1. Henning Schulzrinne Stephen McCann Gabor Bajko Hannes Tschofenig
Extensions to the Emergency Services Architecture for dealing with Unauthenticated and Unauthorized Devices
Henning Schulzrinne
Stephen McCann
Gabor Bajko
Hannes Tschofenig
March 2009 (IETF 74)
IETF - ECRIT

2. Scenario classification
No access authorization (NAA)
e.g., for-pay WiFi or corporate networks
most challenging
No VoIP provider (NVP)
should work without additional standards
ISP needs to provide LoST DHCP entry
limited fraud without PSTN bridging
Zero-balance VoIP provider (ZBP)
March 2009 (IETF 74)
IETF - ECRIT

3. NAA case ≈ provide restricted Internet connectivity Assumptions:
already common for hotel and airport WiFi providers
Assumptions:
provide fraud-proof emergency-only communications
More difficult for emergency case:
LoST server unknown unless provided by ISP
PSTN media addresses unknown
need to provide SIP outbound proxy (with record-routing)
update media firewall
March 2009 (IETF 74)
IETF - ECRIT

4. NAA cases “just stay off my lawn”
Allow “external” Internet connectivity
“just stay off my lawn”
“leave me alone”
No ECRIT infrastructure
(except LIS?)
engaged
Provide LIS, LoST and SIP outbound proxy
March 2009 (IETF 74)
IETF - ECRIT

5. TBD Is there a need? Problem description? Adopt as WG item?
Guidance to local regulators?
Can we restrict the problem?
E.g., corporate case may have simpler solutions since fraud is not a concern  SSID for external access only
Problem description?
Adopt as WG item?
March 2009 (IETF 74)
IETF - ECRIT