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Slide 11 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Eaten by the Worms Eaten by the Worms The perils of network hostile code Dr Neil Barrett Technical Director - IRM Plc.

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Presentation on theme: "Slide 11 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Eaten by the Worms Eaten by the Worms The perils of network hostile code Dr Neil Barrett Technical Director - IRM Plc."— Presentation transcript:

1 Slide 11 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Eaten by the Worms Eaten by the Worms The perils of network hostile code Dr Neil Barrett Technical Director - IRM Plc 27 th September 2001 – Hong Kong

2 Slide 21 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Introduction Nature and development of Computer Worms Risk elements and damage potential Responses and preparation work Future of worms Conclusion

3 Slide 31 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 What is a Computer Worm? A self-replicating program Copies itself from system to system Free-standing and complete Not really a virus But can carry a hostile Payload

4 Slide 41 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Where did Worms come from? Self-replicating programs in early 1984 By mid 1984 had become network mobile First viruses start to be proposed By 1985, self-replicating programs through trust networks Hostile viruses arise And then along came Robert Morris Jnr…

5 Slide 51 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 The Morris Worm - 1988 First true Exploit Worm Used a security weakness to force replication –I.e., outside of the trust network Also followed trust network, but interest is in the exploit aspects Used a then new trick called Buffer Overflows

6 Slide 61 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 The Morris Worm (2) Buffer overflows first proposed by Morris Snr Now well known, but then very new Allowed worm to be an automated hacker Did nothing deliberately damaging –Indeed, believed to have been loosed accidentally But resulted in system flooding

7 Slide 71 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Worms since Morris Took a few years for subsequent worms More interest in viruses Worms scripted to use emerging exploits –E.g., Word macro, Unicode, etc Slowly became objective focused

8 Slide 81 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Development of Worms Most early worms achieved no objective Damage resulted from flooding or from panic Solitary objective was self-propagation More recent worms grab and copy some information –E.g., PGP information Some military use of focused worms

9 Slide 91 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 How do Modern Worms Work? E.g., NIMDA spread from server to server through Web exploits Spread from client to client through executables –I.e., persuasive mail attachments Potential for uncontrollable executables –I.e., Web pages, Outlook preview panel, etc

10 Slide 101 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Risk Elements and Damage Potential Essentially threefold Flooding and related panic behavior –System shutdown and associated costs Or information leakage –Leakage is so far only limited Or a set of destructive payloads –I.e., resetting BIOS and system information

11 Slide 111 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 How Great a Risk? Reputation, financial, security risks Damage, disclosure or distrust of stored information Costs of repair or of business loss Reputation risks depend on worm publicity profile –I.e., wide spreading worm carries low reputation risk

12 Slide 121 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Countermeasures Best approach is to know ones exposure Not virus related But hacker related Best option is to have had focused, audit-based penetration testing –Because worms now use well-known hacking tricks –These can be looked for and removed

13 Slide 131 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Countermeasures (2) Constant system monitoring and correction of known existing weaknesses A culture of security awareness –Limits executable tricks An alert system management staff –That are a part of the community No Head in the Sand attitude –Share information and experiences

14 Slide 141 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Future No reason at all to believe that worms will stop! Increasing sophistication –More clever option controls –Multiple exploit selection –Multi-platform and multi-environment Increasing incidence of hostile intent Growth into non-IP environment –Mobile phones? PDA?

15 Slide 151 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Conclusion Best defense comes from knowledge Knowledge comes from testing Correct the faults shown through testing Share information with others Dont expect this problem to go away!

16 Slide 161 June 2014© IRM Plc 2001 Thank You! Dr Neil Barrett Technical Director – IRM Plc Tel: + 44 (0) 20 7808 6420 Neil.Barrett@IRMPLC.com Richard Stagg Managing Consultant – IRM Asia Level 30 Bank of China Tower Tel: 2251 8291 Richard.Stagg@IRMPLC.com


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