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Ali Galip Bayrak EPFL, Switzerland June 7th, 2011

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1 Ali Galip Bayrak EPFL, Switzerland June 7th, 2011
A First Step Towards Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures Ali Galip Bayrak EPFL, Switzerland June 7th, 2011 and Francesco Regazzoni (UCL and Alari) Philip Brisk (UC Riverside, USA) François-Xavier Standaert (UCL, Belgium) Paolo Ienne (EPFL, Switzerland)

2 Side-Channel Attacks Cryptographic Algorithm Plaintext Ciphertext
(e.g., “Encrypt me”) Ciphertext (e.g., “aB14t752s”) Secret Key (e.g., “I’m unknown”) Leakage (power consumption, EM radiation, timing etc.) 2

3 Power Analysis Attacks
3

4 They are handled manually!!!
Motivation PROBLEM: They are handled manually!!! VS ATTACK! COUNTERMEASURE! Software Implementation Analyze the algorithm Determine the weaknesses Apply the countermeasure Protected Implementation 4

5 Automatic Protection Flow
5

6 Step I: Information Leakage Analysis
Normalized Mutual Information of Key and Leakage Main point: Determine the leaking parts of the software!

7 Step II: Transformation Target Identification
Local Modifications: Protect each sensitive instruction (peephole optimization). Random Precharging (used here) Global Modifications: Protect all the nodes between two sensitive nodes. Masking sbci r28,0xfd ld r25,r28:r29 movw r18,r26 subi r18,0x4f sbci r19,0xfd movw r28,r18 ld r30,r28:r29 Main point: Determine the portions of the implementation that need to be protected!

8 Step III: Code Transformation
sbci r28,0xfd ld r25,r28:r29 movw r18,r26 subi r18,0x4f sbci r19,0xfd movw r28,r18 ld r30,r28:r29 sbci r28,0xfd lds r25,rnd mov r24,r25 ld r25,r28:r29 movw r18,r26 subi r18,0x4f Main point: Apply the given protection on the determined portions of the implementation!

9 Experimental Results (Security)
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is used. Traces are collected from board with 8-bit AVR MCU. Correlation-based DPA attack is used for attack. ρ = 0.437 ρ = 0.048 Correlation values for unprotected and protected implementations are shown. Number of necessary traces to mount a successful attack increases over 76 times. 9

10 Experimental Results (Performance)
# of clock cycles during the execution of three different implementations 4212 100% 2700 64% 1190 10

11 Conclusions Software Implementation Protected Implementation
AUTOMATIC PROTECTION Software Implementation Protected Implementation Off-the-Shelf Compiler AP Security-Aware Compiler security vs. performance vs. energy etc. 11


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