1. Lecture 4
CSE 331
Sep 6, 2017

2. Read the syllabus CAREFULLY!
No graded material will be handed back till you submit a signed form!

3. Sign-up for mini projects
Deadline: Monday, Sep 25, 11:59pm
me your group (=3) composition

4. Separate Proof idea/proof details

5. TA office hours finalized

6. Makeup recitations TODAY, 4-5pm in Davis 338A
Tomorrow, 5-6pm in Davis 113A

7. On matchings
Mal
Wash
Simon
Inara
Zoe
Kaylee

8. A valid matching
Mal
Wash
Simon
Inara
Zoe
Kaylee

9. Not a matching
Mal
Wash
Simon
Inara
Zoe
Kaylee

10. Perfect Matching
Mal
Wash
Simon
Inara
Zoe
Kaylee

11. Preferences
Mal
Wash
Simon
Inara
Zoe
Kaylee

12. Instability
Mal
Wash
Simon
Inara
Zoe
Kaylee

13. Even though BBT and JA are not very happy
A stable marriage
Even though BBT and JA are not very happy

14. Two stable marriages

15. Stable Marriage problem
Input: M and W with preferences
Output: Stable Matching
Set of men M and women W
Preferences (ranking of potential spouses)
Matching (no polyandry/gamy in M X W)
Perfect Matching (everyone gets married) m w m’ w’
Instablity
Stable matching = perfect matching+ no instablity

16. Questions/Comments?

17. Two Questions Does a stable marriage always exist?
If one exists, how quickly can we
compute one?

18. Today’s lecture Naïve algorithm
Gale-Shapley algorithm for Stable Marriage problem

19. Incremental algorithm to produce all n! prefect matchings?
The naïve algorithm
Incremental algorithm to produce all n! prefect matchings?
Go through all possible perfect matchings S
n! matchings
If S is a stable matching
then Stop
Else move to the next perfect matching

20. Gale-Shapley Algorithm
David Gale
Lloyd Shapley
O(n3) algorithm

21. Moral of the story…
>

22. Questions/Comments?

23. Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Intially all men and women are free
While there exists a free woman who can propose
Let w be such a woman and m be the best man she has not proposed to
w proposes to m
If m is free
(m,w) get engaged
Else (m,w’) are engaged
If m prefers w’ to w
w remains free
Else
(m,w) get engaged and w’ is free
Output the engaged pairs as the final output

24. Preferences
Mal
Wash
Simon
Inara
Zoe
Kaylee

25. GS algorithm: Firefly Edition
Mal
Inara 1 2 3 4 5 6
Wash
Zoe 1
Simon
Kaylee

26. Once a man gets engaged, he remains engaged (to “better” women)
Observation 1
Intially all men and women are free
While there exists a free woman who can propose
Let w be such a woman and m be the best man she has not proposed to
w proposes to m
If m is free
(m,w) get engaged
Once a man gets engaged, he remains engaged (to “better” women)
Else (m,w’) are engaged
If m prefers w’ to w
w remains free
Else
(m,w) get engaged and w’ is free
Output the engaged pairs as the final output

27. If w proposes to m after m’, then she prefers m’ to m
Observation 2
Intially all men and women are free
While there exists a free woman who can propose
Let w be such a woman and m be the best man she has not proposed to
w proposes to m
If m is free
If w proposes to m after m’, then she prefers m’ to m
(m,w) get engaged
Else (m,w’) are engaged
If m prefers w’ to w
w remains free
Else
(m,w) get engaged and w’ is free
Output the engaged pairs as the final output

28. Questions/Comments?

29. Why bother proving correctness?
Consider a variant where any free man or free woman can propose
Is this variant any different? Can you prove it?

30. GS’ does not output a stable marriage