1. Intelligence Failures Tet 1968
WHEN I FIRST TOOK ON THIS PROJECT-
I THOUGHT I WOULD FOCUS ON U.S.
INTELLIGENCE FAILURES BUT THE
MORE I THOUGHT ABOUT IT (AND
SEEING THAT MY COLLEAGUE ,
MICHAEL HIGHAM, WAS GOING TO DISCUSS SAM ADAMS AND THE ORDER OF BATTLE ISSUE DIRECTLY, I CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT A MORE INTERESTING TACT MIGHT BE TO COMPARE THE INTELLIGENCE FAILURES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONFLICT –
SO THE PAPER THAT I WROTE FOR THE CONFERENCE IS REALLY IN TWO PARTS:
1. A BRIEF REVIEW OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO TET
2. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY A LOOK AT THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE ON THE OTHER SIDE
-- WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?
-- WHAT KIND OF ASSESSMENTS DID THEY MAKE?
-- WHAT WERE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THOSE ASSESSMENTS?
IN ORDER TO LOOK AT THIS ASPECT OF THE OFFENSIVE, I WOULD NEED A SOURCE OF VIETNAMESE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS FROM THE OTHER SIDE THAT ADDRESS THESE ISSUES
IN THAT TASK, I, LIKE MANY OF THE HISTORIANS IN THE ROOM, TURNED TO MR. MERLE PRIBBENOW – SOMEONE TO WHOM WE SHOULD ALL BE GRATEFUL -- NOT ONLY FOR HIS SEMINAL WORK IN TRANSLATING THE OFFICIAL PAVN HISTORY, BUT ALSO FOR THE GENEROUS ASSISTANCE THAT HE SO FREELY GIVES TO VIRTUALLY ANYONE WHO ASKS -– SO, MERLE, PLEASE ACCEPT MY PUBLIC THANKS, BOTH FOR YOUR LONG SERVICE IN VIETNAM AND FOR YOUR SERVICE TO THOSE ATTEMPTING TO DOCUMENT THE RECORD OF THE WAR.
Intelligence Failures Tet 1968
James H. Willbanks
Director, Department of Military History
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

2. THE FIGHTING ESCALATES -- 1967
BEFORE TURNING TO THE OTHER SIDE,
IT IS APPROPRIATE TO REVIEW
THE INTELLIGENCE LEAD-UP TO THE
OFFENSIVE.
THE STORY OF THE TET OFFENSIVE
BEGINS, OF COURSE, IN 1967
WITH THE ESCALATION IN FIGHTING
-- SONG BE
-- LOC NINH
-- CON THIEN
-- HILL FIGHTS AT KHE SANH
-- DAK TO
ALL OF THESE ACTIONS REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE WAY THAT THE PAVN AND VC NORMALLY CONDUCTED OPERATIONS UP UNTIL THIS TIME
THESE ACTIONS WERE AMONG THE CLUES THAT SOMETHING NEW WAS AFOOT
IT WOULD EVENTUALLY BECOME APPARENT THAT THESE ACTIONS WERE WHAT WE TODAY CALL “SHAPING OPERATIONS” DESIGNED TO DRAW U.S. FORCES AWAY FROM THE POPULATED AREAS, WHICH WOULD BE THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE PLANNED GENERAL OFFENSIVE
IN THAT SENSE, THOSE OPERATIONS WERE REALLY DESIGNED TO SHAPE THE PERCEPTIONS OF WESTMORELAND AND THEY WORKED VERY WELL IN DOING JUST THAT.
Apr - May 67: Khe Sanh Hill Battles (Hill 881)
Sep 67: Siege of Con Thien
Oct 67: Battles of Loc Ninh and Song Be
Nov 67: Battle of Dak To

3. Intelligence Indicators 1967
IN ADDITION TO THE CHANGE IN THE
NATURE OF ENEMY OPERATIONS IN THE
FINAL SIX MONTHS OF 1967…
THERE WERE ALSO NUMEROUS OTHER
INDICATORS THAT SOMETHING
BIG MIGHT BE AFOOT:
-- CAPTURED DOCUMENTS
-- EPW REPORTS
-- SIGNAL INTERCEPTS
-- INCREASE IN TRAFFIC DOWN THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL
THESE INDICATORS BEGAN TO INCREASE AS THE END OF 1967 NEARED.
TO WESTMORELAND, THE MOST STARTLING DEVELOPMENT WAS THE PAVN BUILD-UP AT KHE SANH AND HE RESPONDED BY SENDING ADDITIONAL FORCES TO I CORPS.
THAT SOMETHING BIG WAS IN THE OFFING BECAME ONLY TOO APPARENT IN MID-JANUARY WHEN THE PAVN BESIEGED THE MARINE COMBAT BASE AT KHE SANH – REINFORCING WESTMORELAND’S EXPECTATION THAT THE MAIN PUSH WOULD COME THERE.
Con Thien, Loc Ninh, Song Be, Dak To, Dinh Tuong, and Khe Sanh Hill Fights
>200% increase in traffic along HCM Trail
Operations Order No. 1 captured by 4th ID
COSVN B-3 Front directive captured
Similar order captured by ARVN in Mekong Delta
Build-up around Khe Sanh
Plan captured by 101st Abn in I Corps
Training manual for “general uprising” captured in Tay Ninh
VC cadres captured with audio tapes
Jan 21, 1968 – PAVN besiege Khe Sanh
Late Jan 1968 – Hanoi announces that Tet would be celebrated on 29 Jan

4. The Offensive 30-31 Jan 5 of 6 autonomous cities
DESPITE THIS LITTANY OF INDICATORS
AND THE ENEMY ACTION AT KHE SANH,
WHEN THE ATTACKS WERE LAUNCED ON
30-31 JAN, THE COMMUNISTS ACHIEVED
A STUNNING LEVEL OF SPRUPRISE.
THE SHEER SCOPE OF THE COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVE WAS BREATH-TAKING IN ITS IMPACT ON MACV, THE WHITEHOUSE, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.
General Offensive/General Uprising
Forces and Deployment
80,000 NVA and VC troops
Objectives
5 of 6 autonomous cities
Saigon
Hue
36 of 44 province capitals
23 airfields/bases

5. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE WAR
INCLUDES A WIDE-RANGING
DEBATE ABOUT HOW THE OTHER SIDE
ACHIEVED SUCH A STUNNING SURPRISE
“…the worst intelligence failure of the war.” William Jorden NSC Staff

6. Why surprise at Tet?
FIRST AND FOREMOST – THE INDICA-
OF A MAJOR ATTACK FLEW IN THE
FACE OF WHAT MOST ANALYSTS AND
COMMANDERS BELIEVED THE ENEMY
WAS CAPABLE OF
DID NOT FIT THE PRECONCEIVED
NOTIONS ABOUT ENEMY STRENGTHS
AND CAPABILITIES – NOT SEEN WITHIN THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY BASED ON EARLIER CONFLICTING REPORTS
NOT LOGICAL GIVEN THE REPORTED NUMBER OF CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE PAVN AND VC IN
SEEN BY MANY ANALYSTS AND COMMANDERS AS JUST SO MUCH PROPAGANDA MEANT BY THE LEADERS ON THE OTHER SIDE TO PROP UP THE FLAGGING MORALE OF THEIR TROOPS
ANOTHER LINE OF EXPLANATION ADDRESSES THE SHEER NUMBER AND VOLUME OF THE INDICATORS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO PUT THEM ALTOGETHER INTO SOME SORT OF MEANINGFUL MOSAIC THAT WOULD HAVE PROVIDED WARNING ABOUT THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE COMING OFFENSIVE
THIS COUPLED WITH BUREACRATIC INFIGHTING BETWEEN MACV AND THE CIA OVER THE ORDER OF BATTLE RULES AND THE COUNTING OF THE ENEMY – WILL NOT GO INTO THIS SINCE WILL NO DOUBT ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN MICHAEL HIAM’S PRESENTATION
LASTLY, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, CERTAINLY AFTER THE BUILDUP BEGAN AT KHE SANH, THE INDICATORS THAT HAD BUILT UP TO THAT POINT RAN CONTRARY TO WESTMORELAND’S CERTAINTY THAT THE MAIN ATTACK WOULD COME IN I CORPS.
THE BEST INTELLIGENCE IN THE WORLD IS USELESS IF THE COMMANDER IS NOT PREPARED TO BELIEVE IT.
Enemy estimates not believed (“reports were ‘so much wishful thinking’ on part of VC”)
Reports were in contradiction of previous reports and perceptions of enemy strength/capabilities
Difficulties in “fusion” of various reports
Change in OB rules
Bureaucratic in-fighting among intelligence agencies
Focus on Khe Sanh

7. Tet Offensive in Hue DESPITE THE SURPRISE OF THE
COUNTRYWIDE OFFENSIVE,
THE U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE
FORCES RECOVERED FAIRLY QUICKLY
AND REACTED STRONGLY TO THE
COMMUNIST ATTACKS.
IN THE END THE COMMUNISTS SUFFERED HORRENDOUS CASUALTIES IN THE FIGHTING THAT EXTENDED INTO THE FALL OF 1968
THE OUTCOME OF THE OFFENSIVE AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL PROVED LARGELY IRRELEVANT, OF COURSE, BECAUSE THE DAMAGE WAS ALREADY DONE
ULTIMATELY, THE TET OFFENSIVE WOULD HELP DRIVE LBJ OUT OF OFFICE AND SET THE CONDITIONS FOR RICHARD NIXON TO WIN THE ’68 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND BEGIN THE LONG BLOODY WITHDRAWL FROM VIETNAM.
PAUSE
IT WOULD BE EASY TO THINK THAT THE COMMUNISTS, GIVEN THE OUTCOME AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL, DID NOT HAVE ANY DIFFICULTIES IN THE INTELLIGENCE AND PLANNING ARENA, BUT AN EXAMINATION OF JUST A SMALL SAMPLING OF THEIR OFFICIAL UNIT HISTORIES, DOCUMENTS, AND OTHER POSTMORTEMS REVEALS ANOTHER STORY ALTOGETHER.
ANY DISCUSSION OF THE TET OFFENSIVE FROM THE COMMUNIST
PERSPECTIVE MUST BEGIN WITH AN EXAMINATION OF WHAT THEY WERE
TRYING TO ACHIEVE WITH THE OFFENSIVE.
Tet Offensive in Hue

8. Communist Objectives for TCK-TKN
THE OBJECTIVES DEPICTED ON THIS SLIDE
ARE DRAWN FROM THE PAVN OFFICIAL
HISTORY.
GIVEN THE NATURE OF THESE OBJECTIVES
AND THE SITUATION THAT FACED THE
COMMUNISTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
AFTER 1967, A RATIONALE PERSON
MIGHT ASK – “WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?’
BUT THE CAVEAT “BY WHOSE DEFINITION OF RATIONALITY?” MUST BE ADDED TO THE QUESTION.
THESE OBJECTIVES WERE IRRATIONAL TO US AND THAT HELPS EXPLAIN WHY THE INTEL INDICATORS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED WERE SO DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT AS PRECURSORS TO A COUNTRYWIDE GENERAL OFFENSIVE.
TO A STRONG SEGMENT WITHING THE DECISION MAKING APPARATUS IN HANOI, THESE OBJECTIVES WERE NOT AT ALL IRRATIONAL.
THAT DOES NOT MEAN THERE WAS UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT THAT THE TIME WAS RIGHT TO LAUNCH A GENERAL OFFENSIVE.
ON THE CONTRARY, PRIOR TO THE DECISION TO LAUNCH THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE, THERE WAS A HEATED DEBATE IN THE POLITBURO BETWEEN THE MORE CAUTIOUS PROPONENTS OF CONTINUING THE PROTRACTED STRUGGLE AND THOSE WHO ADVOCATED TAKING THE WAR TO A NEW AND POTENTIALLY DECISIVE LEVEL – THIS IS ADDRESSED VERY WELL IN AN ARTICLE BY HANG WIN IN THE INAUGURAL ISSUE OF THE JOURNAL OF VIETNAMESE STUDIES.
IN THE END, THE MORE AGGRESSIVE ADVOCATES OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE WON OUT.
FROM THAT POINT ON -- WITH THE DISSENTING VOICES MARGINALIZED AND IN SOME CASES EVEN IMPRISONED -- IT APPEARS THAT THE LEADERSHIP AT THE SENIOR LEVELS BOUGHT INTO THE IDEA THAT, THE TIME WAS RIPE TO LAUNCH THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE – DESPITE THE REALITIES OF THE BATTLEFIELD IN MID TO LATE 1967.
Communist Objectives for TCK-TKN
Annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet [South Vietnamese] army, overthrow the puppet regime at all administrative levels, and place all governmental power in the hands of the people.
Annihilate a significant portion of the American military’s troops strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions.
On this basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as our basis, we would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification.
Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, pp

9. khoi nghia
CENTRAL TO THIS DECISION IS THE
VIETNAMESE CONCEPT OF
KHOI NGHIA – GENERAL UPRISING.
THIS IS A LONG-STANDING IDEAL THAT IS THREADED THROUGHOUT
VIETNAMESE HISTORY AND PLAYS A KEY ROLE IN THE VIETNAMESE IDEA OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTRACTED WAR.
WITH THIS IDEAL IN MIND, THE DECISION-MAKERS APPEAR TO HAVE CONVINCED THEMSELVES AND THEIR SUBORDINATES THAT THE SOUTHERN PEOPLE, WHEN THEY SAW THAT THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE WAS UNDERWAY, WOULD RISE UP AND JOIN THEIR BRETHREN TO OVERTHROW THE YOKE OF THE OPPRESORS AND REUNITE VIETNAM.
“It [the general uprising] is pictured both as spontaneous by people no longer able to contain their spirit of revolution, and is considered to be a deliberate strategy, the culmination of systematic, intensive organizational and motivational work. In khoi nghia the revolutionary consciousness of the people has been gradually raised through the use of the dau tranh strategy [the two pronged Vietnamese concept of simultaneous military and political struggle] to the point where it explodes in a great spontaneous combustion, which, like a forest fire, consumes all before it.”

10. khoi nghia
THIS REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL AND
IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR WOULD
ENABLE THE PEOPLE TO HELP
OFF-SET THE FIREPOWER AND
MOBILITY ADVANTAGES OF THE
AMERICANS AND THE “PUPPET”
ARMY.
IN EFFECT, THE GENERAL UPRISING WOULD INSURE THE ULTMATE SUCCESS OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE.
Driven by revolutionary zeal fostered by the political cadres in the South
Would help offset American advantages in firepower and numbers once offensive is launched
Would reinforce general offensive and insure its success

11. Three Possible Outcomes
HAVING MADE THE DECISION TO
LAUNCH THE OFFENSIVE, THE
PLANNERS DETERMINE THAT THERE
WILL BE THREE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES
TO THE CAMPAIGN.
THIS SEEMS PRUDENT – SOMETHING THAT ALL MILITARY PLANNERS DO --- CONSIDER POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND PLAN ACCORDINGLY
IN U.S. DOCTRINE, THIS IS KNOWN AS PLANNING FOR “BRANCHES AND SEQUELS” – PLANNING FOR WHAT TO DO IF THINGS DON’T GO THE WAY THAT YOU EXPECT THEM TO -- SOMETHING THAT WE POUND INTO THE HEADS OF OUR MAJOR AT THE STAFF COLLEGE.
HOWEVER, THE COMMUNISTS, IN THIS CASE, HAVING IDENTIFIED THE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS DID NOT SPEND A LOT OF TIME PLANNING FOR EACH OF THEM.
ON THE CONTRARY, HAVING IDENTIFIED THE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, THE COMMUNISTS PROMPTLY DISCOUNTED ALL BUT THE BEST CASE.
First: We would win great victories on the important battlefields, our attacks and uprisings would succeed in the large cities, and the American will to commit aggression would be crushed, forcing them to agree to negotiations to end the war in accordance with our goals and conditions.
Second: Even though we won important victories in many locations, the enemy would have forces left. Relying on his large bases and with additional reinforcements brought in from the outside, the enemy would launch counterattacks to retake the important positions and the large cities, especially Saigon, in order to continue the fight against us.
Third: The United States would send in reinforcements, expand the war into North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and force us to react in order to transform the nature of the war and to break out of their current posture of defeat.
> “History of the Resistance War Against the Americans to Save the Nation, , Volume V: The 1968 General Offensive and Uprising”

12. In Reality
A REVIEW OF THE TET POST-MORTEMS
REVEALS THAT THE PROCESS
ACHIEVED ITS OWN MOMENTUM
IN A VERY REAL SENSE, IDEALOGICAL FERVOR
OVERCAME SOUND MILITARY JUDGEMENT
THIS DECISION TO CONSIDER NOTHING BUT COOMPLETE SUCCESS IS A RECURRING THEME IN THE LITERATURE AND DOCUMENTATION EXAMINED.
“…[we] planned for one possibility – that the general offensive-general uprising would certainly secure victory, meaning we did not plan for possible changes or developments in the situation; we never discussed possibilities 2 and 3 laid out in the orders and instructions we received.”
“…the three outcomes actually were in essence only one possible outcome.”

13. Planning for the Offensive
THE RESULT OF ALL THIS WAS A
SORT OF “IDEALOGICAL GROUP
THINK” AT THE MOST SENIOR LEVELS
ACCORDINGLY, THE COMMUNISTS
OVER-ESTIMATE THEIR OWN STRENGTHS
AND UNDERSETIMATE THEIR WEAKNESSES
WHILE DOING JUST THE OPPOSITE FOR THEIR OPPONENTS.
THIS LED TO A SET OF FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS UPON WHICH THE ENTIRE PLAN AT ALL LEVELS HINGED:
THE ARVN WOULD COLLAPSE
DEMORALIZED AMERICAN FORCEDS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY IN ENOUGH FORCE TO OFFSET ATTACKS
BUT, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE IDEA OF KHOI NGHIA PERVADES THE WHOLE PLANNING PROCESS – THE KEY ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE PEOPLE WILL RISE UP
THE ASSUMPTIONS PROVE TO BE FATALLY FLAWED, BUT PART OF THE REASON FOR THEIR ADOPTION IS “FALSE REPORTING” FROM THE FIELD – ANOTHER OF THE RECURRING THEMES IN THE DOCUMENTS EXAMINED
DRIVEN BY THE NEED TO SHOW PROGRESS AND STAY FOCUSED ON THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEAL, REPORTS REFLECTED THAT THINGS WERE GETTING BETER EVERYDAY – IT APPEARS THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD THEIR OWN “SUCCESS CAMPAIGN” JUST LIKE THAT OF LYNDON JOHONSON.
ANYONE WHO HAD ANYTHING DIFFERENT TO SAY WAS CHASTIZED FOR “NEGATIVE THINKING.”
THE FALSE REPORTS LED TO INCORRECT ASSESSMENTS THAT IMPACTED THE PLANNING PROCESS BEFORE THE OFFENSIVE BEGAN AND CONTINUED AFTER THE OFFENSIVE WAS IN PROGRESS.
Overestimation of own capabilities and underestimation of enemy’s
Flawed assumptions
The people will rise up
ARVN will collapse
Demoralized American forces would not be able to respond quickly in enough force to offset attacks
“Untruthful” reporting from the field
Pressure to conform to party line/conventional wisdom – those who dissented were accused of “negativism”

14. “Assessments were flawed because…”
ALMOST EVERY ARTICLE, UNIT
HISTORY AND VIERTUALLY EVERY
OTHER SOURCE EXAMINED
MENTIONED “SUBJECTIVITY” AND
“SUBJECTIVISM” AS THE REASONS
FOR THE FLAWED INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSMENTS AND THE SKEWED
ESTIMATES OF THEIR OWN
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.
THIS IS SUCH A PREVALENT THEME THAT IT BEARS CLOSER SCRUTINY.
“We were subjective in our assessment of the situation, especially in assessing the strength of the mass political forces in the urban areas. We had somewhat underestimated the capabilities and reactions of the enemy and set our goals too high…”
The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam
“…the reason the first wave of the Tet offensive had not achieved the highest level of victory as laid out by the Politburo…was… that our primary weakness was the weakness of subjectivism. The primary error was our subjective assessment of the balance of forces, from which we set goals that were too high…”
The Resistance War in Eastern Cochin China
“…the planners were wrong in their assessment of enemy capabilities due to the fact that higher authorities were subjective in their analysis of both the enemy’s situation and our own situation, and in determining the that the specific conditions necessary for a general offensive, and especially for a general uprising, were present.”
The Offensive in the Saigon-Gia Dinh Sector

15. “Subjectivism”
WEBSTER’S DEFINES “SUBJECTIVISM”
AS AN OUTLOOK ARISING WITHIN
ONE’S OWN MIND THAT ESSENTIALLY
FLIES IN THE FACE OF REALITY.
IN VIETNAMESE USEAGE – SUBJECTIVISM HE OPPOSITE OF OBJECTIVE -- IN VIETNAMESE:
CHU QUAN VERSUS KHACH QUAN
THE COMMUNISTLEADERSHIP, AT LEAST THAT PART OF IT THAT HELD SWAY IN THE ARGUMENT ABOUT LAUNCHING THE OFFENSIVE – MUCH LIKE MANY AMERICANS AT MACV ON THE OTHER SIDE, HAVING DECIDED THAT THE SITUATION WAS ONE WAY, WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER THAT IT MIGHT ACTUALLY BE ANY OTHER.
IN THE CASE OF THE COMMUNISTS, THEY HAD DECIDED TO LAUNCH THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN THEIR MINDS THAT IT WOULD SUCCEED.
THIS WAS MALADY THAT INFECTED THE AMERICAN DECISIONMAKERS THAT WOULD HAVE DISASTROUS RESULTS AND THE SAME MALADY WOULD HAVE SIMILAR RESULTS FOR THE COMMUNISTS AS WELL.
“of, relating to, or arising within one’s self or mind in contrast to what is outside.
Webster’s Dictionary
chu quan vice khach quan

16. The other side always gets a vote.
“Subjectivism”
AN ARTICLE IN THE ISSUE COMMEM-
ORATING THE 29TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE OFFENSIVE CHARACTERIZED
THE DIFFICULTIES IN “SUBJECTIVISM”
IN THE MANNER YOU SEE ON THE
SLIDE.
ANOTHER, MORE BASIC WAY TO DESCRIBE THE DANGER IN “SUBJECTIVISM” IS
[CLICK]
THE OTHER SIDE GETS A VOTE!
THE COMMUNISTS SEEMED TO HAVE FORGOTTEN THIS IN THEIR DECISION AND PLANNING FOR THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE.
“Things do not always develop exactly according to our subjective desires, especially in struggle or in war, when there are enemies, when there are subjective conditions and objective conditions, when there is a conflict between two living forces that are always moving and always developing and changing.”
Military History Magazine, Special Edition: 20 Years After Tet
-or-
The other side always gets a vote.

17. Expectations?
THE RESULT OF THIS WAS AN
ALMOST UNIVERSAL EXPECTATION --
PARTICULARLY AT THE HIGHER
ECHELONS THAT THE GENERAL
OFFENSIVE WOULD SUCCEED AND
ACCOMPLISH ALL OF ITS ITS STATED
GOALS.
NO OTHER OUTCOME WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.
OF COURSE, THERE WERE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS OVERCONFIDENCE – PARTICULARLY DOWN AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL – MERLE CAN CITE NUMEROUS CASES WHERE THE GUYS WHO HAD TO EXECUTE THE OFFENSIVE QUESTIONED THE SANITY OF LAUNCHING THESE ATTACKS IN THE FACE OF U.S. COMBAT POWER.
-- BUT BY THIS TIME THE OPERATION HAD GAINED ITS FULL MOMENTUM AND WAS PAST THE POINT OF RECALL.
“…everyone, from the highest-ranking cadre to the lowliest front-line soldier, concentrated on one thing: finishing them off. That was why at the time we burned the huts in our headquarters, because we thought we were leaving and we weren’t coming back. …in actual fact everyone concentrated on one outcome and one outcome only.”
> Military History Magazine, Special Edition: 20 Years After Tet

18. Outcomes
THESE REPORTS, HISTORIES, AND
ARTICLES DOCUMENT THE VERY REAL
DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE
COMMUNIST FORCES IN 1968.
THIS IS JUST A SMALL SAMPLING
OF THE ASSESSMENTS OF THEIR
LOSSES.
MOST REPORTS AND UNIT HISTORIES ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THESE
CASUALTIES GREATLY IMPACTED THEIR ABILITY OF PARTICULARLY THE PLAF TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1969 AND THE SUCCESSIVE YEARS THAT FOLLOWED.
FROM LATE 1968 ON, THE COMBAT ON THE OTHER SIDE, WAS INCREASINGLY CONDUCTED BY MAINFORCE PAVN (WITH SOME NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS)
IN THE WAY OF A PERSONAL ANECDOTE, WHAT IT MEANT TO ME IN 1971 AND 1972 WAS THAT I NEVER SAW OR FOUGHT A VC IN 12 MONTHS – WHICH INCLUDED COMBAT OPS IN FIVE DIFFERENT PROVINCES IN MILITARY REGION III
“…we had 3,600 wounded soldiers alone, not counting guerrillas and village-level cadres, our organizations were in disarray, we were short of food and ammunition, our combat power had declined, and our agents and organizations in the villages and the city had either been driven up into the mountains or had lost contact with our headquarters.
Tri-Thien Hue Theater history
“…eight times as many wounded were sent back to the reat area [in 1968] as during 1967.”
Official History, Group 559
“…As for our forces, our main force units were suffering a severe shortage of personnel. Where province units had each possessed two or three battalions before the Tet Offensive, now each province had only one battalion, and each battalion had a strength of only around 100 men. Districts had previously each had a full company, and some districts had 2 or 3 companies, but now each district had only one company made up of a few dozen cadre and soldiers, and some districts had only a platoon left.”
Official History, Military Region 9
“…we suffered heavy casualties and were not capable of fighting a protracted battle to finish off the enemy….Our civilian mass movement continued to decline and weaken in each passing day. Our military command cadres at all levels were confused and disorganized in their efforts.”
Official History, Military Region 8
“…in the B2 theater alone our casualties for the year 1968 were higher than the total for all the years from 1961 until 1967, and our casualties during the three years from 1968 through 1970 were twice as high as those for the entire seven year period ”
Military History Magazine, Special Edition: 20 Years After Tet

19. Bottomline
IN THE END, THE COMMUNISTS PAY A HUGE BUTCHER’S BILL AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL FOR THEIR MISCALCULATIONS IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION FOR THE OFFENSIVE.
HOWEVER, AS WE ALL KNOW, THE OUTCOME AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL PROVED TO BE IRRELEVANT IN THE LONG RUN.
PAUSE
WHAT IS TO BE TAKEN AWAY FROM THIS DISCUSSION?
-- NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW HERE – IT IS AKIN TO WHAT
ONE OF MY OLD INFANTRY COMMANDERS SO APTLY DESCRIBED AS “THE DANGERS OF DRINKING ONE’S OWN BATHWATER.”
“If at that time we had been more intelligent, if we had evaluated the situation in a more concrete manner, in a more practical manner, or what our comrades commonly call a more truthful manner, the goals we set for ourselves would have been more realistic. We would have prepared forces, prepared our battlefield posture, and prepared our thoughts and our ideology to continue to contend with the enemy later, after the attack. If we had done that, perhaps our losses during the years would not have been as enormous.”
“A Few Strategic Issues in the Spring 1968 Tet Offensive and Uprising” by Hoang Van Thai, in “Military History Magazine, Issue 2 (26), 1988; “Special Edition: 20 Years After Tet 1968”, p. 52.

20. Lesson Learned (and Not Learned?)
THE BOTTOMLINE IS THAT --
INTELLIGENCE IS WHAT IT IS – USING, ABUSING, OR IGNORING IT FOR POLITICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL PURPOSES IS A DANGEROUS PROPOSITION THAT NORMALLY HAS DRASTIC CONSEQUENCES.
AS FOR LESSONS LEARNED – I WILL LET YOU DETERMINE WHETHER WE LEARNED OUR LESSON ON NOT.
THANK YOU.
When it comes to intelligence, beware of “Drinking your own bathwater.”

21. Communist Plans General Offensive General Uprising
Forces and Deployment
80,000 NVA and VC troops