1. LENDING BOOMS, FOREIGN BANK ENTRY AND COMPETITION: THE CROATIAN CASE Evan KraftLjubinko Jankov Croatian National Bank *The views presented here are the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Croatian National Bank.

2. Outline Lending booms, banking and currency crises Foreign banks and lending booms The Croatian case –features of the lending boom –causes: competition, liberalization, stock adjustment, capital inflows –consequences –policy measures

3. Consequences of lending booms: financial side Credit quality deteriorationlooser underwriting standards (Gavin and Hausmann 1996), dilution of relationships (Niinimaka 2001) Financial accelerator followed by crisis Financial deepening, with positive long-term effects on growth (Wachtel 2001, Levine, Loayza and Beck 2000 )

4. Policy dilemmas Difficult to measure extent of bad asset problem in real time Where is the trade-off between preventing crisis by slowing down growth and slowing down beneficial financial deepening? –speed limits view –increased capital requirements view –wait and see view

5. Consequences of lending booms: macro side Investment and/or consumption boom Increased volatility of GDP, recession and currency crises

6. What causes lending booms? Real business cycle theorypositive technology or terms of trade shocks. Such booms would not be problematic at all. Financial liberalization Capital inflows Wealth shocks

7. Lending booms and banking crises: the evidence Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), Honohan (1997) and Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) all find evidence that rapid lending growth increases the probability of banking problems However, Eichengreen and Rose (1998) do not find this, and Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (2001) find that only Latin American lending booms are strongly correlated with crises.

8. Foreign banks and lending booms Foreign banks less dependent on domestic funding sources, above all deposits Foreign banks subject to strong push factors Competition strong among foreign players Evidence from Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe confirms these observations Effect on instability: foreign banks grow faster but are more soundambiguous effects

9. Croatias lending boom: phase 1, 1995-1998 Liberalization of banking laws in early 1990s Substantial entry by domestic banks Funding: –high deposit growth due to repatriation of deposits held abroad after ending of hostilities –strong foreign borrowing after Croatia received an investment grade credit rating in January 1997

10. Croatias lending boom: phase 2, 2000-present Large scale entrance of foreign banks, late 1999 and early 2000 Recovery of household loans begins in second half of 2000 Recovery of enterprise loans is slower, beginning slowly in the first half of 2001 and only reaching 15- 20% growth rates –improved enterprise liquidity in 2000 may have slowed loan demand, but also improved balance sheets

11. Credit growth: households

12. Credit growth: enterprises

13. Causes of lending boom: demand side Stock adjustment under communism, economy was financially repressed –war and transition led to further write-offs and credit contraction –but economy is relatively developed, and probably the equilibrium level of credit/GDP is far above the actual Insider loans (in phase 1) Capital inflows

14. Causes of lending boom: supply side Liberalization and competition –removal of restrictions on entry and interest rate controls meant to stimulate supply –increasing competition also should increase supply Availability of funding –deposit growth (especially 1995-97 and 2002) –foreign borrowing (especially 1997, 2000 on) Foreign bank role –t-tests show that both privatized and de novo (greenfield) foreign banks increased lending faster than domestic banks in 2000 and 2001

15. Deposit growth

16. Evidence of increased competition Number of banks decreases after 1998, and Herfindahl index increases, but competition actually increases Narrowing spreads between lending and deposit interest rates Lower variation of market interest rates across banks Increased number of banks actually covering the whole territory of Croatia Panzar-Rosse h test

17. Lending boom and banking crisis: what is the connection? Downgrade incidents: –definition: greater than 4 percentage point increase in bad assets (B to E) –37 of 43 banks undergoing downgrades in 1998-99 grew faster than 30% yoy in at least 1 quarter prior to downgrade –30 of 40 banks that grew rapidly experienced downgrades

18. Lending boom and failure Early Warning System (EWS) –best predictors of failure are deposit interest rates and liquidity –loan growth a weaker predictor –but loan growth may be correlated with other problems –cannot conclude that rapid growth leads to failure

19. Macro side of lending boom, phase 1 1995199619971998 Inflation, retail prices, %3,73,43,85,4 Real GDP growth, %6,86,06,62,5 Current Account, % GDP-7,7-5,5-11,6-7,1 Sources: Croatian National Bank and Central Statistical Office.

20. Macro side of lending boom, phase 2 1999200020012002 Inflation, retail prices, %4,47,42,62,3 Real GDP growth, %-0,42,93,85,2 Current Account, % GDP-6,9-2,3-3,8-7,1 Sources: Croatian National Bank and Central Statistical Office.

21. Policy measures: phase 1 Tighter monetary policy introduced in mid- 1997 Chilean-style capital controls introduced in April 1998 Not clear whether capital controls or bank failures and the Russian crisis slowed down banks foreign borrowing and lending boom

22. Policy measures, phase 2 16% rulebanks must buy low-interest rate Croatian National Bank paper if growth of risk assets exceeds 4% in a given quarter. 35% rulebanks must hold liquid foreign exchange assets equal to at least 35% of their total foreign exchange liabilities These measures are mainly aimed at slowing growth, not at preventing asset quality problems per se

23. Why not just raise interest rates? Transmission mechanism based on fx market CNB bills rate would be most likely instrument Raising rates could trigger more capital inflows Rates would have to be raised very substantially Implications for public finance

24. Prudential measures Banks that grow faster than 20% will be required to form special reserves (0.10% of risk assets) Like a temporary increase in capital requirements Banks will be exempt if they meet higher capital standards (15% for growth between 20% and 30%, 20% for growth between 30% and 40% etc) Exceptions for new banks (first 3 years). Mergers: growth based on sum of merged entities.