1. Introduction to IATG
C2 Slide 1

2. Origins of IATG 2008 – Report to UN General Assembly
Problems arising from accumulation of (surplus) conventional ammunition stockpiles
A need for effective stockpile management
Experts’ Recommendation: UN to develop technical guidelines
“Saferguard” programme (within the UN) developed “IATG” document set
INTRODUCTION TO IATG: (4 slides, 11 minutes)
SLIDE 1 of 4: ORIGINS OF IATG (2 min 30 sec)
In 2008, a United Nations group of governmental experts reported to the UN General Assembly on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus.
The group noted a need for effective stockpile management measures ranging from accounting systems to physical security measures. This included surveillance and testing procedures to assess the stability and reliability of ammunition.
A central recommendation was that the UN should develop technical guidelines for the management of ammunition stockpiles.
A program within the UN called "Saferguard" then developed ‘technical guidelines for the stockpile management of conventional ammunition’. These are now commonly known as International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG).
To note specifically here - IATG is a document set, rather than an organisation or IT tool for example.
The latest version of the IATG document set can be found online on the website for the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. The documents are regularly reviewed by Saferguard to incorporate developments in international legislation and regulation, as well as norms and practices.
(The website is:

3. The Challenge INTRODUCTION TO IATG: (4 slides, 11 minutes)
SLIDE 2 of 4: THE CHALLENGE (3 min)
It is the prerogative of each State to determine the system of stockpile management that is most suited for its national defence and security purposes.
However there has been a growing concern within the international community because poor ammunition stockpile management can potentially lead to (1) accidents which may have an impact on social and economic development within developing nations; and (2) significant cross-border consequences of poorly managed stockpiles if this leads to cross-border arms shipments.
Inadequately managed conventional ammunition stockpiles pose a risk. We will look at this over the course, however it is obvious that ammunition, by its nature, poses a hazard - an explosive safety hazard - given some sorts of stimulus. To develop this thinking - a fire in a building might cause a temperature rise that causes a shell to explode unintentionally. This hazard would be highly likely to kill anyone by that building at the time. This risk must be seen as undesirable, to say the least. If the effect is magnified such that sympathetic detonation occurs within an entire stockpile, this may cause significant damage to national infrastructure and housing, as well as death, mass casualties and destruction of the livelihoods of those in the affected community. This is especially true of residential areas if these are close to the depot. There have been numerous ammunition depot incidents each year in recent history. Examples of recent significant ammunition depot incidents include the explosion of seized munitions in Cyprus, and the ammo depot at Brazzaville in The Congo. In addition to the immediate human suffering, such explosions can have terrible effects on the environment.
In those States with limited means to finance the technically challenging clean-up costs, local populations, especially children, are all too often exposed to the risk of injury or death due to the explosive ordnance that tends to litter large areas for extended periods of time after the explosion. In addition, there may be environmental risk posed by the prolonged burning of chemical materials that are contained in items of ammunition, or indeed within the fabric of the explosive storehouses that did exist. There may be contamination of the land and water supplies as well.
Ammunition diverted from national stockpiles can find its way into civil wars, insurgencies, terrorism, crime and other armed violence, thus fuelling national and regional instability and threatening the security of States. This is clearly undesirable on a national and international level. This largely a matter of physical security and stock keeping. These respectively, in simple terms, aim to limit the likelihood of items being taken in the first place, and secondly to identify if there is a problem of theft of items. This stock keeping and management may help to identify both a systematic ‘trickle’ of repeated small scales, and also perhaps larger, single events where many items may be removed in one go.
The photos on the left: Paracin ammo depot explosion, Serbia.

4. Conventional Ammunition Stockpile Management
Main areas of activity:
Ammunition storage
Ammunition processing, inspection, surveillance, proof, maintenance and repair
Ammunition accounting
Ammunition demilitarization or destruction
Security of ammunition stockpiles
Transport of ammunition
INTRODUCTION TO IATG: (4 slides, 11 minutes)
SLIDE 3 of 4: STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT (2 min 30 sec)
The term ‘stockpile management’ refers to those procedures and activities regarding the safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation, handling and disposal of conventional ammunition.
Conventional ammunition stockpile management comprises six complementary groups of activities:
a) ammunition storage;
b) ammunition processing,4 maintenance and repair;
c) ammunition accounting;
d) ammunition demilitarization or destruction;
e) security of ammunition stockpiles; and
f) transport of ammunition.
And a number of other enabling activities are required to support these six components of stockpile management, including:
a) risk assessment and planning,
b) allocation of resources,
c) information management,
d) human skills development and management training,
e) quality management,
f) the selection and use of effective, appropriate and safe equipment.

5. IATG = a framework = flexibility = graduated plan = pragmatic solution
How IATG Helps
“To reduce the hazard to local communities from unplanned explosive events and to negate the risks to wider communities posed by the uncontrolled proliferation of ammunition”
Low funding availability to State
INTRODUCTION TO IATG: (4 slides, 11 minutes)
SLIDE 4 of 4: HOW IATG HELPS (3 min)
IATG clearly articulates the objective of conventional ammunition stockpile management as being “To reduce the hazard to local communities from unplanned explosive events and to negate the risks to wider communities posed by the uncontrolled proliferation of ammunition”.
Ammunition stockpile management is a complex technical area that require specialist management to ensure safety and security - this can be expensive. Some states may not have adequate funding to meet all of the possible stockpile management standards.
A more pragmatic approach is needed, rather than dictate exactly what must be done.
The better solution is to have a way of developing a graduated response, within an integrated risk management process.
The IATG provide a suitable framework of guidelines to facilitate such a graduated response.
IATG are not themselves SOPs. They do not define the detailed way in which conventional stockpile management requirements are to be achieved by States - that should be covered in national and local SOPs, rules, instructions and codes of practice. They provide a frame of reference, which encourages national Authorities responsible for conventional ammunition stockpile management to achieve and demonstrate effective levels of safety and security. They provide a common language.
Solutions can then be developed on a site-specific basis (or entity-specific or whatever) which are tailored, relevant and proportionate to that situation and location, both in terms of explosive safety and the socio-political state of affairs.
Pragmatism has to be a watch-word in these cases, notwithstanding the fact that the top level goal is to improve safety and security of the stockpile to an adequate, tolerable level.
IATG = a framework = flexibility = graduated plan = pragmatic solution
Complex, expensive task to establish full system for stockpile management

6. IATG’s Guiding Principles
National responsibilities and obligations
Explosive safety
Capacity building
Other international guidelines, regulations and guides
THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES: (5 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 1 of 5: OVERVIEW OF THESE GUIDING PRINCIPLES (2 min)
Guiding principles are necessary to allow IATG to provide a path to follow, but which allow that path to remain within the anticipated and expected direction and boundaries – to ensure that the solutions are likely to contribute successfully to reducing the risk of poorly managed stockpiles.
IATG clearly articulates its guiding principles, and these are as follows:
a) National responsibilities and obligations
b) Explosive safety
c) Capacity building
d) Other international guidelines, regulations and guides
We will now look at these in a little more detail…

7. IATG’s Guiding Principles
National responsibilities and obligations
THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES: (5 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 2 of 5: NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS (3 min)
The first of these is “National Responsibilities and Obligations.”
The primary responsibility for conventional ammunition stockpile management shall rest with the Government of the state holding the ammunition.
In the case of a State developing its own stockpile management system, for example:
This responsibility should normally be vested in an authority, which is charged with the regulation, management and coordination of conventional ammunition stockpile management.
This national authority shall be responsible for establishing the national and local conditions that enable the effective management of conventional ammunition. It is ultimately responsible for all phases and all facets of the stockpile management processes within its national boundaries, including the development of national standards, SOPs and instructions.
In the case of a nation deploying troops abroad as part of a UN contingent:
Obviously those deployed troops need to have their own ammunition management Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The activities required for deploying abroad should be enshrined within the State's national ammunition management regulations. For example, this may take the part of a document of two halves - the first half for domestic management at home, and the second half for management abroad on deployed operations. The IATG may well be a useful template and foundation for the nation to develop its regulations for deployed operations.
Photo courtesy of Rob Hart

8. IATG’s Guiding Principles
Explosive safety
THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES: (5 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 3 of 5: EXPLOSIVE SAFETY (3 min)
The second Guiding Principle is “Explosive Safety.”
The accumulation of conventional ammunition presents inherent risk to local communities. This risk may ultimately mean, in real terms, death and destruction of large areas of a city. This risk is likely to arise from hazards within the ammunition storage areas. These hazards - which are most likely to manifest themselves as a an unplanned explosive event within an ammunition storage area - need to be reduced as far as practicably possible. This means taking measures to reduce the probability of something untoward happening in the first place, and also reducing the likely actual effects if something does still happen.
Let us briefly consider the proper definition of risk, particularly in a safety management perspective:
Risk may be seen simply as the combination of: the probability of an undesirable event occurring, combined with the severity (or scale, or magnitude, or whatever). This leads to a consequence.
The consequence could be, for example, death of a single civilian who isn’t associated with the state ammunition depot located net to his block of flats.
The risk will be derived from a hazard, which in this case for example may be a shell exploding in a storage building. Of course this doesn’t ‘just happen’ – there needs to be some root cause as to why the shell might explode. This could be thermal stress on the explosive filling or the propellant in a fixed cartridge case, for example.
The probability is the likelihood of this event occurring. For example, thermal stress causing unplanned detonation of a shell may be highly unlikely if the shell is new and it is stored in a climate-controlled, purpose built storage facility. However, it may be entirely likely (and indeed perhaps expected) – that is to say, more probable - that the propellant may explode if it is in a fixed cartridge case, left in the open sun and cold nights, for 20 years with no protection from the environmental effects and no surveillance to monitor the stabiliser levels in the propellant itself.
The severity will be the likely effects on the likely ‘receptors’. These receptors may be the fabric of the ammunition depot itself, the fabric of the surrounding residential areas, or people – which may be sub-divided into associated personnel (ie the troops and staff who form the workforce of the depot), and non-associated personnel who have nothing to do with the facility – in the example just mentioned this could be the civilian population living close to the depot.
The risk is derived through the process of safety management – this is a specialist area which has at its heart a Hazard Log – from which hazards and risks can be identified, and appropriate measures considered and then implemented to reduce the risk. In the hazard log, this takes the form of reducing numbers in columns, but in real life this equates to reducing the real risk – is improving the explosive safety – to the people and assets around the ammunition storage site.
Lagos, Nigeria, 2002
© A C Welch

9. IATG’s Guiding Principles
Capacity Building
THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES: (5 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 4 of 5: CAPACITY BUILDING (2 min)
The third Guiding Principle is “Capacity Building.”
Some countries may have a limited national capacity to effectively and safely manage conventional ammunition stockpiles.
Development of an indigenous capacity should be key to long-term stockpile safety and security.
Capacity development is the process by which individuals, institutions and societies (individually and collectively) perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives.
This requires a cultural commitment, starting at the very highest levels. The State's leadership and management, be that a prime minister or president, and his or her parliament or whatever, must commit to getting the issue right. Leadership from the top is key. It shows a commitment to the cause and gives direction and gravitas to the task in hand.
At the national level an indigenous capacity is characterised by a state's ability and willingness to develop and articulate stockpile management policy and direction. However the culture and process must go beyond what may become simply a paperwork exercise to develop some documentation.
It also about a state's ability and intent to actually plan, coordinate, manage and sustain a safe, secure and effective conventional ammunition stockpile management programme. This includes the technical capability to develop, maintain and apply appropriate national standards for conventional ammunition stockpile management.
Developing States, which may have limited financial and technical resources, may not be able to initially achieve a minimum standard of safe, efficient and effective ammunition stockpile management using just their own resources. The UN and other such donors may take initiatives to mobilize resources to support such States.

10. IATG’s Guiding Principles
Other international guidelines, regulations and guides include:
International Labour Organization (ILO) - safety in the workplace
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) - risk management (ISO Guide 51)
Quality management systems (ISO 9001:2008 series)
Environmental management systems (ISO 14001:2004)
International protocols for the classification and transport of conventional ammunition
THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES: (5 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 5 of 5: OTHER INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, REGULATIONS AND GUIDES (2 min)
The fourth Guiding Principle is “Other international guidelines, regulations and guides.”
The IATG document set is written to be consistent with international guidelines, and to comply with international regulations, conventions and treaties.
The main ‘top level’ guidelines, precedents and norms that exist at international level include:
The International Labour Organization (ILO) for safety in the workplace
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) which provides guidance on risk management (ISO Guide 51)
Quality management systems (ISO 9001:2008 series)
Environmental management systems (ISO 14001:2004)
International protocols for the classification and transport of conventional ammunition

11. The Framework of IATG IATG – a document set
IATG structured to provide a logical framework for its content
More detail on specific areas
General, top level subjects
More detail on specific areas
THE FRAMEWORK OF IATG: (6 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 1 of 6: GENERAL STRUCTURE (1 min)
The IATG document set is structured to provide a logical layout for the wealth of information that it contains.
This is achieved by dividing the subject matter into top-level “Generic Areas”. Examples of these generic areas include “Ammunition Accounting” and “Security of Ammunition”.
Each generic area is then sub-divided into more specific sub-sections. These are called “Individual Guides”, or “Individual Guidelines”.
Examples of the Individual Guides within the generic area of “Ammunition Accounting” include “Inventory Management” and “Lotting and Batching”.
More detail on specific areas

12. IATG – Generic Areas THE FRAMEWORK OF IATG: (6 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 2 of 6: GENERIC AREAS (1 min)
The Generic Areas are shown on the slide. You can also read these on your hand-out for this lesson.
These are fairly self-explanatory. Take a few seconds to look over these…

13. IATG – Individual Guides
THE FRAMEWORK OF IATG: (6 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 3 of 6: INDIVIDUAL GUIDES (2 min)
You will have seen, by looking at your hand-outs, that there are numerous individual guides within each generic area.
In the example on the screen, Volume “03” is about the generic subject of “Ammunition Accounting”. Within this wide-ranging topic, there are a number of more specific areas that benefit from more detailed, discrete explanation. So these are numbered 03.10, 03.20, and so on, to show that they are sub-divisions of the overall “03” area. The contents column gives an indication of the detail covered therein.
This will be especially important to you as you become familiar with IATG. As you get to know the documents and this table in particular, you will be able to quickly and efficiently find exactly where, within this extensive document set, you will find the area of information you are looking for.

14. Example Generic area and sub-level guides
THE FRAMEWORK OF IATG: (6 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 4 of 6: EXAMPLE: GENERIC AREA AND SUB-LEVEL GUIDES (2 min)
Let us imagine you have been tasked with helping to draw up some guidelines for ammunition management. You are to use IATG as the basis for developing this document. The nation has little finance and you need to prioritise the effort, so it can be applied in an incremental way. The biggest problem facing the state, in the immediate term, is that of petty theft by locals from a weapons cache in a remote, rural area.
Now, take a minute, and by yourselves consider:
Where, within the IATG, might you first focus significant effort?
How might this relate to the Guiding Principles?
Which parts might you look to, in order to get a general feel for the topic?
Do you think there might be scope to prioritise effort within the individual guides?
How about if you knew there were plenty of security staff to call upon but little money for investment in technological improvements?
After a minute or so, get the class to engage in discussion on this matter.
(Note to the instructor: The key messages to get across here are that IATG is a document set, and to get the students to become comfortable with the structure).

15. Ascending Level of Detail of Guides
THE FRAMEWORK OF IATG: (6 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 5 of 6: ASCENDING LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THE GUIDES (4 min)
Where appropriate, individual guides will be divided into levels of ascending comprehensiveness.
The first level offers the most expedient ways to apply the basic principles of safe and secure ammunition management.
Subsequent levels will detail progressive measures that can be taken to improve management of the stockpile in the area in question.
This offers a way to progressively reduce risk - through an incremental approach. This is obviously in line with the overall method of application of the IATG that we have already covered.
Technical drawings and diagrams will be included.
Each level may feature statistics to indicate how much risk might be reduced by following the guidelines. This uses a qualitative or quantitative risk assessment (QRA) methodology.
For example:
In Volume 03:10 – “Inventory Management”, the document is written as most technical documents on such matter might be written. It follows a logical sequence to present the information in an accessible way. It looks like many other documents of this type. However, there is red text next to paragraph heading (both in the contents page and the main body of the text), which states Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3.
The extract on the screen is from Volume 03:10, Inventory Management, and shows part of the contents page, specifically Chapter 14 which is about ammunition accounting. The levels suggest to you that, for example, using ‘stack tally cards’ and a ‘stocktaking and audit’ regime offers a relatively simple, easy method that should have a significant effect on improving even the most shoddily managed ammunition storage area. However, the text suggests that implementation of “ammunition accounting requirements” may be relatively easy to make a start, but may get somewhat more complex and or expensive if a more technological approach is deemed necessary.
Some other paragraphs cover activity that may be even more difficult to implement again, and these are shown as “Level 3”.
The levels go from Level 1 to Level 3, with 1 obviously being the most easy to implement, relatively speaking.
THESE LEVELS ARE KNOWN AS “RISK REDUCTION PROCESS LEVELS”
Risk Reduction Process Levels (RRPL)

16. Integrated Risk and Quality Management System
IATG is itself an integrated risk and quality management system
National Authorities should still develop their own specific systems for stockpile management
A guide for use of risk management:
IATG – Introduction to Risk Management Principles
THE FRAMEWORK OF IATG: (6 slides, 12 minutes)
SLIDE 6 of 6: INTEGRATED RISK AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (2 min)
IATG have been developed in line with the recommendations and processes contained within the ISO quality management systems (ISO 9001:2008) and the ISO risk management system (ISO Guide 51).
Elements of these systems are contained within the majority of IATG, thereby making the IATG themselves an integrated risk and quality management system. There is still a requirement, however, for national authorities to develop their own specific individual risk and quality management systems for the stockpile management of conventional ammunition.
A guide to the use of risk management in IATG is contained at IATG Introduction to risk management principles.

17. Integrated Risk and Quality Management System
The ISO organisation
ISO definitions
ISO management systems
Need for national authorities to develop integral systems
Review of IATG
INTEGRATED RISK AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:
SLIDE 1 of 1: INTEGRATED RISK AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (2 min)
To develop the topic of Integrated Risk and Quality Management Systems a little further:
Firstly, the International Standard for Organisation, or "ISO", is an international standard-setting body composed of representatives from various national standards organizations. Founded in 1947, the organization promulgates worldwide proprietary, industrial, and commercial standards. It has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. For example, there is the ISO standard for quality management systems. You will have heard of ISO containers for freight shipping. They cover many, many other things beside such as photography standards, pipeline standards for aircraft, and acoustics for musical pitch.
The IATG documents use ISO definitions. These are clearly defined and understood definitions, as per ISO definitions. The purpose of using these words is to ensure that there is as little ambiguity as possible when interpreting the documentation. The definitions are clearly articulated at the beginning of each guide.
ISO management systems are internationally used systems, ISO quality management system and ISO risk management system. This has already been covered, but you will appreciate now that these are reputable standards that are used and recognised worldwide.
We have already seen that IATG forms a suitable framework for guidelines for developing stack management of ammunition and weapons. It is important to note, however, that nations should develop their own risk and quality management systems (probably based on relevant ISO standards) and their own ammunition stockpile management standards (probably base don IATG). These systems should be integral to managing their military and/or paramilitary forces, and should be integral to managing their nations – it should be a component part of the leadership’s ‘state-craft’.
Finally – the global situation, and the management of ammunition and weapons as well – is an ever evolving process. There will be improvements and ‘lessons learned’ that will mean changes are made to legislation, guidance, societal norms and due process. IATG needs to be able to accommodate such developments. As such the IATG document set is reviewed, as routine, every 5 years. Of course, if there are essential changes to be made in the interim, then the documents will be reviewed and amended accordingly on an ad-hoc basis. This may especially be the case if there are changes required in term of operational safety and efficiency.

18. Questions? Are there any questions? (allow 5 minutes for questions)
If there are no questions, test their understanding about asking about ISO, Risk Reduction Process Levels, and the structure of the IATG document set. C
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