1. Welcome to the FEEM Transport Working Group Meeting Batcelona 2016

2. Federation of European Explosives Manufacturers Meeting of the Transport Working Group on Tuesday, 20th September 2016 in Barcelona

3. List of Participants
Ivana Jakubkova, Chairlady Austin, CZ
Jean-Paul Reynaud Titanobel, F
Anders Sjörud Orica, SW
Lucie Holubova Explosia, CZ
Janusz Drzyzga Nitroerg, P
Martin Bischopink Austin, D
Matti Vähäpassi Forcit, FI
Thierry Rousse EPC, F
Maurice Delaloye SSE, CH
Rafael Loriente Maxam, E
In attendance: Hans H. Meyer FEEM, B

4. Compliance with European Competition Law
As an Association, FEEM operates in compliance with European competition laws. Respect for these laws is a core value applying to all FEEM activities. All members of this Meeting have been informed by the Secretary General about prohibited discussion topics which apply not only during meetings but also to social gatherings before and after meetings. By signing the participation form, the delegates declare their adherence to the Competition Compliance Programme and agree to comply with Competition Law.

5. Meeting of the Transport Working Group
(Draft) Agenda for 20th September 2016, 9 a.m. – 1 p.m.
Opening remarks by the Chairlady
Compliance with the European and National Competition Laws and Regulations
Agenda & Approval of the Agenda
Minutes of the Meeting in Brussels on 15 March 2016
Secretary General’s Report with, in particular:
Truck accident in Drevja, 2013 – Practical consequences by DSB
Explosives transport related matters from Forty-ninth Session in Geneva, 27 June – 6 July 2016
Ivana Jakubkova on DSB Project: “Investigating the explosion risks of ammonium nitrate under fire exposure and its consequences”
Review of CGP no. 26 (vide nos. 31 & 32)
2015 Explosives Statistics
Any other business
Date & place of the next meeting
Closure of the meeting

6. 3. (Draft) Agenda for 20th September 2016 Do you approve?
Meeting of the Transport Working Group
3. (Draft) Agenda for 20th September 2016
Do you approve?

7. 4. Minutes of the Meeting in Brussels on 15th March 2016
Meeting of the Transport Working Group
4. Minutes of the Meeting in Brussels on 15th March 2016
Do you approve?

8. 5) Secretary General’s Report

9. 5.a) Possible Consequences from the MEMU accident in Drevja, 2013

10. Under Agenda topic no. 6 Ivana will report in detail about the DSB Project.
During our last meetings we have been deeply analyzing the possible consequences e.g. in form of new MEASURES proposed by DSB, new restrictive regulations or modification of existing ones on national, European or international levels.

11. Here are just a few recommendations from the DSB report:
Changed procedures for applications for manufacture.
Follow up on non-conformances identified through document audits.
Assess the need for regulatory changes.
Evaluate possible fire prevention and fire fighting actions.
Assess the need for a comprehensive assessment of the risks related to mobile production of explosives.

12. Here are just a few recommendations from the DSB report (cont.):
Assess the need for full-scale tests
Improved risk assessments
Improved Preventive Measures
change of procedure for applications for manufacture
initiating a process of evaluating fire prevention and fire fighting measures
TOTAL LIABILITY for manufacturers.

13. DSB Project
DSB has initiated a 1st project in summer this year. In summery it will be the establishment of in-depth knowledge pertaining to the risks involved in transport and storage of AN-products used in explosives manufacture, with emphasis on the initiation of explosion in AN and AN-based products exposed to high temperatures. This project initiative is taken by Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) and the plan is to fund and organize the work in cooperation with the NORDIC explosives and fertilizer industry.

14. DSB Project
The industry has already been involved in definition and set-up of what DSB expect to be the first stage of the project. The plan is to widen the project and search for wider support (public and private) given a positive outcome of the first stage. This approach is chosen to save time and secure a better platform for what could turn out to be a very important, but big and complex project - where the outcome at a stage may impact international laws and regulations.

15. The following is an extract from the Project Plan:
INVESTIGATING THE EXPLOSION RISKS OF AMMONIUM NITRATE UNDER FIRE EXPOSURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Background: Ammonium nitrate, NH4NO3, is used in vast amounts globally, first and foremost as a component of fertilizers and explosive formulations. In the explosives industry, ammonium nitrate-based explosives have become dominant, and most of the explosives currently used for civil applications are of this kind. At room temperature, ammonium nitrate (AN) is considered to be a chemically stable substance. However, under certain conditions, the sensitivity and explosive risk of AN increase considerably. These include changes in conditions such as temperature, pressure, particle morphology and bulk density, but also the presence of contaminants.

16. Explosive events during storage and transport of AN are rare, but not uncommon, and they have been the cause of some of the largest industry- and transport-related accidents to date. Most of them have involved uncontrollable fires. Due to the unpredictable behaviour of AN during fire incidents, several inquiries into the thermo chemical and explosive behaviour of AN have been performed previously. However, due to the complex decomposition patterns that take place at high temperatures and in the presence of contaminants, the essential determinants in the transition from decomposition to explosion by AN exposed to high temperature are still inadequately understood.

17. As part of the Norwegian governmental follow-up of the explosion accident in Drevja, 2013, where a mobile explosives manufacturing unit exploded as a consequence of a prolonged fire, the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) intends to prepare a risk profile for AN-based products used for explosives production based on profound, technical knowledge. Factors essential for the transition from decomposition to detonation in AN at elevated temperatures are to be identified, and efficient safety measures to avoid this transition when these products are transported and stored will be investigated.

18. DSB believes it is essential to establish such a fundament as an appropriate scientific basis for future risk assessments and revisions of the relevant legislations. As we believe that this information also is crucial for the involved industries, we wish to perform this work in a close collaboration with them. This entails a completely open flow of information and data, benefiting all parties.

19. General aims:
The general aims of the project will be the establishment of in-depth knowledge pertaining to the risks involved in transport and storage of AN-products used in explosives manufacture, with emphasis on the initiation of explosion in AN and AN-based products exposed to high temperatures. In this overview, we have divided these into three general aims (GAs). These GAs are further sub-divided into specific aims and deliverables.

20. • Establish appropriate TNT-equivalency for AN and AN-based compositions for use in risk assessments relevant to storage, transportation and bulk production, respectively (GA1).
Thoroughly review and evaluate previous work.
Perform and evaluate thermochemical calculations for specific AN and AN-based compositions.
Formulate and define the appropriate definitions for TNT-equivalency and their application in safety evaluations.

21. Identify essential criteria for the deflagration-to-detonation transition in ammonium nitrate during fire, using practical experiments and numerical based methods (GA2).
Compile a review of previous experiments and results, including unpublished work provided by the industry.
Perform computer simulations and analyses and use them to investigate specific criteria.
Determining the role of impurities during fire through experiments involving combination of molten AN and relevant contaminants under various conditions including examinations of relevant trigger mechanisms.

22. Evaluate and identify relevant safety measures, such as selection of tank material for transportation and storage of AN products (GA3).
Review and evaluate previous experiments and results (deliverable from GA1).
Scrutiny of aluminium tanks used in transportation of AN and AN-based products using suitable test conditions and constructions.
Identification and examination of possible trigger mechanisms.
Investigate and review the safety profile of relevant tank materials for the transportation of AN and ANE when subjected to fire.

23. Project administration
The project will be owned by DSB and performed at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). At FFI, the project will be administrated by Rune Lausund (research manager) and coordinated by Maria Due-Hansen (scientist). Formal agreements and necessary contracts will be negotiated with the project participants prior to the project start-up. .

24. Steering group
A steering group, which includes relevant and appointed representatives from DSB, FFI and the industry, will be established before the project commences. Steering group meetings will be held every 6 months.

25. Reference groups
The planning of experiments and tests will be done in consultation with an established reference group consisting of researchers from FFI, representatives from DSB and technical representatives from the explosives industry. The latter is expected to supply the project with in-depth knowledge and support on the selected issues, where appropriate. An honest and open form of communication, involving all the relevant industrial partners, will be essential for the project evolution and final outcome. The reference group meetings will be held at time periods that correlate with the design and planning of experiments

26. Forty-ninth Session in Geneva, 27 June – 6 July 2016
5.b) News from the Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN/SCETDG)
Forty-ninth Session in Geneva, 27 June – 6 July 2016

27. Subject: Improvements to Koenen Test
Agenda Item 2(c): Review of tests in parts I and II of the Manual of Tests and Criteria
Test results with emulsions (ANE) relating to the Koenen test (Koenen Testing is used to measure the sensitivity of a solid or liquid sample to intense heat with varying confinement)
Subject: Improvements to Koenen Test
Germany proposed to amend the quality requirement of the steel tube in the Koenen Test (ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2015/4). The Sub-Committee encouraged Germany to continue research into replacement materials for the unavailable tube steel and prepare a revised proposal which considered the comments of the working group on explosives. The UK, CEFIC and IME suggested running comparison tests on pharmaceutical and ANE samples.

28. Actions – Users
As of the writing of 2016/6, Germany had not received any further test results, so it executed comparison tests with ANE samples and reports on those in 49/INF.27. The tests were done on 2 emulsions with 6 trials each. 49/INF.27 concludes that the test results demonstrate, that also for emulsions and slow responding samples the change of steel quality does not have an effect on the outcome of the Koenen test.

29. As a result of the comparison tests, Germany recommended
As a result of the comparison tests, Germany recommended changing the steel tube bursting pressure criteria in terms of quality control to 28 MPa ± 4 MPa.
There was some support for the proposal in these documents; however, questions were raised about the range of tube bursting pressure criteria and the potential that current classifications might be undesirably impacted. The working group suggested that the proposed pressure range be shifted (from the proposed 28 MPa ± 4 MPa to 29 MPa ± 4 MPa) so that it included the criteria currently found in the Manual (30 MPa ± 3 MPa) as well as the new test results.
Conclusion: Taking into account the change recommended by the working group, the proposals in 2016/6 were accepted. See Amendments 1 – 4 in Annex 3 of this report.

30. 2. Subject: Proposal for replacing Dibutyl phthalate (DBP) in Koenen Test
Documents: ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2016/13 (France)
Informal documents: None
Discussion: Dibutyl phthalate (DBP) is used for calibrating the heating rate in the Koenen Tests 1(b), 2(b), 8(c), and E.1. DBP is forbidden for general use within the European Union because it has been identified as substance of very high concern within the EU’s REACH regulations. France has been seeking an acceptable alternative for DBP and presented the results of its research in 47/INF.40 of the 47th session. At that session, the working group suggested that the use of synthetic oils rather than natural oils might be a viable solution to the problem described by France.

31. Subject: Proposal for replacing Dibutyl phthalate (DBP) in Koenen Test (cont.)
France has identified a silicone oil that it believes is a suitable replacement for DBP and suggests that the silicone oil could be specified by its apparent density and by its heat capacity, with appropriate tolerances for possible regional variations in the manufacturing process and availability in various parts of the world.
Conclusions: The working group agreed that synthetic oil (as proposed by France) was a good substitute. It was suggested that synthetic oils might vary by manufacturer and so a round robin testing program will likely take place (coordinated by France) to investigate before the next session whether this is an issue of concern or not.

32. 3. Subject: UN Standard Detonator Documents: ST/SG/AC. 10/C
3. Subject: UN Standard Detonator Documents: ST/SG/AC.10/C.3/2016/10 (Germany) Informal documents: UN/SCETDG/49/INF.36 (IME) Discussion: One of the longer term problems identified by IME in 2014/4 of the 45th session, and discussed in 47/INF.10 of the 47th session (see para. 7) was the lack of availability of detonators meeting the specifications of the standard detonator that is described in Appendix 1 of the Manual of Tests and Criteria. In 2015/26 of the 47th session, Germany sought to update the specifications for the European version of the standard detonator to align with current technological developments while seeking to avoid “… any change to the performance of the detonator, since test results should not depend on the use of the former type or the new type.” In 2016/10 of the current session, Germany has provided some test data to support a new design for the European version of the standard detonator. Also provided in 2016/10 is an intention to update the proposal in 2015/26 taking into account comments from the working group at the 47th Session.

33. Subject: UN Standard Detonator During the discussion of this issue by the working group at the 47th Session, IME suggested that it might be possible to simplify the specifications of the standard detonator and to replace the European and US versions with a single universal version. The working group agreed that this concept was desirable and encouraged IME to review further and to report back. In 49/INF.36 of this session, IME starts with the proposal from Germany in 2015/26 and suggests revisions that would simplify the specifications and achieve the goal of a universal version of the standard detonator.

34. Subject: UN Standard Detonator Conclusion: The working group continued to support the possible development of a single, universal version of the standard detonator instead of the two versions currently described in Appendix 1 of the Manual. However, it feels that not enough actual data exists to perform a thorough comparison of the two current versions, specifically in regards to net explosive weight, content, pressing pressure of the base load, material of construction (aluminium vs. copper), and bottom shape for the detonator shell.

35. Subject: UN Standard Detonator Additionally, it was generally agreed that some references to a standard detonator in some tests may not be necessary since the intent (in those tests) is simply to ensure that a booster is initiated. However, in other cases, for instance, the cap sensitivity test, a standard, consistent output is imperative. Work will continue through the 2017/2018 biennium with a goal of a formal proposal by the end of that biennium. The work will likely be coordinated by Germany and IME.

36. Subject: THE MINIMUM BURNING PRESSURE (MBP) TESTS AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATE OR REPLACEMENT FOR THE 8(C) AND/OR THE 8(D) TESTS
[Manual of Tests and Criteria:
8(c): Koenen test in section 18.6
8(d): Vented pipe tests in section 18.7]

37. Subject: THE MINIMUM BURNING PRESSURE (MBP) TESTS AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATE OR REPLACEMENT FOR THE 8(C) AND/OR THE 8(D) TESTS
Discussion: In 49/INF.34 Spain presents an industry report on temperature influence on the MBP test. Spain noted that the MBP tests hitherto have been performed at ambient temperature and not at elevated temperatures such as in a transport fire. 49/INF.34 concludes that “MBPs showed a decreasing linear dependence on temperature, the MBP of the studied emulsions tend to converge to similar values as the temperature at which the measurement has been carried out increases. The MBPs reach a null value at temperatures close to 200 °C.” Spain recommends “ … to take into account the dependence of the MBP on the ANE temperature when the suitability of the MBP test to analyse the risk of an external fire is under consideration.”

38. How to include the MBP test as part of TS 8 (c)
Subject: The Minimum Burning Pressure (MBP) Tests as a possible alternate or replacement for the 8(c) and/or the 8(d) tests
In 49/INF.50, Canada reports on the progress made by an intercessional correspondence group (ICG) established in January 2016 by the expert from Canada. The ICG includes seven CAs and four NGOs, and its work was previously reviewed at the IGUS-EPP and CIE conference held in Bern (April, 2016) for further progressing the proposal, if deemed appropriate, or exploring alternatives. The ICG has identified 3 work streams:
How to include the MBP test as part of TS 8 (c)
MBP Criteria to determine the suitability of a candidate ANE to be classified in Division 5.1
Should the MBP test be proposed as an alternative or replacement to 8 (d) Vented pipe test

39. Subject: The Minimum Burning Pressure (MBP) Tests as a possible alternate or replacement for the 8(c) and/or the 8(d) tests
49/INF.50 discusses initial responses to the 3 work streams and acknowledges the report provided in 49/INF.34 as well as a similar report from CERL from 2013.

40. Subject: The Minimum Burning Pressure (MBP) Tests as a possible alternate or replacement for the 8(c) and/or the 8(d) tests
49/INF.60 from AEISG (Australian Explosives Industry and Safety Group) provides context to the discussion on the MBP test as a potential alternative to the 8(c) Koenen Test. The presentation, which was distributed to the working group, highlighted the large differences in heat transfer and burst pressure between the Koenen test, the vented pipe test and tanks used in actual road transport.

41. Subject: The Minimum Burning Pressure (MBP) Tests as a possible alternate or replacement for the 8(c) and/or the 8(d) tests
Results of Koenen tests were also shown that demonstrated negative results (pass) for ANEs with low (8%) water content. An example of an incident was given that shows the poor thermal conductivity of ANEs. Reference was also made to the MBP research carried out by CERL and MAXAM in which the MBP is shown to decrease with increasing temperature, as expected. The observed null MBP was shown to be consistent with the thermal decomposition seen for ANEs.

42. Subject: The Minimum Burning Pressure (MBP) Tests as a possible alternate or replacement for the 8(c) and/or the 8(d) tests
There was a discussion on the issues of classifying all ANEs using two alternative tests which are known to have different outcomes. A suggestion was made to amend the criteria in the 8(c) test. Germany pointed out that consistency with Test Series 2 and classification of other chemicals would then be lost.
The UK does not consider the Koenen test as suitable for emulsion ANEs and proposed to have the Koenen test applicable for suspensions or gels, and the MBP test applicable for emulsions due to their much higher water content and other factors. The USA believes this could be a favourable path pending further discussion at the ICG.
Conclusion: The ICG will continue to work through the summer to consider whether the Koenen test might be a suitable 8(c) test for gels and suspensions and the MBP test for emulsions.

43. 5.) A simplified approach to a standardized marking format (Globally Harmonized standard for explosives security markings
Informal documents: UN/SCETDG/49/INF.35 (IME)
Discussion: This paper was discussed in the TDG plenary and was not discussed by the working group.
Conclusion: None

44. Review of Chapter 2.1 of the GHS
Proposals at the Thirty-first session in Geneva, 5– 8 July 2016
1.) Definitions and general considerations
An explosive substance (or mixture) is a solid or liquid substance (or mixture of substances) which is in itself capable by chemical reaction of producing gas at such a temperature and pressure and at such a speed as to cause damage to the surroundings. Pyrotechnic substances are included even when they do not evolve gases.
An explosive article is an article containing one or more explosive substances or mixtures.

45. Table 2.1.1: Classification criteria for explosives
Division
1.1
1.2
1.3
Criteria
Substances, mixtures and articles which have a mass explosion hazard (a mass explosion is one which affects almost the entire quantity load present virtually instantaneously)
Substances, mixtures and articles which have a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard
Substances, mixtures and articles which have a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard:
(i) combustion of which gives rise to considerable radiant heat; or
(ii) which burn one after another, producing minor blast or projection effects or both;

46. Table 2.1.1: Classification criteria for explosives
Division
1.4
Criteria
Substances, mixtures and articles which present no significant hazard: substances, mixtures and articles which present only a small hazard in the event of ignition or initiation. The effects are largely confined to the package and no projection of fragments of appreciable size or range is to be expected. An external fire shall not cause virtually instantaneous explosion of almost the entire contents of the package.

47. Table 2.1.1: Classification criteria for explosives
Division
1.5
Criteria
Very insensitive substances or mixtures which have a mass explosion hazard: substances and mixtures which have a mass explosion hazard but are so insensitive that there is very little probability of initiation or of transition from burning to detonation under normal conditions;

48. Table 2.1.1: Classification criteria for explosives
Division
1.6
Criteria
Extremely insensitive articles which do not have a mass explosion hazard: articles which predominantly contain extremely insensitive substances or mixtures and which demonstrate a negligible probability of accidental initiation or propagation.

49. NOTE 1:
Explosive substances or mixtures in packaged form and articles may be classified under divisions 1.1 to 1.6 and, for some regulatory purposes, are further subdivided into compatibility groups A to S to distinguish technical requirements (see UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations, Chapter 2.1).

50. NOTE 2:
Some explosive substances and mixtures are wetted with water or alcohols, diluted with other substances or dissolved or suspended in water or other liquid substances to suppress or reduce their explosives properties.
THESE MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE CLASS OF EXPLOSIVES (SEE CHAPTER 2.17). They may be a candidate for classification as desensitized explosives (see Chapter 2.17) or may be treated differently from explosive substances and mixtures (as desensitized explosives) for some regulatory purposes (e.g. transport), see

51. Note 3
UNSTABLE EXPLOSIVES (those which are thermally unstable and/or too sensitive for normal handling, transport and use) [are outside the scope of GHS] and shall be managed through a risk assessment process.

52. Table 2.1.2: Label elements for explosives
Unstable Explosive
Now: Explosive not in transport configuration
Division 1.1
Div. 1.2
Div. 1.3
Div. 1.4
Div. 1.5
Div. 1.6
Symbol
Exploding bomb
Exploding bomb or 1.4 on orange backgrounds
Exploding bomb; delete: 1.5 on orange backgrounds
Exploding bomb: delete: 1.6 on orange backgrounds
Signal word
Danger
Warming
Before: no signal word
Hazard statement
Before: Unstable Explosive now only “Explosive”
Explosive; delete: mass explosion hazard
Explosive; delete: severe projection hazard
Explosive; delete: fire, blast or projection hazard.
Fire or projection hazard
Explosive
Delete:
May mass
explode in
fire
Before:

53. Transport of PENTAERYTHRITE TETRANITRATE (PETN) with less than 25 % of water but more than 9 % of water
Discussion:
49/INF.9 provides information on sensitivity tests of PETN with different water contents and concludes that the water in wetted PETN is only loosely attached to the crystals and can easily be removed even at ambient temperature. Proposes to not change the actual conditions for the transport of PETN. This avoids an undue increase in risk during transport.

54. Transport of PENTAERYTHRITE TETRANITRATE (PETN) with less than 25 % of water but more than 9 % of water
In 49/INF.38, Spain reports that the results provided in 49/INF.9 vary significantly from tests results obtained by LOM in Spain. Spain suggests to perform a round robin test with interested laboratories and it would provide test material to interested labs and would coordinate the work.

55. Transport of PENTAERYTHRITE TETRANITRATE (PETN) with less than 25 % of water but more than 9 % of water
The USA noted that Competent Authorities can authorize lower percentages of water on a case-by-case basis, but that the test results reported in 49/INF.9 confirm that there is a lot of variability in the affinity of PETN to water and agreed with the conclusion that no changes should be made. Since PETN’s affinity for water is so low, the UK opposed reducing the current water content of UN 0150 below 25% since there may be in general insufficient water present to ensure homogeneous desensitization of the PETN while in transport. Spain advised that their current concern is not to lower the water content in UN 0150, but rather it is the wide variability in test results. They explained that they proposed the round robin tests so that the phenomenon could be better understood and possibly controlled. A number of labs expressed an interest to participate.

56. Transport of PENTAERYTHRITE TETRANITRATE (PETN) with less than 25 % of water but more than 9 % of water
Conclusion: The working group favoured the conclusions in 49/INF.9 that no changes be made to the water desensitization requirements for UN0150 PETN (1.1D). Also, because of the disparity noted between tests reported by Germany in 49/INF.9 and those reported by Spain in 49/INF.38, several labs agreed to participate in the round robin testing* to investigate further. This testing will be coordinated by Spain (LOM).
(*Round Robin Test: In experimental methodology, a round robin test is an interlaboratory test (measurement, analysis, or experiment) performed independently several times. This can involve multiple independent scientists performing the test with the use of the same method in different equipment, or a variety of methods and equipment. In reality it is often a combination of the two, for example if a sample is analyzed, or one (or more) of its properties is measured by different laboratories using different methods, or even just by different units of equipment of identical construction.
A round robin program is a Measurement Systems Analysis technique which uses Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) random effects model to assess a measurement system.)

57. Coffee Break for 30 Minutes

58. Topic 6 of the Agenda
Ivana on DSB Project:
Investigating the explosion risk of AN under fire exposure and its consequences

59. Item 7 on the Agenda Review of CGP no. 26
In the light of the Drevja incident and the follow-up discussion the group considered it important to review CGP no. 26 (STANDARDS FOR THE TRANSPORT, STORAGE, MIXING AND HANDLING OF BULK EMULSION EXPLOSIVES AND THEIR COMPONENTS) into an up-dated format.

60. Statistics 2015

61. around 750.000 tons. Explosives Statistic 2015
The volume of explosives consumed (not manufactured!) in Europe (EU27 + Norway & Switzerland) in 2015 amounted to
tons.
This is 3,8 % higher compared to 2014.
The volume produced by EU manufacturers is
around tons.

62. Total Explosives Consumption 2015 ./. 2014

76. Detonators 2015

77. Detonator Statistic 2015
The amount of detonators consumed (not manufactured!) in Europe (EU27 + Norway & Switzerland) in 2015 amounted to
68,97 mio. units
This is 1,7 % higher than in 2014 (67,8 mio.)

85. (+ 2,4 %)

91. Detonating Cords 2015
+ 5,1%

93. All Seismic Products by Markets (% Value)

96. Blasting agents and oxidizers
SALIENT STATISTICS OF INDUSTRIAL EXPLOSIVES AND BLASTING - AGENTS SOLD FOR CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
(Metric tons)
Class
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Permissibles
990
1.020
1.470
1.440
2.400
Other high explosives
22.600
21.900
31.400
32.900
35.700
Blasting agents and oxidizers
Total

97. (Thousand metric tons)
ESTIMATED INDUSTRIAL EXPLOSIVES AND BLASTING AGENTS SOLD FOR CONSUMPTION IN HE UNITED STATES, BY CLASS AND USE 2014
(Thousand metric tons)
Coal
Quarrying and
Metal
Construction
All other
Class
mining
nonmetal mining
work
purposes
Total
Permissibles 2
(3) --
Other high explosives 4 12 1 19 36
2.050
343
270
354 80
3.100

98. Topic no. 9 of the Agenda
Any other Business?

99. 10. Date and Place of the next Meeting
Tuesday, 20 March 2017
Hotel Manos Premier
Chaussée de Charleroi ,
1060 Brussels - Sint-Gillis,
Belgium

100. Closure of the Meeting

101. Thank you for your attention