Federation of European Explosives Manufacturers Meeting of the Transport Working Group on Tuesday, 15th March 2016 in Brussels.

Federation of European Explosives Manufacturers Meeting of the Transport Working Group on Tuesday, 15th March 2016 in Brussels

List of Participants Ivana Jakubkova, Chairlady Austin, CZ Jean-Paul Reynaud Titanobel, F Marion Lövgren Orica, SW Lucie Holubova Explosia, CZ Janusz Drzyzga Nitroerg, P Matti Vähäpassi Forcit, FI Thierry Rousse EPC, F Maurice Delaloye SSE, CH Rafael Loriente Maxam, E In attendance: Hans H. Meyer FEEM, B

Compliance with European Competition Law
As an Association, FEEM operates in compliance with European competition laws. Respect for these laws is a core value applying to all FEEM activities. All members of this Meeting have been informed by the Secretary General about prohibited discussion topics which apply not only during meetings but also to social gatherings before and after meetings. By signing the participation form, the delegates declare their adherence to the Competition Compliance Programme and agree to comply with Competition Law.

Meeting of the Transport Working Group
(Draft) Agenda for 15th March 2016, 9 a.m. – 1 p.m. Opening remarks by the Chairlady Compliance with the European and National Competition Laws and Regulations Agenda & Approval of the Agenda Minutes of the Meeting in Budapest on 22nd September 2015 Subjects for discussion from the last meeting in Budapest Secretary General’s Report with, in particular: Security Of Sensitive Data In Cloud Storage Systems ‘Track and Trace’ Directive Report on the Mapping of the implementation of the Directive (Survey) DSB report concerning MEMU truck accident in Drevja, 2013 (follow-up). SCEPYLT Questionnaire Presentation

(Draft) Agenda (cont.) Any other business Classification of dual use explosives, like RDX, PETN, HSX, HNS and similar (The Wassenaar Arrangement) Incidents Tianjin Blast West Fertilizer Explosion and Fire on Explosives precursors Date, place and time of next meeting

3. (Draft) Agenda for 15th March 2016 Do you approve?
Meeting of the Transport Working Group 3. (Draft) Agenda for 15th March 2016 Do you approve?

4. Minutes of the Meeting in Budapest on 22rd September 2015
Meeting of the Transport Working Group 4. Minutes of the Meeting in Budapest on 22rd September 2015 Do you approve?

5) SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION FROM THE LAST MEETING
Survey of implementation with possible varying interpretations in the EU member states, e.g. Definition of end-users and their duties Magazines & inventories Explosives quantities

a) PROBLEMS RELATED WITH MS ACTIONS
Redundancy with current National legislation, creating administrative cost and burden’s duplication, - Proposal: Speed-up National legislative process to solve any duplication and administrative burden, and promote the implementation of e-administration instead paper Documents. Some countries want to make XML-file mandatory!

T&T redundancies with National Legislation
For instance: According to national and European regulations undertakings in the Explosives sector have to record the receipt and inventory of every single explosive item. With the existing Track & Trace soft-wares companies have the possibility to use an electronic stock book instead of the traditional handwritten one. However, several national authorities still request to maintain the old manual explosives registers in book form (e.g. in Italy & other countries: manual plus electronic registers).

b) Misinterpretations of the Directive:
– Some countries are applying the T&T Directive only till the gate of the user’s site (e.g. Austria & Norway) • Interpretation of the EC end users definition and Directive • Creates distortions of the market and unfair competition between companies from the different surrounding countries Need of clarification!

6) Secretary General’s Report

a) SECURITY OF SENSITIVE DATA IN CLOUD STORAGE SYSTEMS
in connection with EU Dircetive 2008/43 of 04 April 2008 respectively Dierctive 2012/04 of 22 February 2012, the so-called „Track & Trace Directive“.

Security of Sensitive Explosives Transfer Data
COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC regulates in Article 13 the Data collection: 3. “Member States shall ensure that the data collected including the unique identifications is kept and maintained for a period of 10 years after the delivery or whenever known after the end of the life cycle of the explosive even if undertakings have ceased trading.“ Of course the Directive does not stipulate any method of how to store the data.

The only specifics are mentioned in:
(d) keeping and maintaining the data collected including the unique identifications for the period specified in paragraph 3 of Article 13; (e) protecting the data collected against accidental or malicious damage or destruction; Within the explosives’ supply chain XML files with consignment details, which are standardized according to the harmonized FEEM structure are usually transferred and are generally being stored by means of: CDs s with XML attachment USB-Sticks private FTP* / SFTP* Servers (* (Secure) file transfer protocol)

WEB-Services An increasing number of users, normally the larger companies have outsourced their specific T&T IT-Services to specialized IT-Providers, who offer web-solutions because of the following advantages: Common interface to all clients and suppliers, no individual adjustments Highest possible data security, safety, availability guarantied by certified Severs Transaction safe: 100% guaranty of correct data transmission ENCRYPTION and compression of data possible Formal correctness of all messages is checked, no unreadable data Secure deletion of all transmitted data, no hidden remains (only technical message status information is stored in case a later proof of delivery is needed) Central provision of product master data to customers Adding additional information needed to operate electronic stock book by customers

At the last meeting of the Explosives Working Group in Brussels on 26
At the last meeting of the Explosives Working Group in Brussels on a delegate from Italy raised concerns about the security of sensitive explosives data in such cloud storage systems. The data is often and especially in this case of great value and its irrecoverable loss or damage could be a total disaster for its owner and he would not be able to fulfill his legal requirements. On top these might be sensitive data which could be misused? Of course Cloud storage services offer user-friendly, easily accessible and money-saving ways of storing and automatically backing up arbitrary data. But are they also safe and secure?

Data Safety & Security These concerns have been taken seriously and have been discussed in the past months with members and IT providers. Of course there are general rules , how to deal with security-related data. Most of the providers are storing their data in encrypted form. In addition, the data never leave Europe! The T&T IT-providers use specially certified data centers in Europe, such as IBM in Frankfurt and Amsterdam. All accesses to the data require a login to the system . This ensures that only the confirmed owner of the data can view them. A subsequent change or loss of the data are excluded . The present solutions should meet all relevant European rules & regulations concerning save data.

In the end, however, the question remains how far are the T & T data at all relevant to security? Even if an cyber-attacker could read the data, he would only learn that quarry XY gets explosives from supplier Z. Since the conventional explosives are well known, the gain of knowledge of such an attack is likely to be limited. If someone wants to raid an explosives transport, he does not need XML file data and cloud information. Thus, I am of the opinion that the economic value of the data is more worth to be protected. Anyway, as far as we can evaluate the situation, the T&T IT- providers have conducted considerable effort to save the data on the Internet safely. Experience also shows that many smaller companies have difficulties to implement reliable data storage and archiving concepts in their own offices. In this respect, the data are currently certainly better protected and conserved in a professional data center, as on a domestic laptop.

b) ‘Track and Trace’ Directive Survey & Report

‘Track and Trace’ Directive Report on the Mapping of the implementation of the Directive by the Task Force between UEPG, EU-Commission & FEEM Working Group delegates (Ramon Eguren, Maxam & Collin Ning, Orica)

ACTIONS

Actions – Explosives for civil uses TF (1)
Dissemination of Guidelines to the whole supply chain Recommendation for use of FEEM code system FEEM Small Articles guidance document Operational Procedures, marking and labeling Safety and Legal requirements for Hardware and Software IT System, Installations, Software companies in line with National and EU legislations applicable in other countries and users Training Documents – Campaign - Action

Actions – Explosives for civil uses TF (2)
Set an ongoing action plan Identify any challenges raised during the first and second phase of the implementation + Actions to solve challenges Create and disseminate a first Guidance document for the whole supply chain .

Actions - Explosives for civil uses TF (3)
Create Guidance documents for end users in leaflet format translated in 9 languages and Questions & Answers Set up a TF Website: s-for-civil-uses.eu/

RESULTS

Actions – Manufacturers
Huge investments already done for: – Implementing the identification and T&T systems in their production plants and developing T&T internal systems – Marking and labelling their new products and those old ones unsold as the Directive stated – Improvement of the quality systems to better control explosives supply and avoid practical problems – Developing software to send information to the supply chain (Xml files) – Improvement customer systems and Help Desks

– Fulfil the requirements of the T&T Directive
Actions – Users Investments to – Fulfil the requirements of the T&T Directive – Implementation of T&T systems (manual record is almost impossible) – Record and double check the explosive materials and the information received • Software • Hardware – Training of concerned workers

Actions – Users Still a little bit hesitant, because Need Administration Guidance/control Need official information on how to demonstrate they are complying with postponed decisions till the last minute leading to some technical problems

Actions – End-User Associations (UEPG & others)
Disseminate information and advise companies – The use of TF Explosives documents is recommended – Technical and Workshops meetings all over Europe – Difficulties to reach all the end users not being Members

Actions – End-User Associations (UEPG & others)
Analyse if any redundancy with previous legal national requirement be modified Adaptation of communication, authorisation and ordering formats Contact the national Administration to solve the main issues and problems Very challenging! not always receptive!

SURVEY

What? – Survey on the identification and mapping of the implementation process of the ‘Track and Trace’ Directive and latest challenges faced up by the whole supply chain for a good directive’s implementation in Europe.

Why? – Evaluate the implementation of T&T Directives – Presentation of the results to EC WG on Explosives on 26 October 2015.

When? – Decided at the Explosives for civil uses Task Force Meeting on 9 June 2015 – Launched in September 2015 – Deadline November 2015

The survey (1) Country Organisation
Is the Identification and Traceability of Explosives for civil uses Directive in your country... A. Fully implemented? B. Partially implemented? C. Not yet implemented? If so, any reasons: Other Comments:

THE SURVEY (2) What are the latest challenges you are facing up in your country regarding the good implementation of the Identification and Traceability Explosives for civil uses Directive? Highlight current challenge( s) in your country (please mark one or more answers) A. No request for compliance by the Members States authorities B. No or little Members States’ information / support C. No request from the Members States authorities D. There is an official delay for compliance E. Delay in the implementation process

G. Unmarked explosive products
THE SURVEY (2) What are the latest challenges you are facing up in your country regarding the good implementation of the Identification and Traceability Explosives for civil uses Directive? Highlight current challenge( s) in your country (please mark one or more answers) F. Redundancy with current National legislation, creating administrative cost and burden’s duplication G. Unmarked explosive products H. SMEs resources’ barriers (e.g. financial, human, methodology) I. Mistakes in the Xml file, which leading one or several of the stakeholders of the supply chain to be responsible for an item that was not received J. Non readable explosives. Some stickers on detonators, cartridges and other items are not always readable and still difficult to scan. It is a question of ink, format of the items, quality of the devices and software… ?

K. Availability of hardware (hand held scanners)
THE SURVEY (3) What are the latest challenges you are facing up in your country regarding the good implementation of the Identification and Traceability Explosives for civil uses Directive? Highlight current challenge (s) in your country (please mark one or more answers) K. Availability of hardware (hand held scanners) L. Availability of software M. Cost of devices and/or software N. Companies security features O. No or little support for the devices, e.g. scanners and software

Q. Intermittent issues/connection with the software/hardware solution
THE SURVEY (3) What are the latest challenges you are facing up in your country regarding the good implementation of the Identification and Traceability Explosives for civil uses Directive? Highlight current challenge (s) in your country (please mark one or more answers) P. Difficulties with the interoperability of companies (e.g. between the supply of data from one explosives provider to another) Q. Intermittent issues/connection with the software/hardware solution R. XML files not compatible or used by company S. Lack of training of workers on track & trace systems Any Comments on the above mentioned challenges and their reasons Suggest other challenges in your country not yet listed

Who replied? Users – 17 replies Explosives manufacturers – 34 replies TTE (software company) – 7 replies

Replies 22 EU Members 2 EFTA 6 EU Members Not replying (Lithuania, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Slovakia, Malta)

Should be fully implemented since the 5 April 2015
Partially implemented (2 EU + 2 EFTA Countries – Norway, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary) Fully implemented (20 EU Countries) No information (6 Countries - (Lithuania, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Slovakia, Malta)

Degree of implementation
Fully implemented 72% Partially implemented 7% No information 21%

Problems related with MS actions
A. No request for compliance by the Members States authorities B. No or little Members States’ information / support C. No request from the Members States authorities

D. There is an official or unofficial delay for compliance Since there are normally 2 or more involved authorities at MS level (Administration + police), sometimes it is not clear who is taking the leadership and / or who is controlling Proposal: MS Authorities to actively support better compliance, especially for SMEs It is known that some MS have delayed the implementation to adapt to their national legislation

E. Delay in the implementation process - This happens because end-user companies waited till the very last moment – 5 April 2015 F. Redundancy with current National legislation, creating administrative cost and burden’s duplication - Proposal: Speed-up National legislative process to solve any duplication and administrative burden, and promote the implementation of e-administration instead paper Documents (e.g. in Italy: manual + electronic registers)

Misinterpretations of the Directive: – Some countries are applying the T&T Directive only till the gate of the user’s site (e.g. Austria & Norway) • Interpretation of the EC end users definition and Directive • Creates distortions of the market and unfair competition between companies from the different surrounding countries Need of clarification!

No clear procedures to: Demonstrate that a single company is already complying with the Directive & on sanctions for non compliance Not only different approaches at national level but also, in some countries, regions (Germany, Italy) have their own interpretation causing some confusion

Other MS issues A protocol should be in place to requests for official information to undertakings in the supply chain (Authorization process). The problem is the contact points - how to verify that the contact person asking for T&T information is from the Police or from the competent Authorities? No-one should give “blind” information.

Hardware and software technical problems
K. Availability of hardware (hand held scanners) L. Availability of software M. Cost of devices and/or software N. Companies security features O. No or little support for the devices, e.g. scanners and software Q. Intermittent issues/connection with the software/hardware solution

User’s specific problems
R. SMEs resources’ barriers (e.g. financial, human, methodology) S. Lack of training of workers on track & trace systems

XML files problems - Mistakes in the xml file, which leading one or several of the stakeholders of the supply chain to be responsible for an item that was not received - Differences between the xml content and the explosives received - Legal problem for the end user - Quality of information

XML files not compatible or used by company
XML files problems XML files not compatible or used by company - Difficulties with the interoperability of companies (e.g. between the supply of data from one explosives provider to another) - Since the FEEM Code is voluntary, different structure of data from different suppliers (for the non mandatory part of the codes)

Explosives problems - Unmarked explosive products on the hands of users and distributors - Not a problem for manufacturers but for distributors and users - Could be old products or products where the label was lost due to handling operations - Non readable explosives. Some stickers on detonators, cartridges and other items are not always readable and still difficult to scan. It is a question of ink, format of the items, quality of the devices and software… - Sometimes can be solved by reading the human readable code, but not always possible - Ongoing solution by new printing methods

Important problem with unreadable explosives
Sometimes, the labels become unreadable due to different causes like: water, handling for blasting, … - What to do with them? Proposal: – The safest and most economical way would be to allow END-USERS to destroy them in the quarry according to the Swedish derogation: “Products without marking may not be assigned by manufacturers and importers. However, consumers / users are allowed to consume unlabelled products. So you are free to use and consume the unlabeled products when you are loading and blasting yourselves.“ Note: Distributors/blasting service companies/end-users (unlike manufacturers) are not entitled to re-label unmarked products.

Irish Proposal (J. Coates GIE Ireland)
to EU Commission of Dec concerning Identification & Traceability Problems and Solutions

Irish Proposal to EU Commission Dec
Irish Proposal to EU Commission Dec concerning Identification & Traceability Problems and Solutions Main problems: Unreadable Bar/Matrix Codes Poor printing Damaged, wrinkled or scratched labels Non-standard bar-codes Logistical information incomplete in code fields. XML data file supplied by manufacturers/distributors incomplete or missing

Consequences: Each parent and sub-pack has to be opened to scan each article Increased hazard in extra handling Breaking of factory sealed packages reduces storage life Repacking into unsealed or reconstituted packing increases hazard of downstream transport Extra time involved adds to cost and inefficiency

Directive requirements:
Mandatory fields for unique identification apply only to article, not to packaging Arts 5-10 refer to “associated label” to be placed on each case – details unspecified. Annex mentions inclusion of “logistical information designed by the manufacturer” without specifying minimum information to be included. No mention of provision of electronic data (XML files) by manufacturers to downstream customers.

Unreadable labels/codes
Possible solutions: Unreadable labels/codes Use two identical codes on each label Discontinue poor quality printing techniques Electronic information Amend the Directive to clarify the minimum information to be provided in electronic data files and on labels/matrix codes

Proposed amendment to Directive:
Insert a new Article 3.7 :“manufacturers, or distributors who repackage explosives, shall provide sufficient information by electronic means to downstream undertakings, to enable the logistical information in the bar code and/or matrix code to be used for logistical and tracking purposes”

Proposed amendment to Directive:
Insert a new Article 3.8 : “The associated label on each case (parent pack or sub-pack) shall contain sufficient electronic information in the bar code and/or matrix code, to enable all of its contents to be identified and quantified, and to generate the associated list of unique identifications of each article contained therein” Footnote to read “For example by provision of XML data files”

DSB report concerning MEMU truck accident in Drevja, 2013.
At the last meeting we introduced and analyzed the report concerning possible consequences arising from changes in regulatory procedures by relevant institutions based on the proposals by DSB.

Beginning of December 2015 the FEEM Transport Working Group represented by their Chairperson Ivana Jakubkova had the opportunity to meet Bjørn Gregertsen and Gry Haugsnes from DSB in Norway. They went through the Report presented by Ms. Haugsnes (she is lead investigator of the accident) and they had the opportunity to discuss some of the major topics. One of our concerns was if there will be any proposals leading to legislational changes on an international, European or national level.

Mr. Gregertsen reported there is no intention by DSB to send any direct recommendations or proposals to the international or European level. However, they reflected the regulatory situation of MEMU trucks and informed the delegation that there are tendencies for mapping all situations and they try to identify any regulatory and pragmatic gaps which might cause public hazard.

Generally we understand, that DSB is trying to apply corrective measures limited to Norway.
The group discussed the local situation and came to the conclusion that by audits and good, documented maintenance levels the safety could be improved.

DSB has already added new requirements for approval documentation of MEMU in Norway.
The meeting was in so far useful as we now know there will be no direct actions specifically concerning changes in ADR or EU-Directives. The Transport Working Group group should pay attention to this issue. The number of trucks is rising all over Europe and if a similar accident will happen in a more populated area, there will be more & severe consequences.

FEEM thanks Ivana for her initiative

d) SCEPYLT Questionaire
Last week the Commission has distributed a Questionnaire concerning the public knowledge & the application of the system / software in the EU Member States. They have asked FEEM to investigate with their members.

How familiar are you with SCEPYLT? Please check one answer (x)
SCEPYLT Questionaire How familiar are you with SCEPYLT? Please check one answer (x) ( ) I am new to SCEPYLT ( ) I know about it but I have never seen it ( ) I have seen the electronic system but have never used it ( ) I used SCEPYLT in the past in my capacity as ( ) I use SCEPYLT currently in my current capacity

SCEPYLT Questionaire If you use or have used SCEPYLT, what are/were your exact responsibilities? (i.e, apply, receive, process and/or approve requests, IT development and maintenance, point of contact...)

SCEPYLT Questionaire Do you know if your Member State is connected to SCEPYLT? If not, do you know why: If so, does your Member State actively use SCEPYLT? If so, since when?

SCEPYLT Questionaire Do you think the use of SCEPYLT should become mandatory for all EU Member States? Please explain why or why not: If your Member State actively uses SCEPYLT, Do you find it efficient? Do you find the electronic platform user-friendly? How could SCEPYLT be improved?

SCEPYLT Questionaire What is/are the competent authority in your Member State for the approval of intra-EU transfers of explosives? If several authorities are involved, what is the division of competences? Is there a single point of contact for SCEPYLT? Is it the same authority that oversees the implementation of the national act transposing the Directive on Explosives for Civil Uses?

SCEPYLT Questionaire Commission Directive 2012/4/EU of 22 February amending Directive 2008/43/EC setting up, pursuant to Council Directive 93/15/EEC, a system for the identification and traceability of explosives for civil uses establish that some articles (Article 3(6) and Articles 13 and 14) should be applied as of 5 April 2015: Who is the competent authority in your Member State for the above Directives? How does your Member State control traceability of intra-community transfers of explosives? How does your Member State monitor compliance with authorisations that are granted for Would you favour introducing traceability tools into SCEPYLT? Would you favour a voluntary use or a mandatory use of such tools?

8. AoB Classification of dual use explosives,
like RDX, PETN, HSX, HNS and similar (The Wassenaar Arrangement)

The Wassenaar Arrangement
Military Explosives versus Dual Use Explosives The COMMON MILITARY LIST OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (adopted by the Council on 17 March 2014) classifies and regulates the following explosives (relevant to our industry) as “Military Equipment” under reference: ML 8: Explosives as follows, and mixtures thereof: 13. HMX and derivatives (see also ML8.g.5. for its ‘precursors’), as follows: a. HMX) (CAS ); 15. HNS (hexanitrostilbene) 16. RDX 26.Tetryl (trinitrophenylmethylnitramine) (CAS );

33. Explosives not listed elsewhere in ML 8 .a. and having any of the following: a. Detonation velocity exceeding 8,700 m/s, at maximum density, or b. Detonation pressure exceeding 34 GPa (340 kbar);

The Wassenaar Arrangement (not to be confused with the Wassenaar Agreement, (full name: The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) is a multilateral export control regime (MECR) with 41 participating states including many former COMECON (Warsaw Pact) countries. As of January 2012, the 41 participating states are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. China and Israel are also not members, but they have aligned their export controls with Wassenaar lists, and are significant arms exporters.

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 sets up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items: ‘DUAL-USE ITEMS’ shall mean items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military purposes, and shall include all goods which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; these include the following substances relevant to our industry:

Items of the Community strategic control
1A007 Equipment and devices, specially designed to initiate charges and devices containing energetic materials, by electrical means, as follows: N.B.: SEE ALSO MILITARY GOODS CONTROLS, 3A229 AND 3A232. Explosive detonator firing sets designed to drive multiple controlled detonators specified in 1A007. . Electrically driven explosive detonators as follows: Exploding bridge (EB); 2. Exploding bridge wire (EBW); 3. Slapper; 4. Exploding foil initiators (EFI). Note: 1A007.b. does not control detonators using only primary explosives, such as lead azide.

High explosives, other than those specified in the Military Goods Controls, or substances or mixtures containing more than 2 % by weight thereof, with a crystal density greater than 1,8 g/cm 3 and having a detonation velocity greater than m/s. 1A008 Charges, devices and components, as follows: a. ’Shaped charges’ having all of the following: Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) greater than 90 g; and Outer casing diameter equal to or greater than 75 mm;

Linear shaped cutting charges having all of the following, and specially designed components therefor: b. An explosive load greater than 40 g/m; and a width of 10 mm or more; c. Detonating cord with explosive core load greater than 64 g/m; d. Cutters, other than those specified in 1A008.b., and severing tools, having a Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) greater than 3,5 kg.

Incidents Tianjin (China) Blast
West Fertilizer Explosion and Fire on

Tianjin A series of explosions that killed over one hundred people and injured hundreds of others occurred at a container storage station at the Port of Tianjin on Wednesday, 12 August The first two explosions occurred within 30 seconds of each other at the facility, which is located in the Binhai New Area of Tianjin, China. The second explosion was far larger and involved the detonation of about 800 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. Fires caused by the initial explosions continued to burn uncontrolled throughout the weekend, repeatedly causing secondary explosions, with eight additional explosions occurring on Saturday, 15 August.

Tianjin The cause of the explosions was not immediately known at first, but an investigation concluded in February 2016 that an overheated container of dry nitrocellulose was the cause of the initial explosion. Poor coverage of the event and the emergency response to it received criticism. The Chinese government also censored the internet and social media using the words "Tianjin" and "explosion", and announced it had taken down multiple websites for publishing "false" information. As of 12 September 2015, the official casualty report was 173 deaths, 8 missing, and 797 non-fatal injuries.

The Chinese state news agency Xinhua reports in February 2016 that more than 120 people, including senior officials, were responsible for deadly blasts. Investigators identified 123 people, including five officials at ministerial level, who they said were responsible. The blasts killed 173 people, 8 missing, and 797 non-fatal injuries More than 300 buildings were damaged by the blasts in the port area, forcing thousands of people from their homes. The Xinhua report said a highly flammable chemical, nitro-cotton, had been allowed to dry out and self-ignite, setting fire to other chemicals including ammonium nitrate and causing a chain reaction of fires and explosions.

It said that the owner of the warehouse, Ruihai International Logistics, had "illegally built a freight-yard of hazardous materials, conducted illegal operations, illegally stored hazardous material and had been running inept safety management". The report said local officials in several departments had failed to enforce regulations strictly. In December 2015, police arrested 24 people from Ruihai and 25 government officials in connection with the blasts. The investigation panel, led by the State Council, China's Cabinet, suggested that authorities take action against those it had identified.

The report also recommended that Ruihai International Logistics' licences be revoked and the company's officials be barred from other executive posts in the same sector. Those killed in the blasts included 99 port fire-fighters, Xinhua said. Leading investigator Du Lanping told state broadcaster CCTV that fire crews sent to tackle the initial blaze had not been told of the existence of 800 tons of ammonium nitrate.

"The key is that ammonium nitrate was not supposed to be stored there at all,'' she said.
"The fire-fighters were not told of its existence so the commanders could not make sufficient risk assessments." Another investigator, Li Wanchun, told CCTV: "If the proper approval procedures had been followed, Ruihai would have never been allowed to exist in the first place.''

The huge explosions also destroyed more than 12,400 cars and 7,500 containers in the port, Chinese media said. The cost of the damage from the blasts has been put at 6.87 billion yuan ($1.1bn; £758m), Xinhua said.

West Fertilizer Company explosion on 17.04.2013 in Texas

West Fertilizer Company explosion on 17.04.2013 in Texas
Accident Description A massive explosion at a fertilizer storage and distribution facility fatally injured twelve volunteer firefighters, two members of the public and caused hundreds of injuries. Investigation Status The CSB's investigation was approved by a unanimous board vote at a public meeting in Waco, TX, on January 28, 2016.

West Fertilizer Company explosion
The following video has been published by CSB at this the meeting. As a consequence there have been several proposals and recommendations also on international level by the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), International Code Council (ICC) , Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) , Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

Revise the Risk Management Program rule to include ammonium nitrate (AN) at an appropriate threshold quantity on the List of Regulated Substances. Ensure that the calculation for the offsite consequence analysis considers the unique explosive characteristics of AN explosions to determine the endpoint for explosive effects and overpressure levels. Examples of such analyses include that adopted by the 2014 Fire Protection Research Foundation report, “Separation Distances in NFPA Codes and Standards,” Great Britain’s Health and Safety Executive, and other technical guidance.

The following requirements for the storage and handling of ammonium nitrate (AN) are requested by ICC: a. Require automatic fire detection and suppression systems in existing buildings constructed of combustible materials b. Provide ventilation requirements in accordance with the International Mechanical Code to prevent the accumulation of off-gases produced during AN decomposition

c. Provide smoke and heat vents to remove heat from AN during fire situations
d. Establish minimum safe separation distances between AN and combustible materials to avoid contamination in the event of fire. e. Prohibit the use of combustible materials of construction.

Explosives precursors
Most commonly, terrorists have used explosives to inflict casualties and damage. Home-made explosives, fabricated from certain easily accessible chemical precursors, are a preferred tool for perpetrators of terrorist attacks. The Europol TE-SAT reports indicate that these continue to pose a serious threat to the EU. Therefore, the Commission's efforts concentrate on ensuring greater security of explosives, bomb-making equipment and technologies that contribute to the perpetration of terrorist acts.

EU Action Plan on the security of explosives
While the usefulness of explosives for industrial purposes is beyond doubt, policy-makers must reduce the possibility of their misuse for terrorist purposes to ensure the security of citizens. This can only be achieved through the active contribution of all stakeholders at EU, national and industry level. This rationale formed the basis of the 2008 EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives . The Action Plan contains 48 measures related to prevention, detection and response, as well as horizontal measures, such as the development of information sharing mechanisms and platforms, supporting research and working with partners both in and outside the EU. A review of the EU Action Plan was undertaken in An overview of its implementation by the Member States and EU bodies is provided in the 2012 Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives.

Regulation 98/2013 on explosives precursors
The Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors establishes a tighter regulatory regime for high-risk chemical explosives precursors, to reduce their accessibility to the general public (private individuals). In addition, the Regulation introduces the obligation for economic operators to report any suspicious transactions involving both the restricted precursors and other non-restricted substances which are also considered of concern.

The Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors harmonises rules across Europe on the making available, introduction, possession and use, of certain substances or mixtures that could be misused for the illicit manufacture of explosives.

Under the Regulation, each Member State is expected to designate a competent authority and adopt its own measures to implement the restrictions and, if it opts to have one, a licensing or registration regime. The competent authority in each Member State is also required to set up its own national contact point (s) for the reporting of suspicious transactions. The Commission is tasked with making the list of measures notified by Member States publicly available and with drawing up guidelines to facilitate the implementation of the Regulation.

The Standing Committee on Precursors
The Standing Committee on Precursors (SCP), an expert group chaired by the Commission and composed of representatives of Member States and of industry associations, assists the Commission in its work to facilitate and harmonise the implementation of the Regulation. FEEM is invited to their meetings as an external observer and adviser.

Guidance materials The Standing Committee on Precursors (SCP) has issued a Guidelines document, available in English only, which provides guidance to Member State competent authorities and to economic operators in the implementation of the requirements contained in the Regulation. The SCP Guidelines also offer advice on good practice to economic operators.

Guidance materials It is called the: “Guidelines by the European Commission and the Standing Committee on Precursors relating to Regulation (EU) No 98/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors

Hydrogen peroxide (CAS RN 7722-84-1) 12% w/w
REGULATION (EU) No 98/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 15 January 2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors In ANNEX I and II Substances are listed which shall not be made available to members of the general public or for which for which suspicious transactions shall be reported: Hydrogen peroxide (CAS RN ) 12% w/w Nitromethane (CAS RN ) 30% w/w Nitric acid (CAS RN ) 3 % w/w Potassium chlorate (CAS RN ) 40 % w/w Potassium perchlorate (CAS RN ) 40 % w/w Sodium chlorate (CAS RN ) 40 % w/w Sodium perchlorate (CAS RN ) 40 % w/w

Hexamine (CAS RN ) Sulphuric acid (CAS RN ) Acetone (CAS RN ) Potassium nitrate (CAS RN ) Sodium nitrate (CAS RN ) Calcium nitrate (CAS RN ) Calcium ammonium nitrate (CAS RN ) Ammonium nitrate (CAS RN ) [in concentration of 16 % by weight of nitrogen in relation to ammonium nitrate or higher]

New Swedish Proposal There is a brand-new proposal from last week by Sweden to amend Annex II of EU-Regulation 98/2013 in order to accommodate nitrate salt hydrates.

8.) Date & Place of the next meeting: Crowne Plaza Fira Palace Hotel,
In Barcelona, Spain on Tuesday, 20st September at Crowne Plaza Fira Palace Hotel, Avenida Rius y Taulet 1

Thank you for your attention

Federation of European Explosives Manufacturers Meeting of the Transport Working Group on Tuesday, 15th March 2016 in Brussels.

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Federation of European Explosives Manufacturers Meeting of the Transport Working Group on Tuesday, 15th March 2016 in Brussels.

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Presentation on theme: "Federation of European Explosives Manufacturers Meeting of the Transport Working Group on Tuesday, 15th March 2016 in Brussels."— Presentation transcript:

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