1. Sellafield Ltd An Overview

2. Modern Catastrophes BP Deep Water Horizon
11 employees died in the initial explosion
Cost to date £30 Billion and rising
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
Arising from Natural event
Costs around £30 Billion and rising
TEPCO Nationalised by Japanese Government

3. National Audit Office 2012
“Nuclear operations at Sellafield started in the 1940s, successive operators of the site did not give sufficient thought to decommissioning or retrieving and disposing of radioactive waste. The Authority inherited a legacy of poor planning, neglect and gaps in information”
Predicted out turn costs £70 Billion

4. Safe Secure Stewardship Demonstrable Progress Return on Investment
Sellafield Strategy
Safe Secure Stewardship
Demonstrable Progress
Return on Investment

5. 11,000 employees at Sellafield
Sellafield Today
£1.8bn|
annual budget
£300m|
Local supply chain spend
11,000 employees at Sellafield

6. Sellafield Context 7 shutdown reactors 2 Reprocessing plants
Waste Management
High hazard legacy facilities
Product Storage
Supporting Infrastructure
Low temperature, low pressure processes
Very large inventory of radioactive material
Relatively low rates of change to loss of cooling
Aging facilities and infrastructure

7. Sellafield Ltd COMAH status
SL is the largest Nuclear site in Europe
One of only two COMAH (Seveso) Nuclear sites in the UK
SL uses a number of hazardous substances (COMAH). Examples are as follows, with associated major accident hazards (MAH):
Petroleum products
Oxygen
Sodium Nitrite 38%
Hydroxylamine Nitrate 36%
NOx
Hydrogen
COMAH assessment shows SL is currently
a lower-tier site
PROTECT - COMMERCIAL
15 November 2018

8. Site History – National Defence Programme
The Sellafield site has been operational since the 1940s, when it was used as a Royal Ordinance Factory supporting the war effort.
In 1946 the US Congress passed an Atomic Energy Act prohibiting passing classified information to other countries
In response to this, Sellafield became the UK’s first atomic energy site and construction of the Windscale Piles to produce military plutonium began in 1947.

9. Site History – Accelerating the clean up
From the 1990s construction began on a number of waste treatment and storage facilities to support reprocessing and decommissioning operations.
In 2002 the Waste Vitrification Plant was opened to convert the Highly Active Waste from reprocessing into a solid form for long term storage.

10. Nuclear Safety Principles: Preventing a Catastrophe
Maintaining containment
Maintaining cooling
Maintaining control of reactivity
Maintaining control of chemistry

11. Scope of Emergency Arrangements
Radiological/Nuclear
Chemical
Fire
Transport
Loss of Site Services
External Events – Weather, Seismic,
Malicious Acts/Security
Environmental Impacts
Severe Accident Considerations

12. Co-ordination of Emergency Response
Emergency Management
15/11/2018 4

13. Effective Management Control
Control of Contractors
Security
SQEP
Nuclear Site Licence
COMAH
Training
Accountability
Assurance
Regulators
Review

14. Control of contractors
Approved contractor status
Gated process
Demonstrate SQEP
Subject to intense scrutiny
Performance subject to monthly review
Scocio economic commitments
Security vetting

15. Security considerations
Driven by specific legislation
Classification anyone on site DV SC BC
Visitors
Info security
Breach sanctions

16. SQEP Demonstrable and auditable experience Must be “Suitable”
Formally reviewed at least annually
Applies to all site areas
Subject to regulatory review

17. Nuclear Site Licence 36 Licence conditions
Each condition approved by the Regulator
Covers all aspects of site
Subject to formal review

18. Training Not SQEP Formal Site Induction linked to Security
Contract Induction
Planned
Approved

19. Accountability At all levels Reviewed as part of work package planning
Reviewed at Stakeholder meetings
Subject to formal review by the Regulator
Runs from SL Board to all areas

20. Assurance Internal Assurance Group Focussed on: Internal Regulation
Tiered audit process
Full range of activities
Reports directly to the SL Board
Works alongside Regulators

21. Regulators: ONR HSE EA Euratom IAEA WANO INPO

22. Review Activities reviewed by SL Board through:
Safety, Security Assurance Group
Project Assurance Group
Safety Case Assurance Group
RIM (Regulator Interface Meetings)
Tier 1 Regulatory interface
NMP Safety and Operations Review Group
Performance Assurance Group

23. Conclusions
Sellafield Limited and its specialist suppliers have developed an effective and systematic method of assessing resilience.
Effective management control cornerstone
Focussed on the plants within the greatest potential consequences
Provided successful insights into many facilities beyond their Design Basis.
Identified a range of considerations and actions which will make a genuine and sustainable improvement in resilience.
Close engagement with Regulators and industry colleagues has been important to success
Sellafield are committed to enhanced resilience
Incorporated this approach into our long-term periodic review of safety cases

24. Arrangements for resilience