1. Confronting Globalized Terrorism in the 21st Century: Lessons from Fighting Islamic State Terrorists,
Dr Rachel Lea Heide
DRDC CORA Defence Scientist/Strategic Analyst
Conference of Army Historians (Arlington, Virginia)
24-28 July 2017
-The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Canada, the Department of National Defence, or Defence Research and Development Canada’s Centre for Operational Research and Analysis.

2. Outline Introduction/Definitions The Adversary – Islamic State Forces
Strategic Level Analysis – Root Causes of Terrorism
Operational Level Analysis – Capacity Building Attempts in Iraq
Tactical Level Analysis – Questions to be Asked of the Mission
Conclusions – Lessons Learned and Policy Implications
-Since 2001, the United States and its coalition allies have been battling militant Islamist terrorism on home soil and abroad.
-This presentation will focus on the latest iteration of violent extremist organizations – Islamic State (IS) – and what lessons need to be learned from recent research and battlefield experiences.
-After introducing the Islamic State adversary, this presentation will then discuss strategic, operational, and tactical levels of analysis that must be conducted to better understand how to fight and destroy the militant Islamist terrorist threat.
-Based on the findings of such studies, this presentation will argue that combatting terrorist organizations such as IS is not simply a matter of attrition and eventual allied military victory. Instead, a Whole of Government approach is needed to eradicate the underlying causes and regional political/military deficiencies that led to this type of threat taking root and persisting for so long.

3. Definitions
-First, let me explain the reasoning behind my choice of terminology – militant Islamist terrorists – when referring to the current terrorism threat stemming from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

4. Definitions
Terrorism: “The unlawful use of – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.”
Islam: The religious faith that worships Allah as the sole deity and recognizes Muhammad as Allah’s prophet
Islamists: Islamists pursue a political Islam where adherents aim to translate their religious beliefs into a political system and a physical state. Their interpretation of Islamic teachings is more radical, imitates the social conditions of the early days of Islam, and requires the adherence to sharia law. They expect to achieve their objectives within their countries’ existing political and electoral frameworks
Militant Islamists: Militant Islamists pursue the same ideological goals as Islamists, but they systematically use violence to bring about the purification of society and the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Militant Islamists consider anyone who does not follow their belief system to be a sinner and apostate
Terminology: A significant challenge of terminology is differentiating between the religion of Islam, Islamists who translate their religious beliefs into politics, and militant Islamists who choose to pursue violence and terror to establish their radical interpretation of Islam in an immediate Caliphate state. The challenge is to not broad-brush all adherents to Islam as terrorists, but to, at the same time, identify that these terrorists’ belief system is linked to a radical interpretation of the Muslim religion.
-Hence, I am going to using the term militant Islamist terrorists to refer to the current terrorism threat which the West is confronting both at home and abroad.

5. The Adversary
-As Islamic State has grown and taken over more territory, it has changed its name to reflect is evolution. It grew out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI); the group called itself Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and then Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in When its leader (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) declared the creation of a Caliphate in 2014, the group identified itself as Islamic State (IS), indicating its intention to spread beyond just Iraq and Syria.

6. Islamic State Territorial Gains, 2014 -2015
Gains 2014: Fallujah, Tikrit, Mosul, Baiji, Hawija, Tal Afar, and portions of the Sunni provinces of Ninewa, Anbar, and Salah ad-Din
Gains 2015: Seized population centres outside of Iraq and Syria, including Sirte in Libya and seven district centres in Afghanistan
Gains in 2014
-The roots of this organization go back to the 1990s, but it came of age after the United States’ invasion of Iraq in IS garnered the attention of local governments and the international community when it started to make significant territorial gains in At the end of June 2014, IS declared the establishment of its Caliphate, with the capital of Raqqa (held by IS since 2013), which spanned the distance from Aleppo in Syria to the eastern province of Diyala in Iraq. By the end of 2014, IS controlled 34,000 square miles of territory in Iraq and Syria.
Gains in 2015
-In early August 2014, coalition airstrikes against IS began in support of the Iraqi military and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. In 2015, it appeared that Western airstrikes were helping local allies make headway in retaking territory from IS, such as Kobane and Tikrit. Nonetheless, IS took over the cities of Palmyra in Syria and Ramadi in Iraq (just 60km from Baghdad); Ramadi was wrested from IS control in December.

7. Islamic State Territorial Losses, 2016 - 2017
Losses 2016: Ramadi, Abu Ghraib, Palmyra (regained Dec), Fallujah, Aleppo
Losses 2017: Mosul mostly retaken; Raqqa encircled
Losses in 2016
-In March 2016, reports assessed that coalition airstrikes and local allies on the ground had driven IS out of 40% of the territory it had seized in Iraq and out of 20% of the territories held in Syria, and by end-2016, IS-held territory has shrunk by 14% from the previous year.
-In January 2016, IS held 78,000 square km (30,100 square miles) territory; by December, this had decreased to 60,400 square km (23,300 square miles).
Losses in 2017
-As of March 2017, IS had lost approximately 66% of the land it formerly controlled.
-Mosul: The operation to retake Mosul began in October 2016; nine months later (end June/beginning July 2017), the old part of the city had been recaptured from IS, and Iraq’s Prime Minister Hadier al-Abadi declared the end of the IS Caliphate.
-IS still holds territory west and south of the city, as well as other towns and cities in Iraq.
-Fighting with IS is expected to continue for weeks as Iraqi forces face pockets of resistance, guerrilla attacks, and terrorist attacks in urban centres (such as Baghdad).
-IS retains strongholds in northern Iraq (Hawija, Tal Afar) and along the Euphrates River valley (from Anah to Qaim).
-Raqqa: Kurdish-led and US-backed Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) have been advancing on Raqqa since November 2016; at the beginning of June 2017, the SDF launched the offensive to finally take back the city.
-As the SDF was moving closer to Raqqa, it liberated territory and towns moving in the direction toward the Euphrates River. Consequently, the SDF now encircles the city, holds it under siege, and has blocked off all remaining escape routes.
-The SDF will be drawn into urban warfare while also relying on heavy bombardment, and the time estimate for fully taking over the city (at the end of June 2017) was up to a month-and-a-half.

8. Islamic State Tactics and Capabilities
IS Tactics
Conventional: lightening offensives, traditional military manoeuvres and campaigns Insurgent: kidnappings, hostage-takings, executions, ambushes, snipers, mustard and chlorine gas, suicide attacks
IS Equipment
Conventional: heavy weaponry including field guns (with ammunition), rocket launchers (with rockets), tanks, howitzers, rocket-propelled grenades, air-to-surface missiles, self-propelled artillery pieces, anti-tank guided missiles and launchers, anti-aircraft guns and portable anti-aircraft missile systems, armoured personnel carriers, high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), helicopters, and drones
Insurgent: Small arms, assault rifles, mortars, machine guns on pick-up trucks, suicide vests, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)
Why Understand
-Understanding IS’ capabilities will help define what regional capacity is required to counter this threat. IS military tactics are spread across the spectrum of conflict. The organization is an insurgent group, well-versed in irregular and guerilla warfare tactics; nevertheless, IS is capable of conventional warfare and has blended its insurgent and conventional capabilities into instances of hybrid warfare.
IS Tactics
-When capturing cities such as Mosul in 2014 and fighting the Peshmerga, IS has fought as a conventional offensive force that can conduct manoeuvres, sustain pitched battles, hold territory, and use heavy weaponry.
-The advent of coalition airstrikes did force IS to change its approach and return to insurgent tactics, opting for smaller teams of fighters and formations of commercial vehicles, thus making them lighter, faster, and more difficult to target. In order to be a less viable target, IS fighters avoid manning roadblocks, hide amongst civilians in urban areas, travel through tunnels, and use human shields so the militants cannot be struck without causing civilian casualties as collateral damage.
IS Equipment
-Initially, the group was equipped with light infantry fire power (small arms, assault rifles, and mortars) and typically used civilian pick-up trucks modified to carry mounted machine guns.
-After capturing Iraqi and Syrian territory, IS has been able to take possession of much more substantial military equipment that was left behind by defeated and fleeing forces.
-With the fall of Mosul, Iraqi security forces left behind four divisions’ worth of equipment and at least three armament depots for IS to seize.

9. Strategic Level Analysis
Strategic Level Analysis: Root Causes of Terrorism
-Before sending military forces into a theatre of operations to put an end to violence and restore peace and stability, senior level military and policy leaders need to initiate and support research and analysis to determine what caused the conflict in the first place and what will actually keep it from reoccurring once military forces put an end to the violence. Soft power approaches will be needed, in addition to hard power.
-The strategic level analysis required to inform counter-terrorism operations is the study of the root causes of terrorist threats.

10. Root Causes of Terrorism
Political: Poor governance, corruption, ineptitude, authoritarian regimes, repression, oppression, curtailing political expression, discrimination, violation of human rights, beatings, imprisonment.
Western Foreign Policy: Interference in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria; support for Israel at Palestinian expense.
Economic: Poverty, unemployment, economic disparities, unequal distribution of wealth.
Social: Marginalization, discrimination, economic limitations, political exclusion in Europe.
Psychological: Emotional reactions, personal experiences, us-vs-them mentality, identity crises, lack sense of belonging, searching for personal significance, vengeance for wrongs.
Radical Religion: Puritanical interpretations, establish a Caliphate, violent behaviour justified, millenarianism, no room for negotiations.
Political Causes:
-There is discontent over poor governance, corruption, oppression, discrimination, violation of human rights, beatings, imprisonment; angry citizens (especially youth) often turn to violence since no other alternative seems effective.
Western Foreign Policy Causes:
-Terrorists cite grievances such as Western nations’ actions (military actions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria), foreign policies (supporting Israel and failing to end the Palestinian occupation), and interference in governments
Economic Causes:
-Economic causes include poverty, unemployment, unequal distribution of wealth, and economic disparities between the West and the MENA region.
Social Causes:
-Systematic marginalization and discrimination in European host countries has resulted in cultural isolation, economic limitations, physical attacks, difficulties finding well-paying jobs, and political exclusion.
Psychological Causes:
-Some individual Muslims have strong emotionally-based reactions to injustices, resulting in crises in identity, searches for personal significance, loss of self-esteem, lacking a sense of belonging in the West, and a desire to carry out vengeance for wrongs against their community; for these people, terrorist organizations provide belonging, purpose, and identity.
Radical Religious Causes:
-Militant Islamists embrace versions of Islam that follow very traditional, puritanical, and literal interpretations of the Quran (based in Wahhabism and Salafism). Their belief system is millenarian: they are fighting in the end times and believe the world must end and that violence is justified against all opponents and infidels.

11. Root Causes of Terrorism
Solutions:
Address macro-level causes through Whole-of-Government/Comprehensive Approach
Address poor governance and lack of democratic practices in MENA states
Improve economic situations
Ensure social justice and human rights
Focus on youth vulnerability
Involvement of family, religious, leaders, and community role models
Conduct diplomacy to address concerns over Western hegemony/military operations
Prepare strategic communications plan to counter anti-Western propaganda
Accept that incremental changes will take time
Have the military prepared to conduct counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations or capacity building of local defence forces if required
Potential Solutions:
-It will be necessary to address governance, economic, youth, and human rights grievances in order to make any progress in defeating this global security threat.
Recommendations:
-Incremental changes happen over centuries; it must be accepted, and expected, that MENA nations will need time to undergo progressive changes to their political, economic, and social structures and systems;
-Addressing the root causes of militant Islamist terrorism is not something militaries are equipped or mandated to do. It will take diplomatic and development initiatives to address problems with governance, the economy, and humans rights violations.
-Cooperation with allies is key: this problem is bigger than any one nation’s capabilities.
-The only role for militaries is, if directed by their government, to conduct future counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, to provide capacity building training to local defence and security forces, and to assist whole of government partners in addressing these challenges.

12. Operational Level Analysis
Operational Level Analysis: Capacity Building in Iraq
-Looking at lessons that can be learned from studying the local military capacity building efforts in Iraq is an example of operational level analysis in the current counter-terrorism context.
-Taking an in-depth and critical look how an operation was planned, trained for, supplied, conducted, and ended will highlight problems that need to be resolved, solutions that need to be maintained, and errors that should never be repeated.
Questions to Ask and Investigate
-In the West’s efforts against IS in Iraq and Syria, local force capacity building has played a significant role in the West’s focus; the West has been sending military trainers and advisers to help indigenous forces improve their capacity and capability to fight the enemy themselves.
-Research questions should include:
Were previous capacity building attempts in Iraq successful; if not, what were the deficiencies?
After almost a decade of training by the US, why were Iraqi forces so easily defeated by IS in 2014?
What types of training and capabilities does Iraqi forces need to succeed against the IS adversary today?

13. Capacity Building in Iraq
Loss of Experienced Leadership
Disbandment of 400,000 soldiers of Iraqi Army meant loss of experienced leaders
Unemployed former Iraqi officers supplied the terrorist organization with influential leaders, military expertise, and equipment from the former army’s arsenal
Focus of Previous Capacity Building Training
2003: wrong trainers, poor recruits, sent into battle before ready
2005: focus on counter-insurgency skills (checkpoint, route clearance, and counter-IED techniques); conventional warfare tactics and support functions were not part of the curriculum
Brought back senior and general officers for leadership positions; many were corrupt, alienated from new recruits, and distrustful of the American approach
Iraqi Prime Minister’s Interference in Iraqi Army
Takes control of Iraqi National Command, Iraq Counter-Terrorism Service, Special Operations Forces; creates regional commands, headed by loyal generals; takes over roles of Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior; purges Iraqi Army leadership of Sunni officers, replacing them with militarily incompetent political favourites who allowed corruption and bribes
Case Study: US SFA
-In order to understand why the Iraqi Army failed when confronted by IS in 2014, analysis must be done on the previous capacity building attempt ( ) to understand what went wrong.
Loss of Experienced Leadership
-To remove all ties between a new Iraqi Army and the old military force that had operated under Saddam Hussein, on 23 May 2003, American Ambassador Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi Army and put approximately 400,000 soldiers out of work;
-With thousands of men who were now unemployed, angry, and desperate to earn income for survival, many of the former officers joined IS forces, giving the terrorist organization influential leaders, military expertise, and equipment from the former army’s arsenal.
Focus of Previous Capacity Building Training
-The United States’ early attempts to train and rebuild the Iraqi Army did not result in a military force that could withstand the security challenges that would arise.
The embryonic military force (trained to protect Iraq’s borders from external threats) was sent into battle before it was ready, due to a rising insurgency. Iraqi forces collapsed in April 2004 as they tried to put down uprisings in Sadr City;
-In 2005, American military capacity builders focused on developing the counter-insurgency skills of Iraqi forces. Conventional warfare tactics and support functions were not part of the curriculum since it was assumed that no external force would try to invade Iraq as long as the United States military was present.
Iraqi Prime Minister’s Interference
-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki established regional commands across Iraq, headed by loyal generals, in order to by-passing all other military and civilian decision-makers;
-In 2010, the Prime Minister took over the roles of both the Minister of Defence and the Interior;
-Prime Minister Maliki purged the Iraqi Army leadership of Sunni officers and filled positions with political favourites;
-With the power he consolidated within himself, Maliki overruled and dismissed senior commanders, interfered with personnel and equipment decisions, moved troops contrary to battle plans, issued orders through informal command structures of loyal officers, appointed his political favourites, and discontinued military training.
-This unprecedented shift in power was justified by Maliki as necessary to avoid a coup by military officers.

14. Iraqi Army Collapse in Mosul, June 2014
Why did Iraqi Army Collapse?
Fear of capture, torture, and beheadings by IS
Rumours of exaggerated numbers of IS forces
Iraqi Army was not trained to confront conventional attacks
High absenteeism in Iraqi Army and Police
Ammunition and equipment shortages
Poor decisions by political appointee officers
Collapse at Mosul, June 2014
-The decline of the Iraqi Army’s capabilities was brought to the fore when fighting IS attacks on the cities of Mosul and Tikrit in Although Iraqi forces supposedly numbered 25,000 and far out-numbered the less than one thousand insurgents IS used to attack the cities, Iraqi forces could not withstand the conventional attacks, abandoned their positions and equipment, and fled.
Why did the Iraqi Army Collapse?
-IS’ reputation for terror instilled fear in Iraqi soldiers about to face the insurgents; stories were quickly shared of militants’ torture of Iraqi soldiers in Mosul and of exaggerated numbers of IS forces.
- The Iraqi Army was not trained to confront conventional attacks, which was how IS descended upon the city of Mosul in June 2014.
-The army was overwhelmed by IS forces because the Iraqi Army was understrength due to high absenteeism. There were supposed to be 25,000 Iraqi soldiers and police in Mosul; it was estimated that only 10,000 personnel were actually in the city.
-Iraqi forces were also experiencing shortages in ammunition and equipment. While each IS pickup truck had a mounted machine gun, within the Iraqi forces, there was only one machine gun assigned per battalion.
-Prime Minister Maliki and his personally appointed military officers made poorly informed decisions.
Requests for reinforcements were rejected;
The offer of Peshmerga fighters was rejected;
Commanders were dismissed during battle, leaving leadership vacuums;
The top officers withdrew to the other side of the river with a convoy of men and vehicles, leaving the impression with remaining soldiers that the top leaders had just abandoned them.
This influenced already demoralized soldiers to desert and save themselves. 13

15. Capacity Building in Iraq
Current Iraqi Army Problems:
Insufficient manpower and equipment shortages
Not trained in conventional warfare or support roles
Incompetent political appointees in senior officer positions; corruption allowed
Cessation of Training
Lack of national unity and national loyalty
Lessons:
Require adequate and long term commitment
Must cover conventional, counter-insurgency, and institutional training
Need local government that is considered legitimate by military
Overcome regionalism, tribalism, and sectarian divides
Apply a Comprehensive Approach
Problems in Current Iraqi Army
-The case study of training the Iraqi Army between 2003 and 2011, and the fall at Mosul to IS in 2014, highlights the problems of insufficient manpower, equipment shortages, training in only counter-insurgency, the lack of experience in support roles, poor leadership and corruption due to political appointments, and the fact that training stopped when American forces left Iraq.
-Sectarian and ethnic divisions are preventing any real sense of cohesion. After Maliki purged Sunni leaders, Shiites now dominate the institution, thus causing distrust amongst Sunni civilian and military populations.
-The lack of national loyalty stems from the fact that Prime Minister Maliki has not instilled faith in his government, which has translated into unwillingness by the Iraqi military to fight and die for a government in which they do not believe.
Lessons:
-Lessons that come from the Iraqi case study will include that security force assistance takes time to create an independent and capable indigenous force; training must cover counter-insurgency, conventional warfare, as well the development of institutions; government legitimacy, national unity, and overcoming sectarian divides is imperative to success; and a Comprehensive Approach will be needed to help the local government maintain the new military capabilities.

16. Tactical Level Analysis
Tactical Level Analysis – Questions for Missions Analysis
-This presentation will discuss the necessity of tactical level studies of combat operations.
-Operations can only be improved if analysis is done to determine which tactics have been successful; what has failed; and why.

17. Tactical Level Analysis Questions
What were successes and failures?
Was pre-deployment training adequate?
Were there problems reaching theatre, setting up, being supplied?
Were there problems with carrying out the mission successfully?
How successful were students in facing adversary after receiving training?
What were the metrics for measuring success and determining an appropriate mission end date?
-Due to time constraints, this presentation is not going to analyze the tactics of a specific operation. Instead, the focus will be on highlighting the types of questions that need to be asked to better inform future deployments, thus illustrating the importance of conducting tactical level analyses.
-There are two time periods where the benefit of conducting mission analysis comes to the fore:
Immediately after a mission for after action and lessons learned reports; and
As preparation for a new mission to better inform, plan, and carry out the mission as effectively as possible.
Questions
-To learn lessons from previous missions, research needs to done to discern the following:
What were the successes and failures of the mission? What aspects – from pre-deployment to deployment to mission conduct to ending the mission and re-deployment – need to be kept or need to be fixed/changed?
Pre-deployment: Was training adequate? Were there any problems with training materials and curriculum, students’ ability to grasp the material, missing topics, suitable pace, sequence, relevancy?
Deployment: Were there any problems with movement into theatre, setting up the camp, receiving required equipment (initially and through resupply)? Was the length of time to reach full operational capacity acceptable and appropriate?
Mission Conduct: Where there problems with carrying out the assigned mission or working with other nations?
Evaluation: In a capacity building context, how well did local forces apply the training received and how successful were students in facing the adversary after receiving training? Did curriculum changes have to be made to deal with an evolving threat? How long before local militaries were capable of operating on their own and taking the lead in missions?
Ending the Mission: Were there metrics for measuring when success had been achieved and when it would be appropriate to call an end to the mission, without setting an arbitrary date and without leaving local forces in theatre with inadequate capabilities to prevent an adversary’s resurgence? What are the consequences of a premature departure?
Some Further Considerations
-Access to primary documentation is imperative to conducting this type of lessons learned analysis, either immediately after the mission or at a later date: the types of sources that need to be maintained include domestic and in-theatre decisions, and hard-copy correspondence, and interviews with senior leaders and in-theatre personnel;
-Analysis does not need to wait until combat is over before producing a mission analysis report. If personnel are provided to conduct the analysis as the mission is happening, the findings can inform on-going operations and help change current in-theatre tactics, as well as training curriculum and doctrine manuals;
-Lessons learned analysis, and the sources sought after and retained, should not be limited to the questions on a critical topics list that are to be answered immediately after a mission is completed. All available primary material needs to be collected and retained so that future investigations can occur as new questions and needs arise.

18. Conclusions

19. Current Local Capacity Building Efforts
Canada United Kingdom
United States
-Regarding the ongoing local military capacity building efforts to counter IS, there is much material available for analysis – not just from home countries’ efforts, but also from coalition partners as well.
-The United States forces aims to train a total of twelve brigades (nine Iraqi and three Peshmerga) with approximately people in each brigade. US military personnel are filling training, advising, and assisting roles in the fight against IS.
-The United Kingdom initially focused its training contributions on Kurdish Peshmerga forces and running the counter-improvised explosive device training program. In 2016, the UK government committed more troops to the mission and expanded its training to Iraqi units as well.
-Canada has been part of this coalition training operation since October 2014, training Peshmerga forces and providing equipment such as small arms, ammunition, and optics for the Iraqi security forces Canadian Armed Forces personnel are deployed in Canada’s train, advise, and assist commitments, and the Canadian government has just announced that it will extend its mission to 31 March 2019 and expand training to other partners within the Iraqi security forces beyond just the Peshmerga.

20. Conclusion: Lessons learned and Policy Implications
Helping build local capacity for a country with recent human rights violations;
Building capacity with a group that might use new capabilities in a fight against a legitimate government and ally;
Balancing relations with NATO ally Turkey while working with/training Kurdish forces (considered terrorists by Turkey);
Addressing Sunni concerns adequately or ongoing discontent and conflict will re-emerge;
Preparing for IS fighters to disperse amongst civilians and into other territories and continuing their insurgence even after strongholds fall;
Ensuring that IS is defeated and remains so (eliminating the conditions that brought them about);
Determining if Western presence needs to remain in Iraq and Syria to prevent terrorists from resurrecting by rebuilding nations where everyone feels included and loyal;
Dealing with the return of foreign fighters who continue violence in their home states.
Macro-Level Lessons Learned
Levels of Analysis: This presentation has outlined three levels of analysis that can be done to glean lessons from the current fight against militant Islamist terrorism: strategic level studies of root causes to provide context and background; operational level studies of functional topics (such as capacity building) using case studies; and tactical level studies of discrete missions to determine successes to be repeated and problems to be solved;
Need More Research: The nations involved in countering militant Islamist terrorism need to conduct more strategic level research to better understand the MENA region, politics, culture, people, threats, and causes of terrorism;
Whole of Government Approach: Terrorism is not a problem that will be solved by hard-power alone; military forces are but one approach; long term solutions need the participation of other government departments and other countries to improve governance, build military and civilian capacity, provide humanitarian assistance, ensure social justice and human rights, supply economic aid, and cut off terrorists’ financing (just to name a few);
Policy Implications: The fight against militant Islamist terrorism and capacity building of local military forces raises some difficult issues that Western governments will need to address and resolve. These span from the implications of working with partners that do not share the same values, adjusting to changes in the adversaries’ tactics as they are driven out of current territorial holdings, to making post-conflict commitments to address grievances and reform governance so that discontent does not lead to another iteration of terrorism and civil strife in the MENA region.

21. Questions?
-As an historian and strategic analyst, I can only hope that participating nations’ governments and militaries will look at past capacity building attempts to learn lessons about the keys to success, failures to be avoided, and the required levels of commitment by both the training nations and the recipient nation’s government.
-Otherwise, there should be no expectation that the status quo will change, that the expenditure and effort will have a lasting impact, and that a cycle of defeat and failure – as occurred in the Iraqi context – will not be repeated.
-We can truly see the future by looking at the past and doing nothing, but we can also change that future by looking to that same past and honestly learning the lessons that it offers.
-Thank You!