Andreas Schleicher Director for Education and Skills Betsy DeVos

Education and social mobility Challenges for Colombia Universidad Simon Bolivar
Andreas Schleicher Director for Education and Skills Betsy DeVos Tom Brock, acting director of IES Adam Gamoran, President of William T. Grant Foundation Stephen Fraser, Education Endowment Foundation, notably Stephen Fraser, Director of International Affairs Loretta Goodwin, American Youth Policy Forum, responsible for the logistics of the event Stephan Vincent Lancrin

Countries with lower educational attainment have higher earning disparities…
Figure A4.2 Percentage of adults (25-64 year-old workers) earning more than the median, by educational attainment (2016)

Spending on education institutions ranges from 3
Spending on education institutions ranges from 3.1% of GDP in Russia to 6.4% in Norway Figure C2.1. Total expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP (2015)

The public sector funds the largest share of primary and secondary education
Figure C3.2.a. Distribution of public and private expenditure on educational institutions (2015)

Spending on early childhood education and care
Figure B2.4 Expenditure on pre-primary (ISCED 02) education as a percentage of GDP (2005, 2010 and 2015)

Defining and measuring equity
Equality Equity Inputs Variation in financial and human resources Strength of relationship between resources and the social background of students and schools Outcomes Variation in student and school performance Strength of relationship between student performance and the social background of students and schools

Science performance and equity in PISA (2015)
Some countries combine excellence with equity Higher perfomance More equity

Poverty need not be destiny: PISA math performance by decile of social background
High science performance Science performance of the 10% most privileged Colombian 15-year-olds PISA science performance Science performance of the 10% most disadvantaged Colombian 15-year-olds Low science performance Source: PISA 2012

At secondary level, social background affects teenagers’ learning outcomes
SDG Fig1 Proportion of 15-year-olds achieving at least proficiency level 2 (PISA) in mathematics by gender, socio-economic status (ESCS), and location parity indices Note: The gender parity index refers to the ratio of the female value over the male value. ESCS refers to the PISA index of economic, social and cultural status. The ESCS parity index refers to the ratio of the value for the bottom quartile over the value for the top quartile of the ESCS index. Location parity is measured using the PISA definition of rural and urban areas (see the Definitions section at the end of this chapter). The location parity index refers to the ratio of the value for rural areas over the value for urban areas. Countries are ranked based on the average distance of each index to 1

Equity in education has not improved significantly over the past decade
SDG Fig 3 Proportion of 15-year-olds achieving at least proficiency level 2 (PISA) in mathematics Trends in socio-economic (ESCS) parity index (2006, 2015) In Denmark, the proportion of girls achieving at least PISA level 2 in mathematics is almost equal to that of boys (a parity index of 1 indicates perfect parity). The proportion of children from the bottom quartile of the PISA ESCS index achieving at least PISA level 2 in mathematics is 20% lower than that of childen from the top ESCS quartile.

Variation in performance between and within schools
Figure I.6.11 % OECD average 30% OECD average 69% Total variation as a proportion of the OECD average

OECD School Resources Review: Colombia Strengths and Challenges
Education has been a priority in recent years Key pillar of National Development Plan for Recognition in Peace Agreement: Special Rural Education Plan Ambition to increase access to early childhood education Policy to increase upper secondary education Steps to improve teaching quality Programme to extend full-day schooling and improve educational infrastructure Policy to promote the inclusion of children with special needs Policy to ensure the education of youth in the criminal justice system

But goals are not sufficiently backed by public funding Slowing economic growth (end of commodity supercycle) and fiscal rule to limit structural deficit to 1% of GDP by 2022 Slight increase in public resources in real terms, but reduction with respect to total public spending and relative to the size of the economy Reduction of resources in the General System of Transfers (SGP) for education as a result of changes to the annual adjustment since 2017 Competition for funds between school/pre-school and tertiary education, with a prioritization for tertiary level

Spending per student from the age of 6 to 15 and science performance
Figure II.6.2 Effect of ensuring that every Colombian 15-year-old is in school and achieves at least the basic Level 2 on PISA 6.2bn $ over the working life 910% of current GDP

Trend in public and private spending on education as a share of GDP in Colombia Source: Adjusted from Sánchez (2018), Country Background Report, MEN

Total expenditure per student in public education, 2017 By socio-economic level of the certified territorial entity In sum, greater disadvantage does not necessarily entail a greater allocation of public resources. For example, the total spending per student (SGP Education and own resources combined) in the district of Bogotá is very similar to the level observed in the departments of Chocó, Nariño or Vichada, which are among the poorest of the country Source: Data provided by the Ministry of National Education (MEN), based on the Single Territorial Format (Formato Único Territorial, FUT) for 2017

Differences in educational resources between advantaged and disadvantaged schools
Figure I.6.14 Disadvantaged schools have more resources than advantaged schools Disadvantaged schools have fewer resources than advantaged schools

Student-teacher ratios and class size
Figure II.6.14 High student-teacher ratios and small class sizes OECD average OECD average Low student-teacher ratios and large class sizes

Attendance at pre-primary school by schools’ socio-economic profile
Table II.6.51 OECD average After accounting for students’ and schools’ socio-economic status

Equality Equity Inputs Variation in financial and human resources Governance Strength of relationship between resources and the social background of students and schools Outcomes Variation in student and school performance Strength of relationship between student performance and the social background of students and schools

Science performance in public and private schools
Figure II.4.14 Students in public schools perform better Students in private schools perform better

Low expenses as a reason for choosing school, by schools’ socio-economic status
Figure II.4.17 Low expenses are more important for parents whose children attend advantaged schools Low expenses are more important for parents whose children attend disadvantaged schools

Schools’ low expenses as a reason for choosing school and students’ science performance
Figure II.4.17 Students whose parents consider schools' low expenses "important" or "very important” perform higher Students whose parents consider schools' low expenses "important" or "very important” perform lower

Equality Equity Inputs Variation in financial and human resources Governance Strength of relationship between resources and the social background of students and schools Outcomes Variation in student and school performance Strength of relationship between student performance and the social background of students and schools

Equality Equity Inputs Variation in financial and human resources Governance Policy and practice Strength of relationship between resources and the social background of students and schools Outcomes Variation in student and school performance Strength of relationship between student performance and the social background of students and schools

Learning time and science performance
Figure II.6.23 OECD average OECD average

Learning time and science performance (PISA)
Figure II.6.23

Professionalism Public confidence in profession and professionals
Professional preparation and learning Collective ownership of professional practice Decisions made in accordance with the body of knowledge o the profession Acceptance of professional responsibility in the name of the profession and accountability towards the profession

Policy levers to teacher professionalism
Mean mathematics performance, by school location, after accounting for socio-economic status 3939 3939 Fig II.3.3 Policy levers to teacher professionalism Policy levers to teacher professionalism Autonomy: Teachers’ decision-making power over their work (teaching content, course offerings, discipline practices) Teacher professionalism Peer networks: Opportunities for exchange and support needed to maintain high standards of teaching (participation in induction, mentoring, networks, feedback from direct observations) Knowledge base for teaching (initial education and incentives for professional development) There are different models of teacher professionalism across the TALIS systems, these figures present an example of the five most frequent models: High peer networks/low autonomy High autonomy Knowledge emphasis Balance domains/high support for professionalism Balance domains/ low support for professionalism

Teachers’ self-efficacy and professional collaboration
Less frequently More frequently Here is some data on this. Teachers who teach more often jointly as a team consistently report higher levels of job satisfaction. The same is true for observing other teachers classes Or engaging in joint activities across different classes Or to take part in collaborative professional learning

Teachers’ job satisfaction and class size
-TALIS data indicates that the type of students who are in a class has the largest association with the teacher’s self-efficacy and job satisfaction. -As seen in the figure, class size has minimum effect on teachers’ job satisfaction compared to the stronger influence of teaching students with behavioural problems (Next slide). - What this also tells us is that teachers need to be better prepared and supported to teach in classes with students who have different achievement levels, special needs or behavioural problems.

Teacher job satisfaction and professionalism
Fig II.3.3 The figure shows teacher’s predicted percentile in the distribution of all teachers, estimated by his or her overall score on the teacher professionalism index. The figure indicates where in the distribution of all teachers a given teacher would be expected to rank if she benefited from only one support, compared to those benefiting from five or ten best practices. As the figure shows, teachers with a value on the overall index of only one are expected to fall in the bottom third of all teachers in terms of their perceived status and self-efficacy and their satisfaction with their profession and work environment. In contrast, teachers with a value of five on the overall professionalism index are in the 40-51st percentile of all teachers in terms of all outcomes. At the top end of the spectrum, teachers with values of ten on the overall index, which corresponds to benefiting from two-thirds of the identified In concrete terms, it appears that gains in support for teacher professionalism matter more at the lower end of the spectrum, such that implementing a few additional best practices matters more for teachers’ perceptions of status and self-efficacy and satisfaction with profession and work environment if they are not benefiting from any. At the top end, additional best practices do not have the same additional effect on teachers’ perceptions and satisfaction. best practices, are likely to rank in the top half of the distribution of all teachers. In terms of variations across teachers’ perceptions and satisfaction, the analysis finds that teacher professionalism is least associated with teachers’ beliefs about the status of teaching in society, and more strongly linked to their perceptions of their own teaching and their satisfaction. The status outcome specifically asks teachers to what extent they believe that teaching is a valued profession in society, which may reflect larger structures of educational requirements and pay than the other three outcomes, which are more personal perceptions of satisfaction and teaching abilities. Nonetheless, we do find that higher values on the knowledge base and peer networks indices are both positively associated with perceived status. A careful look at the domains of teacher professionalism (TP) reveals different patterns of relationships between the different TP domains and teacher outcomes. IN particular it shows particularly the importance knowledge base and peer networks. Perceptions of teachers’ status Satisfaction with the profession Satisfaction with the work environment Teachers’ self-efficacy

Thank you Find out more about our work at www.oecd.org/edu
All publications The complete PISA micro-level database Twitter: SchleicherOECD Wechat: AndreasSchleicher and remember: Without data, you are just another person with an opinion

Andreas Schleicher Director for Education and Skills Betsy DeVos

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