Metaphysics Part Two.

Metaphysics Part Two

Regress & Absurdity Methodology
Introduction Circular Regress Defined Form & Examples A requires A A requires B, B requires C…Z requires A Job-Experience Infinite Regress Form 1 requires 2 2 requires 3 3 requires 4 X requires X+1 Evil Bureaucrat Regresses & Absurdity

Regresses & Absurdity Reductio Ad Absurdum (Reducing to Absurdity)
Defined Form #1 Assume P is true. Prove that assuming P leads to something false, absurd or contradictory. Conclude that P is false. Form #2 Assume P is false. Prove that assuming P is false leads to something false, absurd or contradictory. Conclude that P is true. Example

Regresses & Absurdity Using a regress in a Reductio Ad Absurdum
Introduction Example

St. Thomas Aquinas Background (1224-1274) Early Life
Son of the count of Aquino Imprisoned in a tower Albert the Great Eastern Orthodox Church Mystic Experience Canonized in 1323 1879 Pope Leo XIII This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-ND

St. Thomas Aquinas The Ox Works Nickname The flying Cow 25 Volumes
Summa Theologica

St. Thomas Aquinas Aristotle & Aquinas Complete Works Conflict
12th-13th Century: the complete works of Aristotle became available in Europe. Aristotle’s works presented a systematic and developed philosophy. Conflict Aristotle: the world is eternal and uncreated. Apparently did not accept personal immortality. Ibn Rushd’s commentaries on Aristotle Neo-Platonism Aquinas’ View Aristotle’s view could be adopted without heresy. Regarded Aristotle as a rich intellectual behavior. “The Philosopher.” Aristotle as a pagan lacking divine revelation.

St. Thomas Aquinas Faith & Reason Shift from Plato to Aristotle
Platonic notions of the eternal & other worldliness. Aristotle’s works presented a systematic and developed philosophy. Faith & Reason Reconciliation: Augustine Sin damaged reason Grace Faith as necessary condition for philosophical understanding Reconciliation: Aquinas Sin did not cripple our rational facilities Reason as autonomous source of knowledge Distinguishes between philosophy & theology Two sources of knowledge Theology yields knowledge via faith & revelation Philosophy yield knowledge via reason and experience

St. Thomas Aquinas Aquinas’ Epistemology & Metaphysics Epistemology
Aristotle’s Influence Blank slate No innate knowledge Senses provide reason with content Intellect Passive & active Passive operations Objects of experience Active aspect Potential Natural process

St. Thomas Aquinas Metaphysics: Hierarchy Actuality & Potentiality
Prime matter-potentiality Forms-actuality God-pure actuality Change Great Chain of Being Hierarchy Variety Angels Knowable Purpose Objective Values

St. Thomas Aquinas Metaphysics: Existence & Essence
Essence & Existence Essence Existence God His essence entails He exists Necessity Rejection of ontological argument Empirical experience

St. Thomas Aquinas The First Way (the Way of Motion)
Some things are in motion Whatever is moved is moved by another Potentiality A thing moves Reduction from potentiality to actuality Fire Actuality & potentiality in different respects Hot Cold Impossible to be both moved and mover. Moved by another

St. Thomas Aquinas: Five Ways
Moved by another This cannot go on to infinity No first mover No other mover Moved by first mover Staff First mover This everyone understands to be God

St. Thomas Aquinas The Second Way ( Efficient Cause)
Order of efficient causes Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself Not possible to go on to infinity Efficient causes following an order First Intermediate Take away the cause If no first cause, then neither intermediate nor ultimate If it is possible to go on to infinity No first efficient cause No ultimate effect No immediate efficient causes Plainly false First efficient cause to which everyone gives the name God.

St. Thomas Aquinas The Third Way (Possibility & Necessity)
Possible to be and not to be Impossible for these to always exist One time there was nothing Nothing would exist now Impossible for anything to have begun to exist Thus now nothing would be in existence There must exist something whose existence is necessary Every necessary thing either has its necessity cause by another or not Impossible to go on to infinity As per efficient causes Therefore we must admit the existence of a being Having of itself its own necessity Not receiving it from another Causing necessity in others This all men speak of as God

St. Thomas Aquinas The Fourth Way (Gradation)
Among beings are some more and some less More or less are predicated by resemblance to a maximum There is something truest, best, noblest There is something most in being The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus Fire There must be something which is the cause of being, goodness, perfection This being we call God

St. Thomas Aquinas The Fifth Way (Governance of the World)
Things that act from knowledge act for an end Evident from acting in the same way Whatever lacks knowledge must be directed Therefore some intelligent being directs all natural things This being we call God

Common Mistakes in Interpreting the 5 Ways Everything must have a cause Does not assume this What is potential must be cause by what is actual Created beings The world has a beginning in time Does not attempt to prove this Does not disprove Aristotle’s eternal world and unmoved mover Possibility of an eternal universe First cause Eternal flame God as a continuously sustaining cause Not possible to prove an eternal world St. Bonaventure Beginning in time Revelation, not proof

Common Criticisms Five beings Five different beings Being distinguished by qualities Perfect and unlimited being Two perfect beings would be identical Cannot be two unlimited beings “And this everyone understands to be God” Different from the personal God Not a complete view of God Important qualities Way of gradation

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) Background
Life & Works Life Works Agenda Motivation Travel Inward Focus Goals

Rene Descartes Method Methodology Mathematics Intuition Deduction
The Meditations on First Philosophy

Rene Descartes Fifth Meditation
The Proof 1. I have the idea of a God that possess all perfections. 2. Existence is a kind of perfection. 3. If the God I am thinking of lacked existence, then He would not be perfect. 4. Hence, if I can have the idea of a perfect God, I must conclude that existence is one of His essential properties. 5. If existence is one of God’s essential properties, He must exist. 6. Therefore, God exists.

Rene Descartes Fifth Meditation
Unique to God 1. No other being has existence as part of its essence. 2. Aside from God, we can have an idea of a being without that being actually existing. 3. Since existence is part of God’s perfection, it is a contradiction to deny his existence. 4. This argument is a variation of St. Anselm’s ontological argument. 5. This argument was criticized by Kant on the grounds that existence is not a property.

Immanuel Kant Background Philosophical Motivations & Goals
Personal information Contributions Philosophical Motivations & Goals Leibnizian rationalism Assumptions First Goal: clarification of the foundations of science Experience Second Goal: Resolve the conflict between science & religion, morality and freedom. Third Goal: Deal with the crisis in metaphysics

Immanuel Kant Theory of Knowledge
Critical Philosophy Critiques “Copernican” revolution Reality Varieties of judgment Analytic judgments Synthetic judgments A priori knowledge A posteriori knowledge

Analytic a priori Analytic a posteriori Synthetic a posteriori Synthetic a priori Mathematics Geometry Goal: how synthetic a priori judgments are possible in math, physics, and morality.

The Transcendent Method Rejection of empiricism The transcendent method Space & time Space Time Mathematics

Categories of the Understanding Knowledge from sensibility & understanding Knowledge is from sensibility& understanding in tandem Concepts

12 a priori concepts Quantity: unity, plurality, totality Quality: reality, negation, limitation Modality: possibility-impossibility, existence-non-existence, necessity- contingency

Immanuel Kant Metaphysics
Phenomena & Noumena Introduction Phenomena Noumena Difficulties

Transcendent Illusions of Metaphysics Third Faculty: Reason Transcendental ideas Self Cosmos God Problem: application of categories beyond borders

The Self The self No impression of self Empirical self Transcendental self The self of psychology

The Cosmos The cosmos The failure of reason The antimonies First The world has a beginning in time & occupies finite space The world has no temporal beginning & is spatially & temporally infinite

Second All things can be analyzed into basic components Nothing can be analyzed into basic components Third Some events are free and not determined No events are free and all events are determined

Fourth A necessary being exists There is no necessary being The argument Kant’s resolution

Immanuel Kant Ontological Argument
Can conceive of a perfect being The conceivable is possible Possible a perfect being exists If PB exists, then has all perfections Existence is a perfection If PB exists, then it has existence Possible that a PB necessarily exists Absurd Thus a perfect being must exist of necessity Kant’s First Refutation of the Ontological Argument Concept of God includes concept of absolutely necessary being Compares to nature of a triangle Does not show triangles exist If God, then being exists necessarily-deniable. Cannot go from concept to existence.

Immanuel Kant Second Refutation of the Ontological Argument
Existence is not a predicate Existence is not a property that adds to the concept of X If existence is not a property, then it cannot be an essential part of God’s concept Merchant analogy The Cosmological Argument A necessarily existing first cause Assumes the principle that everything has a cause The principle only applies to the realm of experience Defects of the ontological argument The Teleologicial Argument Intelligent designer Praise Design imposed on pre-existing matter Need for cosmological argument

Immanuel Kant Conclusion
Attempts to prove God’s existence are fruitless Impossible to prove God does not exist Theist and Atheist cannot know Possibility of basing religion on practical or moral faith “To deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.”

Pure Reason Theology & metaphysics Legitimate use What does it mean?

The Problem of Universals
Introduction Plato & Aristotle Universal Speech & Thought Metaphysical nature of universals Thales: The Problem of the One & the Many B.C. Sought to find the unity underlying the diversity of the world. Determining the basic principle that accounts for everything.

Tokens & Types Type Token The problem: in virtue of what does a specific token fall under a type? In virtue of what is token a of the type F? Realism Defined Universals are real & exist in the world. Universals are immaterial Separate from sensible objects or not John Scotus Erigena St. Anselm William of Champeux

Scholasticism Charlemagne Scholastics Dominant Scholastic Formulation of the Problem Boethius’s translation of Porphyry’s introduction to Aristotle’s Categories. Question 1: Do universals exist as metaphysical entities or only in the understanding? Question 2: If universals exist as metaphysical entities are they material or immaterial? Question 3: If universals exist as metaphysical entities are they separate from sensible objects or not?

Epistemic Motivation Aristotle’s logic Reasoning Knowledge Correspondence between reality & logic. Scholastic Theological Motivation: Original Sin Original sin Odo of Tournai Human sin Shared universal Scholastic Theological Motivation: Trinity Trinity Divine essence as single universal

Humanness falls under the universal mammal All universals are subsumed under Being If Being is identical to God, then Pantheism John Scotus Erigena Unaware of Criticism Nominalism Defined Nomina Universals are merely names Individuals

Roscelin ( ) Teacher Heretic Only particulars exist Universals do not have metaphysical existence. Flatus Vocis “Trinity” is a mere name. Problems Commonsense Christian theology Original sin Trinity

Conceptualism Peter Abelard ( ) Student of Roscelin & William of Champeaux Argued against realism & nominalism Abelard’s Attacks on Realism Universals can have inconsistent qualities. The problem of multiple location. Pantheism Abelard’s View of Universal Words Universal words point to universal concepts. Concept: word’s logical content or meaning. Common & confused image

Abelard’s Moderate Nominalism General concepts in the mind Mental constructs Abelard’s Steps Towards Moderate Realism Abstraction Objective basis, but do not exist apart. Distinction in reason. Alternative to Realism

Moderate Realism Early Moderate Realism Abelard, Aquinas & others Universal ideas are in the mind, but based on reality. Universals exist ante rem (before things) in God’s Mind Universals exist in rem (in things) as properties that group via resemblance. Universals exist post rem (after things) as mental concepts formed by abstraction. The particular is the basic ontological entity. Trope theory

George Berkeley Idealism
Berkeley’s Project Treatise Three Dialogues Newtonian Science Matter Idealism Against skepticism The philosopher of common sense

George Berkeley Empirical Reformation
Locke to the logical conclusion Locke Theory of Ideas Ideas Criticism of Abstract Ideas Locke’s theory of abstract ideas Berkeley’s criticism General ideas Language problem Rejection of abstract ideas: rejection of matter

Arguments from Mental Dependency Meaning Argument Idea argument Objection & reply Argument from Pain & Pleasure The argument Heat & pain

Arguments from Perceptual Relativity Hot & Cold Argument Taste & Odor Argument Sound Color Results

Primary & Secondary Qualities Arguments Primary & Secondary Qualities Contradiction argument Inseparability Argument Extension Argument Objection: extension & matter in general Number Argument Dream Argument Distance Argument

Imagination Argument Criticism of Representational Realism Locke Objection Primary & secondary qualities

George Berkeley Metaphysics
The World Objection: banishing the real Reply Dreams vs. Reality Existence Samuel Johnson Seeming Absurdity

Cause of Ideas Goal Ideas cannot Cause Ideas Material Substance Substance Spirit & Ideas Spirit There can be no idea of soul or spirit The active mind Ideas of sense

Proof of God’s Existence Knowledge of other spirits Argument from design God: another proof & cause God the Perceiver Perceiver Refutation of Deism Deism Refutation

Problem with God The Problem Hylas’ Dilemma Berkeley’s Reply Hylas’ Reply

George Berkeley Science & Laws of Nature
Science in an Immaterial World Berkeley’s View The Laws of Nature Causation Science & Religion Scriptural Argument Time & Space

George Berkeley Problems & Impact
Trilemma Solipsism Representative Realism Pantheism Other Problems Perceiving & Conceiving Notion Common Sense Hume Theists

George Berkeley Problems & Impact

Meeting Yourself Introduction Metaphysical Problems & Universals
Travel Meeting Yourself Problem & Paradoxes Metaphysical Problems & Universals Problem of Multiple Location The Problem of Universals Universals Universals & Time Travel This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY

Meeting Yourself Tropes No Time Travel With Tropes Relativity
The End of Instantiated Universals Reconciling Tropes & Time Travel The Problem of Universals Universals Universals & Time Travel

Substances & Substrata
Introduction, Tropes and Substances Tropes & Substrata vs. Bundles The Marbles Six blue marbles of different sizes. This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-NC This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY

Substances & Substrata Introduction, Tropes & Substances
Immanent Universals Defined: A property that can be wholly located at many different locations on the same dimension at the same time . Analysis 6 particulars are present. 8 universals and 18 instances are present. 6 instances of blue. 6 instances of spherical shape. 1 instance of each of the 6 sizes.

Defined: A property that is limited to occupying at most one location on each dimension at a time. Analysis 24 particulars are present. 6 objects (marbles) 18 tropes 6 exactly resembling blue tropes. 6 exactly resembling shape tropes, 6 different but resembling size tropes.

Universals vs. Tropes Universal vs. Trope Identity vs. exact resemblance. Realist view of properties. Tropes are properties which can be located at most on a single place on each dimension at the same time.

Substances & Substrata
Descartes: a substance is "a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence." Alternatives The "real essence" of the thing in question. That which supports properties. A things most fundamental or categorical properties." The Cartesian definition will be used.

Substances & Independent Existence A substance is an entity whose existence depends on no other entities. Substances are entities capable of independent existence. Independent existence is determined by the dependence hierarchy of the world. Dependence hierarchy: various relations of metaphysical dependence that hold between the various entities.

General Definition of ‘substance.’ x is an n-ary substance iff x's existence is independent of all other n-level entities. Prime substance. Example

Substances & Substrata Bundles vs. Substrata
The Need for Substances: Substances Trope bundle as substance. Trope + substratum as substance. The Need for Substances: Trope-substratum theory. Substances are at least groups of tropes. Relational tropes should not be accepted as substances. Single tropes will not do as substances. A substance will have to consist of at least multiple tropes.

The Regress Argument for Substrata: Bundles are a False Economy The bundle of tropes view is more economical than a trope-substrata view. This economy gives the bundle view and initial advantage, This initial advantage of economy is a false one.

The Regress Argument for Substrata: Objects Object S has tropes A and B. Object D has tropes C and D. Existence of tropes A, B, C, and D is not enough to account for S being A and B and D being C and D. Grouping needed for higher order objects. Objects . More is needed over and above tropes.

The Regress Argument for Substrata: The Bundle Option A sophisticated bundle theory No “loose” tropes. Bundles Binder cannot be an additional ontological kind. Two options.

The Regress Argument for Substrata: Bundle Option 1 Bundle theorist: denial of the real being of the binder. Problem: This runs contrary to Plato's "mark of being.” Anything has real being that is so constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be affected. In however small a degree, by the most insignificant agent, though it be only once. A mark to distinguish real things: they are nothing but power. Unreasonable and uneconomical.

The Regress Argument for Substrata: Bundle Option 2 Real being without substrata. Binding tropes Economic advantage retained. A binding tropes must also be bound by tropes. This leads to an infinite regress: Problem 1: A binding between any two tropes will presuppose infinite bindings. No binding can ever be successful.

Problem 2: An infinite number of binding tropes, if possible, would be uneconomical. Unbound binder is needed. Trope cannot exist singly. If tropes could be unbound, binders are not need. Binding tropes as exempt from binding. This is ad hoc. Might be a different ontological kind. These "tropes" might be substrata.

The Regress Argument for Substrata: Problem for Trope-Substrata Theory Trope-substrata view Binding cannot be a trope, Binding taken as primitive. Bundle theorist: binding as primitive Ad hoc. Binding tropes are still tropes. The price of avoiding the regress requires accepting primitive binding "relations” which hold "between" tropes and substrata.

The Regress Argument for Substrata: Bundle Option, Again Economical to take the bundling of tropes as a primitive. Require rejecting Plato's mark of being or providing arguments that there is no need to accept a real being to account for binding. This is not plausible.

Armstrong's Argument for Substrata: Armstrong’s Argument Against Trope Bundles A trope-substrata view is superior to a bundle of tropes view. Tropes are not suitable to be the substances of the world. No sense to speak of relations existing apart from what they relate. Property tropes cannot be substances. Bundle theorists give tropes attributes. 6. Armstrong: "the theorists are then embarrassed because shape, size, and duration appear themselves to be properties and therefore ought to be tropes alongside other property tropes." 7. Thus, tropes will not do as substances.

Armstrong's Argument for Substrata: Problems for Trope-Substrata A substratum with one property is not much more substantial than a single trope. While a single trope is not suitable as a substance, neither is a substratum with a single trope. A substance will have to be a robust complex entity. Bundle view: multiple tropes. Substrata view: multiple tropes + substratum.

Armstrong's Argument for Substrata: Two Questions Question 1: what constitutes a minimal substance? Question 2: what is it that "programs" the binders to form these minimal entities? Determinables and determinates. No reason to think the answer will count against tropes. Armstrong's first argument does not tell against bundle theory in favor of a substrata view. Indicates the need for robust substances.

Armstrong's Argument for Substrata: Second Argument Trope view: first, second and higher order properties are tropes. What it would be, on the bundle view, for a first order trope to have a second order trope. Should it be accepted that a first order trope is only a bundle of properties. ”Very unattractive" ”Substance-attribute model of the relation of a first order trope to its property seems much more inviting." If a trope counts as a substratum vis-a-vis its second order properties, then why not adopt the substratum-attribute model at the base level? Trope-substrata should be accepted over a bundle of tropes view.

Substances & Substrata The Defense of Substrata
Objective Addressing the problems attributed to substrata. The Empiricists' Challenge Stock empiricist argument. ”Substance" rather than 'substrata.' Attacking the supporter of properties.

The Empiricist Argument Whatever is known about things is known in terms of, or by means of, their properties. Since substrata are the binders and not properties, they cannot be known. Being unknown, to posit their existence is unjustified speculation. So, this should not be done. Milder Empiricist Argument Properties are understood and are experienced every day. The alleged binder is not well understood and never experienced. They are mysterious sorts of entities. Hence, the mysteriousness provides a reason to reject them and at least raises their cost.

Reply: Knowable Binding Tropes Argue a substratum has a property of binding properties by which it may be known. Problem: Regress Suppose here are binding tropes that substrata possess and that tropes need to be bound by substrata. Since binding tropes are tropes they need to be bound to substrata. This leads to an infinite regress, making binding impossible. Even if binding were possible, it would be uneconomical. So binding tropes should not be postulated and the binding capacity of substrata kept as a primitive. This leaves the empiricists' challenge unanswered.

Descartes’ Reply Principles of Philosophy We cannot initially become aware of a substance through its being an existing thing since this alone does not of itself have any effect on us. We can know a substance by one of its attributes, because nothingness possesses no properties or qualities. If we perceived the presence an attribute, we can infer there is a substance to which it may be attributed. If it is known that properties cannot exist without existing as the property of a substance, and it is known that properties exist, it can be inferred that substances exist. While substances cannot be known directly, they can be known by inference.

Reply for Substrata If only properties can be known, then direct knowledge of substrata is not possible. However, substrata can be known by inference. Tropes cannot exist singly and that they need to be bound by substrata to form substances, when the presence of a property is perceived, it can be inferred that there must be a substratum present to which it is bound. Thus, substrata can be known by inference and the empiricists' challenge is countered.

Bare Substrata and Individuality: Two Problems Either substrata have properties of their own or are bare. If substrata have properties of their own, they are still bare. Substrata must be bare, causing two difficulties. Difficulty 1: Bare substrata lack the capacity to bind properties. If substrata cannot bind , there is no reason to postulate them as binders . Difficulty 2: Bare substrata have no qualitative differences among them. There are numerous substrata. An account must be given of their individuation with no appeal to qualitative differences.

Reply to Difficulty 1 Take the binding ability as a capacity that is not a property. The price of accepting substrata is taking their binding capacity to be a primitive. The price is high, but better than the alternative. Accepting binding tropes results in two very serious regresses. So, substrata are a better choice than binding tropes.

Reply to Difficulty 2 The individuation of substrata must be taken as a primitive. This increases the cost of the trope-substrata theory. Reply: All theories must take individuation as a primitive at some level. Suppose the individuality of an entity is not taken as primitive but is analyzed. Suppose that X (where x is the individuator) individuates entity a. Either X itself must be individuated or its individuality must be taken as primitive. . If X's individuality is analyzed in terms of Y, then either Y's must be individuated by something else or its individuality is primitive. And so, on, ad infinitum. The only way to stop the regress is to accept individuation as a primitive or admit an individuator that need not be individuated.

Reply: Nothing can be self-Individuating If something is self-individuating, then a requirement regress arises. For X to individuate itself requires that X be an individual, for it to be an individual, it must individuate itself. Example There is no way to deny that other properties can be individuated by their powers and there is no need for the property of individuation. What individuates powers? What individuates what individuates powers? There can be no self-individuating entities and individuation must be taken as a primitive. Because individuation must be accepted as a primitive by all theories, the primitive individuation of substrata is not a special problem.

Change and Destruction: Keith Campbell’s Objection All causal action is by way of properties all effects are effects on properties. Being without properties, the substratum ought to be immune to all causal activity. A fortiori, it ought to be metaphysically indestructible substrata. This is a priori natural philosophy of a most discreditable kind. What in the natural order, is necessarily immune to destructive alteration? First Reply to Campbell Each substratum has an essence, which would be a trope that it has necessarily. If this essential trope were to be destroyed, then the substratum would also perish. Cartesian Example

Second Reply to Campbell No substratum can be bare by being tropeless. To lose a trope is always, necessarily, to gain a new one. The indestructibility of substrata would no longer be an objection. A bare substratum would not be a substance. If a single mass trope cannot exist on its own, a single binder of tropes cannot. Tropes and substrata are mutually dependent, neither kind can exist apart from the other. Hence, a minimal substance would be a substratum and the set of tropes it binds.

Substances & Substrata Conclusion
Conclusions The trope-substrata view is the most plausible. The most plausible trope-substrata view is the tropeless view of substrata. The binding capacity of substrata is taken as primitive. Substrata are not substances and cannot exist without tropes. Tropes are not substances are cannot exist without substrata.

Taoist Metaphysics The Tao Origin of the Tao Naming the Tao
Names of the Tao The Tao & Water The Tao & Emptiness Qualities of the Tao Passing On Interacting with the Tao Law Action of the Tao This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA

Taoist Metaphysics The Sage Knowledge Movement of the Tao Production
The Sage does without doing Possessing the Tao Desires Great Knowledge Opposites

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