1. Joseph T. Kelley Walter A. Anderson
The Maine Shore and the Army Corps: A Tale of Two Harbors, Wells and Saco Maine
Joseph T. Kelley
Walter A. Anderson

2. “Rather, it is our intention to demonstrate how the single-minded, engineering approach of the army to complex, interdisciplinary coastal issues can create bigger problems on the coast than existed in the first place”

3. Camp Ellis, Saco, Maine
Small, recreational and fishing community at the mouth of the Saco river, southern end of Saco Bay
Economic importance of navigating the Saco River
1866 USACOE removed river shoals and build a rock jetty on N side of river
Built a 2nd jetty, continued expanding and raising them
Loss of beach growth, houses and roads
USACOE studies said no harmful influence
Saco River channel super narrow
USACOE studies said no linkage b/w saco and pine point, also more studies, no conclusions

4. Wells Harbor and Wells and Drakes Island Beaches, Wells, Maine
Wells and Drakes Island Beaches separated by small tidal channel, no development on dunes
Wells Harbor behind channel, traditionally access at high tide
WWII, houses built on seaward sand dunes
Bigger boats, needed expanded anchorage
Area behind wells beach behind channel is what was dredged

5. USACOE Action
1962 created rock jetties at the end of Drakes Island and Wells Beach
Prevent sand from moving into navigation channel from the beaches
Dredgers quit because of gear loss and lots of shoaling
Extended jetties and re-dredged the area
186 mooring harbor to 40 from
Continue dredging
Harbor or beach?
Began > continued forever
Sand stripped from other parts of the beach, collected around jetties
Harbor filled in at much faster rate than expected

6. Discussion
Construction of harbor created beach erosion that was not originally an issue
No economic analysis by USACOE
Costs not inferred by local communities
USACOE didn’t consider all factors
Sand from Saco River as beach source
Value of a harbor over beaches
Camp Ellis had more economic consideration
Erosion continues

7. “As an organization, the army has exhibited a pattern of behavior that involves initial denial of responsibility, followed up (when political pressure is brought to bear) by technical studies that repeat old, untested assumptions and conclusions”