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SNAP and SPAN Barry Smith.

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1 SNAP and SPAN Barry Smith

2 Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science
Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science Faculty of Medicine University of Leipzig

3 Reality

4 Reality

5

6 Reality

7 Reality is complicated

8 What is the best language to describe this complexity?

9 formalized + domain-independent
Formal ontology formalized + domain-independent

10 Formal Ontology Examples of categories:
Substance, Process, Agent, Property, Relation, Location, Spatial Region Part-of, Boundary-of

11 = regional or domain-specific
Material Ontology = regional or domain-specific e.g. GeO Examples of categories: River, Mountain, Country, Desert … Resides-In, Is-to-the-West-of

12 Realist Perspectivalism
There is a multiplicity of ontological perspectives on reality, all equally veridical i.e. transparent to reality vs. Eliminativism: “Only my preferred perspective on reality is veridical”

13 Need for different perspectives
Double counting: 3 apples on the table 7 x 1016 molecules at spatial locations L1, L2 and L3 Not one ontology, but a multiplicity of complementary ontologies Cf. Quantum mechanics: particle vs. wave ontologies

14 Cardinal Perspectives
Formal vs. Material Micro- vs. Meso- vs. Macro SNAP vs. SPAN

15 A Network of Domain Ontologies
BFO = Basic Formal Ontology

16 A Network of Domain Ontologies

17 A Network of Domain Ontologies

18 A Network of Domain Ontologies

19 A Network of Domain Ontologies

20 A Network of Domain Ontologies

21 AgrO PsychO

22 Cardinal Perspectives
Formal vs. Material Ontologies Granularity (Micro vs. Meso vs. Macro) SNAP vs. SPAN

23 Ontological Zooming

24 Ontological Zooming medicine cell biology

25 Ontological Zooming both are transparent partitions of one and the same reality

26 Cardinal Perspectives
Formal vs. Material Ontologies Granularity (Micro vs. Meso vs. Macro) Time: SNAP vs. SPAN

27 Ontology seeks an INVENTORY OF REALITY
Relevance of ontology for information systems, e.g.: terminology standardization taxonomy standardization supports reasoning about reality

28 Semantic Web Ontoweb OWL DAML+OIL …
these are standardized languages only – not themselves ontologies

29 Ontology research marked by ad hoc-ism

30 get real ontology right first
IFOMIS Strategy get real ontology right first and then investigate ways in which this real ontology can be translated into computer-useable form later DO NOT ALLOW ISSUES OF COMPUTER-TRACTABILITY TO DETERMINE THE CONTENT OF THE ONTOLOGY IN ADVANCE

31 a language to map these Formal-ontological structures in reality

32 a directly depicting language
‘John’ ‘( ) is red’ Property Object Frege

33 Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Propositions States of affairs are pictures of

34 The Oil-Painting Principle
in a directly depicting language all well-formed parts of a true formula are also true A new sort of mereological inference rule – the key to the idea of a directly depicting language – presupposes that parthood is determinate

35

36 A directly depicting language
may contain an analogue of conjunction p and q _______ p

37 but it can contain no negation
p _______ p

38 and also no disjunction
p or q ______ p

39 The idea of a directly depicting language
suggests a new method of constituent ontology: to study a domain ontologically is to establish the parts of the domain and the interrelations between them

40 BFO Basic Formal Ontology
= a formal ontological theory, expressed in a directly depicting language, of all parts of reality (a great mirror)

41 John lived in Atlanta for 25 years
The Problem John lived in Atlanta for 25 years

42 John lived in Atlanta for 25 years
The Problem John lived in Atlanta for 25 years substances, things, objects PARTHOOD NOT DETERMINATE

43 John lived in Atlanta for 25 years
The Problem John lived in Atlanta for 25 years process state

44 Substances and processes exist in time in different ways

45 SNAP and SPAN Substances and processes Continuants and occurrents
In preparing an inventory of reality we keep track of these two different categories of entities in two different ways

46 A Popular Solution

47 Fourdimensionalism – time is just another dimension, analogous to the three spatial dimensions – only processes exist – substances are analyzed away as worms/fibers within the four-dimensional process plenum

48 Parts of processes (1) a c b a: scattered part b: temporal slice
c: boundary

49 Parts of processes (2) a a: sub-process b b: phase

50 There are no substances
Bill Clinton does not exist Rather: there exists within the four-dimensional plenum a continuous succession of processes which are similar in Billclintonizing way

51 4-Dism –>There is no change
That the water boils means: Not: the water is colder at one time and hotter at another time Rather: that one phase of the boiling process is cold and another hot as one part of a colored ribbon is red and another blue

52 The Parable of Little Tommy’s Christmas Present

53 Eliminativism a sort of adolescent rebellion a product of physics envy we must simplify reality for the sake of the software

54 Fourdimensionalism rests on a misunderstanding of physics
(both of relativity theory and of quantum mechanics) and on a misunderstanding of the status of Newtonian physics

55 Confession Some of my best friends are fourdimensionalists
Fourdimensionalism is right in everything it says But incomplete

56 Realist Perspectivalism
There is a multiplicity of ontological perspectives on reality, all equally veridical = transparent to reality

57 Need for different perspectives
Not one ontology, but a multiplicity of complementary ontologies Cf. Quantum mechanics: particle vs. wave ontologies

58 Two Orthogonal, Complementary Perspectives
SNAP and SPAN

59 Substances and processes exist in time in different ways

60 Snapshot Video ontology ontology
t i m e process substance

61 SNAP and SPAN Substances and processes Continuants and occurrents
In preparing an inventory of reality we keep track of these two different categories of entities in two different ways

62 commodities and services anatomy and physiology
SNAP and SPAN stocks and flows commodities and services product and process anatomy and physiology

63 SNAP and SPAN the lobster and its growth the nation and its history
a population and its migration the ocean and its tide(s)

64 SNAP and SPAN SNAP entities - have continuous existence in time
- preserve their identity through change - exist in toto if they exist at all SPAN entities - have temporal parts - unfold themselves phase by phase - exist only in their phases/stages

65 SNAP vs. SPAN SNAP: a SNAPshot ontology of endurants existing at a time SPAN: a four-dimensionalist ontology of processes

66 Substances vs. their lives
SNAP vs. SPAN Substances vs. their lives

67 Your life is 4-dimensional
You are a substance Your life is a process You are 3-dimensional Your life is 4-dimensional

68 Change Adding SNAP to the fourdimensionalist perspective makes it possible to recognize the existence of change (SNAP entities are that which endure, thus providing identity through change) SNAP ontologies provide perspective points – landmarks in the flux – from which SPAN processes can be apprehended as changes

69 Substances do not have temporal parts
The first 5-minute phase of my existence is not a temporal part of me It is a temporal part of that complex process which is my life

70 How do you know whether an entity is SNAP or SPAN?

71 Three kinds of SNAP entities
Substances SPQR… entities Spatial regions, contexts, niches, environments

72 SPQR… entities States, powers, qualities, roles …
Substances are independent SPQR entities are dependent on substances, they have a parasitic existence: a smile smiles only in a human face

73 Other SPQR… entities: functions, dispositions, plans, shapes
SPQR… entities are all dependent on substances one-place SPQR entities: temperature, color, height

74 Substances and SPQR… entities
Substances are the bearers or carriers of, SPQR… entities ‘inhere’ in their substances

75 one-place SPQR… entities
tropes, individual properties (‘abstract particulars’) a blush my knowledge of French the whiteness of this cheese the warmth of this stone

76 relational SPQR… entities
John Mary love stand in relations of one-sided dependence to a plurality of substances simultaneously

77 Ontological Dependence
Substances are that which can exist on their own SPQR… entities require a support from substances in order to exist Dependence can be specific or generic

78 Generic dependence of relational SPQR… entities
legal systems languages (as systems of competences) religions (as systems of beliefs)

79 Ontological Dependence
Substances are such that, while remaining numerically one and the same, they can admit contrary qualities at different times … I am sometimes hungry, sometimes not

80 Substances can also gain and lose parts
… as an organism may gain and lose molecules

81 Dependence process a thought cannot exist without a thinker substance

82 Spatial regions, niches, environments
Organisms evolve into environments SNAP Scientific Disciplines Atomic physics Cell biology Island biogeography

83 SPAN scientific disciplines
Thermodynamics Wave Mechanics Physiology Also FIELD disciplines: Quantum Field Theory

84 each SNAP section through reality
includes everything which exists (present tense)

85 each section through reality is to be conceived in presentist terms
each section includes everything which exists at the corresponding now

86 mereology works without restriction in every instantaneous 3-D section through reality

87

88 Problem of identity over time for substances
What is it in virtue of which John is identical from one SNAP ontology to the next?

89 Many SNAP Ontologies t3 t2 t1
here time exists outside the ontology, as an index or time-stamp

90 SNAP ontology = a sequence of snapshots

91 Examples of simple SNAP ontologies
space

92

93

94 Examples of simple SNAP ontologies

95 Examples of simple SNAP ontologies

96 The SPAN Ontology t i m e

97 The SPAN ontology here time exists as part of the domain of the ontology

98 Processes demand 4D-partonomies
t i m e

99 many smeered boundaries
SNAP ontology many sharp boundaries SPAN ontology many smeered boundaries

100 Substances Mesoscopic reality is divided at its natural joints
into substances: animals, bones, rocks, potatoes

101 The Ontology of Substances
Substances form natural kinds (universals, species + genera)

102 Processes Processes merge into one another
Process kinds merge into one another … few clean joints either between instances or between types

103 boundaries are mostly fiat
everything is flux t i m e

104 mereology works without restriction everywhere here
t i m e clinical trial

105 Some clean joints derive from the fact that processes are dependent on substances (my headache is cleanly demarcated from your headache)

106 Some clean joints in realms of artefactual processes: weddings
chess games dog shows ontology tutorials sharp divisions imputed via clocks, calendars

107 Clean joints also through language = fiat demarcations
Quinean gerrymandering ontologies are attractive for processes not for substances Quine: there are no substances

108 SNAP entities provide the principles of individuation/segmentation for SPAN entities No change without some THING or QUALITY which changes identity-based change

109 Processes, too, are dependent on substances
One-place vs. relational processes One-place processes: getting warmer getting hungrier

110 Examples of relational processes
kissings, thumps, conversations, dances, Such relational processes join their carriers together into collectives of greater or lesser duration

111 Example: the Ontology of War
needs both continuants (army, battle-group , materiel, morale, readiness, battlespace …) and occurrents (manoeuvre, campaign, supply, trajectory, death …)

112 Battalion moves from A to B
t i m e invasion

113 Processes, like substances, are concrete denizens of reality
My headache, like this lump of cheese, exists here and now, and both will cease to exist at some time in the future. But they exist in time in different ways

114 SNAP and SPAN ontologies are partial only
Each is a window on that dimension of reality which is visible through the given ontology (Realist perspectivalism)

115 SNAP: Entities existing in toto at a time

116 Three kinds of SNAP entities
Substances SPQR… entities Spatial regions, Contexts, Niches

117

118

119 SNAP

120 SPAN: Entities extended in time

121 SPAN: Entities extended in time

122 SPAN: Entities extended in time

123 3-dimensional and 4-dimensional environments
“Lobsters have evolved into environments marked by cyclical patterns of temperature change” The Afghan winter The window of opportunity for an invasion of Iraq

124 Relations between SNAP and SPAN
SNAP-entities participate in processes they have lives, histories

125 Participation SNAP-ti. SPAN substances x, y participate in process B
time SPAN B time B x y substances x, y participate in process B x y SNAP-ti.

126 SPQR… entities and their SPAN realizations
the expression of a function the exercise of a role the execution of a plan the realization of a disposition the application of a therapy the course of a disease

127 SPQR… entities and their SPAN realizations
function role plan disposition therapy disease SNAP

128 SPQR… entities and their SPAN realizations
expression exercise execution realization application course SPAN

129 instruction and operation
score and performance algorith and execution

130 provide the principles of individuation for SPAN entities
SNAP entities provide the principles of individuation for SPAN entities

131 Movement to location y begins movement ends from location x

132 Creation process P initiates a, a's birth at t2
SNAP-t1 t2>t1 R SNAP-t2 process P initiates a, a's birth at t2 a's life overlaps process P

133 Some ontological consequences

134 Granularity parts of substances are always substances spatial region

135 Granularity parts of spatial regions are always spatial regions
substance parts of spatial regions are always spatial regions

136 Granularity process parts of processes are always processes

137 Relations crossing the SNAP/SPAN border are never part-relations
MORAL Relations crossing the SNAP/SPAN border are never part-relations

138 Relations crossing the SNAP/SPAN border are never part-relations
substance John John’s life sustaining in existence physiological processes

139 problem cases traffic jam forest fire anthrax epidemic hurricane Maria
waves shadows

140 forest fire: a process a pack of monkeys jumping from tree to tree
the Olympic flame: a process or a thing? anthrax spores are little monkeys

141 hurricanes why do we give an entity a proper name? because it is
1) important, 2) such that we want to re-identify it when it reappears at a later time

142 How do we glue these two different sorts of entities together mereologically?
How do we include them both in a single inventory of reality

143 How do we fit these two entities together within a single system of representations?
within a directly depicting language?

144 Substances and processes form two distinct orders of being
Substances exist as a whole at every point in time at which they exist at all Processes unfold through time, and are never present in full at any given instant during which they exist. When do both exist to be inventoried together?

145 Main problem English swings back and forth between two distinct depictions of reality … imposing both 3-D partitions (yielding substances) and 4-D partitions (yielding processes) at the same time

146 Main problem There is a polymorphous ontological promiscuity of the English sentence, which is inherited also by the form ‘F(a)’ of standard predicate logic

147 Against Fantology For the fantologist
“(F(a)”, “R(a,b)” … is the description language for ontology The fantologist sees reality as being made up of atoms plus abstract (1- and n-place) ‘properties’ or ‘attributes’ … confuses logical form with ontological form

148 Formalizing time F(a,b) at t F(a,b,t)

149 John lived in Atlanta for 25 years

150 F(a@t,b@t) – stage ontology
Formalizing time F(a,b) at t – SNAP F(a,b,t) – Eternalism(?) – stage ontology

151 Two alternative basic ontologies
both of which are able to sustain a directly depicting language plus a system of meta-relations for building bridges between the two ontologies via: dependence participation initiation etc.

152 Three views/partitions of the same reality

153 species, genera instances substance organism animal mammal cat frog
siamese frog instances

154 common nouns proper names substance organism animal mammal cat
pekinese mammal cat organism substance animal common nouns proper names Common nouns

155 types substance organism animal cat mammal siamese frog tokens

156 Accidents: Species and instances
substance animal mammal human Irishman Accidents: Species and instances types this individual token man tokens

157 There are universals both among substances (man, mammal)
and among processes (run, movement)

158 Substance universals pertain to what a thing is at all times at which it exists: cow man rock planet VW Golf

159 Note use of ‘substance’
in the sense of ‘thing’, ‘object’ count sense of substance vs. mass sense of substance (‘milk’, ‘gold’)

160 red hot suntanned spinning
Quality universals pertain to how a thing is at some time at which it exists: red hot suntanned spinning Clintophobic Eurosceptic

161 Qualities, too, instantiate genera and species
Thus quality universals form trees

162 quality color red scarlet R232, G54, B24

163 qualities too are distinguished as between tokens and types
which is to say: between genera and species on the one hand, ... and instances on the other

164 Accidents: Species and instances
quality color red scarlet R232, G54, B24 this individual accident of redness (this token redness – here, now)

165 One plus Nine Categories (AQL)
quid? substance quale? quality quantum? quantity ad quid? relation ubi? place quando? time in quo situ? status/context in quo habitu? habitus quid agit? action quid patitur? passion

166 Not in a Subject Substantial In a Subject Accidental Said of a Subject Universal, General, Type Second Substances man, horse, mammal Non-substantial Universals whiteness, knowledge Not said of a Subject Particular, Individual, Token First Substances this individual man, this horse this mind, this body Individual Accidents whiteness, knowledge of grammar

167 Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

168 Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

169 Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

170 Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

171 Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

172 Refining the Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

173 Refining the Ontological Square
Substantial Dependent Entities Exercise of power Exercise of function Movement Action Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries Powers Functions Qualities Shapes Occurrents Continuants

174 Refining the Ontological Square
Substantial Moments (Dependent) Exercise of power Exercise of function Movement Action Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries Powers Functions Qualities Shapes Occurrents Continuants

175 Refining the Ontological Square
Substantial Dependent Entities Exercise of power Exercise of function Movement Action Processes? Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries Powers Functions Qualities Shapes Moments? Occurrents Continuants

176 Refining the Ontological Square
Substantial Dependent Entities John‘s reddening John‘s blushing John‘s bruising 4-D Substances Collectives Undetached parts Substantial boundaries John‘s redness John‘s blush John‘s bruise 3-D Occurrents Continuants

177 Refining the Ontological Square
Substantial Dependent Entities John‘s reddening John‘s blushing John‘s bruising 4-D (perduring) Stuff (Blood, Snow, Tissue) Mixtures Holes John‘s redness John‘s blush John‘s bruise 3-D (enduring) Occurrents Continuants

178 A Refined Ontological Square
Substantial Dependent Entities John‘s reddening John‘s blushing John‘s bruising 4-D (perduring) Stuff (Blood, Snow, Tissue) Mixtures Holes John‘s redness John‘s blush John‘s bruise 3-D (enduring) Occurrents Continuants

179 Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental Second substance man cat ox Second accident headache sun-tan dread First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

180 Some philosophers accept only part of the Aristotelian multi-categorial ontology

181 Standard Predicate Logic – F(a), R(a,b) ...
Substantial Accidental Attributes F, G, R Individuals a, b, c this, that Universal Particular

182 Bicategorial Nominalism
Substantial Accidental First substance this man this cat this ox First accident this headache this sun-tan this dread Universal Particular

183 Process Metaphysics Substantial Accidental Universal Events Processes
“Everything is flux” Universal Particular

184 An adequate ontology of geography has to have three components:
SNAP GeO SPAN GeO FIELD GeO

185 GeO

186 SNAP GeO

187 SPAN GeO

188 FIELD GeO

189 A good formal ontology must divide into two sub-ontologies:
1. a four-dimensionalist ontology (of processes) cf. Quine 2. a modified presentist ontology cf. Brentano, Aristotle, Chisholm (takes tense seriously)

190 These represent two views
of the same rich and messy reality, the reality captured promiscuously by natural language sentences


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