1. Brandt, Nat. Chicago Death Trap: The Iroquois Theatre Fire of 1903
Brandt, Nat. Chicago Death Trap: The Iroquois Theatre Fire of Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003.

2. Built fall 1903
Opened November 23
Capacity 1724
State and Randolph Streets
Fire: December 30, 1903

4. December 30, matinee:
1724 in seats
200 standing
300 performers
200 stage crew
Total: near 2300

5. 150 performers
1600 costumes
3000 sq yards of fabric in curtains
8000 sq feet of white pine for scenery

8. “gates of death”

10. 602
Aged 2 to 76

12. Chicago Times, February 13,1875
Theaters of the period were “crammed with inflammable materials that a fire once started in them would in an incredibly short period gain such headway that nothing under heaven could check its mad and devouring career.”
Chicago Times, February 13,1875
“It was every man for himself.”
Several men “fought like maniacs to reach the exits.”
“It had taken TWO MINUTES from the moment of the first spark from the arc light until all the upper scenery was in flames. THREE OR FOUR MINUTES later, the loft above the stage was completely filled with fire and smoke. Trapped inside the theater, members of the audience began suffocating within FIVE MINUTES from the first spark. The initial fire alarm had not even been turned in by then. When it was, the response was prompt for those horse-drawn days. Firefighters were on the scene within minutes However, whether TWO MINUTES OR FIVE was moot. By then, most of the victims had already suffocated” (70-71).

13. Human Nature
Architect/Owner/Manager/Staff/ Fire Codes/City Inspectors/Actors/ Victims

14. Blame the victims’ panic:
“It was, despite all the details of what happened that came out over the next days, a textbook case of denial” (97).
Mayor Carter Harrison as violations added up:
“[T]here would have been no panic if the apparatus in this theatre, which, judged by all ordinary standards, was the best equipped playhouse in the city, had been in proper working condition” (102).
“It was a disaster waiting to happen. So many things were wrong with the theater, so many ordinances ignored, so little attention paid to the basics of crowd control and fire prevention, that fixing responsibility for who was to blame would become a labyrinth of recriminations. It is difficult to point one’s finger at any one thing or at any one person. Everything and everyone were at fault” (103).

15. Patrons’ panic? Emergency skylights clamped shut.
No functioning ventilators to remove flames and fumes.
Asbestos stage curtain could not lower completely.
Single thickness asbestos curtain.
Opened stage door admitted blast of air.
Lights went out.
No exit signs.
No indicators of directions to exist or ushers (teenagers) for guidance.
Doors locked.
No sprinkler system.
Water system not completed so no water or hoses.
No water pails, portable fire extinguishers, or hand pumps on stage.
Required alarm callboxes not installed.
No hooks to pull down flaming scenery.
No axes to break open doors.
Hall blocked by locked accordion gates.
Heavy damask curtains hung over exit doors.
Difficult to unlock bascule locks.
(Only one usher knew how to open the locks.)
Ushers/crew/stagehands had no training for fires.
Single entrance.
Projecting balconies.
Patrons’ panic?

17. “How could the theater with so many deficiencies open” (114).
“How does one explain the complete lack of attention to even the most basic fire laws? Simply benign neglect? Hubris on everyone’s part? Most likely it was just a matter of business-as-usual” (108).

18. Plus -- reforms in Chicago and elsewhere:
“It is safe to say that never before or since has a fire inspired so many different inquiries, official, legal, and private” (122).
Plus -- reforms in Chicago and elsewhere:
Wider aisles and hallways
Balconies with separate entrances/exits
More space between rows of seats
Open areas outside of theater
Outward opening doors
No more than 6 seats between a seat and an aisle
No exit obscured by draperies or locked when public present
Signs indicating direction to exits
Scenery treated with “non-flammable” solution/paint
Flues/vents controlled by closed circuit battery and switches
Strict inspections