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Countermeasure
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Brute-force attack Countermeasures
However database and directory administrators can take countermeasures against online attacks, for example by limiting the number of attempts that a password can be tried, by introducing time delays between successive attempts, increasing the answer's complexity (e.g
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Defragmentation Common countermeasures
A common strategy to optimize defragmentation and to reduce the impact of fragmentation is to partition the hard disk(s) in a way that separates partitions of the file system that experience many more reads than writes from the more volatile zones where files are created and deleted frequently
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Buffer overflow Protective countermeasures
Various techniques have been used to detect or prevent buffer overflows, with various tradeoffs. The most reliable way to avoid or prevent buffer overflows is to use automatic protection at the language level. This sort of protection, however, cannot be applied to legacy code, and often technical, business, or cultural constraints call for a vulnerable language. The following sections describe the choices and implementations available.
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Mobile security - Countermeasures
The security mechanisms in place to counter the threats described above are presented in this section
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Application security - Threats, Attacks, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures
According to the patterns & practices Improving Web Application Security book, the following terms are relevant to application security:
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Application security - Threats, Attacks, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures
Asset. A resource of value such as the data in a database or on the file system, or a system resource.
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Vulnerability. A weakness that makes a threat possible.
Application security - Threats, Attacks, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures Vulnerability. A weakness that makes a threat possible.
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Application security - Threats, Attacks, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures
Countermeasure. A safeguard that addresses a threat and mitigates risk.
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Keystroke logging - Countermeasures
The effectiveness of countermeasures varies, because keyloggers use a variety of techniques to capture data and the countermeasure needs to be effective against the particular data capture technique. For example, an on-screen keyboard will be effective against hardware keyloggers, transparency will defeat some—but not all—screenloggers and an anti-spyware application that can only disable hook-based keyloggers will be ineffective against kernel-based keyloggers.
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Keystroke logging - Countermeasures
Also, keylogger program authors may be able to update the code to adapt to countermeasures that may have proven to be effective against them.
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Botnet - Countermeasures
The geographic dispersal of botnets means that each recruit must be individually identified/corralled/repaired and limits the benefits of filtering
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Botnet - Countermeasures
The botnet server structure mentioned above has inherent vulnerabilities and problems. For example, finding one server with one botnet channel can often reveal the other servers, as well as their bots. A botnet server structure that lacks redundancy is vulnerable to at least the temporary disconnection of that server. However, recent IRC server software includes features to mask other connected servers and bots, eliminating that approach.
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Botnet - Countermeasures
Security companies such as Afferent Security Labs, Symantec, Trend Micro, FireEye, Umbra Data and Damballa have announced offerings to counter botnets
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Botnet - Countermeasures
Command and control is embedded into the botnet rather than relying on external servers, thus avoiding any single point of failure and evading many countermeasures
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Botnet - Countermeasures
Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories are analyzing botnets' behavior by simultaneously running one million Linux kernels—a similar scale to a botnet—as virtual machines on a 4,480-node high-performance computer cluster to emulate a very large network, allowing them to watch how botnets work and experiment with ways to stop them.
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Countermeasure (computer)
In Computer Security a countermeasure is an action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken.
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Countermeasure (computer)
The definition is as IETF RFC that is the same as CNSS Instruction No dated 26 April 2010 by Committee on National Security Systems of United States of America
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Countermeasure (computer)
According to the Glossary by InfosecToday, the meaning of countermeasure is:
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Countermeasure (computer)
The deployment of a set of security services to protect against a security threat.
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Countermeasure (computer)
A synonym is security control. In telecommunications, communication countermeasures are defined as Security services as part of OSI Reference model by ITU-T X.800 Recommendation. X.800 and ISO ISO (Information processing systems – Open systems interconnection – Basic Reference Model – Part 2: Security architecture are technically aligned.
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Countermeasure (computer)
The following picture explain the relationships between these concepts and terms:
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Countermeasure (computer)
| i.e., A Threat Action | | measure | | Target of the Attack |
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Countermeasure (computer)
A resource (both physical or logical) can have one or more vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a threat agent in a threat action. The result can potentially compromises the Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability properties of resources (potentially different that the vulnerable one) of the organization and others involved parties (customers, suppliers).
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Countermeasure (computer)
The so called CIA triad is the basis of Information Security.
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Countermeasure (computer)
The attack can be active when it attempts to alter system resources or affect their operation: so it compromises Integrity or Availability. A "passive attack" attempts to learn or make use of information from the system but does not affect system resources: so it compromises Confidentiality.
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Countermeasure (computer)
A Threat is a potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach security and cause harm
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Countermeasure (computer)
A set of policies concerned with information security management, the information security management systems (ISMS), has been developed to manage, according to Risk management principles, the countermeasures in order to accomplish to a security strategy set up following rules and regulations applicable in a country.
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Net banking - Countermeasures
There exist several countermeasures which try to avoid attacks. Digital certificates are used against phishing and pharming, the use of class-3 card readers is a measure to avoid manipulation of transactions by the software in signature based online banking variants. To protect their systems against Trojan horses, users should use virus scanners and be careful with downloaded software or attachments.
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Net banking - Countermeasures
In 2001, the U.S. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council issued guidance for multifactor authentication (MFA) and then required to be in place by the end of 2006.[ OCC ]
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Social engineering (security) - Countermeasures
Organizations reduce their security risks by:
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Social engineering (security) - Countermeasures
* Establishing frameworks of trust on an employee/personnel level (i.e., specify and train personnel when/where/why/how sensitive information should be handled)
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Social engineering (security) - Countermeasures
* Identifying which information is sensitive and evaluating its exposure to social engineering and breakdowns in security systems (building, computer system, etc.)
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Social engineering (security) - Countermeasures
* Establishing security protocols, policies, and procedures for handling sensitive information.
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Social engineering (security) - Countermeasures
* Training employees in security protocols relevant to their position. (e.g., in situations such as tailgating, if a person's identity cannot be verified, then employees must be trained to politely refuse.)
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Social engineering (security) - Countermeasures
* Performing unannounced, periodic tests of the security framework.
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Social engineering (security) - Countermeasures
* Reviewing the above steps regularly: no solutions to information integrity are perfect.Mitnick, K., Simon, W. (2005). The Art Of Intrusion. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing.
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Social engineering (security) - Countermeasures
* Using a waste management service that has dumpsters with locks on them, with keys to them limited only to the waste management company and the cleaning staff
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LOIC - Countermeasures
Security experts quoted by the BBC indicated that well-written firewall (computing)|firewall rules can filter out most traffic from DDoS attacks by LOIC, thus preventing the attacks from being fully effective. Specifically, it has been claimed that filtering out all User Datagram Protocol|UDP and Internet Control Message Protocol|ICMP traffic helps to address LOIC attacks in an efficient way.
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LOIC - Countermeasures
However, the firewall rules need to be entered upstream, e.g. at the ISP of the site operator, where the backbone is converted to the server's broadband line. If the packets still have to travel through the server's limited line, then filtering the packets at the firewall level is not a valid deterrence, since the packets still have to travel to the firewall before the firewall can do anything to the packets, and the line between the server's ISP and the server's firewall will be clogged.
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LOIC - Countermeasures
LOIC attacks are easily identified in system logs, and the attack can be tracked down to the IP addresses used at the attack.
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SYN flood - Countermeasures
There are a number of well-known countermeasures listed in RFC 4987 including:
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
Techniques exist for mitigating or reversing the effects of desertification, however there are numerous barriers to their implementation. One of these is that the costs of adopting sustainable agricultural practices sometimes exceed the benefits for individual farmers, even while they are socially and environmentally beneficial. Another issue is a lack of political will, and lack of funding to support land reclamation and anti-desertification programs.
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
Desertification is recognized as a major threat to biodiversity. Some countries have developed Biodiversity Action Plans to counter its effects, particularly in relation to the protection of endangered flora and fauna.Techniques for Desert Reclamation by Andrew S. Goudie[ Desert reclamation projects]
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
Reforestation gets at one of the root causes of desertification and isn't just a treatment of the symptoms
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
Techniques focus on two aspects: provisioning of water, and fixation and hyper-fertilizing soil.
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
Fixating the soil is often done through the use of windbreak|shelter belts, woodlots and windbreaks. Windbreaks are made from trees and bushes and are used to reduce soil erosion and evapotranspiration. They were widely encouraged by development agencies from the middle of the 1980s in the Sahel area of Africa.
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
Some soils (for example, clay), due to lack of water can become Consolidation (soil)|consolidated rather than porous (as in the case of sandy soils). Some techniques as zaï or tillage are then used to still allow the planting of crops.[ Arid sandy soils becoming consolidated; zai-system]
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
Another technique that is useful is contour trenching. This involves the digging of 150m long, 1m deep trenches in the soil. The trenches are made parallel to the height lines of the landscape, preventing the water of flowing within the trenches and causing erosion. Stone walls are placed around the trenches to prevent the trenches of closing up again. The method was invented by Peter Westerveld.[ Westerveld's Naga Foundation]
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
Enriching of the soil and restoration of its fertility is often done by plants. Of these, the legume|Leguminous plants which extract nitrogen from the air and fixes it in the soil, and food crops/trees as grains, barley, beans and Phoenix dactylifera|dates are the most important. Sand fences can also be used to control drifting of soil and sand erosion.[ List of plants to halt desertification; some of which may be soil-fixating]
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
As there are many different types of deserts, there are also different types of desert reclamation methodologies. An example for this is the salt-flats in the Rub' al Khali desert in Saudi-Arabia. These salt-flats are one of the most promising desert areas for seawater agriculture and could be revitalized without the use of freshwater or much energy.[ Rethinking landscapes, Nicol-André Berdellé July 2011] H2O magazine
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Desertification - Countermeasures and prevention
Farmer-managed natural regeneration (FMNR) is another technique that has produced successful results for desert reclamation
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Bushmeat - Effect on wild animal populations, and countermeasures
The bushmeat trade is considered by some antiglobalization activists to be one of many ways in which globalization affects life on the planet, due to the lumber trade (as described in the Bushmeat#Factors|Factors section above)
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Bushmeat - Effect on wild animal populations, and countermeasures
A main method on how the decline of wildlife (caused by the consumption of bushmeat) could be stopped is by legalising the sale of the flesh of self-grown local animals, but keeping the sale of the flesh of animals that were shot in the wild illegal
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Bushmeat - Effect on wild animal populations, and countermeasures
It has also been proposed by Dr
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Sonar - Countermeasures
Active (powered) countermeasures may be launched by a submarine under attack to raise the noise level, provide a large false target, and obscure the signature of the submarine itself.
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Sonar - Countermeasures
Passive (i.e., non-powered) countermeasures include:
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Sonar - Countermeasures
* Mounting noise-generating devices on isolating devices.
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Sonar - Countermeasures
* Sound-absorbent coatings on the hulls of submarines, for example anechoic tiles.
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Sonar - Mine countermeasures
Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Sonar, sometimes called Mine and Obstacle Avoidance Sonar (MOAS), is a specialized type of sonar used for detecting small objects. Most MCM sonars are hull mounted but a few types are VDS design. An example of a hull mounted MCM sonar is the Type 2193 while the SQQ-32 Mine-hunting sonar and Type 2093 systems are VDS designs. See also Minesweeper (ship)
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Torrent poisoning - Countermeasures
The methods of attack described above are not particularly effective on their own, as for each measure effective countermeasures have evolved. These measures must be combined in order to have a significant impact on illegal peer-to-peer filesharing using BitTorrent protocols and Torrent files.
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Torrent poisoning - Countermeasures
* BitTorrent is highly resistant to content poisoning (as opposed to index poisoning), as it is able to verify individual file chunks.Lou, X
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Torrent poisoning - Countermeasures
* By Torrent users being members of Private Tracker websites (where one has to be a member of the Torrent tracker website) -- poisoned torrents can be quickly labeled and deleted and the person responsible can be banned from the site(s).
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Torrent poisoning - Countermeasures
* Public torrent tracker sites have enabled the ability to report if a torrent has been poisoned (or is fake or malicious in any way). Thus torrent files shared by public trackers can have similar levels of quality assurance as Private Tracker websites.
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Torrent poisoning - Countermeasures
* BitTorrent used to exclusively be a TCP-IP protocol, but this is no longer true. Use of UDP, with the Micro Transport Protocol|uTP protocol has made TCP Man in the Middle attacks more difficult to nearly impossible.
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Torrent poisoning - Countermeasures
* Public or Private tracker websites have selectively switched over to using SHTTP for the distribution of their web text and image content. By using SHTTP for the website content (versus tracker communications) many poisoning techniques are rendered impossible.
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Ad filtering - Advertiser offensive countermeasures and justifications
Some websites have taken counter-measures against ad-blocking software, such as attempting to detect the presence of ad blockers and informing users of their views, or outright preventing users from accessing the content unless they disable the ad-blocking software. There have been several arguments supporting and opposing the assertion that blocking ads is wrong.
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'LiDAR jamming devices' (Blinder(tm), etc.). This units create slurry of 905nm pulses to try to confuse the Police LiDAR unit. Some units can indicate if an attempt at jamming has occurred and in some states it is illegal to jam LiDAR (such as Virginia laws state, in summary, Any attempt to thwart or negate police attempts to measure traffic speed is illegal.
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'LiDAR 905nm specific absorbing pigments and dyes:' Since 905nm LiDAR is simply a 50W pulsed laser there are pigments and dyes on the market that can be made into paints and clear-coats that will absorb most of the LiDAR that strikes the body of a vehicle. Absorbing dyes and pigments are often dark green, black, or rust-brown in visual appearance. Their existence can be masked by using overcoatings that are transparent to 905nm wavelengths.
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'LiDAR 905nm specific deflectors' [reflecting LiDAR away from police point-of-origin]: On top of #2 above it is possible to design a vehicle with angled surfaces that further prevent reflections from going back to the point of origin (the police LiDAR unit).
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'License Plate Shaping-Angeling Technique:' One simple method of reducing a vehicle reflectivity to LIDAR is to bend the license plate so that LIDAR beams hitting it will be deflected at a slightly upward angle (into the sky)
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'License Plate Painting Technique:' This is specifically illegal in many states: Painting over the retro-reflective (white portions) of the license plate with a white acrylic primer paint (usually Titanium Dioxide as a pigment) will negate the retro-reflectivity of the surface
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'Motorcycle Plates Present a Weaker Reflection' Standard automobile license plates are about 6 high X 12 wide. A motorcycle, having a plate size of 4 high x 7 wide has 38.9% less reflective surface area and so naturally presents a lessor amount of LIDAR return (given the same distance). Manipulating, over-coating, or otherwise modifying the surface of a license plate to reduce its reflectivity is against the law in many states.
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'High Technology AR Coatings'LiDAR 904nm specific (AR) anti-reflective coatings (for clear glass/plastics). There are companies that produce tuned coatings that are narrow-band specific and can be made to peak at 904nm there by negating all but a small 3% or less reflection. These coatings can be used on clear surfaces such as windshields, headlights, or even bexel retro-reflectors in various reflectors, turn signal indicators, tail lights, etc. on most modern vehicles.
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'LiDAR obfuscation measures' and theories—Light travels at differing velocities through differing materials. It may be possible to use that characteristic to create a passive system that provides a strong reflection back to the LiDAR unit with a number of overlapping pulses that have been delayed by minute but varying amount. The theory is that this would confuse the LiDAR unit into trying again until it gets a clean reading (which conceivably—it may never get).
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'Beating the RDD' Radar detector detector: Radar detector detectors are a police tool and detect the harmonic RF leakage that emanates from the oscillating circuit in most Radar detectors
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LIDAR speed gun - Police LiDAR countermeasures
# 'Crowd-Sourced Intelligence:' Applications such as (and others) provide a method for traffic to report on the GPS location of police speed traps and traffic cameras, etc. and users can gain real-time intelligence. Users get a warning on their smart phone in advance of moving into the trap zone. As of October 2013 Waze had 17M users.
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
Countermeasures to combat Creditcard fraud include the following.
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* PAN truncation – not displaying the full number on receipts
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Tokenization (data security) – not storing the full number in computer systems
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Requesting additional information, such as a PIN, ZIP code, or Card Security Code
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Perform geolocation validation, such as IP address
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Use of Reliance authentication|Reliance Authentication, indirectly via PayPal, or directly via iSignthis or miiCard.
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Fraud detection and prevention software) that analyzes patterns of normal and unusual behavior as well as individual transactions in order to flag likely fraud. Profiles include such information as IP address. Technologies have existed since the early 1990s to detect potential fraud. One early market entrant was Falcon; other leading software solutions for card fraud include Actimize, SAS, BAE Systems Detica, and IBM.
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Fraud detection and response business processes such as:
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
** Contacting the cardholder to request verification
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
** Placing preventative controls/holds on accounts which may have been victimized
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
** Blocking card until transactions are verified by cardholder
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Strong authentication|Strong Authentication measures such as:
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
** Multi-factor authentication|Multi-factor Authentication, verifying that the account is being accessed by the cardholder through requirement of additional information such as account number, PIN, ZIP, Challenge-response authentication|challenge questions
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
** Out-of-band Authentication, verifying that the transaction is being done by the cardholder through a known or trusted communication channel such as text message, phone call, or Security token|security token device
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Industry collaboration and information sharing about known fraudsters and emerging threat vectors
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
By Governmental and Regulatory Bodies:
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Enacting consumer protection laws related to card fraud
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Performing regular examinations and risk assessments of Creditcard issuers
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Publishing standards, guidance, and guidelines for protecting cardholder information and monitoring for fraudulent activity
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
*Regulation, such as that introduced in the Single Euro Payment Area|SEPA and EU28 by the European Central Bank's [ 'SecuRE Pay'] requirements and the [ Payment Services Directive 2] legislation.
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Reviewing charges regularly and reporting unauthorized transactions immediately
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Installing virus protection software on personal computers
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Using caution when using credit cards for online purchases, especially on non-trusted websites
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
* Keeping a record of account numbers, their expiration dates, and the phone number and address of each company in a secure place.[ Avoiding Credit and Charge Card Fraud
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Credit card fraud - Countermeasures
Additional technological features:
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Affiliate marketing - Consumer countermeasures
Various countermeasures have evolved over time to prevent or eliminate the appearance of advertising when a web-page is rendered
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Traffic congestion - Countermeasures
It has been suggested by some commentators that the level of congestion that society tolerates is a rational (though not necessarily conscious) choice between the costs of improving the transportation system (in infrastructure or management) and the benefits of quicker travel. Others link it largely to subjective lifestyle choices, differentiating between car-owning and car-free households.
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Bullwhip effect - Countermeasures
In theory, the bullwhip effect does not occur if all orders exactly meet the demand of each period. This is consistent with findings of supply chain experts who have recognized that the bullwhip effect is a problem in forecast-driven supply chains, and careful management of the effect is an important goal for Supply Chain Management|Supply Chain Managers. Therefore it is necessary to extend the visibility of customer demand as far as possible.
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Bullwhip effect - Countermeasures
One way to achieve this is to establish a demand-driven supply chain which reacts to actual customer orders
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Bullwhip effect - Countermeasures
Barriers to the implementation of a demand-driven supply chain include the necessary investment in information technology and the creation of a corporate culture of flexibility and focus on customer demand. Another prerequisite is that all members of a supply chain recognize that they can gain more if they act as a whole which requires trustful collaboration and information sharing.
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Bullwhip effect - Countermeasures
Methods intended to reduce uncertainty, variability, and lead time:
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Bullwhip effect - Countermeasures
* [ Demand Driven Material Requirements Planning (DDMRP)]
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Bullwhip effect - Countermeasures
** smaller and more frequent replenishments
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Bullwhip effect - Countermeasures
** restrict returns and order cancellations
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Bullwhip effect - Countermeasures
** order allocation based on past sales instead of current size in case of shortage
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Steganography - Countermeasures and detection
Detection of physical steganography requires careful physical examination, including the use of magnification, developer chemicals and ultraviolet light
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Steganography - Countermeasures and detection
In computing, detection of steganographically encoded packages is called steganalysis
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Mine countermeasures A 'naval mine' is a self-contained explosive device placed in water to destroy surface ships or submarines. Unlike depth charges, mines are deposited and left to wait until they are triggered by the approach of, or contact with, an enemy vessel. Naval mines can be used offensively—to hamper enemy shipping movements or lock vessels into a harbour; or defensively—to protect friendly vessels and create safe zones.
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Mine countermeasures - Description
Mines can be laid in many ways: by purpose-built minelayers, refitted ships, submarines, or aircraft—and even by dropping them into a harbour by hand. They can be inexpensive: some variants can cost as little as United States dollar|US$1000, though more sophisticated mines can cost millions of dollars, be equipped with several kinds of sensors, and deliver a warhead by rocket or torpedo.
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Mine countermeasures - Description
Their flexibility and cost-effectiveness make mines attractive to the less powerful belligerent in asymmetric warfare
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Mine countermeasures - Description
Mines have been employed as offensive or defensive weapons in rivers, lakes, estuaries, seas, and oceans, but they can also be used as tools of psychological warfare. Offensive mines are placed in enemy waters, outside harbours and across important shipping routes with the aim of sinking both merchant and military vessels. Defensive minefields safeguard key stretches of coast from enemy ships and submarines, forcing them into more easily defended areas, or keeping them away from sensitive ones.
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Mine countermeasures - Description
Minefields designed for psychological effect are usually placed on trade routes and are used to stop shipping reaching an enemy nation. They are often spread thinly, to create an impression of minefields existing across large areas. A single mine inserted strategically on a shipping route can stop maritime movements for days while the entire area is swept.
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Mine countermeasures - Description
International law requires nations to declare when they mine an area, in order to make it easier for civil shipping to avoid the mines. The warnings do not have to be specific; for example, during World War II, Britain declared simply that it had mined the English Channel, North Sea, and French coast.
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Mine countermeasures - Early use
The precursor to naval mines was first described by the early Ming Dynasty Chinese artillery officer Jiao Yu, in his 14th century military treatise known as the Huolongjing.Needham, Volume 5, Part 7, 203–205
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Mine countermeasures - Early use
The first plan for a sea mine in the West was by Ralph Rabbards, who presented his design to Queen Elizabeth I of England in 1574.Needham, Volume 5, Part 7, 205. The Dutch inventor Cornelius Drebbel was employed in the Office of Ordnance by King Charles I of England to make weapons, including a floating petard which proved a failure. Weapons of this type were apparently tried by the English at the Siege of La Rochelle in 1627.
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Mine countermeasures - Early use
American David Bushnell invented the first practical mine, for use against the British in the American War of Independence. It was a watertight keg filled with gunpowder that was floated toward the enemy, detonated by a sparking mechanism if it struck a ship. It was used on the Delaware River as a drift mine, and was regarded as unethical.Gilbert, Jason A., L/Cdr, USN. Combined Mine Countermeasures Force, Naval War College paper (Newport, RI, 2001), p.2.
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Mine countermeasures - 19th century
In 1812 Russian engineer Pavel Shilling exploded an underwater mine using an electrical circuit
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Mine countermeasures - 19th century
The American Civil War also saw the successful use of mines. The first ship sunk by a mine was the USS Cairo|USS Cairo in 1862 in the Yazoo River. Rear Admiral David Farragut's famous statement, Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead! refers to a minefield laid at Mobile, Alabama.
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Mine countermeasures - 19th century
In the 19th century, mines were called torpedoes, a name probably conferred by Dennis Fletcher after the torpedo fish, which gives powerful electric shocks
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Mine countermeasures - 19th century
Following the Civil War, the United States adopted the mine as its primary weapon for submarine mines in U.S
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Mine countermeasures - Early 20th century
During the Boxer Rebellion, Imperial Chinese forces deployed a command-detonated mine field at the mouth of the Peiho river before the Battle of Dagu Forts (1900)|Dagu forts, to prevent the western Eight-Nation Alliance|Allied forces from sending ships to attack.(Original from the University of Wisconsin - Madison)(Issue 143 of Document (United States. War Dept.))(Original from the New York Public Library)
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Mine countermeasures - Early 20th century
The next major use of mines was during the Russo-Japanese War of
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Mine countermeasures - Early 20th century
Many early mines were fragile and dangerous to handle, as they contained glass containers filled with nitroglycerin or mechanical devices that activated a blast upon tipping. Several mine-laying ships were destroyed when their cargo exploded.
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Mine countermeasures - Early 20th century
Beginning around the start of the 20th century, submarine mines played a major role in the Submarine Mines in U.S. Harbor Defense|defense of U.S. harbors against enemy attack. The mines employed were controlled mines, anchored to the bottoms of the harbors and detonated under control from large mine casemates on shore.
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Mine countermeasures - Early 20th century
During World War I, mines were used extensively to defend coasts, coastal shipping, ports and naval bases around the globe
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
During World War II, the U-boat fleet, which dominated much of the battle of the Atlantic, was small at the beginning of the war and much of the early action by German forces involved mining convoy routes and ports around Britain. German submarines also operated in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Caribbean Sea, and along the U.S. coast.
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
Initially, contact mines—requiring a ship physically strike a mine to detonate it—were employed, usually tethered at the end of a cable just below the surface of the water
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
Later, some ships survived mine blasts, limping into port with buckled plates and broken backs
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
The British experienced a stroke of luck in November 1939
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
From these data, methods were developed to clear the mines
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
While these methods were useful for clearing mines from local ports, they were of little or no use for enemy-controlled areas. These were typically visited by warships, and the majority of the fleet then underwent a massive Degaussing#Degaussing ships' hulls|degaussing process, where their hulls had a slight south bias induced into them which offset the concentration effect almost to zero.
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
Initially, major warships and large troopships had a copper degaussing coil fitted around the perimeter of the hull, energized by the ship's electrical system whenever in suspected magnetic-mined waters
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
The Allies deployed acoustic mines, against which even wooden-hull (watercraft)|hulled ships (in particular Minesweeper (ship)|minesweepers) remained vulnerable. Japan developed sonic generators to sweep these; the gear was not ready by war's end. The primary method Japan used was small air-delivered bombs. This was profligate and ineffectual; used against acoustic mines at Penang, 200 bombs were needed to detonate just 13 mines.
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
The Germans had also developed a pressure-activated mine and planned to deploy it as well, but they saved it for later use when it became clear the British had defeated the magnetic system
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
Mining campaigns could have devastating consequences. The U.S. effort against Japan, for instance, closed major ports, such as Hiroshima, for days, and by the end of the Pacific War had cut the amount of freight passing through Kobe–Yokohama by 90%.
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Mine countermeasures - World War II
When the war ended, more than 25,000 U.S.-laid mines were still in place, and the Navy proved unable to sweep them all, limiting efforts to critical areas.Gilbert, p.5. After sweeping for almost a year, in May 1946, the Navy abandoned the effort with 13,000 mines still unswept. Over the next thirty years, more than 500 minesweepers (of a variety of types) were damaged or sunk in continuing clearance efforts.
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Mine countermeasures - Cold War era
Since World War II, mines have damaged 14 United States Navy ships, whereas air and missile attacks have damaged four. During the Korean War, mines laid by North Korean forces caused 70% of the damage suffered by U.S. naval vessels and caused 4 sinkings.
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Mine countermeasures - Cold War era
During the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, the belligerents mined several areas of the Persian Gulf and nearby waters. On April 14, 1988, the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)|USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) struck an Iranian M-08 naval mine|M-08/39 mine in the central Persian Gulf shipping lane, wounding 10 sailors.
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Mine countermeasures - Cold War era
In the summer of 1984, magnetic sea mines damaged at least 19 ships in the Red Sea. The U.S. concluded Libya was probably responsible for the minelaying. In response the U.S., Britain, France, and three other nationsGilbert, p.8. launched Operation Intense Look, a minesweeping operation in the Red Sea involving more than 46 ships.[ Operation Intense Look]; Gilbert, p.5.
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Mine countermeasures - Cold War era
On the orders of the Reagan administration, the CIA mined Nicaragua's Puerto Sandino|Sandino port in 1984 in support of the Contras|Contra guerrilla group. A Soviet tanker was among the ships damaged by these mines. In 1986, in the case of Nicaragua v. United States, the International Court of Justice ruled that this mining was a violation of international law.
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Mine countermeasures - Cold War era
During the Gulf War, Iraqi naval mines severely damaged USS Princeton (CG-59)|USS Princeton (CG-59) and USS Tripoli (LPH-10)|USS Tripoli (LPH-10). When the war concluded, eight countries conducted clearance operations.
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Mine countermeasures - Types
Naval mines may be classified into two major groups.
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Mine countermeasures - Contact mines
The earliest mines were usually of this type. They are still used today, as they are extremely low cost compared to any other anti-ship weapon and are effective, both as a terror weapon and to sink enemy ships. Contact mines need to be touched by the target before they detonate, limiting the damage to the direct effects of the explosion and usually affecting only the single vessel that triggers them.
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Mine countermeasures - Contact mines
Early mines had mechanical mechanisms to detonate them, but these were superseded in the 1870s by the 'Hertz Horn' (or 'chemical horn'), which was found to work reliably even after the mine had been in the sea for several years
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Mine countermeasures - Contact mines
Earlier forms of the detonator employed a vial of sulfuric acid surrounded by a mixture of potassium perchlorate and sugar. When the vial was crushed, the acid ignited the perchlorate / sugar mix, and the resulting flame ignited the gunpowder charge.
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Mine countermeasures - Contact mines
During the initial period of World War I, the British Navy used contact mines in the English Channel and later in large areas of the North Sea to hinder patrols by German submarines
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Mine countermeasures - Limpet mines
Limpet mines are a special form of contact mine that are manually attached to the target by magnets and left, and are so named because of the superficial similarity to the limpet, a mollusk.
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Mine countermeasures - Moored contact mines
Generally, this mine type is set to float just below the surface of the water or as deep as five meters
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Mine countermeasures - Moored contact mines
Floating mines typically have a mass of around 200kg, including 80kg of explosives e.g. Trinitrotoluene|TNT, Minol (explosive)|minol or amatol.
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Mine countermeasures - Moored contact mines
During WWII mine traps were used for blocking port entrances. Two floating mines were anchored some distance apart on either side of a shipping channel, linked by a chain. When a deep draft vessel passed through the trap it would pull the chain along with it, dragging the mines onto the sides of the ship; the resulting double explosion often sank it. This system was not used extensively, but proved effective in blocking ports.
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Mine countermeasures - Drifting contact mines
Drifting mines were occasionally used during World War I and World War II
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Mine countermeasures - Drifting contact mines
Churchill promoted Operation Royal Marine in 1940 and again in 1944 where floating mines were put into the Rhine in France to float down the river, becoming active after a time calculated to be long enough to reach German territory.
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Mine countermeasures - Drifting contact mines
After World War I the drifting contact mine was banned, but was occasionally used during World War II. The drifting mines were much harder to remove than tethered mines after the war, and they caused about the same damage to both sides.
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Mine countermeasures - Bottom contact mines
A bottom contact mine is the simplest form of mine
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Mine countermeasures - Bottom contact mines
These mines usually weighed 2 to 50kg, including 1 to 40kg of explosives (TNT or RDX|hexatonal).
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Mine countermeasures - Remotely controlled mines
Frequently used in combination with coastal artillery and hydrophones, controlled mines (or command detonation mines) can be in place in peacetime, which is a huge advantage in blocking important shipping routes
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Mine countermeasures - Remotely controlled mines
Modern examples usually weigh 200kg (440lb), including 80kg (175lb) of explosives (TNT or hexatonal).
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Mine countermeasures - Influence mines
These mines are triggered by the influence of a ship or submarine, rather than direct contact
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Mine countermeasures - Influence mines
The sophistication of modern Electronics|electronic mine fuzes incorporating these Digital Signal Processing capabilities makes it much more difficult to detonate the mine with electronic countermeasures because several sensors working together (e.g
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Mine countermeasures - Influence mines
Modern influence mines such as the Stonefish (mine)|BAE Stonefish are embedded computer system|computerised, with all the programmability that this implies e.g
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Mine countermeasures - Influence mines
Even as far back as the Second World War it was possible to incorporate a ship counter facility into mine fuzes e.g
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Mine countermeasures - Moored mines
The moored mine is the backbone of modern mine systems
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Mine countermeasures - Moored mines
Moored mines usually have lifetimes of more than 10 years, and some almost unlimited. These mines usually weigh 200kg (440lb), including 80kg (175lb) of explosives (RDX). In excess of 150kg (330lb) of explosives the mine becomes inefficient, as it becomes too large to handle and the extra explosives add little to the mine's effectiveness.
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Mine countermeasures - Bottom mines
Bottom mines are used when the water is no more than 60 meters (180ft) deep or when mining for submarines down to around 200 meters (660ft). They are much harder to detect and sweep, and can carry a much larger warhead than a moored mine. Bottom mines commonly utilize multiple types of sensors, which are less sensitive to sweeping. Slide 33 of 81. Hosted by Federation of American Scientists.
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Mine countermeasures - Bottom mines
These mines usually weigh between 150 and 1,500 kilograms (330 to 3,300 pounds), including between 125 and 1,400kg (275 to 3,090 pounds) of explosives. Slide 40 of 81. Hosted by Federation of American Scientists.
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Mine countermeasures - Unusual mines
Several specialized mines have been developed for other purposes than the common minefield.
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Mine countermeasures - Bouquet mine
The bouquet mine is a single anchor attached to several floating mines. It is designed so that when one mine is swept/detonated, another takes its place. It is a very sensitive construction and lacks reliability.
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Mine countermeasures - Anti sweep mine
The anti sweep mine is a very small mine (40kg warhead) with as small a floating device as possible. When the wire of a mine sweep hits the mine, it sinks, letting the sweep wire drag along the anchoring wire of the mine until the sweep hits the mine. That detonates the mine and cuts the sweeping wire. They are very cheap and usually used in combination with other mines in a minefield to make sweeping more difficult. One type is the Mark 23 used by the United States during World War II.
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Mine countermeasures - Oscillating mine
The mine is hydrostatically controlled to maintain a pre-set depth below the water's surface independently of the rise and fall of the tide.
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Mine countermeasures - Ascending mine
The ascending mine is a floating distance mine that may cut its mooring or in some other way float higher when it detects a target. It lets a single floating mine cover a much larger depth range.
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Mine countermeasures - Rocket mine
A Russian invention, the rocket mine is a bottom distance mine that fires a homing high-speed rocket (not torpedo) upwards towards the target. It is intended to allow a bottom mine to attack surface ships as well as submarines from a greater depth. One type is the Te-1 rocket propelled mine.
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Mine countermeasures - Torpedo mine
The torpedo mine is a self-propelled variety, able to lie in wait for a target and then pursue it e.g
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Mine countermeasures - Torpedo mine
The U.S. Mark 24 mine, code-named Mark 24 Mine|FIDO, was actually an Anti-submarine warfare|ASW homing torpedo. The mine designation was disinformation to conceal its function.
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Mine countermeasures - Mobile mine
The mine is propelled to its intended position by propulsion equipment such as a torpedo. After reaching its destination, it sinks to the seabed and operates like a standard mine.
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Mine countermeasures - Nuclear mine
During the Cold War a test was conducted with naval mine fitted with tactical nuclear warheads for the Baker shot of Operation Crossroads. This weapon was experimental and never went into production. There have been some reports that North Korea may be developing a nuclear mine The Seabed Arms Control Treaty prevents the placement of nuclear weapons on the seabed beyond a 12-mile coast zone.
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Mine countermeasures - Daisy-chained mine
This comprises two moored, floating contact mines which are tethered together by a length of steel cable or chain
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Mine countermeasures - Dummy mine
Plastic drums filled with sand or concrete are periodically rolled off the side of ships as real mines are laid in large mine-fields. These inexpensive false targets (designed to be of a similar shape and size as genuine mines) are intended to slow down the process of mine clearance: a mine-hunter is forced to investigate each suspicious sonar contact on the sea bed, whether it is real or not. Often a maker of Naval mines will provide both training and dummy versions of their mines.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine laying
Historically several methods were used to lay mines. During the First and Second World Wars, the Germans used U-boats to lay mines around the UK. In the Second World War, aircraft came into favour for mine laying with the one of largest such examples being the mining of the Japanese sea routes in Operation Starvation.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine laying
Laying a minefield is a relatively fast process with specialized ships, which is still today the most common method
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Mine countermeasures - Mine laying
Other methods to lay minefields include:
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Mine countermeasures - Mine laying
*Aircraft – descent to the water is slowed by a parachute
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Mine countermeasures - Mine laying
*Submarines – launched from torpedo tubes or deployed from specialized mine racks on the sides of the submarine
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Mine countermeasures - Mine laying
*Camouflaged boats – masquerading as fishing boats
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Mine countermeasures - Mine laying
In some cases, mines are automatically activated upon contact with the water. In others, a safety lanyard is pulled (e.g. one end attached to the rail of a ship, aircraft or torpedo tube) which starts an automatic timer countdown before the arming process is complete. Typically, the automatic safety-arming process takes some minutes to complete. This is in order to give the people laying the mines sufficient time to move out of its activation/blast zone.
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Mine countermeasures - Germany
In the 1930s, Germany had experimented with the laying of mines by aircraft; it became a crucial element in their overall mining strategy
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Mine countermeasures - Soviet Union
The USSR was relatively ineffective in its use of naval mines in WWII in comparison with its record in previous wars
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Mine countermeasures - United Kingdom
In September 1939, the UK announced the placement of extensive defensive minefields in waters surrounding the Home Islands
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Mine countermeasures - United States
The United States's early aerial mining efforts used smaller aircraft unable to carry many mines
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Mine countermeasures - United States
As early as 1942, American mining experts such as Naval Ordnance Laboratory scientist Dr
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Mine countermeasures - United States
In the meantime, B-24 Liberator, PBY Catalina and other available bomber aircraft took part in localized mining operations in the South West Pacific theatre of World War II|Southwest Pacific and the China Burma India Theater of World War II|China Burma India (CBI) Theaters, beginning with a very successful attack on the Yangon River in February 1943
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Mine countermeasures - United States
Finally, in March 1945, Operation Starvation began in earnest, using 160 of LeMay's B-29 Superfortress bombers to attack Japan's inner zone
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Mine countermeasures - Clearing WWII aerial mines
Between 600,000 and 1,000,000 naval mines of all types were laid in World War II
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Mine countermeasures - Clearing WWII aerial mines
For the purpose of clearing all types of naval mines, the Royal Navy employed German crews and minesweeper (ship)|minesweepers from June 1945 to January 1948,[ German Mine Sweeping Administration (GMSA)] (in German), accessed: 9 June 2008 organised in the German Mine Sweeping Administration, the GMSA, which consisted of 27,000 members of the former Kriegsmarine and 300 vessels.[ Google book review: German Seaman 1939–45] Page: 41, author: Gordon Williamson, John White, publisher: Osprey Publishing, accessed: 9 July 2008 Mine clearing wasn't always successful: a number of ships were damaged or sunk by mines after the war
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Mine countermeasures - Damage
The damage that may be caused by a mine depends on the shock factor value, a combination of the initial strength of the explosion and of the distance between the target and the detonation. When taken in reference to ship hull plating, the term Hull Shock Factor (HSF) is used, while keel damage is termed Keel Shock Factor (KSF). If the explosion is directly underneath the keel, then HSF is equal to KSF, but explosions that are not directly underneath the ship will have a lower value of KSF.
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Mine countermeasures - Direct damage
Usually only created by contact mines, direct damage is a hole blown in the ship
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Mine countermeasures - Bubble jet effect
The bubble jet effect occurs when a mine detonates in the water a short distance away from the ship
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Mine countermeasures - Bubble jet effect
The Baengnyeong incident, in which the ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772)|ROKS Cheonan broke in half and sank off the coast South Korea in 2010, was caused by the bubble jet effect according to an international investigation.
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Mine countermeasures - Shock effect
If the mine detonates at a distance from the ship, the change in water pressure causes the ship to resonate
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Mine countermeasures - Shock effect
The resulting gas cavitation and shock-front-differential over the width of the human body is sufficient to stun or kill Frogman|divers.
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Mine countermeasures - Countermeasures
The US has worked on some innovative mine hunting countermeasures, such as the use of military dolphins to detect and flag mines
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Mine countermeasures - Passive countermeasures
Ships can be designed to be difficult for mines to detect, to avoid detonating them
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Mine countermeasures - Passive countermeasures
A steel-hulled ship can be Degaussing|degaussed (more correctly, de-oerstedted or deperming|depermed) using a special degaussing station that contains many large coils and induces a magnetic field in the hull with alternating current to demagnetize the hull
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Mine countermeasures - Passive countermeasures
A simpler variation of this technique, called wiping, was developed by Charles F. Goodeve which saved time and resources.
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Mine countermeasures - Passive countermeasures
Between 1941 and 1943 the US Naval Gun factory (a division of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory) in Washington D.C
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Mine countermeasures - Passive countermeasures
Some ships are built with magnetic inductors, large coils placed along the ship to counter the ship's magnetic field
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Mine countermeasures - Active countermeasures
Active countermeasures are ways to clear a path through a minefield or remove it completely. This is one of the most important tasks of any mine warfare flotilla.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine sweeping
A sweep is either a contact sweep, a wire dragged through the water by one or two ships to cut the mooring wire of floating mines, or a distance sweep that mimics a ship to detonate the mines
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Mine countermeasures - Mine sweeping
If a contact sweep hits a mine, the wire of the sweep rubs against the mooring wire until it is cut. Sometimes cutters, explosive devices to cut the mine's wire, are used to lessen the strain on the sweeping wire. Mines cut free are recorded and collected for research or shot with a deck gun.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine sweeping
Minesweepers protect themselves with an oropesa or Paravane (weapon)|paravane instead of a second minesweeper
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Mine countermeasures - Mine sweeping
The distance sweep mimics the sound and magnetism of a ship and is pulled behind the sweeper. It has floating coils and large underwater drums. It is the only sweep effective against bottom mines.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine sweeping
During the Second World War, RAF Coastal Command used Vickers Wellington bombers Wellington DW.Mk I fitted with degaussing coils to trigger magnetic mines.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine sweeping
Modern influence mines are designed to discriminate against false inputs and are therefore much harder to sweep
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Mine countermeasures - Mine sweeping
Another anti-sweeping mechanism is a ship-counter in the mine fuze. When enabled, this allows detonation only after the mine fuze has been triggered a pre-set number of times. To further complicate matters, influence mines may be programmed to arm themselves (or disarm automatically—known as self-sterilization) after a pre-set time. During the pre-set arming delay (which could last days or even weeks) the mine would remain dormant and ignore any target stimulus, whether genuine or faked.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine sweeping
When influence mines are laid in an ocean minefield, they may have various combinations of fuze settings configured
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Mine countermeasures - Mine sweeping
Mines with ship-counters, arming delays and highly specific target signatures in mine fuzes can falsely convince a belligerent that a particular area is clear of mines or has been swept effectively because a succession of vessels have already passed through safely.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine hunting
Mine hunting is very different from sweeping, although some minehunters can do both tasks. Mines are hunted using sonar, then inspected and destroyed either by divers or Remotely operated vehicle|ROVs (remote controlled unmanned mini submarines). It is slow, but also the most reliable way to remove mines. Mine hunting started during the Second World War, but it was only after the war that it became truly effective.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine hunting
Sea mammals (mainly the Bottlenose Dolphin) have been trained to hunt and mark mines, most famously by the U.S. Navy Marine Mammal Program. Mine-clearance dolphins were deployed in the Persian Gulf during the Iraq War in The Navy claims that these dolphins were effective in helping to clear more than 100 antiship mines and underwater booby traps from Umm Qasr Port.
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Mine countermeasures - Mine hunting
French naval officer Jacques Yves Cousteau's Undersea Research Group was once involved in mine-hunting operations: They removed or detonated a variety of German mines, but one particularly defusion-resistant batch—equipped with acutely sensitive pressure, magnetic, and acoustic sensors and wired together so that one explosion would trigger the rest—was simply left undisturbed for years until corrosion would (hopefully) disable the mines.Cousteau, Jacques Yves
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Mine countermeasures - Mine breaking
A more drastic method is simply to load a cargo ship with cargo that makes her less vulnerable to sinking (wood for example) and drive her through the minefield, letting the ship to be protected follow the same path
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Mine countermeasures - Mine breaking
An updated form of mine breaking is the use of small unmanned Remotely operated vehicle|ROVs that simulate the acoustic and magnetic signatures of larger ships and are built to survive exploding mines. Repeated sweeps would be required in case one or more of the mines had its ship counter facility enabled i.e. were programmed to ignore the first 2, 3, or even 6 target activations.
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Mine countermeasures - US mines
The United States Navy MK56 ASW mine (the oldest still in use by the United States|US) was developed in More advanced mines include the CAPTOR mine|MK60 CAPTOR (short for encapsulated torpedo), the MK62 and MK63 Quickstrike and the MK67 SLMM (Submarine Launched Mobile Mine). Today, most U.S. naval mines are delivered by aircraft.
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Mine countermeasures - US mines
'MK67 SLMM Submarine Launched Mobile Mine'
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Mine countermeasures - US mines
The SLMM was developed by the United States as a submarine deployed mine for use in areas inaccessible for other mine deployment techniques or for covert mining of hostile environments. The SLMM is a shallow-water mine and is basically a modified Mark 37 torpedo.
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Mine countermeasures - US mines
*Type: Submarine-laid bottom mine
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Mine countermeasures - US mines
*Detection System: Magnetic/seismic/pressure target detection devices (TDDs)
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Mine countermeasures - US mines
The Quickstrike is a family of shallow-water aircraft-laid mines used by the United States, primarily against surface craft
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Mine countermeasures - US mines
* Type: aircraft-laid bottom mine (with descent to water slowed by a parachute or other mechanism)
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Mine countermeasures - US mines
* Detection System: Magnetic/seismic/pressure target detection devices (TDDs)
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Mine countermeasures - US mines
* Explosives: Various loads
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Mine countermeasures - Royal Navy
According to a statement made to the UK Parliament in 2002:
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Mine countermeasures - Royal Navy
:...the Royal Navy does not have any mine stocks and has not had since Notwithstanding this, the United Kingdom retains the capability to lay mines and continues research into mine exploitation. Practice mines, used for exercises, continue to be laid in order to retain the necessary skills.
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Mine countermeasures - Royal Navy
However, a British company (BAE Systems) does manufacture the Stonefish (mine)|Stonefish influence mine for export to friendly countries such as Australia, which has both war stock and training versions of Stonefish,[ SSK Collins Class (Type 471) Attack Submarine]
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Active protection system - Aerial countermeasures
Generally one has to distinguish between infrared and radar countermeasures. The wavelength range between 0.8 and 5µm is considered as Infrared (IR), the frequency range between 2 and 18GHz is considered as Radar.
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Active protection system - Aerial countermeasures
In 2007, Saab Group|Saab announced a new infrared countermeasures|infrared countermeasure system called CAMPS that does not use pyrotechnic Flare (countermeasure)|flares, thereby directly addressing these concerns.
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Maritime patrol aircraft - Armament and countermeasures
The earliest patrol aircraft carried bombs and machine guns. Between the wars the British experimented with equipping their patrol aircraft with the COW 37 mm gun. During the Second World War depth charges that could be set to detonate at a specific depth and later when in proximity with a metal object replaced anti-submarine bombs that detonated on contact.
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Maritime patrol aircraft - Armament and countermeasures
Patrol aircraft also carried defensive armament which was necessary when patrolling areas close to enemy territory such as Allied operations in the Bay of Biscay targeting U-boats starting out from their base.
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Maritime patrol aircraft - Armament and countermeasures
As a result of Allied successes with patrol aircraft against U-boats, the Germans introduced German_Type_VII_submarine#U-flak|U-flak (submarines equipped with more anti-aircraft weaponry) to escort U-boats out of base and encouraged commanders to remain on the surface and fire back at attacking craft rather than trying to escape by diving
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Maritime patrol aircraft - Armament and countermeasures
To counter the German long range patrol aircraft which targeted merchant convoys the British introduced the CAM ship which was a merchant vessel equipped with a single fighter aircraft which could be launched once to engage the enemy aircraft. Once escort carriers became available these were converted back into conventional merchant ships.
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Countermeasure A 'countermeasure' is a measure or action taken to counter or offset another one. As a general concept it implies precision, and is any technological or tactical solution or system (often for a military application) designed to prevent an undesirable outcome in the process. The first known use of the term is in 1923.[ Meriam-Webster Dictionary] Countermeasure defined
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Countermeasures can refer to the following disciplinary spectrum:
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* Diplomatic security Countermeasure
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Countermeasure Defense countermeasures are often subdivided into active and passive countermeasures.
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Countermeasure - Active
Active countermeasures alter the electromagnetic, acoustic or other signature(s) of a target thereby altering the tracking and sensing behavior of an incoming threat (e.g., guided missile) are designated 'soft-kill' measures. Measures that physically counterattack an incoming threat thereby destroying/altering its payload/warhead in such a way that the intended effect on the target is majorly impeded are designated 'hard-kill' measures. Both are further described in active protection systems.
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Trophy (countermeasure)
'Trophy' (also known as 'ASPRO-A', Israel Defense Forces designation מעיל רוח, lit. (Windbreaker)) is a military active protection system (APS) for vehicles. It intercepts and destroys incoming missiles and rockets with a shotgun-like blast. Trophy is the product of a ten-year collaborative development project between the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aircraft Industries' Elta Group. Its principal purpose is to supplement the armor of light and heavy armored fighting vehicles.
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Design
the system was being integrated onto Israeli Merkava tank|Merkava main battle tanks
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Design
The Trophy development plan includes an enhanced countermeasure unit to be available in the future for protection against kinetic energy penetrators.
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Advantages
The primary role of Trophy is defense against missile strikes, particularly for lighter armored personnel carriers, which are very vulnerable to rocket attacks
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Trophy Light
A new version called Trophy Light was unveiled by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in September 2007
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Tests by the United States
MSNBC has reported that there is resistance to incorporating Trophy in the US Army
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Tests by the United States
The Institute for Defense Analyses analyzed 15 active protection systems, including Trophy and Quick Kill, and found Trophy to be the top system
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Tests by the United States
The Government Accountability Office has since reviewed the Army's actions and issued a report that concluded that the Army and Boeing, the FCS lead systems integrator, followed the regulations to avoid conflicts of interest; that although Raytheon's technology is not mature, the Army estimated that a prototype for current vehicles could be delivered by 2009; that Army officials found Trophy tests to be unrealistic, and worried that integrating Trophy would delay fielding other capabilities.[ Analysis of Processes Used to Evaluate Active Protection Systems GAO ]
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Tests by the United States
According to the DOD Buzz the United States will be testing the trophy system on a Stryker vehicle in 2010.Colin Clark, [ US to try Israeli tank protector], DoD Buzz, October 25, 2010
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Tests by the United States
On February 28, 2011, Trophy manufacturer, Rafael, announced that the system completed a successful evaluation in the USA
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Tests by the United States
General Dynamics Land Systems planned to host a demonstration of a version of the Trophy in mid-October 2013
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Combat history
Following the series of tests of the Trophy system, the IDF Ground Forces Command declared the Trophy operational in August It was scheduled to be installed in an entire battalion of Israeli Armored Corps tanks by 2010.
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Combat history
On March 1, 2011, stationed near the Gaza border, a Merkava MK IV equipped with the trophy system foiled a missile attack aimed toward it and became the first operational success of the trophy active defense system.[ IDF armor-defense system foils attack on tank for first time] Haaretz, By AMOS HAREL, 01/03/ :11
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Combat history
On March 20, 2011, a missile was fired toward a Merkava MK IV tank equipped with trophy system inside the Israeli area along the perimeter fence of the Gaza Strip, the system identified the shooting, but calculated that it did not endanger the tank, and no intercept occurred
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Combat history
On August 1, 2012, Trophy-Windbreaker successfully intercepted an anti-tank missile launched from the Gaza Strip toward a Merkava tank near Kissufim junction.
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Possible countermeasures
On November 12, 2009, PhD Vladimir Korenkov, who led Russian state unitary enterprise “Basalt” from 2000 to 2009, stated that “The Israeli system of active protection of tanks, “Trophy”, as any other similar systems, can be evaded”
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Possible countermeasures
In response to concerns that the RPG-30 had fallen into the hands of Hezbollah fighters, Israel Defense reported that the Rafael Advanced Defense Systems|Rafael weapons development authority developed a defense system called the Trench Coat that can counteract the RPG-30, by utilizing a 360-degree radar to detects all threats and, in the case of one, launch 17 projectiles, one of which should strike the incoming missile.
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Related
*Drozd - The first attempt at making an active protection system by the Soviet Union.
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Related
*Arena Active Protection System - An updated and more effective version of Drozd.
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Related
*Zaslon Active Protection System - Ukrainian APS for use on BM Oplot tanks.
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Trophy (countermeasure) - Related
*Iron Fist (countermeasure)|Iron Fist - Another Israeli active protection system developed by Israel Military Industries.
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Traffic analysis - Countermeasures
It is difficult to defeat traffic analysis without both encrypting messages and masking the channel. When no actual messages are being sent, the channel can be 'masked'
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Traffic analysis - Countermeasures
by sending dummy traffic, similar to the encrypted traffic, thereby keeping bandwidth usage constant
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Traffic analysis - Countermeasures
. It is very hard to hide information about the size or timing of messages. The known solutions require Alice and Bob|Alice to send a continuous stream of messages at the maximum Bandwidth (computing)|bandwidth she will ever use...This might be acceptable for military applications, but it is not for most civilian applications. The military-versus-civilian problems applies in situations where the user is charged for the volume of information sent.
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Traffic analysis - Countermeasures
Even for Internet access, where there is not a per-packet charge, ISPs make statistical assumption that connections from user sites will not be busy 100% of the time. The user cannot simply increase the bandwidth of the link, since masking would fill that as well. If masking, which often can be built into end-to-end encryptors, becomes common practice, ISPs will have to change their traffic assumptions.
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Intelligence cycle security - Countermeasures to specific collection disciplines
More specific countermeasures against intelligence collection disciplines are listed below
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Data corruption - Countermeasures
When data corruption behaves as a Poisson process, where each bit of data has an independently low probability of being changed, data corruption can generally be detected by the use of checksums, and can often be Error detection and correction|corrected by the use of error correcting codes.
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Data corruption - Countermeasures
If an uncorrectable data corruption is detected, procedures such as automatic retransmission or restoration from backups can be applied. Certain levels of Redundant array of independent disks|RAID disk arrays have the ability to store and evaluate parity bits for data across a set of hard disks and can reconstruct corrupted data upon the failure of a single or multiple disks, depending on the level of RAID implemented.
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Data corruption - Countermeasures
Many errors are detected and corrected by the hard disk drives using the ECC/CRC codes which are stored on disk for each sector. If the disk drive detects multiple read errors on a sector it may make a copy of the failing sector on another part of the disk- remapping the failed sector of the disk to a spare sector without the involvement of the operating system (though this may be delayed until the next write to the sector).
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Data corruption - Countermeasures
This silent correction can lead to other problems if disk storage is not managed well, as the disk drive will continue to remap sectors until it runs out of spares, at which time the temporary correctable errors can turn into permanent ones as the disk drive deteriorates
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Data corruption - Countermeasures
Some filesystems (including Btrfs and ZFS) provide internal data and metadata checksumming, what is used for detecting silent data corruption; if a corruption is detected that way and internal RAID mechanisms provided by those filesystems are also used, such filesystems can additionally reconstruct corrupted data in a transparent way. This approach allows improved data integrity protection covering the entire data paths, which is usually known as end-to-end data protection.
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Data corruption - Countermeasures
Data scrubbing is another method to reduce the likelihood of data corruption, as disk errors are caught and recovered from, before multiple errors accumulate and overwhelm the number of parity bits
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Data corruption - Countermeasures
If appropriate mechanisms are employed to detect and remedy data corruption, data integrity can be maintained
284
Brute force attack - Countermeasures
However database and directory administrators can take countermeasures against online attacks, for example by limiting the number of attempts that a password can be tried, by introducing time delays between successive attempts, increasing the answer's complexity (e.g
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Geophysical MASINT - Magnetic detonators and countermeasures
Magnetic sensors, much more sophisticated than the early inductive loops, can trigger the explosion of mines or torpedoes. Early in World War II, the US tried to put magnetic torpedo exploder far beyond the limits of the technology of the time, and had to disable it, and then work on also-unreliable contact fuzing, to make torpedoes more than blunt objects than banged into hulls.
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Geophysical MASINT - Magnetic detonators and countermeasures
Since water is incompressible, an explosion under the keel of a vessel is far more destructive than one at the air-water interface. Torpedo and mine designers want to place the explosions in that vulnerable spot, and countermeasures designers want to hide the magnetic signature of a vessel. Signature is especially relevant here, as mines may be made selective for warships, merchant vessel unlikely to be hardened against underwater explosions, or submarines.
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Geophysical MASINT - Magnetic detonators and countermeasures
A basic countermeasure, started in World War II, was degaussing, but it is impossible to remove all magnetic properties.
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Signals intelligence - Countermeasures to interception
Spread-spectrum communications is an Electronic counter-countermeasures|electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) technique to defeat looking for particular frequencies. Spectrum analysis can be used in a different ECCM way to identify frequencies not being jammed or not in use.
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Signals intelligence - Mitigation and countermeasures
The word TEMPEST itself, and its meaning, are unclassified
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Signals intelligence - Mitigation and countermeasures
#Red/Black Installation Guidance
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Signals intelligence - Mitigation and countermeasures
#Specification for Shielded Enclosures
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Signals intelligence - Mitigation and countermeasures
A number of individuals have made a hobby of ferreting out TEMPEST and related information, and firms in the broader-than-TEMPEST business of technical surveillance counter-measures (TSCM) also reveal concepts.
293
Clandestine cell system - A possible countermeasure
In 2002, U.S
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Clandestine cell system - A possible countermeasure
Writing in the U.S
295
Key disclosure law - Theory and countermeasures
Mandatory decryption is technically a weaker requirement than key disclosure, since it is possible in some cryptosystems to prove that a message has been decrypted correctly without revealing the key
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Key disclosure law - Theory and countermeasures
As a countermeasure to key disclosure laws, some personal privacy products such as BestCrypt, FreeOTFE, and TrueCrypt have begun incorporating deniable encryption technology, which enable a single piece of encrypted data to be decrypted in two or more different ways, creating plausible deniability.[ Plausible Deniability][ TrueCrypt - Free Open-Source On-The-Fly Disk Encryption Software for Windows 7/Vista/XP, Mac OS X and Linux - Hidden Volume] Another alternative is steganography, which hides encrypted data inside of benign data so that it is more difficult to identify in the first place.
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Key disclosure law - Theory and countermeasures
A problematic aspect of key disclosure is that it leads to a total compromise of all data encrypted using that key in the past or future; time-limited encryption schemes such as those of Desmedt et al. allow decryption only for a limited time period.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
There are other countermeasures to avoid DLL Hell, some of which may have to be used simultaneously:
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
Some other features that help to mitigate the problem are
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* Installation tools are now bundled into Microsoft Visual Studio, one of the main environments for Windows development. These tools perform version checking before DLL installation, and can include predefined installation packages in a .MSI installation. This allows third party applications to integrate OS component updates without having to write their own installers for these components.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* System Restore can recover a system from a bad installation, including registry damage. While this does not prevent the problem, it makes it easier to recover from.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* WinSxS (Side-by-side assembly|Windows Side-by-Side) folder, which allows multiple versions of the same libraries to co-exist.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* Run 16-bit applications in separate memory space under a 32-bit version of Windows, to allow two applications to use conflicting versions of the same DLL at the same time.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* Use a version of Windows that includes Windows File Protection. Windows Me and Windows 2000, both released in 2000, support this form of system file protection, as do Windows XP and Windows Server Its replacement, Windows Resource Protection, was introduced in Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, and uses a different method of protecting system files from being changed.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* Registration-free COM: Windows XP introduced a new mode of COM object registration called Registration-free COM
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* Shipping the Operating System with a capable package management system that is able to track the DLL dependencies, encouraging the use of the package manager and discouraging manual installation of DLLs. Windows Installer, included with Windows Me, Windows 2000 and all later versions provides this functionality.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* Having a central database or authority for DLL conflict resolution and software distribution. Changes to a library can be submitted to this authority; thus, it can make sure compatibility is preserved in the developed branches. If some older software is incompatible with the current library, the authority can provide a compatibility interface for it, or bundle the old version as a distinct package.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* If software developers need to customize a library, and if the main library release is unlikely to incorporate the changes that they need, they can ship the customized DLL for the program's private use (commonly by placing it in the program's private directory) or statically link the program against the customized library.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* While DLLs are best for modularizing applications and the system's components and as third-party libraries, their usage is not imperative in all cases on modern systems where memory is no longer a constraint. For example, if an application needs a library that will not be used anywhere else, it can be linked statically, with no space penalty and with a speed gain.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* Windows Vista and later use a special TrustedInstaller service to install Operating System files. Other user accounts, including the SYSTEM, have no access to overwrite core system binaries. Windows 7 expands this functionality to some critical parts of the Registry.
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DLL hell - Other countermeasures
* Web-based applications avoid many side-by-side problems by running the bulk of the code on a server and using a browser interface on the client.
312
Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Because side channel attacks rely on the relationship between information emitted (leaked) through the side-channel and the secret data, countermeasures fall into two main categories: (1) eliminate or reduce the release of such information; and (2) eliminate the relationship between the leaked information and the secret data; that is, make the leaked information unrelated, or rather uncorrelated, to the secret data, typically through some form of randomization of the ciphertext that transforms the data in a way that can be undone after the cryptographic operation (e.g., decryption) is completed.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Under the first category, displays are now commercially available which have been specially shielded to lessen electromagnetic emissions reducing susceptibility to TEMPEST attacks
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Another countermeasure (still in the first category) is to jam the emitted channel with noise. For instance, a random delay can be added to deter timing attacks, although adversaries can compensate for these delays by averaging multiple measurements together (or, more generally, using more measurements in the analysis). As the amount of noise in the side channel increases, the adversary needs to collect more measurements.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
In the case of timing attacks against targets whose computation times are quantized into discrete clock cycle counts, an effective countermeasure against is to design the software so that it is isochronous—so it runs in an exactly constant amount of time, independently of secret values. This makes timing attacks impossible.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
[ A Network-based Asynchronous Architecture for Cryptographic Devices]
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
in sections Countermeasures, Countermeasures,
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
3.5.8 Hardware countermeasures, and 4.10 Side-channel analysis of asynchronous architectures.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Such countermeasures can be difficult to implement in practice, since even individual instructions can have variable timing on some CPUs.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
One partial countermeasure against simple power attacks, but not differential power analysis attacks, is to design the software so that it is PC-secure in the program counter security model. In a PC-secure program, the execution path does not depend on secret values—in other words, all conditional branches depend only on public information.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
(This is a more restrictive condition than isochronous code, but a less restrictive condition than branch-free code.)
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Even though multiply operations draw more power than NOP on practically all CPUs, using a constant execution path prevents such operation-dependent power differences—differences in power from choosing one branch over another—from leaking any secret information.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
On architectures where the instruction execution time is not data-dependent, a PC-secure program is also immune to timing attacks.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
[ The Program Counter Security Model: Automatic Detection and Removal of Control-Flow Side Channel Attacks][ Usenix.org] by David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz, David Wagner (2005)
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Another way in which code can be non-isochronous is that modern CPUs have a memory cache: accessing infrequently used information incurs a large timing penalty, revealing some information about the frequency of use of memory blocks
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Other partial countermeasures attempt to reduce the amount of information leaked from data-dependent power differences.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Some operations use power that is correlated to the number of 1 bits in a secret value.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Using a constant-weight code (such as using Fredkin gates or dual-rail encoding) can reduce the leakage of information about the Hamming weight of the secret value, although exploitable correlations are likely to remain unless the balancing is perfect. This balanced design can be approximated in software by manipulating both the data and its complement together.
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
Several secure CPUs have been built as asynchronous circuit#Asynchronous CPU|asynchronous CPUs; they have no global timing reference. While these CPUs were intended to make timing and power attacks more difficult, subsequent research found that timing variations in asynchronous circuits are harder to remove .
330
Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
A typical example of the second category is a technique known as blinding (cryptography)|blinding
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Side-channel attack - Countermeasures
obtain ^d = y^d \cdot r^ = y^d \cdot r. Since the decrypting system chose r, it can compute its inverse modulo m to cancel out the factor r in the result and obtain y^d, the actual result of the decryption. For attacks that require collecting side-channel information from operations with data controlled by the attacker, blinding is an effective countermeasure, since the actual operation is executed on a randomized version of the data, over which the attacker has no control or even knowledge.
332
Keylogger - Countermeasures
The effectiveness of countermeasures varies, because keyloggers use a variety of techniques to capture data and the countermeasure needs to be effective against the particular data capture technique. For example, an on-screen keyboard will be effective against hardware keyloggers, transparency will defeat some—but not all—screenloggers and an anti-spyware application that can only disable hook-based keyloggers will be ineffective against kernel-based keyloggers.
333
Skimming (credit card fraud) - Countermeasures
Countermeasures to combat credit card fraud include the following.
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Skimming (credit card fraud) - Countermeasures
*Regulation, such as that introduced in the Single Euro Payment Area|SEPA and EU28 by the European Central Bank's [ 'SecuRE Pay'] requirements and the [ Payment Services Directive 2] legislation.
335
Strategic Defense Initiative - Countermeasures
In war-fighting, countermeasures can have a variety of meanings:
336
Strategic Defense Initiative - Countermeasures
# The immediate tactical action to reduce vulnerability, such as Chaff (radar countermeasure)|chaff, decoys, and maneuvering.
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Strategic Defense Initiative - Countermeasures
# Counter strategies which exploit a weakness of an opposing system, such as adding more MIRV warheads which are less expensive than the interceptors fired against them.
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Strategic Defense Initiative - Countermeasures
# Defense suppression. That is, attacking elements of the defensive system.
339
Strategic Defense Initiative - Countermeasures
Countermeasures of various types have long been a key part of warfighting strategy. However, with SDI they attained a special prominence due to the system cost, scenario of a massive sophisticated attack, strategic consequences of a less-than-perfect defense, outer spacebasing of many proposed weapons systems, and political debate.
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Strategic Defense Initiative - Countermeasures
Whereas the current U.S. National Missile Defense|NMD system is designed around a relatively limited and unsophisticated attack, SDI planned for a massive attack by a sophisticated opponent. This raised significant issues about economic and technical costs associated with defending against anti-ballistic missile defense countermeasures used by the attacking side.
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Strategic Defense Initiative - Countermeasures
For example, if it had been much cheaper to add attacking warheads than to add defenses, an attacker of similar economic power could have simply outproduced the defender. This requirement of being cost effective at the margin was first formulated by Paul Nitze in November 1985.Marilyn Berger. [ Paul Nitze, Cold War Arms Expert, Dies at 97].(PDF) New York Times. October 20, 2004.
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Strategic Defense Initiative - Countermeasures
In addition, SDI envisioned many space-based systems in fixed orbits, ground-based sensors, command, control and communications facilities, etc. In theory, an advanced opponent could have targeted those, in turn requiring self-defense capability or increased numbers to compensate for attrition.
343
Strategic Defense Initiative - Countermeasures
A sophisticated attacker having the technology to use decoys, shielding, maneuvering warheads, defense suppression, or other countermeasures would have multiplied the difficulty and cost of intercepting the real warheads. SDI design and operational planning had to factor in these countermeasures and the associated cost.
344
Botnet - Countermeasures
The geographic dispersal of botnets means that each recruit must be individually identified/corralled/repaired and limits the benefits of firewall (networking)|filtering
345
Botnet - Countermeasures
Security companies such as Afferent Security Labs, Symantec, Trend Micro, FireEye, Inc.|FireEye, Umbra Data, Inc.|Umbra Data and Damballa (company)|Damballa have announced offerings to counter botnets
346
Botnet - Countermeasures
Command and control is embedded into the botnet rather than relying on external servers, thus avoiding any single point of failure and evading many countermeasures
347
Botnet - Countermeasures
Some botnets are capable of detecting and reacting to attempts to investigate them, reacting perhaps with a DDoS#Distributed attack|DDoS attack on the IP address of the investigator.
348
Camping (computer gaming) - Countermeasures
Although camping can give players a tactical advantage especially against less experienced players, they are left vulnerable if they consistently stay in one spot
349
Camping (computer gaming) - Countermeasures
This type of gameplay is sometimes seen as one of the core components of Attack/Defend matches as both teams seek to set up or destroy prepared defensive positions. However, these maps are usually under a time or casualty limit to passively encourage or discourage camping behaviors and designers must take great care in designing maps to prevent the creation of essentially unassailable camping spots.
350
Camping (computer gaming) - Countermeasures
Some shooters include settings that kill the player if he or she stays in one location, not moving, for a certain amount of time.
351
Double Irish arrangement - Countermeasures
In 2010, the Obama administration was said to propose to tax excessive profits of offshore subsidiaries as a curb on tax avoidance
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Double Irish arrangement - Counter-Countermeasures
Companies such as Google, Oracle Corporation|Oracle and FedEx are declaring fewer of their ongoing offshore subsidiaries in their public financial filings, which has the effect of reducing visibility of entities declared in known tax havens.[ From Google to FedEx: The Incredible Vanishing Subsidiary]
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Staling - Countermeasures
Anti-staling agents used in bread include Gluten|wheat gluten, enzymes, and Lipid#Glycerolipids|glycerolipids, mainly monoglycerides and diglycerides.
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MUSCULAR - Reactions and countermeasures
In early November 2013, Google announced that it was encrypting traffic between its data centers. In mid-November, Yahoo! announced similar plans.
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MUSCULAR - Reactions and countermeasures
In December 2013, Microsoft announced similar plans and used the expression advanced persistent threat in their press release (signed-off by their top legal representative), which the press immediately interpreted as comparison of the NSA with the Chinese government-sponsored hackers.
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Greek fire - Effectiveness and countermeasures
Although the destructiveness of Greek fire is indisputable, it should not be seen as some sort of wonder weapon, nor did it make the Byzantine navy invincible
357
Tocotrienol - Tocotrienols as radiation countermeasures
Following exposure to gamma radiation, hematopoietic stem cells (HSCs) in the bone marrow, which are important for producing blood cells, rapidly undergo apoptosis (cell death)
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Tocotrienol - Tocotrienols as radiation countermeasures
In one study, after exposure to total-body irradiation, the number of hematopoietic progenitor cells (HPCs) in mice treated with γ-tocotrienol recovered by 90% after 7 days while HPC counts of the mice in the control group, which were treated identically except that they did not receive any form of tocotrienol, failed to recover by more than 30%, even after 13 days
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Tocotrienol - Tocotrienols as radiation countermeasures
A 2014 AFRRI study conducted using irradiated mice found that δ-tocotrienol administration induced higher levels of cytokines than other tocols being studied as radiation countermeasures
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Tocotrienol - Tocotrienols as radiation countermeasures
A 2009 study conducted at AFRRI sought to evaluate the radio-protective potential of γ-tocotrienol including how best to optimize the treatment regimen in terms of both time and dose
361
Energy weapons - Countermeasures
The Chinese People's Liberation Army has invested in the development of coatings that can deflect beams fired by U.S
362
Ninja - Countermeasures
A variety of countermeasures were taken to prevent the activities of the ninja. Precautions were often taken against assassinations, such as weapons concealed in the lavatory, or under a removable floorboard. Buildings were constructed with traps and trip wires attached to alarm bells.
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Ninja - Countermeasures
Japanese castles were designed to be difficult to navigate, with winding routes leading to the inner compound
364
Polygraph - Countermeasures
Several countermeasures designed to pass polygraph tests have been described
365
Polygraph - Countermeasures
Other suggestions for countermeasures include for the subject to mentally record the control and relevant questions as the examiner reviews them prior to commencing the interrogation
366
Polygraph - Countermeasures
There are two types of countermeasures: General State (intending to alter the physiological or psychological state of the examinee for the length of the test), and Specific Point (intending to alter the physiological or psychological state of the examinee at specific periods during the examination, either to increase or decrease responses during critical examination periods).
367
Butyrylcholinesterase - Prophylactic countermeasure against nerve gas
Butyrylcholinesterase is a prophylactic countermeasure against organophosphate nerve agents. It binds nerve agent in the bloodstream before it can exert effects in the nervous system. Because it is a biological scavenger (and universal target), it is currently the only therapeutic agent effective in providing complete stoichiometry|stoichiometric protection against the entire spectrum of organophosphate nerve agents.
368
Bunker - Countermeasures
Bunkers can be destroyed with powerful explosives and bunkerbusting warheads. The crew of a pillbox (fortification)|pillbox can be killed with flamethrowers.[ Flame Thrower] Complex, well-built and well-protected fortifications are often vulnerable to attacks on access points. If the exits to the surface can be closed off, those manning the facility can be trapped. The fortification can then be bypassed.
369
Mass murder - Police response and countermeasures
Analysis of the Columbine High School massacre and other incidents where first responders waited for backup has resulted in changed recommendations regarding what bystanders and first responders should do
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
None of the First World War's combatants was prepared for the introduction of poison gas as a weapon. Once gas had appeared, development of gas protection began and the process continued for much of the war producing a series of increasingly effective gas masks.
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
Even at Second Ypres, Germany, still unsure of the weapon's effectiveness, only issued breathing masks to the engineers handling the gas
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
The next advance was the introduction of the gas helmet mdash; basically a bag placed over the head
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
A modified version of the P Helmet, called the PH Helmet, was issued in January 1916, and was additionally impregnated with hexamethylenetetramine to improve the protection against phosgene.
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
Self-contained box respirators represented the culmination of gas mask development during the First World War
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
The Small Box Respirator featured a single-piece, close-fitting rubberized mask with eye-pieces
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
Humans were not the only ones that needed protection from gas clouds. Horses and mules were important methods of transportation that could be endangered if they came into close contact with gas. This was not so much of a problem until it became common to launch gas great distances. This caused many researchers to develop masks that could be used on animals such as dogs, horses, mules, and even carrier pigeons.
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
*[ A dog wearing a gas mask in WWI.]
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
*[ A WWI pigeon loft equipped with gas protection.]
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Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
For mustard gas, which could cause severe damage by simply making contact with skin, no effective countermeasure was found during the war. The kilt-wearing Scottish regiments were especially vulnerable to mustard gas injuries due to their bare legs. At Nieuwpoort, Belgium|Nieuwpoort in Flanders some Scottish battalions took to wearing women's tights beneath the kilt as a form of protection.
380
Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
Gas alert procedure became a routine for the front-line soldier. To warn of a gas attack, a bell would be rung, often made from a spent artillery shell. At the noisy artillery battery|batteries of the siege guns, a compressed air strombus horn was used, which could be heard nine miles (14km) away. Notices would be posted on all approaches to an affected area, warning people to take precautions.
381
Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
Other British attempts at countermeasures were not so effective. An early plan was to use 100,000 fans to disperse the gas. Burning coal or Silicon carbide|carborundum dust was tried. A proposal was made to equip front-line sentries with diving helmets, air being pumped to them through a 100ft (30 m) hose.
382
Chemical weapons in World War I - Countermeasures
However, the effectiveness of all countermeasures is apparent. In 1915, when poison gas was relatively new, less than 3% of British gas casualties died. In 1916, the proportion of fatalities jumped to 17%. By 1918, the figure was back below 3%, though the total number of British gas casualties was now nine times the 1915 levels.
383
Messaging spam - Countermeasures
* Many users choose to receive IMs only from people already on their contact list.
384
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
Countermeasures against anti-ship missiles include:
385
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
*Surface-to-air missile|Anti-missile missiles such as the Russian Navy's 9K33 Osa#Variants|9K33 Osa (SA-N-4 Gecko), SA-N-9 Gauntlet#3K95 Kinzhal|9M330 Tor (SA-N-9 Gauntlet), Buk missile system#3S90 .22Uragan.22|9M38 Buk (SA-N-12 Grizzly), RIM-7 Sea Sparrow|Sea Sparrow, the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile|Rolling Airframe Missile, the Standard missile|Standard, or the Royal Navy's Sea Wolf missile|Sea Wolf or Sea Dart missile|Sea Dart and the newer Sea Viper.
386
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
The ships were attacked by an Iraqi Silkworm missile (often referred to as the Seersucker), at which Missouri fired its Mark 36 SRBOC|SRBOC chaff (radar countermeasure)|chaff
387
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
*Close-in weapon systems (CIWS), including the Soviet-or Russian-made AK-630 or Kashtan CIWS|Kashtan/Каштан or the Phalanx and Goalkeeper. These are automated gun systems mounted on the deck of a ship that use radar to track the approaching missile, and then attempt to shoot it down during its final approach to the target.
388
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
*Anti-aircraft guns such as the 5-54 Mark 45|Mk 45 5-inch naval gun or the AK-130
389
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
*Electronic warfare equipment (such as SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare Suite)
390
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
*Decoy systems (such as chaff (radar countermeasure)|chaff - the US Navy's RBOC system), and flare (countermeasure)|flares, or more active decoys such as the Nulka
391
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
Modern stealth ships – or ships that at least employ some stealth technology – to reduce the risk of detection and to make them a harder target for the missile itself. These passive countermeasures include:
392
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
*reduction of their radar cross section (RCS) and hence radar signature.
393
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
*limit a ship's infrared signature|infrared and acoustic signature.
394
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
Examples of these include the Norway|Norwegian Skjold-class patrol boat, the Sweden|Swedish Visby-class corvette, the Germany|German Sachsen-class frigate, the US Navy's Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, their Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force's close counterparts in AEGIS warships, the Chinese Type 054 frigate and the Type 052C destroyer, the Indian Shivalik-class frigate and Kolkata-class destroyer, the French La Fayette-class frigate and the newer FREMM multipurpose frigate.
395
Anti-ship missile - Countermeasures
In response to China’s development of anti-ship missiles and other anti-access/area denial capabilities, the United States has developed the AirSea Battle doctrine
396
Tanks - Protection and countermeasures
The measure of a tank's protection is the combination of its ability to avoid detection, to avoid being hit by enemy fire, its resistance to the effects of enemy fire, and its capacity to sustain damage whilst still completing its objective, or at least protecting its crew. This is done by a variety of countermeasures, such as armour plating and reactive defences, as well as more complex ones such as heat-emissions reduction.
397
Tanks - Protection and countermeasures
In common with most unit types, tanks are subject to additional hazards in wooded and urban combat environments which largely negate the advantages of the tank's long-range firepower and mobility, limit the crew's detection capabilities and can restrict turret traverse. Despite these disadvantages, tanks retain high survivability against previous-generation rocket-propelled grenades in all combat environments by virtue of their armour.
398
Tanks - Protection and countermeasures
However, as effective and advanced as armour plating has become, tank survivability against newer-generation tandem-warhead anti-tank missiles is a concern for military planners.#BBCNews2006|BBC News (2006) Tough lessons for Israeli armour For example, the RPG-29 from 1980s is able to penetrate the frontal hull armour of the Challenger II and also managed to damage a M1 Abrams.
399
BMP-3 - Countermeasures
The hull and turret are made of aluminium, with the front being provided with a layer of spaced armour. Over the frontal 60 degree arc, the vehicle is protected against 30mm armour-piercing rounds of 2A42 gun at a range of 300 m. In an effort to improve battlefield survivability, the fuel tanks are also located in the floor of the vehicle.
400
BMP-3 - Countermeasures
The BMP-3 can lay its own smoke screen by injecting fuel into the exhaust. A chemical agent detector, an FVU filtration system, an automatic fire extinguisher and six 902V Tucha-2 81mm smoke grenade launchers are standard.
401
BMP-3 - Countermeasures
An explosive reactive armour kit is currently available, providing increased protection. However, using ERA on an IFV is considered problematic by some experts, since in the event of the malfunction of the ERA, it can possibly pose a threat to friendly troops located in the vicinity of the vehicle.
402
BMP-3 - Countermeasures
The BMP-3 also has the ability to carry a Shtora electro-optical jammer that disrupts semiautomatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) antitank guided missiles, laser rangefinders and target designators. Shtora is a soft-kill, or passive-countermeasure system.
403
Blackdamp - Detection and countermeasures
In active mining operations, the threat from blackdamp is addressed with proper mineshaft ventilation as well as various detection methods, typically using safety lamp|miner's safety lamps or hand-held electronic gas detectors
404
BMP-2 - Countermeasures
The original BMP-1 had a significant shortcoming in its protection scheme, which only became obvious during the war in Afghanistan
405
BMP-2 - Countermeasures
This shortcoming was addressed in the BMP-2 design, where the tank commander shares the well-armoured two-man turret with the gunner. The driver's station has been enlarged and he is provided with an armoured driver's seat, in addition to extra belly-armour in the lower front.
406
BMP-2 - Countermeasures
The BMP-2's armour is broadly similar to the original BMP-1
407
BMP-2 - Countermeasures
The problem most often cited by western analysts is the design of the main fuel tanks
408
BMP-2 - Countermeasures
However, the rear door tanks are not always filled as they are meant to increase road travel range of the vehicle, and are almost always empty when the BMP goes into combat, instead being filled with sand to add protection
409
BMP-2 - Countermeasures
Furthermore, it is not clear what could be a better alternative to the infantry positioning in an IFV. A hit which actually reaches the center of a vehicle (and the fuel tanks) would presumably impact the infantry inside first. Also investigation by USAF LTC James Burton demonstrated that the center of a vehicle is more likely to be hit, which implies that placing the whole complement of infantry in the center of a vehicle is potentially even more dangerous.
410
BMP-2 - Countermeasures
Therefore the arguments about the design of the fuel tanks or crew positioning in the BMP can only be considered an opinion as there is no clearly better alternative given weight, functionality, and mobility requirements.
411
BMP-2 - Countermeasures
The basic hull armour on the BMP-2 can be easily penetrated by any shaped-charge missile, from the 66mm M72 LAW|LAW on up. One important modification carried out as the result of operational experience in Afghanistan was the fitting of a second layer of stand-off armour, usually a high resistant ballistic rubber-like material, to act as spaced armour around the top of the hull sides and around the attack.
412
Cyber security and countermeasure
There are many countermeasures that can be put in place, in order to ensure security of the data
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Cyber security and countermeasure
Computer crime|Cybercrime (or computer crime) refers to any crime that involves a computer and a computer network|network.Moore, R. (2005) Cybercrime: Investigating High-Technology Computer Crime, Cleveland, Mississippi: Anderson Publishing.
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Cyber security and countermeasure
4009] dated 26 April 2010 An alternate meaning of countermeasure from the InfosecToday glossary[ InfosecToday Glossary] is:
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Cyber security and countermeasure
:The deployment of a set of security services to protect against a security threat.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
Although different types of Threat (computer)|threats (e.g., earthquakes, floods, Electrical breakdown|electrical break-down) can cause an incident, or may harm a system or an organisation,ISO/IEC, Information technology -- Security tecniques-Information security risk management ISO/IEC FIDIS 27005:2008 only intentional threats will be considered here.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
According to Microsoft's classification there are 6 categories of threats:
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
*Spoofing attack|Spoofing of user identity : describes a situation in which one person or program successfully masquerades as another by falsifying data and thereby gaining an illegitimate advantage.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
*Tampering (crime)|Tampering : describes an intentional modification of products in a way that would make them harmful to the consumer.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
*Non-repudiation|Repudiation : describes a situation where the Authentication|authenticity of a signature is being challenged.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
*Information Disclosure (Data privacy|Privacy breach or Data leak) : describes a situation where information, thought as secure, is released in an untrusted environment.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
*Denial-of-service attack|Denial of Service (DoS): describes a situation where a technological resource (computer, network, ...) becomes unavailable to its intended user.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
*Privilege escalation|Elevation of Privilege : describes a situation where a person or a program were to gain elevated privileges or access to resources that are normally restricted to him/it.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
This model is named after the initials of every threat : STRIDE (security)|STRIDE, and is now widely used. Nevertheless, other models do exists ; for instance the DREAD: Risk assessment model|DREAD : Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
To exploit those Vulnerability (computing)|vulnerabilities, perpetrators (Hacker (computer security)|individual hacker or a criminal organization) most commonly use malware (malicious software), Computer worm|worms, Computer viruses|viruses and targeted attacks.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
To assess the risk of an attack, different scale exists. In the United States, authorities use the Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) system. This system is scaled from 5 to 1 (INFOCON 5 being an harmless situation and INFOCON 1 representing the most critical threats).
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Threats
Except human factors, their own flaws of system also is a threat
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Past attacks: the need for policy
Over the past 10 to 15 years, multiple cyber attacks occurred targeting both List of United States federal agencies|governmental agencies and private companies.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Past attacks: the need for policy
*In 2000, several commercial websites including Yahoo.com, Amazon.com, eBay.com, Buy.com, CNN.com, ZDNet.com hit massive DOS. The FBI estimated that the attack caused $1.7 billion in damage.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Past attacks: the need for policy
*In 2003, a SQL Slammer|slammer worm infected 90% of vulnerable computers within 10 minutes. This caused interferences with elections, airline flights cancellation, Seattle's 9-1-1|911 emergency system failure and over 13,000 Bank of America Automated teller machine|ATMs failure. The lost in productivity was estimated around $1 billion.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Past attacks: the need for policy
*Since 2003, a series of coordinated attacks on American computer systems occurred. The US government designated those attacks as Titan Rain. Titan Rain hackers gained access to many U.S. computer networks, including those at Lockheed Martin, Sandia National Laboratories, Redstone Arsenal, and NASA.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - A global problem
As a fundamental principle, cyberspace is a vital asset to the nation and the United States should protect itCybersecurity Act of is the opening statement of the Cybersecurity act of 2010.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - A global problem
Most countries do not possess a Infrastructure|digital infrastructure that can be qualified as Information security|secure. The United States is no different: Without major advances in the security of these systems or significant change in how they are constructed or operated, it is doubtful that the United States can protect itself from the growing threat of cybercrime and state-sponsored intrusions and operations.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - A global problem
As more than 85% of the digital infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector in the United States, it is crucial that both public and private sectors, in addition of on their own, cooperate on finding a global solution.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Government
The role of the government is to make Cyber-security regulation|regulations to force companies and organizations to protect their system, infrastructure and information from any cyber attacks, but also to protect its own national infrastructure such as the national Power grid|power-grid.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Government
The question of whether the government should intervene or not in the regulation of the cyberspace is a very polemical one. Indeed, for as long as it has existed and by definition, the cyberspace is a virtual space free of any government intervention. Where everyone agree that an improvement on Cyber security|cybersecurity is more than vital, is the government the best actor to solve this issue?
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Government
Many government officials and experts think that the government should step in and that there is a crucial need for regulation, mainly due to the failure of the private sector to solve efficiently the cybersecurity problem. Richard A. Clarke|R. Clarke said during a panel discussion at the RSA Conference|RSA Security Conference in San Francisco, he believes that the industry only responds when you threaten regulation. If industry doesn't respond (to the threat), you have to follow through.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Government
On the other hand, executives from the private sector agree that improvements are necessary but think that the government intervention would affect their ability to innovate efficiently.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Public–private cooperation
The cybersecurity act of 2010 establishes the creation of an advisory panel, each member of this panel will be appointed by the President of the United States|President of the United-States. They must represent the private sector, the Academia|academic sector, the public sector and the Nonprofit organization|non-profit organisations. The purpose of the panel is to advise the government as well as help improve strategies.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Public–private cooperation
InfraGard is an example of public-private organization.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Cyber Security Act of 2010
The Cybersecurity Act of S. 773 ([ full text]) was introduced first in the United States Senate|Senate on April 1, 2009 by Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN), Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), and Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME). The revised version was approved on March 24, 2009.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Cyber Security Act of 2010
The main objective of the bill is to increase collaboration between the public and the private sector on the issue of cybersecurity. But also
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Cyber Security Act of 2010
:to ensure the continued free flow of commerce within the United States and with its global trading partners through secure cyber communications, to provide for the continued development and exploitation of the Internet and intranet communications for such purposes, to provide for the development of a cadre of information technology specialists to improve and maintain effective cybersecurity defenses against disruption, and for other purposes.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Cyber Security Act of 2010
The act also wants to instate new higher Technical standard|standards, processes, technologies and Communications protocol|protocols to ensure the security of the critical infrastructure.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Government initiatives
The government put together several different websites to inform, share and analyze information. Those websites are targeted to different audiences:
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Government initiatives
*the Federal government of the United States|government itself: U.S. state|states, US cities|cities, County (United States)|counties
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Government initiatives
* : the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The mission of the MS-ISAC is to improve the overall cyber security posture of state, local, territorial and tribal governments.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Government initiatives
* : The mission of this website is to provide practical tips from the federal government and the technology industry to help the end user be on guard against internet fraud, secure their computers, and protect their private personal information.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Government initiatives
* : The Computer Security Division (Computer Security Resource Center) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Its mission is to provide assistance, guidelines, specifications, minimum information security requirements...
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Homeland Security
The United States Department of Homeland Security|Department of Homeland Security has a dedicated division responsible for the response system, risk management program and rmmequirements for cyber security in the United States called the National Cyber Security Division. The division is home to US-CERT operations and the National Cyber Alert System.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Homeland Security
*help government and end-users to transition to new cyber security capabilities
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Homeland Security
In October 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security|Department of Homeland Security opened the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center. The center brings together government organizations responsible for protecting computer networks and networked infrastructure.AFP-JiJi, U.S. boots up cybersecurity center, October 31, 2009.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - FBI
The third priority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI) is to:
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Cyber security and countermeasure - FBI
:Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes
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Cyber security and countermeasure - FBI
According to the 2010 Internet Crime Report, 303,809 complaints were received via the IC3 website. The Internet Crime Complaint Center, also known as IC3, is a multi-agency task force made up by the FBI, the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA).[ Internet Crime Complaint Center]
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Cyber security and countermeasure - FBI
According to the same report, here are the top 10 reported offense in the United States only :
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Cyber security and countermeasure - FBI
*5. Miscellaneous Fraud 8.6%
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Cyber security and countermeasure - FBI
In addition to its own duties, the FBI participates in non-profit organization such as InfraGard.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - FBI
InfraGard is a private non-profit organization serving as a public-private partnership between U.S
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Department of Justice
In the United States Department of Justice Criminal Division|criminal division of the United States Department of Justice operates a section called the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section. The CCIPS is in charge of investigating computer crime and intellectual property crime and is specialized in the search and seizure of digital evidence in computers and Computer network|networks.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Department of Justice
:The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) is responsible for implementing the Department's national strategies in combating computer and intellectual property crimes worldwide
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Cyber security and countermeasure - USCYBERCOM
The United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is one of the nine Unified Combatant Commands of the United States Department of Defense (DoD). The Command, including components, employs more than 2,700 people, representing all four services, including DoD civilians and contractors, who oversee the command's operationally focused global strategic mission.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - USCYBERCOM
The USCYBERCOM|United States Cyber Command, also known as USCYBERCOM, is a sub-unified command subordinate to USSTRATCOM
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Cyber security and countermeasure - FCC
The U.S. Federal Communications Commission's role in cyber security is to strengthen the protection of critical communications infrastructure, to assist in maintaining the reliability of networks during disasters, to aid in swift recovery after, and to ensure that first responders have access to effective communications services.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Computer Emergency Readiness Team
Computer Emergency Response Team is a name given to expert groups that handle computer security incidents.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Computer Emergency Readiness Team
In the US, two distinct organization exist, although they do work closely together.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Computer Emergency Readiness Team
*US-CERT: the United States Computer Emergency Response Team is part of the National Cyber Security Division of the United States Department of Homeland Security.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Computer Emergency Readiness Team
*CERT Coordination Center|CERT/CC: The Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center is a major coordination center created by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and is run by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI).
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Cyber security and countermeasure - International actions
A lot of different teams and organisations exists, mixing private and public members. Here are some examples:
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Cyber security and countermeasure - International actions
*The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is the global association of CSIRTs. The US-CERT, ATT, Apple Inc.|Apple, Cisco, McAfee, Microsoft are all members of this international team.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - International actions
*The Council of Europe helps protect societies worldwide from the threat of cybercrime through the Convention on Cybercrime and its Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism, the Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) and the Project on Cybercrime.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - International actions
*The purpose of the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group (MAAWG) is to bring the messaging industry together to work collaboratively and to successfully address the various forms of messaging abuse, such as spam, viruses, denial-of-service attacks and other messaging exploitations
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Cyber security and countermeasure - International actions
*ENISA : The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is an agency of the European Union. It was created in 2004 by EU [ Regulation No 460/2004] and is fully operational since September 1, It has its seat in Heraklion, Crete (Greece).
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Cyber security and countermeasure - International actions
The objective of ENISA is to improve network and information security in the European Union. The agency has to contribute to the development of a culture of network and information security for the benefit of the citizens, consumers, enterprises and public sector organisations of the European Union, and consequently will contribute to the smooth functioning of the EU Internal Market.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - National teams
Here are the main computer emergency response teams around the world.
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Cyber security and countermeasure - National teams
Every country have their own team to protect network security
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Europe
CSIRTs in Europe collaborate in the TERENA task force TF-CSIRT. TERENA's Trusted Introducer service provides an accreditation and certification scheme for CSIRTs in Europe. A full list of known CSIRTs in Europe is available from the Trusted Introducer website.[
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Cyber security and countermeasure - Other countries
*[ CERT.br], Brazil, member of FIRST (Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams)
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Anti-submarine weapon - ASW Countermeasures
The main countermeasure the submarine has is stealth, that it tries not to be detected. Against the ASW weapon itself, both active and passive countermeasures are used. The former may be a noise making jammer or a decoy providing a signal that looks like a submarine. Passive countermeasures may consist of coatings to minimize a torpedo's sonar reflections or an outer hull to provide a stand-off from its explosion. The Anti-submarine weapon has to overcome these countermeasures.
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MANPADS - Countermeasures
Man-portable air defense systems are a popular black market item for insurgent forces.[ MANPADS at a Glance] Their proliferation became the subject of the Wassenaar Arrangement's (WA)22 Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS, the G8 Action Plan of 2 June 2003,[ G-8 to Take Further Steps to Enhance Transportation Security] the October 2003 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the Future and in July 2003 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security Co-operation, Decision No
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MANPADS - Countermeasures
Understanding the problem in 2003, Colin Powell remarked that there was no threat more serious to aviation than the missiles,[ Countering the MANPADS threat: strategies for success.(man-portable air defense systems)] which can be used to shoot down helicopters and commercial airliners, and are sold illegally for as little as a few hundred dollars
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MANPADS - Military countermeasures
With the growing number of MANPADS attacks on civilian airliners, a number of different countermeasure systems have been developed specifically to protect aircraft against the missiles.
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MANPADS - Military countermeasures
*'ALQ-144|AN/ALQ-144', 'AN/ALQ-147' and 'AN/ALQ-157' are U.S.-produced systems, developed by Sanders Associates in the 1970s.
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MANPADS - Military countermeasures
*'Directional Infrared Counter Measures|AN/ALQ-212 ATIRCM, AN/AAQ-24 Nemesis' are NATO systems developed by BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman respectively.
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MANPADS - Civilian countermeasures
*'CAMPS|Civil Aircraft Missile Protection System' (CAMPS)—Developed by Saab AB|Saab Avitronics, Chemring Countermeasures and Naturelink Aviation, using non-pyrotechnic infrared decoys.
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PT-76 - Countermeasures The armor of the PT-76 consists of homogeneous, cold rolled, welded steel
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Infantry fighting vehicle - Countermeasures
Generally, IFVs have thinner and less complex armour than tanks to ensure mobility
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Infantry fighting vehicle - Countermeasures
In IFVs, the thickness of armour varies widely between models. Some vehicles are proofed against .50 calibre bullets while others, such as Sweden's CV90, US M2 Bradley|Bradley M2A3 and Russia's BMP-3, can withstand frontal hits from 30mm autocannon. The sides, roof, and floor of IFVs have thinner armour. Vehicles must also protect crew against anti-personnel mines and against anti-tank mines.
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Infantry fighting vehicle - Countermeasures
Newer vehicles like the Finnish Patria AMV use armour made in interchangeable modules of various thickness
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Infantry fighting vehicle - Countermeasures
The most common counter measures are smoke grenade dischargers. These help IFVs to avoid a hits from ATGMs by allowing the IFV to hide behind a smoke screen. Some vehicles, such as the French VBCI, employ infra-red jamming flare dispensers. These are effective against missiles with IR guidance systems.
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Infantry fighting vehicle - Countermeasures
The term heavy infantry fighting vehicle is often applied to IFVs that are heavily armoured.
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T Countermeasures The T-62 has 5% better armour on the front of the hull (102mm at 60°) and 15% better armour on the front of the turret (242mm) than the T-54/T-55
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Light tank - Countermeasures
Typically, the armor in contemporary light tanks is modular, sometimes up to three configurations.
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Light tank - Countermeasures
The flat hull necessary for amphibious light tanks to planing (sailing)|plane across the surface of the water is not nearly as blast-resistant as the V-shape hull.[ JSF Not Too Hot For Carriers] It has been suggested that underbelly armor appliqué could be applied after the light tanks come ashore and before they encounter explosive devices.[ RS22947 The Marines Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): Background and Issues for Congress]
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Anti-tank missile - Countermeasures
Countermeasures against ATGMs include vehicle armour#Spaced armour|spaced, perforated, and composite armour, explosive reactive armour, Electronic countermeasures|jammers like the Russian Shtora, and active protection systems (APS) like the Israeli TROPHY Active Protection System|Trophy and the Russian Arena Active Protection System|Arena.
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Anti-tank missile - Countermeasures
Armour systems have continued in development alongside ATGMs, and the most recent generations of armor are specifically tested to be effective against ATGM strikes, either by 'tricking' the missile into not detonating against the armor itself (such as in Slat armor) or using some form of reactive armor to 'attack' the missile upon impact, disrupting shaped charge that makes the warhead effective
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Ghostwriter - As blacklisting countermeasure
In countries where the freedom of speech is not upheld and authors that have somehow displeased the ruling regime are blacklisted (i.e. forbidden from having their works published), the blacklisted authors or composers may ghostwrite material for other authors or composers who are in the good graces of the regime. A number of blacklisted communist sympathisers have won academy awards.
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Ghostwriter - As blacklisting countermeasure
* Carl Foreman and Michael Wilson (writer)|Michael Wilson for Bridge on the River Kwai (credited to Pierre Boulle who wrote The Bridge over the River Kwai|the novel.)
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Ghostwriter - As blacklisting countermeasure
* Dalton Trumbo for Roman Holiday (credited to Ian McLellan Hunter).
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Corruption in China - Countermeasures
The CCP has tried a variety of anti-corruption measures, constructing a variety of laws and agencies in an attempt to stamp out corruption.
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Corruption in China - Countermeasures
In 2004, the CCP devised strict regulations on officials assuming posts in business and enterprise
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Corruption in China - Countermeasures
Such measures are largely ineffective, however, due to the insufficient enforcement of the relevant laws
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Corruption in China - Countermeasures
While corruption has grown in scope and complexity, anti-corruption policies, on the other hand, have not changed much. Communist-style mass campaigns with anti-corruption slogans, moral exhortations, and prominently displayed miscreants, are still a key part of official policy, much as they were in the 1950s.
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Corruption in China - Countermeasures
In 2009, according to internal Party reports, there were 106,000 officials found guilty of corruption, an increase of 2.5 percent on the previous year. The number of officials caught embezzling more than one million yuan (US$146,000) went up by 19 percent over the year. With no independent oversight like NGOs or free media, corruption has flourished.Quentin Sommerville, [ Corruption up among China government officials], BBC, January 9, 2009
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Corruption in China - Countermeasures
These efforts are punctuated by an occasional harsh prison term for major offenders, or even executions
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Corruption in China - Countermeasures
Thus, while Party disciplinary organs and prosecutorial agencies produce impressive statistics on corruption complaints received from the public, few citizens or observers believe corruption is being systematically addressed.
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Corruption in China - Countermeasures
There are also limits to how far anti-corruption measures will go. For example, when Hu Jintao's son was implicated in a Nuctech|corruption investigation in Namibia, Chinese Internet portals and Party-controlled media were ordered not to report on it.
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Corruption in China - Countermeasures
At the same time, local leaders engage in corruption protectionism, as coined by the head of the Hunan provincial Party Discipline Inspection Commission; apparatchiks thwart corruption investigations against the staff of their own agencies, allowing them to escape punishment
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Laser weapon - Defensive countermeasures
IR countermeasure systems use lasers to confuse the seeker heads on heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles
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Laser weapon - Defensive countermeasures
Another example of direct use of a laser as a defensive weapon was researched for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, nicknamed Star Wars), and its successor programs
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Laser weapon - Defensive countermeasures
Another idea from the SDI project was the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser
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Shoaling and schooling - Predator countermeasures
Predators have devised various countermeasures to undermine the defensive shoaling and schooling manoeuvres of forage fish
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Shoaling and schooling - Predator countermeasures
During the sardine run, as many as 18,000 dolphins, behaving like sheepdogs, herd the sardines into bait balls, or corral them in shallow water
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Shoaling and schooling - Predator countermeasures
The sailfish raises its sail to make it appear much larger so it can herd a school of fish or squid. Swordfish charge at high speed through forage fish schools, slashing with their swords to kill or stun prey. They then turn and return to consume their catch.
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Shoaling and schooling - Predator countermeasures
Thresher sharks use their long tails to stun shoaling fishes
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Shoaling and schooling - Predator countermeasures
Spinner sharks charge vertically through the school, spinning on their axis with their mouths open and snapping all around. The shark's momentum at the end of these spiralling runs often carries it into the air.
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Shoaling and schooling - Predator countermeasures
Some whales lunge feed on bait balls.Reeves RR, Stewart BS, Clapham PJ and Powell J A (2002) [ National Audubon Society Guide to Marine Mammals of the World] Chanticleer Press
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Anti-tank mine - Countermeasures
The most effective countermeasure deployed against mine fields is Demining|mine clearing, using either explosive methods or mechanical methods
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Anti-tank mine - Countermeasures
There are also several ways of making vehicles resistant to the effects of a mine detonation to reduce the chance of crew injury. In case of a mine's blast effect, this can be done by absorbing the blast energy, deflecting it away from the vehicle hull or increasing the distance between the crew and the points where wheels touch the ground - where any detonations are likely to centre.
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Anti-tank mine - Countermeasures
A simple, and highly effective, technique to protect the occupants of a wheeled vehicle is to fill the tires with water.
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Anti-tank mine - Countermeasures
This will have the effect of absorbing and deflecting the mine's blast energy. Steel plates between the cabin and the wheels can absorb the energy and their effectiveness is enhanced if they can be angled to deflect it away from the cabin. Increasing the distance between the wheels and cabin, as is done on the South African Casspir personnel carrier, is an effective technique although there are mobility and ease of driving problems with such a vehicle.
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Anti-tank mine - Countermeasures
Steel plates and armoured glass will protect the occupants from fragments. Mounting seats from the sides or roof of the vehicle, rather than the floor, will help protect occupants from shocks transmitted through the structure of the vehicle and a four-point seat harness will minimise the chance of injury if the vehicle is flung onto its side or its roof - a mine may throw a vehicle 5 – 10 m from the detonation point.
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Call center security - Common countermeasures
There are three identifiable types of illicit activities concerning fraud emanating from call centers:
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Call center security - Common countermeasures
*2. Hackers who gain access to call centre information through illegal means
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Call center security - Common countermeasures
*3. Call centre agents who illegally misuse the information they have access to in call centres.
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Call center security - Common countermeasures
While items '1' and '2' are mostly subject to police action, call centres can use internal procedures to minimise risk. Such mitigation measures include but are not limited to:
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Call center security - Common countermeasures
*1. Creating a paperless environment, preventing employees from writing down and removing information by ensuring that all work processes are done on the computer, without having to record anything on forms or notes.
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Call center security - Common countermeasures
*2. Prohibiting the use of cellphones and cameras on the floor.
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Call center security - Common countermeasures
*3. Prohibiting paper, pens and digital recording devices from being brought onto the floor.
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Call center security - Common countermeasures
*5. Limiting functionality and access of personal computers or terminals used by call center agents (for example, disabling USB ports). Companies may also use data loss prevention software to block attempts to download, copy, or transmit sensitive electronic data.[ Call Center Security How: to Protect Employees and Customers]
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Flare - Countermeasure
A special variety of flare is used in military aircraft as a defensive countermeasure against infrared homing|heat-seeking missiles
532
Twinking - Countermeasures
*Many games have item restrictions that prevent low-level characters from using higher-level items and upsetting game balance; in Diablo II and The Lord of the Rings Online, most items require a minimum attribute (role-playing games)|ability score or level to equip.
533
Twinking - Countermeasures
*Some games, such as World of Warcraft (WoW), Anarchy Online (AO), EverQuest (EQ), and The Lord of the Rings Online (LOTRO) have certain items become restricted to one character—Soulbound (World Of Warcraft|WoW), NoDrop (AO), No Trade (EQ), or Bound (LOTRO) —when the items are picked up, equipped, or used
534
Twinking - Countermeasures
*WoW further reduced twinking in Battlegrounds (World of Warcraft)|Battlegrounds (player versus player|player-versus-player combat arenas) by awarding experience points for Battleground victories, so that as player versus player|PvP characters gain experience, they also gain levels and thus become disqualified from lower-level brackets
535
Twinking - Countermeasures
*Pokémon (video game series)|Pokémon games use a badge system, which makes Pokémon above a certain level tougher to control due to making random actions and falling asleep until the trainer has completed enough of the campaign (role-playing games)|campaign.
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Operation Crossbow - V-2 countermeasures
The Bodyline Scientific Committee (19 members, including Duncan Sandys, Edward Victor Appleton, John Cockcroft, Robert Watson-Watt) was formed in September 1943 regarding the suspected V-2 rocket, and after the 1944 Sweden in World War II#The Bäckebo Bomb|crash of a test V-2 in Sweden, transmitters to jam the guidance system of the rocket were prepared
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Operation Crossbow - V-2 countermeasures
On March 21, 1945, the plan for the Engagement of Long Range Rockets with AA Gunfire which called for anti-aircraft units to fire into a radar-predicted airspace to intercept the V-2 was ready, but the plan was not used due to the danger of shells falling on Greater London. Happenstance instances of Allied aircraft engaging launched V-2 rockets include the following:
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Operation Crossbow - V-2 countermeasures
* on February 14, 1945, a No. 602 Squadron RAF Supermarine Spitfire|Spitfire fired at a V-2 just after launch
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Operation Crossbow - V-2 countermeasures
* on October 29, 1944, Lieutenants Donald A. Schultz and Charles M. Crane in a P-38 Lightning attempted to photograph a launched V-2 above the trees near the River Rhine,Kennedy
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Operation Crossbow - V-2 countermeasures
* on January 1, 1945, a 4th Fighter Group pilot aloft over the northern flightpath for attacking elements of five German fighter wings on Unternehmen Bodenplatte that day, observed a V-2 act up for firing near Lochem ... the rocket was Meillerwagen|immediately tilted from 85 deg. to 30 deg,
541
Operation Crossbow - V-2 countermeasures
* a Consolidated B-24 Liberator|B-24 Liberator of the 34th Training Wing#World War II|34th Bombardment Group over the Low Countries at ~10,000 feet saw a rocket climb through the formation like a telephone pole with fire squirting from out of its tail. ...a left waist gunner in our squadron let fly a burst and down it went. The unit painted a V-2 on the B-24 such as one would mark a downed enemy aircraft.
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Operation Crossbow - V-2 countermeasures
After the last combat V-2 launch on March 27, 1945, the British discontinued their use of radar in the defence region to detect V-2 launches on April 13.
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Operation Crossbow - V-2 countermeasures
It was on one of these occasions that Spitfire pilot Raymond Baxter fired a burst of gunfire as a V-2 reared out of the cloudsCooksley
544
Blood agent - Detection and countermeasures
Chemical detection methods, in the form of kits or testing strips, exist for hydrogen cyanide. Ordinary clothing provides some protection, but proper protective clothing and masks are recommended. Mask filters containing only charcoal are ineffective, and effective filters are quickly saturated.
545
Blood agent - Detection and countermeasures
Due to their high volatility, cyanide agents generally need no decontamination. In enclosed areas, fire extinguishers spraying sodium carbonate can decontaminate hydrogen cyanide, but the resulting metal salts remain poisonous on contact. Liquid hydrogen cyanide can be flushed with water.Ledgard, [ 73].
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Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle - Countermeasures
The EFV was fitted with Composite armour|composite armor, mine-blast protection, and a Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear|nuclear, biological and chemical defense system. The aluminum hull caused some concern due to protection issues.[ Murtha Ups F-22, Downs EFV] However, aluminum hulls have been used for decades in military ground vehicles and watercraft.
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Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle - Countermeasures
In June 2007 members of the United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces|House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces sent a letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps urging that the EFV be redesigned to give troops better protection against roadside bombs
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Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle - Countermeasures
However, tests in January and February 2010 at Aberdeen Proving Ground|Aberdeen Test Center demonstrated that the EFV offers blast protection equal to a category-2 MRAP|Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, including two simulated improvised explosive devices under its belly and tracks
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Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle - Countermeasures
On 13 October 2010 the navy awarded M Cubed Technologies a contract to develop new armor for the EFV to offer better protection and lighter weight.[ M Cubed Technologies, Inc. Wins Contract To Develop Armor For U.S. Marine Corps Fighting Vehicles] M Cubed Technologies, Inc. press release, 13 October 2010
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Privacy in file sharing networks - Countermeasures
A common countermeasure used is concealing a user's IP address when downloading or uploading content by using anonymous networks, such as I2P| I2P - The Anonymous Network. There is also data encryption and the use of indirect connections (mix networks) to exchange data between peers.
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Privacy in file sharing networks - Countermeasures
Thus all traffic is anonymized and encrypted. Unfortunately, anonymity and safety come at the price of much lower speeds, and due to the nature of those networks being internal networks there currently still is less content. However, this will change, once there are more users.
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Car bombing - Countermeasures
Defending against a car bomb involves keeping vehicles at a distance from vulnerable targets by using Jersey barriers, concrete blocks or bollards, Metalith|metal barriers, or by hardening buildings to withstand an explosion
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Cold wave - Countermeasures
In some places, such as Siberia, extreme cold requires that fuel-powered machinery to be used even part-time must be run continuously
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Cold wave - Countermeasures
People can stock up on food, water, and other necessities before a cold wave
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Cold wave - Countermeasures
Most people can dress appropriately and can even layer their clothing should they need to go outside or should their heating fail
556
Replay attack - Countermeasures
A way to avoid replay attacks is by using session tokens: Bob sends a one-time token to Alice, which Alice uses to transform the password and send the result to Bob (e.g
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Replay attack - Countermeasures
Session tokens should be chosen by a (pseudo-) random process. Otherwise Mallory may be able to pose as Bob, presenting some predicted future token, and convince Alice to use that token in her transformation. Mallory can then replay her reply at a later time (when the previously predicted token is actually presented by Bob), and Bob will accept the authentication.
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Replay attack - Countermeasures
One-time passwords are similar to session tokens in that the password expires after it has been used or after a very short amount of time. They can be used to authenticate individual transactions in addition to sessions. The technique has been widely implemented in personal online banking systems.
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Replay attack - Countermeasures
Bob can also send Cryptographic nonce|nonces but should then include a message authentication code (MAC), which Alice should check.
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Replay attack - Countermeasures
Timestamping is another way of preventing a replay attack
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Electronic countermeasure
An 'electronic countermeasure' ('ECM') is an electrical or electronic device designed to trick or deceive radar, sonar or other detection systems, like infrared (IR) or lasers
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Electronic countermeasure - History
First example of electronic countermeasures being applied in a combat situation took place during the Russo-Japanese war
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Electronic countermeasure - History
During the RAF's night attacks on Germany the extent of electronic countermeasures was much expanded, and a specialised organisation, No
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Electronic countermeasure - Radar ECM
Dispersal of small aluminium strips called Chaff (radar countermeasure)|chaff is a common method of changing the electromagnetic properties of air to provide confusing radar echos.
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Electronic countermeasure - Communications ECM
Radio jamming or communications jamming is the deliberate transmission of radio signals that disrupt communications by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio to the point where the target communications link is either degraded or denied service.
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Electronic countermeasure - Aircraft ECM
ECM is practiced by nearly all modern military unitsmdash;land, sea or air. Aircraft, however, are the primary weapons in the ECM battle because they can see a larger patch of earth than a sea or land-based unit. When employed effectively, ECM can keep aircraft from being tracked by search radars, or targeted by surface-to-air missiles or air-to-air missiles. An aircraft ECM can take the form of an attachable underwing pod or could be embedded in the airframe.
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Electronic countermeasure - Aircraft ECM
Fighter planes using a conventional electronically scanned antenna mount dedicated jamming pods instead or, in the case of the US, German, and Italian air forces, may rely on electronic warfare aircraft to carry them.
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Electronic countermeasure - Future Airborne Jammers
The Next Generation Jammer is being developed to replace the current AN/ALQ-99 carried on the E/A-18G and EA-6B electronic warfare planes. Planned for adoption around 2020, it will use a small AESA antenna divided into quadrants[ for all around coverage and retain the capability of highly directional jamming.
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Electronic countermeasure - Future Airborne Jammers
DARPA's Precision Electronic Warfare (PREW) project aims to develop a low-cost system capable of synchronizing several simple airborne jamming pods with enough precision to replicate the directionality of an electronically scanned antenna, avoiding collateral jamming of non-targeted receivers.[ Broad Agency Announcement Precision Electronic Warfare (PREW) STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY OFFICE DARPA-BAA 09-65]
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Electronic countermeasure - Dedicated ECM aircraft
* EA-6 Prowler|EA-6B Prowler equipped with ALQ-92 communications jammer, ALQ-100 multi-band track breaking system, and five ALQ-99 tactical jammer pods.Polmar (1979), p. 122.
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Electronic countermeasure - Shipboard ECM
The BLR-14 Submarine Acoustic Warfare System (or SAWS) provides an integrated receiver, processor, display, and countermeasures launch system for submarines.
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Electronic countermeasure - Infrared and acoustic analogies
Submarines can deploy similar acoustic device countermeasures (or ADCs) from a 3-inch (75-mm) signal launching tube
573
Radiation damage - Countermeasures
Two main approaches to reduce radiation damage are reducing the amount of energy deposited in the sensitive material (e.g. by shielding, distance from the source, or spatial orientation), or modification of the material to be less sensitive to radiation damage (e.g. by adding antioxidants, stabilizers, or choosing a more suitable material).
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Radiation damage - Countermeasures
In addition to the electronic device hardening mentioned above, some degree of protection may be obtained by shielding, usually with the interposition of high density materials (particularly lead, where space is critical, or concrete where space is available) between the radiation source and areas to be protected
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Bird strike - Countermeasures
There are three approaches to reduce the effect of bird strikes. The vehicles can be designed to be more bird resistant, the birds can be moved out of the way of the vehicle, or the vehicle can be moved out of the way of the birds.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure)
'Chaff', originally called 'Window' by the United Kingdom|British, and 'Düppel' by the Second World War era Germany|German Luftwaffe (from Düppel (Berlin)|the Berlin suburb where it was first developed), is a radar countermeasure in which aircraft or other targets spread a cloud of small, thin pieces of aluminium, metallized glass fibre or Metallised film|plastic, which either appears as a cluster of primary targets on radar screens or swamps the screen with multiple returns.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure)
Modern armed forces use chaff (in naval applications, for instance, using short-range Mark 36 SRBOC|SRBOC rockets) to distract radar-guided missiles from their targets. Most military aircraft and warships have chaff dispensing systems for self-defence. An intercontinental ballistic missile may release in its midcourse phase several independent warheads as well as penetration aids such as decoy balloons and chaff.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure)
Chaff can also be used to distress signal|signal distress by an aircraft when communications are not functional. This has the same effect as an SOS, and can be picked up on radar. It is done by dropping chaff every 2 minutes.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
The idea of using chaff developed independently in the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
In 1937, British researcher Gerald Touch (who was working with Robert Watson-Watt on radar) suggested that lengths of wire suspended from balloons or parachutes might overwhelm a radar system with false echoesJones. p.39 and R. V. Jones had suggested that pieces of metal foil falling through the air might do the same.Jones. p.290
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
section 8.3 The British Begin Countermeasures An early idea was to use sheets the size of a notebook page; these would be printed so they would also serve as Airborne leaflet propaganda|propaganda leaflets.Jones, p
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
Meanwhile in Germany, similar research had led to the development of Düppel. The German code name was that of the estate on which the first German tests with chaff had been made, circa 1942.Jones, p. 299 Once the idea had been passed to the US, Fred Whipple developed a system (according to Harvard Gazette Archives) for dispensing strips for the United States Army Air Forces|USAAF, but it is not known if this was ever used.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
The systems were all essentially identical in concept: small aluminium strips (or wires) cut to one-half of the target radar's wavelength
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
However, unaware of the opposing air force's knowledge of the chaff concept, planners felt that using it was even more dangerous than not, since, as soon as it was used, the enemy could easily duplicate it and use it against them
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
Examination of the Würzburg radar equipment brought back to the UK during Operation Biting and subsequent reconnaissance revealed to the British that all German radars were operating in no more than three major frequency ranges, and thus were prone to radio jamming|jamming. Arthur Travers Harris|Bomber Harris, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of RAF Bomber Command, finally got approval to use Window as part of Operation Gomorrah, the fire raids against Hamburg.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
Seeing this as a development that made it safer to go on operations, many crews got in as many trips as they could before the Germans found a countermeasure.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
Although the metal strips puzzled the German civilians at first, German scientists knew exactly what they were because they had developed Düppel themselves but had refrained from using it for exactly the same reasons as Lindemann had pointed out to the British
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
The use of Window rendered the ground-controlled 'Himmelbett' (German for canopy bed) fighters of the Kammhuber Line unable to track their targets in the night sky and left radar-guided flak|guns and Searchlight|spotlights useless
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
A lesser known fact is that the Luftwaffe used this technology just six weeks after the above-mentioned Hamburg raid
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Second World War
Since the strips all had a similar charge they repelled each other, enabling the full countermeasure effect
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Falklands War
British warships in the Falklands War (1982) made heavy use of chaff.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Falklands War
During the war, British Sea Harrier aircraft lacked their conventional chaff-dispensing mechanism.
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Chaff (radar countermeasure) - Falklands War
Therefore Royal Navy engineers designed an impromptu delivery system of welding rods, split pins and string, which allowed six packets of chaff to be stored in the Air brake (aircraft)|airbrake well and be deployed in flight. It was often referred to as the Heath Robinson chaff modification, due to its complexity.
594
Fire-control radar - Countermeasures
Most fire-control radars have unique characteristics, such as radio frequency, pulse duration, pulse frequency and power
595
Infrared countermeasures
An 'infrared countermeasure' ('IRCM') is a device designed to protect aircraft from infrared homing (heat seeking) missiles by confusing the missiles' infrared guidance system so that they will miss their target.
596
Infrared countermeasures - History
First deployed during the Vietnam War, they have been enhanced over the years to be lighter, more portable, and more reliable, but the basic principle is the same.
597
Infrared countermeasures - Infrared missile seeker technology
Infrared missile seekers of the first generation typically used a spinning reticle with a pattern on it that modulates infrared energy before it falls on a detector (A mode of operation called Spin scan)
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Infrared countermeasures - Infrared missile seeker technology
Most shoulder launched (MANPADS) systems use this type of seeker, as do many air defense systems and air to air missiles (for example the AIM-9L).
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Infrared countermeasures - Principles
By using Flare (countermeasure)|flares, the target can cause the confused seeker to lock onto a new infrared source that is rapidly moving away from the true target.
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Infrared countermeasures - Principles
Countermeasure Systems, Volume 7]
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Infrared countermeasures - Drawbacks
One of the drawbacks of standard IRCM systems is that they broadcast a bright source of infrared. If the modulation of the signal is not effective against a particular seeker system, the IRCM will enhance the ability of the missile to track the aircraft. The aircrews typically brief about potential threats and choose an IRCM modulation that will be effective against likely threats.
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Infrared countermeasures - Directional IRCM
Countermeasure success depend on threat's tracking techniques and requires threats' analysis capabilities.[ Evaluating Airliner MANPADS Protection] Defeating advanced tracking systems requires a higher level of DIRCM power
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Infrared countermeasures - Directional IRCM
Israel has announced a program to develop a system called Multi Spectral Infrared Countermeasure (MUSIC) that will similarly use active lasers instead of flare (countermeasure)|flares to protect civilian aircraft against MANPADs
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Infrared countermeasures - Directional IRCM
Department of the Navy Large Aircraft Countermeasures (DoN LAIRCM) by Northrop Grumman provides infrared threat protection for U.S. Marine Corps CH-53E, CH-46E and CH-53D platforms.[ Northrop Grumman to Provide Infrared Missile Warning Systems and Processors to the U.S. Navy for Heavy Lift Helicopter Fleets]
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Infrared countermeasures - Directional IRCM
BAE Systems' AN/ALQ-212 advanced threat infrared countermeasures (ATIRCM) - part of a directable infrared countermeasures suite - is fielded on U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters. The suite provides protection against an array of threats, including all infrared threat bands. The AN/ALQ-212 incorporates one or more infrared jam heads to counter multiple missile attacks.
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Infrared countermeasures - Directional IRCM
At IDEX 2013, Finmeccanica Company, Selex ES launched its Miysis DIRCM, suitable for all airborne platforms, rotary and fixed wing, large and small.
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Infrared countermeasures - CIRCM (Common Infrared Countermeasures)
CIRCM will be a laser based IR countermeasure against current and future IR threat systems for the US Army rotorcraft and fixed wing platforms and US Navy and US Air Force rotorcraft platforms. Currently, systems by BAE Systems, [ ITT Defense and Information Solutions], [ Northrop Grumman] and Raytheon are under consideration.
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Infrared countermeasures - CIRCM (Common Infrared Countermeasures)
[ FedBizOpps - CIRCM RFI]
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Infrared countermeasures - Flares
Flares create infrared targets with a much stronger signature than the aircraft's engines. The flares provide false targets that cause the missile to make incorrect steering decisions. The missile will rapidly break off a target lock-on.
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Infrared countermeasures - Fielded examples
* AN/ALQ-144 by BAE Systems, used for helicopter defense.
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Infrared countermeasures - Fielded examples
* AN/ALQ-157 by BAE Systems, used for larger helicopters and aircraft.
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Infrared countermeasures - Fielded examples
* [ AN/ALQ-212] by BAE Systems, currently fielded on U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters.
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Infrared countermeasures - Fielded examples
*CAMPS by Saab Group|Saab Avitronics, used for civilian and Very Important Person|VIP aircraft.
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Infrared countermeasures - Fielded examples
* [ CIRCM by Northrop Grumman]
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Infrared countermeasures - Fielded examples
* Flight Guard by Israel Aerospace Industries, used in military and civilian aircraft (gain the nickname of Live Saver due to history of success in saving air vehicles during battles at several countries), but banned at several European airports. According to defense sources in Israel, the European ban is odd and based mostly on a misunderstanding
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Infrared countermeasures - Fielded examples
* Sukhogruz - Russian DIRCM (used on Su-25T).
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Infrared countermeasures - Fielded examples
* KT-01 AVE and KT-02 ACE by [ Adron], used for military aircraft ([//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonov_An-26 An-26]/[//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonov_An-32 32]) and helopcters ([//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mil_Mi-8 Mi-8]/[//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mil_Mi-17 17]/[//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mil_Mi-24 24]) defense.
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Public Health Information Network - Countermeasure and Response Administration
The PHIN also works to track and support the supply of vaccinations and as well as the administration of these tasks. As part of this functionality, the PHIN allows limited supplies of vaccines and other needed drugs to be allocated properly when they are in short supply. Some vaccines and drugs will be traceable to clinics and drug administrators. PHIN also supports response administration by allowing adverse events to be monitored and quarantined populations to be monitored if necessary.
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Fujian flu - Resistance to countermeasures
According to the New York Times: [P]oultry vaccines, made on the cheap, are not filtered and purified [like human vaccines] to remove bits of bacteria or other viruses
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Fujian flu - Resistance to countermeasures
Referring to the Fujian-like strain, an October 2006 National Academy of Sciences article reports: The development of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses in poultry in Eurasia accompanied with the increase in human infection in 2006 suggests that the virus has not been effectively contained and that the pandemic threat persists
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* USS|Orleans Parish|MCS-6
List of mine warfare vessels of the United States Navy - Mine Countermeasures Support Ships (MCS) * USS|Orleans Parish|MCS-6
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Air Rhodesia Flight 827 - Countermeasures
Following the second incident, Air Rhodesia modified the exhaust pipes of their Viscount aircraft to reduce their infrared signature, and painted the aircraft with a low-radiation paint.
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Side channel attack - Countermeasures
[ The Program Counter Security Model: Automatic Detection and Removal of Control-Flow Side Channel Attacks] by David Molnar, Matt Piotrowski, David Schultz, David Wagner (2005).[ The Program Counter Security Model: Automatic Detection and Removal of Control-Flow Side Channel Attacks USENIX Work-in-Progress presentation of paper]
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