1. What can you remember about Prescriptivism?

2. Summary – Prescriptivist Moral Language…
It is used to command, to tell people how they ought to behave. (right / wrong)
It is used to commend, to tell people ‘well done’ for behaving in a particular way. (good / bad)
It assumes a set of standards, features in virtue of which something counts as e.g. good / bad / right / wrong etc.
These standards are moral standards but they are adopted, rather than being true or false.
Two relevantly similar things must both be good / bad / right / wrong etc. or not. To think otherwise is logically contradictory.
Different to Stevensons Emotivism – Hare thinks we should also be able to give reasons for our prescriptions, the moral statement on it’s own is not persuasive (as Stevenson thinks they are).

3. Anti-Realist Strengths…
What are some of the strengths of arguing that there are no real external moral facts?

4. Anti-Realist Strengths…
What are some of the strengths of arguing that there are no real external moral facts?
No need to justify mysterious why moral properties motivate (metaphysical queerness) or how we know them (epistemological queerness).
No need to try and explain why people have different views (moral relativity), either they have different standards or different emotional responses.
Increase in tolerance for differing views, if there is no external right and wrong all views are potentially valid.

5. Anti-Realist Weaknesses…
What problems can you identify with the view that there are no external moral facts?

6. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language?
Realist theories state that there are moral facts in the world and when we make a moral judgement we are referring to these facts (this also makes their theories cognitive – either you are saying something true about these facts or something false) – these facts can then be applied in different ways (to motivate, to judge etc.) Anti-Realist theories however argue there are no moral facts that exist in the external world. Moral statements don’t express truth or falsities, instead they do specific things or accomplish specific goals.

7. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language?
What do the two anti-realist theories we’ve discussed say that moral statements are? How can we attack these approaches? What can we look for?

8. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language?
Emotivism – Moral statements express emotions and serve to influence other peoples emotions. Prescriptivism – Moral statements are commands or commendations intended to tell people how they ought to behave.
To criticise these approaches we can look to see if they are correct. Are moral statements only expressions of emotions or command imperatives? Or do they do something else?
If they do something else as well then we can argue the definition supplied by Emotivism or Prescriptivism is not complete, and thus the theories as presented are incorrect.

9. 1. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language? Emotivism
Emotivism – Moral statements express emotions and serve to influence other peoples emotions. Is this the only type of language that is emotive and persuasive?

10. 1. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language? Emotivism
Is moral language always about trying to influence other people? Is it always emotive? Are there times when we may not want it to be?

11. 3 Problems with the Emotivism use of language…
Being emotive and influencing people’s attitudes is something that lots of non-moral language does as well, e.g. advertising. So we need a different way of distinguishing moral language.
Moral language doesn’t always aim to influence others. We may express our moral attitudes to others who already agree with them for example, so influencing their attitudes is not the purpose. But we would still say we are expressing a moral judgement, what are we using to identify it as such?
We don’t want moral language to always be emotive. It depends on context. Surely there are times when it is a bad idea to arouse emotions in others on moral issues, especially by using emotive language. Moral discussion can be, and sometimes should be, dispassionate.
So if there are times when we don’t use moral language emotively (3), we don’t use moral language to influence others (2) AND there is other language that is used emotively / persuasively (1)…
The emotivist definition seems to fail.
What distinguishes moral language? What makes it different from other uses of language?

12. Responses
Emotivism The purpose of moral language, says emotivism, is to influence what people do. However, that doesn’t mean that it always has to be used for this purpose. We use lots of language in ‘non-standard’ ways in different situations. Language which is standardly emotive can be deployed without the intention to arouse emotion or influence action. The objections don’t show that moral language isn’t ‘essentially’ emotive, only that it isn’t always emotive.

13. 1. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language
1. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language? Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism – Moral statements are commands or commendations intended to tell people how they ought to behave. Is this really the only way we use moral language?

14. 1. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language
1. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language? Prescriptivism
We may argue that Hare's account of moral language and the way we use it seems to be limited (even if it does seem more plausible that Emotivism initially).
Warnock illustrates this when he asks if all moral discourse is really only concerned with telling people what to do. Surely, as well as prescribing, we may deploy moral terms in order to:
Resolve a conflict,
Complain about something that has happened
Confess to our wrongdoings
Some other non-prescriptive use.
Hare’s analysis of moral language seems too narrow, only applying to situations in which moral judgements are intended to dictate action. He ignores the other ways we use the terms.
Prescriptivism has not given a full account of what moral language is.

15. Responses Prescriptivism
The objection is based on a misunderstanding. What the prescriptivist intends to stress is not the link between morality and telling people what to do but the connection between moral discourse and any kind of action.
So, while moral statements clearly do not always tell someone what to do, it is still plausible to hold the view that accepting a moral proposition means committing to a certain behaviour if the appropriate circumstances arise

16. Summary So Far…

17. 1. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language? Moral debate
One of the advantages of moral realism is that it gives solid ground for moral debates. If there are real moral facts we can appeal to them and we can do our best to explain why we think our view aligns with them and someone else's view does not. But if there are no real moral facts, where does this leave moral debate?

18. Emotivism on Moral Debate
If I say ‘abortion is wrong’ and you say ‘abortion is right’, according to emotivism, it seems that I am just expressing my disapproval of it and you are expressing your approval (and we are trying to influence each other accordingly).
But this is not what we would call a rational argument, based on careful reasoning or debate. We are basically doing the same thing as we would be doing if we had a disagreement over the best flavor of ice cream.
This seems to hugely over-simplify moral judgement. We want to say that when we’re arguing over ethics we are doing something more substantial than effectively arguing over tastes. What then? If not appealing to facts?

19. Ayer’s response
Moral disagreements don’t actually exist. We never argue about right vs wrong specifically.
What exists are disagreements about facts.
When debating an ethical point, we draw attention to particular facts
E.g. At what age we can consider an embryo or foetus a human / Whether or not the rights of the child should take precedent over the rights of the mother
Once we agree about the facts of the matter we should come to the same moral conclusions meaning the debate will be solved.
If we don’t come to an agreement – it will turn out we are still arguing about the facts!

20. Prescriptivism on Moral Debate
How does Prescriptivism approach the same issue? What have we discussed that might give us grounds for moral debate in Prescriptivism?

21. Prescriptivism on Moral Debate
Hare argues that prescriptivism can explain moral reasoning and debate:
We can ask about someone’s reasons for prescribing what they do (remember, unlike Emotivism Hare thinks prescribing an action should come with suitable reasoning). We are then free to disagree with those reasons.
Morality involves consistency (i.e. we must be able to universalise our standpoint) and we can debate whether or not a particular standpoint achieves this.
For example: Singer claims there is no relevant difference between the suffering of people and the suffering of animals. If we wish to argue that causing the suffering of people is wrong, but that animal suffering is fine, we need to find a relevant difference between the two; a way of showing inconsistency in Singer’s view.

22. Are these responses sufficient?

23. Moral Debate Summary…

24. What issues with Anti-Realism did we see last lesson
What issues with Anti-Realism did we see last lesson? Were there valid responses?

25. 1. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language?
Being emotive and influencing people’s attitudes is something that lots of non-moral language does as well, e.g. advertising.
Moral language doesn’t always aim to influence others. We may express our moral attitudes to others who already agree with them for example.
We don’t want moral language to always be emotive. It depends on context.
Both Anti-Realist theories argue that moral language has a specific purpose: Emotivism – Expresses emotions and influences people. Prescriptivism – Tells people how they ought to act.
Hare's account of moral language and the way we use it seems to be limited.
Surely, as well as prescribing, we may deploy moral terms in order to:
Resolve a conflict,
Complain about something that has happened
Confess to our wrongdoings
Some other non- prescriptive use.
So if we can find examples of moral language being used in a way that is not covered by these examples OR non-moral language being used in these ways, then we can say there is a problem with these descriptions i.e. They are not complete.

26. 1. Can Anti-Realism account for how we use moral language?
One of the advantages of moral realism is that it gives solid ground for moral debates. If there are real moral facts we can appeal to them and we can do our best to explain why we think our view aligns with them and someone else's view does not. But if there are no real moral facts, where does this leave moral debate? Surely we’re just reducing it to arguments about feelings, which means discussion is subjective and pointless.
Emotivism
Any moral disagreement is actually a disagreement about facts, if we agree on the facts we’ll agree morally.
If we both agree on the facts but still disagree morally, then there is nothing left to discuss.
But which facts are important? Surely this is just a matter of gut feeling? Leaving us with the same issue we started with.
Prescriptivism
We can discuss someones reasons for prescribing what they do.
We can also ask whether their judgement is consistent – can it be universalised.
But if universality is the only key thing – what about people who would happily universalise horrific actions?

27. 2. Anti-Realism Vs Nihilism
Moral nihilism is the rejection of all moral values and principles. It is the view that nothing is of moral value, that we have no moral duties.
Moral anti-realism claims that there are no mind-independent moral properties, no objective moral truths, and non-cognitivist forms of anti-realism claim that morality is an expression of our emotions or attitudes.
If anti-realism is true then what is to stop us sliding into moral nihilism? Why can’t we argue that in the absence of moral facts we invent moral values so can ignore them accordingly?
If moral properties are not objective, if moral judgments are not objectively true, then why accept any moral judgement at all?
We have no obligation to be moral, we don’t have to adopt certain standards or feel a certain way, so why bother?
Why is this a problem?

28. Anti-Realism Response
Moral anti-realists can (and have) argued that this an unfair simplification of their theories. All three anti-realist theories will argue that living without moral values is itself a choice or expression of feeling. There is also nothing that says we should avoid any moral values only that we might choose to.
The emotivist may still show emotional disapproval of anyone who advocates that morality doesn’t matter.
Similarly, the fact that we must choose to adopt standards of value doesn’t show that we should stop making prescriptions at all, just that we should prescribe based on what standards we adhere to ourselves.

29. Secondary Criticism from Nihilism
The nihilist can still argue that there is a problem here however. Can we really justify interfering with how other people behave – when they behave ‘immorally’ – just because their actions don’t accord with our feelings or choices? This seems very petty.

30. 3. Anti-Realism Vs Moral Progress
If there is no moral reality then our moral views cannot become better or worse. Obviously, they have changed – people used to believe that slavery was morally acceptable and now they do not. But how can we say that this is progress, that it is more than just a change in feeling, if there is no objective moral truth?

31. Responses There are two responses moral anti- realists may offer here:
First, they can claim that there can be very real improvements in people’s moral views if they become more rational. Perhaps people come to know certain facts they didn’t know before, or they do away with contradictions in their judgements.

32. Responses
Secondly moral anti-realists might argue that if we disapprove of past moral codes and approve of our own moral code, then we have made moral progress. Society has moved from moral principles that were bad (i.e. principles we disapprove of) to moral principles that are good (i.e. principles we approve of). That is what moral progress is.

33. Easy: Outline the Nihilism problem on your whiteboards
Easy: Outline the Nihilism problem on your whiteboards. Medium: Explain how the anti-realists may respond to it? Hard: Explain why nihilism may still be an issue?

34. Easy: Outline the moral progress problem on your whiteboards
Easy: Outline the moral progress problem on your whiteboards. Medium: Explain how the anti-realists may respond to it? Hard: Is this a good / bad criticism? What about the response?