1. “The value of measuring Technical Support contribution to Aviation Safety”By
“Phumie” Phumelele Nomtshongwana
Engineering Technician (ATNS)
© Nomtshongwana Phumelele

2. AFRICAN PROVERB
“For as long as the Lion’s story is told by the Hunters, the real story might never be known! ! !”

3. To prevent accidents and preserve life. For WHO?
AVIATION SAFETY:
For WHAT?
To prevent accidents and preserve life.
For WHO?
Aircrafts?
Personnel:
Flight crew; Passengers; Ground Staff; Aircraft Maintenance Technician/Engineers; …?
Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP):
ATC?
Technical Support?
WHY?

4. Quotes: Lord Kelvin "If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it.“
“When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be.”
"If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it.“
"To measure is to know.“

5. What is measured: Availability Maintainability
Reliability
Availability
Maintainability
Availability, in essence, is a simple function of Reliability and Maintainability
Derived from safety strategies

6. AT WHAT COST TO AVIATION SAFETY?
Availability:
The performance and effectiveness of Systems (Equipment) is measured solely on achieved Availability (Aa)
A= T[Uptime] T Uptime +T[Downtime]
Required Average = 99.80% (Achieved!)
= (17 Hours down/year)
Max = 99.98%
= (1,75 Hours down/year)
AT WHAT COST TO AVIATION SAFETY?
(Achieved!)

7. Availability: Challenges
Redundancy crux
One channel being available CANNOT possibly have the same RISK FACTOR as both channels being available; e.g. Instrument Landing System (ILS)

8. Availability: Challenges
Apart from probability of failure (Pf) and (Aa), consequences of failure is also very important.

9. Consequence of failure:
Risk and Risk perception
SUBJECTIVITY
Eric Hollnagel (2014)

10. “The Butterfly Effect:”
Interdependencies:
“The Butterfly Effect:”
Small catalytic events that are separated by distance and time can be the cause of significant changes in complex systems. 

11. Interdependencies: Systems Approach. Look at the bigger picture
Understand the interdependence of objects and their attributes
Complex wholes are made up of smaller subsystems
VOR/DME Approach! ! !

12. © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele
Dealing with Safety :
AVIATION SAFETY SYSTEM
ETC. / OTHER
CNS
(SAFETY SYSTEM)
Air Craft IN
OUT
SAWS
PILOT
ATC
Interdependency
© Nomtshongwana Phumelele

13. Dealing with Safety :
These interactions are not simple, linear cause and effect relations, but complex networks of interdependencies.
For us to have impacting results, we need to cultivate critical systems thinking!
When confronted with a problem, we should not only look at one part of it, but should, instead, look at the whole/bigger picture.

14. © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele
Swiss Cheese Model:
© Nomtshongwana Phumelele

15. © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele
Swiss Cheese Model:
© Nomtshongwana Phumelele

16. Fallacy w.r.t. Safety:
The greatest FALLACY when dealing with safety issues is the assumption that GROUPTHINK does not take place.

17. Fallacy w.r.t. Safety: Groupthink:
“psychological phenomenon that occurs within a group of people, in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional decision-making outcome.
Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints, by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves from outside influences”
Acceptance of obviously wrong answers simply because it is socially painful to disagree.

18. Weighted Aggregative Safety Index!
The Way Forward:
CALCULATE Technical Support SAFETY RISK
HOW?
Weighted Aggregative Safety Index!
© Nomtshongwana Phumelele

19. © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele
Points to consider (WASI):
Redundancy of equipment
Relation or Interdependence between equipment
VOR/DME
Type of ATC operations
Procedural backed by Radar
Approach or En-route VOR
Level of busyness (Traffic Volume)
Low ( movements/hour)
Medium ( movements/hour)
High (= > 35 movements/hour)
© Nomtshongwana Phumelele

20. © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele
Points to consider (WASI):
Serious consultation is required to achieve a proper matrix!
There is absolutely NO WAYS that an individual can create such; it should be a consultative team effort!
© Nomtshongwana Phumelele

21. © 2015-2016 Nomtshongwana Phumelele
Where to start:
Demystify Risk!
HOW?
Understand ATC perception of Risk in relation to CNS equipment failure.
Level the playing fields.
© Nomtshongwana Phumelele

22. Implications:
Enhanced aviation safety; globally
Create awareness
Spins offs into other critical equipment industries like health care.
Review of maintenance strategies

23. LET US TALK. . .