1. Failure of Process / Failure of Mission
Mars Climate Orbiter
Gerry Tucker [ ]
EMSE 6361 – Fall 2015
Term Paper – Final

2. Case Study Overview

3. Case Study Overview*
Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) launched Dec. 11, 1998 with an anticipated arrival at Mars of Sept. 1999
On Sept. 23, 1999 all contact was lost as MCO was 4 minutes into the Mars Orbital Insertion (MOI) burn
On Sept. 29, 1999 the root cause of the failure was discovered
*Background information derived from MCO Mishap Investigation Board Phase 1 Report

4. Prime contractor for vehicle development
Case Study Primaries
Lead NASA center for Mars Surveyor Program
Project office created by JPL with the responsibility to define the mission, develop the spacecraft / payload elements, and integrate/test/launch the
flight system.*
Prime contractor for vehicle development
*Background information derived from MCO Mishap Investigation Board Phase 1 Report

5. Root Cause* AMD Event Occurs Vehicle Trajectory Modeling
Small Forces Processing
Data
AMD File
Units = Newtons
Units = lbf-s
*Background information derived from MCO Mishap Investigation Board Phase 1 Report

6. Root Cause* - Consequence
Result was a small error build up
Vehicle entered the atmosphere at a periapsis of 57km
Lowest projected by model using the fault data was 110km
Lowest survivable periapsis: 80km
Figure 4 form MCO Mishap Investigation Board Phase 1 Report *
*Background information derived from MCO Mishap Investigation Board Phase 1 Report

7. Root Cause Analysis

8. Root Cause Analysis
Allowed AMD data capability to arrive 4 months after launch
OPS NAV team did not work development and did not receive adequate training on vehicle
Validation testing by JPL was not performed or completed at appropriate level
Developer QA process did not discover critical interface issue

9. Solution Analysis

10. Validation Process Inadequate
Goal
Improved process that catches conversion error
Decomposition
Review
Not properly reviewed by SMEs to catch missing logic
Execution
Not executed by SMEs to catch missing logic
Solutions
Peer Review Process
Ensure that SMEs are required to invite before schedule items related to development can complete
Validation Team Training
Ensure that SMEs provide a high level overview of the capability being tested and provide pointers to all applicable interface specifications

11. Developer QA Process Inadequate
Goal
Improved process that catches conversion error
Decomposition
Review Process
Developers did not discover error in fundamental interface requirement code
QA Training
QA was not properly trained to on the details of the system to determine if developers were coding again specification
Solutions
Peer Review Process
Update to include template checklist of items to review for artifact type (i.e. interface code against applicable spec)
QA Team Training
Ensure QA receives overview of code being reviewed along with applicable references

12. Prog. Mgmt. Process Inadequate
Goal
Improved process that manages critical risks
Decomposition
Process
R&O process inadequate given that management was not aware of the magnitude and impact of the risk of allowing small forces / AMD delay
Solutions
R&O Process
Enforce risk assessment and mitigation plan generation by SMEs prior to accepting risk

13. OPS Training Inadequate
Goal
Improve process for training OPS team
Decomposition
Not Enough Transition Training
OPS NAV team was not aware of particulars of the vehicle and could not properly assess impacts to issues that were noticed
Solutions
Day in the Life (DITL) Training
Provide DITL type training that is a hands on simulation of operations with nominal and non-nominal situations thrown into the mix by SMEs

14. Questions

15. References

16. References
Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Report – Phase 1 Report: Nov. 10, 1999; Stephenson, Mulville, Bauer, etc. [ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/1999/MCO_report.pdf]
Slide 4,5,8 – JPL Logo -
Slide 4,5,8,12,14,15 – Lockheed Martin Logo -
Slide 4,11,14,15 – Mars Surveyor Logo
Slide 5, 8 – MCO Picture browse.jpg