Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Partners: EUI, Hertie, SAR, Basel Institute, and BCE

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Partners: EUI, Hertie, SAR, Basel Institute, and BCE"— Presentation transcript:

1 Partners: EUI, Hertie, SAR, Basel Institute, and BCE
International anti-corruption norms and monitoring mechanisms in Europe WP10, ANTICORRP Project Lead partner: ELIAMEP Partners: EUI, Hertie, SAR, Basel Institute, and BCE

2 Proliferation of international and European norms against corruption
EU: lack of an explicit competence, yet, it has adopted soft law and hard law instruments, i.e Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of MS of the EU New mechanism: EU anti-corruption report (every 2 years) Council of Europe (CoE) approach against corruption, intrinsically linked to democratic values, the rule of law, human rights. Most important instruments are a) Twenty guiding principles for the fight against corruption (1997); b) Criminal Law Convention (c) Civil Law Convention

3 Proliferation of international and European norms against corruption
CoE, Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) mechanism monitoring state compliance with the CoE conventions, through peer process evaluation; identification of deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies and promotion of reforms; 4 rounds of evaluation OECD Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions (1997) 2003 UN Convention against corruption; calls for the development and implementation of effective and coordinated anti-corruption policies 2009: Establishment of a Review Mechanism overseen by the Implementation Review Group and organised in cycles focusing on different provisions of the 2003 Convention

4 Domestic implementation of international and European anti-corruption norms
Flourishing scholarship on state compliance with international law, but little in regard to anti- corruption Also flourishing scholarship on studies on the phenomenon of corruption across many disciplines Single country case-studies explore how international and European anti-corruption standards influence domestic laws and policies But no systematic study on whether, the extend to which, and the conditions under which such international standards are complied with and implemented by states

5 WP10 Research objectives
 Measure state compliance and implementation of international anti-corruption norms in Europe;  Explore whether international law has an independent causal influence over the anti- corruption laws, policies and practices adopted by EU states;  Identify patterns of variation of state compliance and implementation, whether cross- national, or across sectors and issue areas; and  Explore the factors that account for significant variation across sectors or states.

6 Defining compliance, implementation and effectiveness
Compliance: the discrepancy between the legal standard of an int’l convention and domestic law, Implementation: the efforts of, and degree to which national authorities enforce and put international standards into practice through the passage of legislation, the creation of institutions and the enforcement of rules Effectiveness: the efficacy of a given norm and its corresponding prescriptions to tackle the social problem that it is intended to redress, to induce change in state behaviour and to achieve its policy objective

7 Issue areas of focus A set of studies of the EU and the CoE instruments that directly or indirectly address issues of corruption and favoritism Political party funding (GRECO, 3rd round) Organised crime: proceeds of corruption and money laundering (GRECO, 2nd round) Conflict of interest (GRECO, 2nd round) Public procurement in EU law: The first 3 will do a large-N study of all EU-28 states. The last one shall explore the effects of ECJ and national court decisions related to public procurement on favoritism in public contracts

8 May be an artefact of a legal standard grafted onto a treaty
Determining the independent causal effects of European and international anti-corruption norms Compliance with (and even implementation of) international and European anti- corruption standards may be fortuitous and not the result of international law and monitoring its mechanisms May be an artefact of a legal standard grafted onto a treaty We need to detect and isolate the ‘goodness of fit’ (degree of pre-existing state compliance with international standards), from the degree of compliance that is achieved as a result of pressure exercised by international monitoring bodies

9 Measuring a baseline Distinguish between ‘goodness of fit’ and international norms-induced compliance. Set of criteria and questions in each issue area of focus on the basis of which to code: a) the pre-existing legal and institutional frame that is in place in each country; and b) its capacity to enforce the legal regulations and the policy objectives that underpin them.  Such capacity refers to the resources with which existing or newly created anti-corruption institutions and bodies are endowed, their mandate and independence, the coordinating potential of all existing bodies, their political clout, or other.

10 International law-induced compliance and implementation
Subsequently, we will determine the extent to which states have pursued reforms following the monitoring by GRECO and its recommendations, and measure this We will make these assessments by drawing on the information and documentation contained in the various evaluation and compliance reports issued by GRECO for the EU countries Phase 3 of the project: engage in comparisons across countries and issue areas Phase 4 of the project: policy recommendations and briefs Plan of a collective volume (2nd phase) and a special issue of a journal (3rd phase)


Download ppt "Partners: EUI, Hertie, SAR, Basel Institute, and BCE"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google