1. Improving Reliability of Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems
Eric Lazarus
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

2. Brennan Center for Justice
Pro-DRE
Pre-DRE technology has huge error rates
Accessibility
No time to wait for security
Easier to count electrons
Adding paper will
Not add security
Make the system less trusted by the public
Add cost and complexity
These systems are not worse than older technology
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

3. Brennan Center for Justice
Anti-DRE
You cant trust computers
You cannot test them
You cannot reliably inspect them
The current generation is not architected for verifiability or security
It would not be hard to do better with crypto, paper ballots, etc. (Study AutoMark!)
Small conspiracy theory
Bathtub problem
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

4. Anti-DRE: Points of Vulnerability
Software Developed (Very High)
Terminal Built (High)
Software “Built” (Very High)
Terminal Shipped (High)
Software Certified (Low)
Terminal Stored (High)
Software Shipped (High)
Terminal Software Refreshed (Very High)
Terminal Tested (Low)
Each technology is different but there are big vulnerabilities at each stage of the process which are not addressed.
Ratings reflect my concern areas.
Terminal Shipped to Polling Place (High)
Terminal Stored at Polling Place (Medium)
Terminal Setup at Polling Place (Medium)
Terminal Setup at Polling Place (Medium)
Polling (Medium)
Poll Closing (Low)
Votes Transmitted (High)
Votes Tallied (Medium)
Tallies Transmitted (Low)
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

5. Pro-DRE: The real problems are…
Voter Registered
Voter Roll Maintained
Roll Manipulation
Voter Informed of Voting Location
Intimidation
Voter Checked In
Vote Recorded
Ballot Box Stuffing
Vote Tallied
Result Reported
Results Audited
Result Certified
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

6. Assessment of arguments?
Which have merit?
Which don’t?
How do we create public trust given the debate?
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

7. Election Practices Report Card
What do you like?
What do you not like?
What is confusing?
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

8. BC Neutral on DRE/VVPT Question
Assuming that you are using DRE machines, what can you do?
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

9. Brennan Center for Justice
Project Goals
Bring together the civil rights and computer security community
Develop recommendations that would improve the situation – 2004 only
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

10. Brennan Center for Justice
Recommendations
Independent security team
Assessment cover
Hardware Design
Hardware/Firmware Configuration
Software Design
Software Configuration
Election Procedures
Physical Security
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

11. Brennan Center for Justice
Recommendations
Implement the critical recommendations
Provide thorough training
Parallel testing
Permanent independent technology panel
Standard audit procedures to verify correct operation and uncover security breaches
Incident reporting
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

12. Brennan Center for Justice
Recommendations for 2004
Not bad idea for 2006…
We hope that we can exceed this standard
FOR MORE INFO...
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

13. Best thing that can be done
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

14. Brennan Center for Justice
Outside Expert
Engaged an expert in computer security
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

15. Pre-Election Logic & Accuracy Testing
User interface testing!
Automatic self-test scripts
Test audio and other accessibility interfaces.
Test all ballot positions in all languages.
Test intensively by hand some machines in a realistically simulated election
Explain all pre-election testing to those who have come to observe
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

16. Brennan Center for Justice
Parallel testing
“Parallel testing” during Election Day, simulating a real election (poll opening, voting, and poll closing) on a few machines randomly selected from polling places on Election Day.
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

17. Brennan Center for Justice
Seals
Seal with numbered tamper-evident seals and log all physical (paper and electronic) polling place records; then check and log seal numbers when received from polling place.
Logged, numbered, tamper-evident seals to prevent use of the voting machines between the time they pass pre-election testing and the poll-opening process.
Machine has a unique secure key/password.
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

18. Incident Handling and Reporting
Keep sufficient paper ballots on hand at each polling place to ensure no voter is turned away due to system failures.
Forward incident reports to the responsible state official(s) and to the Federal Election Commission or to the Election Assistance Commission.
Incident reports available to news media and the public
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

19. Brennan Center for Justice
Questions?
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice

20. Interesting things to discuss
What do poll watchers need to know?
How do we apply the BC recommendations at this point?
Tricks for dry run of the election
9/18/2018
Brennan Center for Justice