1. Criminal Procedure: Theory and Practice, 2d.by
Jefferson L. Ingram

2. CHAPTER 5
The Concept of Stop and Frisk

3. 1. Introduction to Stop and Frisk
Three kinds of citizen-police encounters:
Exchanging pleasantries.
Some suspicion- requires inquiry.
Arrest.

4. 2. Stop and Frisk Reasonable suspicion of criminality:
Unusual circumstances.
Stop and inquiry permitted.
If fear that subject may be armed and dangerous:
Allows frisk of outer clothes.

5. 2. Stop and Frisk (cont.) Brief stop and conversation:
Ends any suspicion of subject.
May necessitate a frisk.
Frisk may end suspicion.
Frisk may indicate probable cause to arrest.

6. 3. THE TERRY LEGAL STANDARD
Officer sees unusual conduct.
May stop individual.
Make reasonable inquiry.
May resolve concern.
May permit frisk if fear subject armed.
Evidence may allow probable cause arrest.

7. Case 5.1, Leading Case Brief: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Facts: Officer observed Terry and others perhaps casing a robbery. Approached to make inquiry; men made evasive and suspicious replies. Officer frisked Terry, finding a firearm and arrested him. Trial court found no problem. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue: May officer stop and frisk where odd conduct is not resolved as non-criminal and fear subject is armed?
Held: Yes.
Rationale: Unusual conduct may indicate that criminal activity may be afoot. Reasonable stop and inquiry may resolve suspicion as groundless or as indicating criminality. Fourth Amendment allows reasonable seizure where encounter is brief and matter is rapidly resolved.

8. 3. THE TERRY LEGAL STANDARD (cont.)
Stop permitted upon “reasonable suspicion” of criminality.
Frisk permitted when officer concludes subject may be armed and dangerous.
Terry Standard: Requires less evidence than probable cause.

9. 3. THE TERRY LEGAL STANDARD (cont.)
Facts insufficient to justify stop:
Violates Fourth Amendment.
Facts insufficient to justify frisk:
Mere hunch, not reasonable suspicion.
Weapon-like lump:
Justifies search of interior clothing.

10. 4. Facts Indicating Unusual Conduct
Derived from:
Officer’s observation.
Fellow officer’s knowledge.
Citizen’s complaint.
Informant’s information.
Police dispatcher.
Combination of sources.

11. 4. Facts Indicating Unusual Conduct (cont.)
Stop and Frisk Applied to an Automobile:
Officer needs “reasonable suspicion” that:
Vehicle harbors criminal, or
Contraband may be within vehicle, or
Suspicion occupant may be armed.

12. Case 5.2, Leading Case Brief: Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
Facts: Officers received anonymous tip that defendant was leaving her apartment in her car carrying illegal drugs toward a specified address. Officers validated parts of tip and stopped her car. She consented to a search that revealed a quantity of illegal recreational pharmaceuticals.
Issue: Can anonymous tips, when corroborated, give rise to reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity?
Held: Yes
Rationale: An unverified tip may have been insufficient to support an arrest or search warrant, but the information, when partially corroborated by observed facts by the officers, carried sufficient “indicia of reliability” to justify a forcible stop consistent with the Terry rationale. The anonymous tipster was proven honest and well-informed concerning defendant’s activities to justify a stop.

13. 5. Flight Upon Seeing An Officer As Unusual Conduct
Mere flight upon seeing a police officer, without more, no stop and frisk.
Flight with other factors: stop and frisk permitted.
Flight, high crime area, spotting officer, daylight hours allows stop and frisk. Illinois v. Wardlow (2000).

14. Frisk May Not Always Allow Additional Search
If officer observed:
Known drug user, observed with other users, nothing passed between or used for hours.
Insufficient for stop or frisk:
No indication of criminality.
Reputation insufficient for stop. Sibron v. New York (1968).

15. 7. Terry Stops Under a Drug Courier Profile
Brief detention and inquiry permitted.
Must meet reasonable profile.
Reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary.
Brief stop permitted.
Short inquiry allowed.
Quick release if nothing develops.

16. Case 5.3, Leading Case Brief: Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1990).
Facts: Met airport drug courier profile by youth, expensive luggage, one-way cash ticket purchase. Taken to room, ticket, driver’s license, luggage was in possession of police. Held fifteen minutes in small room. Cops got luggage key and found drugs. Royer alleged he was held unreasonably long time under Terry standard.
Issue: Does excessive detention of airline passenger under Terry violate Fourth Amendment?
Held: Yes.
Rationale: Fourth Amendment prohibits seizure without objectively reasonable grounds. Police had right to briefly detain; initial seizure was proper under reasonable suspicion of smuggling. The length of the detention became unreasonable because he was not free to leave and too much time had elapsed. Being illegally detained made any consent to search luggage, involuntary.

17. 8. Subject Must Be Aware of Officer’s Status
Subject stopped by police officer:
Must submit when officer is uniformed.
Plain-clothed officer must identify.
No duty to submit when officer identity unknown.

18. Vehicle interior frisk:
9. Officer Must Have Reason to Believe that the Person May be Armed and Dangerous
For a lawful frisk:
Objectively reasonable suspicion.
Subject- armed and dangerous.
Vehicle interior frisk:
Reasonable suspicion.
Vehicle interior contains weapon.
Inside clothing:
After feeling “weapon-like” lump.

19. Dependant of right to stop or detain. If no right to stop, or
9. Officer Must Have Reason to Believe that the Person May be Armed and Dangerous (cont.)
Authority to frisk:
Dependant of right to stop or detain.
If no right to stop, or
Stop exceeds length of time:
No right to frisk or “pat down.”

20. Reasonable belief that individual may be armed and dangerous:
9. Officer Must Have Reason to Believe that the Person May be Armed and Dangerous (cont.)
Reasonable belief that individual may be armed and dangerous:
Very low threshold.
Evidence rarely suppressed based on officer’s alleged unreasonable belief.

21. Stop and frisk permitted:
10. The Investigation Must Not Dispel the Fear that the Subject May Be Armed and Dangerous
Stop and frisk permitted:
Man leaving house being searched-can be frisked for weapons.
Absence of individualized suspicion:
Suspected drug trafficker- subject to frisk.
Many dealers are known to be armed.

22. 11. The Plain Feel Doctrine
During lawful frisk:
Object seizable when touch or feel indicates criminal nature.
Firearm, knife, unique stolen property, some drugs.
Criminality: obvious under circumstances.
No manipulation:
Constitutes illegal search beyond frisk.

23. 12. Expansion of the Stop and Frisk beyond Its Genesis
Approved stops in absence of fear that subject was armed and dangerous:
Seizure of luggage. Florida v. Royer (1983).
Frisk of vehicle interior after traffic stop. Michigan v. Long (1983).
Order passenger from vehicle at traffic stop. Maryland v. Wilson (1997).
Court balanced danger against inconvenience.

24. 12. Expansion of the Stop and Frisk beyond Its Genesis (cont.)
When officer makes a stop:
Illegal if stop was for “no reason.” Delaware v. Prouse (1979).
Subject need not give police identification:
When walking and not suspected of any crime. Kolender v. Lawson (1983).
Subject must identify:
When suspected of criminal activity.
Only when state law requires. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District (2004).

25. 13. Expansion of Terry-like Stops to Individuals not under Suspicion
Vehicle stops: Reasonable to order passengers to exit.
No individualized suspicion.
No suspicion that person armed.
No suspicion of criminality.
No fear that person posed danger.
Courts consider procedure “reasonable.”
All persons considered “seized.”

26. 14. Summary
Suspicious persons can be briefly seized on less than probable cause.
If reasonable explanation, free to go.
Frisk, if fear that person may be armed.
Profiles may be used to identify persons.

27. 13. Expansion of Terry-like Stops to Individuals not under Suspicion (cont.)
When no individualized suspicion:
Officers may enter interstate bus.
May converse with passengers.
May ask consent to search bags or person.
In United States v. Drayton (2002), arrest made after talking to bus passenger concerning drug trafficking.
Police profiled Drayton.
No initial suspicion.
Drayton consented to frisk; drugs found.