a spur of the moment decision. These moments are often those that feel most free…
2. Can’t our 2nd order desires be controlled or manipulated?
Imagine a case in which someone’s second order desires are manipulate or controlled and yet my second order desire aligns with my first order desire upon reflection.

16. Sartre’s account of freedom
John Paul Sartre:
For Sartre, human beings have absolute freedom: “No limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself, or, if you prefer, we are not free to cease being free.”
Sartre thought human beings lacked any kind of positive nature. Instead, we are ‘non-beings’ whose being, moment to moment, is simply to choose.
Sartre’s words:
“For human reality, to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from the outside or from within which it can receive or accept…. it is entirely abandoned to the intolerable necessity of making itself be, down to the slightest details. Thus freedom…is the being of man, i.e. his nothingness of being.
The quotes from Sartre here are taken from his book titled Being and Nothingness, pages , 1956, New York, Washington Square Press.

17. Kane’s account of freedom
Robert Kane presents an intuitive discussion of free will.
For Kane, free choices are ones that are preceded by efforts of the will within the process of deliberation, in particular where the will is conflicted and indecisive.
It is in cases where the will is conflicted that we see the greatest and most clear moments of freedom for Kane.
For Kane, when one struggles in a moment of deliberation to sort out and prioritize one’s own values, the possible outcomes of the deliberation are undetermined as well as indeterminate at each stage of the process. By this Kane believes that the possible outcomes have no objectively determined probability of occurring. For Kane, it is this indeterminacy that is the essence of freedom…

18. Further Questions
Now that we have looked at several accounts of freedom of the will we are still left with unanswered questions.
Which account of freedom is most plausible?
If there isn’t one clear winner is it possible to take the strengths of a plurality of accounts and create a hybrid account?
I would say that certainly it seems that it is necessary for freedom of the will that:
An agent is rational
An agent is conscious
An agent is reflective and imaginative
An agent deliberates
Are there any other requirements?