1. U.S-China: Anti-access warfare(A2AD)

2. Previously: Three sources of the Hard Power
Military
Politics
Economics
・Actors
>U.S
>Japan
>Russia
>China
・Focus
>Technological innovations!

3. Now: Focus on the Military domain
Politics
Economics
Actors: U.S and China
Military domain as a primary field of investigation= Anti- Access warfare
Economics and Politics as secondary focus
Technological innovations are crucial, but…

4. Why Anti-access warfare?
Caplan(2014)=so called Findalization of East Asia
 National Intelligence Council (2012)= China and Russia are meddling with the current world order, but receive substantial benefits from it too
All out war is too costly, economic ties are too closely related 
However, it is important to note that state’s interests do change over time

5. Why Anti-access/Area-denial(A2AD) warfare?
China wants to deny U.S military’s access and operational capabilities at Taiwan straits, SCS, and ECS so that Beijing can have total control/operational superiority in these areas
China’s growing naval force and challenge to existing maritime order that U.S inherited from U.K
Peter Navarro (2015) =China’s doctrine of 9 dash line and 1st & 2nd island chain
U.S: Operation "Freedom of Navigation"

6. What determines the outcome of A2/AD?
According to Tangredi (2013) 
1.Strategic superiority + (operational jointness)
2.Geographical condition
3.Maritime domain or medium (Essentially a Geographical condition)
4.Infromation and intelligence (Very much in 1)
5.Extrinsic events (Cannot be asessed)
The thesis will investigate China’s asymmetric tactics (ASBM, ASAT, Cyber, Mines), and what are deemed crucial in fighting modern Anti-access warfare (C4ISR, Operational jointness)

7. Questions/Hypothesis
Hypothesis: U.S military still has tactical advantage over PLA (RAND, 2017)
Q1: Can China’s asymmetric warfare tactics (ASBM, ASAT, Cyber, Mines) overcome that performance gap?
Q2: How are the two actors look in field that is considered essential to A2AD (C4ISR, Operational joint-ness, Resilience to Attrition)
Q3: Is A2AD all about having better military? What are other decisive factors? Are there any loopholes?

8. ASAT (Anti-Satellite Weapons)
Space resources are crucial domain of achieving higher standard of ISR, but U.S has not committed itself enough in protecting its own/destroying opponent’s space asset (Tangredi, 2013)
However, it is reasonably assumed that if U.S wishes to acquire such capability, it can, because China can do it. Because U.S army is very much dependent on satellite communication, it does not want to accelerate ASAT arms race for now. 
China’s ASAT capability has many of its flaws and limitations, and U.S can/are substituting space assets with field based ISR modules, such as UAVs  (Sankaran, 2014)

9. ASBM (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles)
ASBM is already operational, though full sketches of its capability is still unknown
ASBM is considerably cheaper compared to what is set to destroy; Aircraft carriers, making U.S military actions too costly in terms of cons-benefit analysis (Navarro, 2014)
However, Chinese ASBM’s range and accuracy is questionable sine C4ISR capability of PLA is still prematured, with sensors and intelligence sharing system fractured to different departments. PLA’s vertically divided organization exacerbates this problem too. Nevertheless, at SCS, ground based radars and sensors are providing enhanced ISR and trajectory precision (Erikson, 2017)
For U.S and its allies, it is imperative to not to concede to China’s dodgy maritime territorial claims anymore to hinder the expansion of its web of radar. More islands and rocks China have, better solidified China’s surveillance web of military radars and better guided missiles in its arsenal. 

10. Cyber
Chinese hackings has stole schematics of state of the art equipments, including 5th generation fighter planes (Navarro, 2014)
Support from civilian sector enhancing power projection in cyberspace (Cordesman & Hess & Yarosh, 2013)
Though speculation is extremely difficult due to the nature of this domain, China seems to be heavily invested in cyber warfare as this is a sort of “blue ocean” that its rival does not have a established superiority

11. Underwater mines
125 million tons of Japanese ships were sunk by American underwater mines (Dunningan, 1988) > They are cheaper than torpedoes, and mine sweeping takes time and need controlled environments
About 80% of the U.S naval ships were sunk by mines after WWII (Navarro, 2015)
China could develop ”smart mines” that targets only preconfigured ships, and disperse them at near waters
Though U.S can make these weapons too, logistical and ideological hurdles makes it ineffective strategy
China has less to lose by using the weapon, but its credibility within the international community would be substantially damaged, goes against their Neo-Bismarkian strategy; its use will be circumstantially limited

12. C4ISR
Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
U.S still has massive edge in this field with its technological upper hand, and affluent experience of fighting multi-domain warfare all over the world
China is catching up, but still weak “system of systems” of coordinated command and control, intelligence gathering and sharing between different institutions
It’s C4ISR gears are still not as capable as the U.S, and state of the art sensors and radars are mostly foreign made (RAND, 2015)
Its defense industry suffers from nepotism, corruption, and bureaucratic fragmentation (RAND, 2015)
Institutional Integration is the key, which will be discussed in the “Operational jointness” section

13. Operational Joint-ness
Operational jointness = ability of different military services (Army, Navy, Air etc…) coordinating their operations at field (Situational awareness, infromation sharing, simultaneous attacks etc…)
U.S military’s "Cross-domain synergy" and "air-sea battle” (DOD,2012)
PLA’s "Integrated Joint Operation” (Chenung, 2014)
U.S has substantial experience of fighting post-RMA warfare after 1991, as well as one massive Counter Anti-Access warfare against Imperial Japan
PLA lacks experience, both in combat altogether and those that utilized high standard-jointness of different military services
China is trying to become a maritime power which, in its continental nature, something it never was before; bound to cause domestic political friction between the rising navy and the army, prevent them from achieving the desired level of jointness =Imperial Japanese army and navy had the same dynamics
Authoritarian political system makes integrating vertically separated organizations even harder

14. Resilience to “attrition”
U.S and, especially U.S allies, have adopted the doctrine of quality over quantity of its military strategy
But Anti-access warfare is essentially a battle of attrition between two political will (Tangled, 2013)
China’s slightly underdeveloped, but mass number of military personal, equipment seems to gain more advantage in winning, not necessarily tactical, but strategic battle of rendering opponents will
It was the sheer economic machine that produced more machines than Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan combined that led to victory in WWII and Pacific War
Most powerful tank in WWII was Tiger II, and most powerful fighter plane were Me262 of Luftwaffe. But Germany still lost to overwhelming size of the enemy 
Cyber and Space related technologies are crucial in today’s military operation. It must be noted, however, that technologies itself never a almighty solution in winning conflict. 

15. Geographical conditions
China has all of its mainland-based assets at disposal
U.S only has several bases, and logistically disadvantaged
Plus, those bases are always in sight of thousands of IRBMs from Chinese mainland (Navarro, 2014)
China already built artificial island at SCS, and while they are being disregarded as “be tactically removed at any time”, preemptive attacks destroying them will provoke warfare, which U.S won’t do. But if they don’t, the enhanced ASBM will deny U.S carriers’ access.  
Stepping back will cause domestic uprising= China won’t concede any sea-based territorial rights, however bogus they are
Geographically, China is much closer, and vital interests are entangled with SCS, ECS, Taiwan straits; Beijing’s commitment won’t wobble
U.S has no direct national security concern attached to the region, and becoming more introvert for various reasons; Washington’s commitment isn’t as strong as Beijing’s, thus more likely to make compromises

16. China’s ”Comprehensive power”
China’s anti-access tactics are beyond military approach
“Psychological warfare”, “Media warfare”, and “Legal warfare”
Efforts to discourage enemy’s motive/ alter their goal and interests
CCTV spreading Chinese narrative/fake news 
Diplomatic messages victimizing Beijing, bogus justifications of its territorial claim
Lesson of history: Germany’s naval expansion alerting British Empire = China is avoiding this scenario (Neo-Bismarkian strategy)
China might reshape how U.S perceives its national interests, making Washington disinterested in retaining influence at Asia, winning anti-access warfare without gunfire 
Whether that is “actually” in U.S’s interests, big powers can always sort out things between themselves
When that comes to pass, those who bear the highest diplomatic costs are U.S allies in the region

17. Economic prosperity
What are the domestic economic prospects of both countries?
Technological innovation is crucial in achieving economic growth=which country is better at that?
Chinese state-oriented, vertically integrated model vs. American Market oriented Horizontally distributed system
Japan’s rise was achieved through the likes of former system

18. Political Stability
Which country have more stable rule and maintain their political will necessary to fight the anti-access warfare?
Information control as an answer for politics in 21st century?
China’s domestic insurgency, and gap of wealth between coastline and inland
Over 500 protests, riots, mass demonstrations every single day in PRC  (Navarro, 2015)