1. Prospect of the Proliferation Resistant
Fuel Cycle Technology Development
in Korea
M.S. YANG, S.W. PARK, H.S. PARK
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

2. Korean Nuclear Power Program
Fuel fabrication facility
PWR in operation
PWR under construction
CANDU in operation
PWR(KSNP) under preparation
NPP under planning *
SOUTH KOREA
SEOUL
Ulchin
Daejeon
Wolsung *
Yonggwang
Gori
BUSAN *
GWANGJU
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

3. Status of AR Spent Fuel Storage
Nuclear Power Stations
Storage Capacity
(MTU)
Cumulative Amount
Year of Saturation
(expected)
Location
Number of Reactors
Gori 4
1,737
1,288
2008
Yonggwang 6
1,696
895
Ulchin
1,563
710
2007
Wolsong
4,807
3,089
2006
Total
9,803
5,982
(As of Dec. 2002)
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

4. DUPIC Fuel Cycle Proliferation Resistant Fuel Cycle Technology
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

5. DUPIC Concept Less Disposal Benefits Technical Challenges
LWR
Uranium Saving
Spent LWR Fuel
Natural Uranium
DUPIC Fuel Fab
Proliferation Resistance
On-site Storage
CANDU
Spent CANDU/DUPIC Fuel
AFR Storage
DUPIC
On-site Storage
PWR once-through
Permanent Disposal
CANDU once-through
Permanent Disposal
No Disposal
Less Disposal
* DUPIC : Direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors
termed in 1991 joint research meeting among KAERI, AECL & US DOS
Getting rid of spent LWR fuel
Reducing the amount of spent fuel generation from CANDU by a factor of 2
Significant (~25%) reduction in natural uranium requirement
Benefits
Development of remote fuel fabrication technology
Development of remote fuel handling method in CANDU plant
Verification of performance and safety of DUPIC fuel
Technical Challenges
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

6. DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Process
Skeleton
Volatiles
Cladding Hulls
Volatiles & Semi-volatiles
Spent PWR Fuel
DUPIC Fuel Bundle
Structural Parts
Oxidation/Reduction (OREOX)
Pelletizing/Sintering
Cut to Size
Fuel Rods
Welding
Decladding
DUPIC Fuel Rods
Inherent Proliferation-resistant process owing to no separation of sensitive nuclear material
Minimization of process waste through a dry thermal/mechanical process
Benefits
Technical Challenges
Development of remote fuel fabrication and QA/QC technology
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

7. Layout of DUPIC Equipment in Hot Cell1 2 3 4 5 6 7 29 25 8 26 9 10 11 28 27 12 13 15 19 16 18 17 20 21 23 22 24
1. MILL
2. OFF-GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM
3. OREOX FURNACE (Oxidation & Dewaxing)
4. MIXER
5. SLITTING MACHINE 6. POWDER QC EQUIPMENT
7. COMPACTION PRESS
8. CENTERLESS GRINDER
9. CUTTER
10. SINTERING FURNACE
11. QC - FURNACE
12. PELLET CLEANER/DRYER
13. PELLET LOADING MACHINE
14. PELLET QC EQUIPMENT
15. PELLET STACK ADJUSTER
16. ROD QC EQUIPMENT
17. S/G-DSNC
18. END CAP WELDER
19. HELIUM LEAK TESTER
20. MINI-ELEMENT ASSEMBLY MACHINE
21. END PLATE WELDER
22. BUNDLE QC EQUIPMENT
23. BUNDLE CLEANER
24. DECON. CHAMBER
25. BALANCE
26. VACUUM CLEANER
27. MATERIAL STORAGE
28. WASTE STORAGE
29. VENTILATION FILTER
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

8. Outside Operation Area
DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF)
Inside Hot Cell
Outside Operation Area
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

9. Fabrication of DUPIC Fuel at KAERI
DUPIC Powder after OREOX Process
Sintered DUPIC Pellets
Inspection of DUPIC Pellets
DUPIC Element Welding
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

10. Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP)
Proliferation Resistant Fuel Cycle Technology
Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP)
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

11. Concept of the Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process
Off-gas
Trapping
Waste Treatment
(LiCl+Cs+Sr)
I2, Kr, Xe
Electrolytic
Reduction
Disassembling
& Cutting
Voloxidation
Smelting of SF
Metal Powder
Casting into
Storage Form
PWR SF
Benefits
Disposal
Recycle to
Transmuter
Reduction of spent fuel heat power, volume and radioactivity to a quarter
Saving of a disposal vault area and number of disposal packages to a half
Significant reduction of accumulated doses from a disposal system
Technical Goals
Technical and economic verification of the process concept
Development of innovative technologies to simplify process systems and to reduce costs
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

12. Development of Electrolytic Reduction Process
Concept of ER Technology
Cathode
Anode - +
Reduction of Oxide
UxOy + 2ye- → xU + yO2-
Oxygen Evolution
O2- → O2 + e-
Spent oxide fuel
O2- O2
Magnesia
Membrane
LiCl-Li2O
Molten Salt
PWR SF
Powder
AM, AEM (Cs, Sr etc)
Integrated Cathode
Assembly
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

13. Performance Test of Electrolytic Reduction System
5 kgU/batch ER Reactor
Metal Product (Reduction Yield : > 99%)
Molten salt
LiCl-3 wt% Li2O
Reactor material
STS-304
Reactor size
Ø 35 x 70 cm
Cathode
Ø 12 x 28 cm
Anode
Pt & Fe3O4, Ø 2 x 30 cm
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

14. Behavior of Rare Earth Elements
Electrolytic Reduction of Rare Earth Elements
XPS Spectrogram of Products
Binding Energy (Ev)
kcps
LiCl-Li2O
Compound
Range of critical concentration of Li2O (wt%)
Reduced (O) or not (x) at Li2O concentration (wt%)
XPS
Cyclic voltammetry
Nd2O3
1.30 ~ 1.55
1.30 (O)
1.03 (O)
1.55 (x)
Gd2O3
0.29 ~ 0.50
0.97 (x)
0.29 (O)
0.50 (x)
Eu2O3
0.35 ~ 0.49
0.63 (x)
0.35 (O)
0.49 (x)
Pr2O3
0.28 ~ 0.42
1.00 (x)
0.28 (O)
0.42 (x)
LiCl-Li2O-Nd2O3
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

15. Milestone of ACP Milestone Schedule Phase I Phase II Phase III KAERI
1997
2001
2004
2007
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
Technology Evaluation
Proof of Principle
Proof of Performance
KAERI
Change of Ref. Concept
Li reduction → ER
Hot Test
20 kgHM/batch
5 kgHM/batch Test
Joint Research with RIAR
Material Development
Joint Research with ANL
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

16. Assessment of Proliferation Resistance of DUPIC Fuel Cycle
INPRO Case Study
Assessment of Proliferation Resistance of DUPIC Fuel Cycle
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

17. Background
The DUPIC team has participated in the national case study of International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) since August 2003.
The objective of the national case study is to assess if INPRO methodology for the areas of economics, proliferation resistance, safety and environment is useful.
The DUPIC case study is limited to Proliferation Resistance (PR) assessment of the DUPIC fuel cycle.
The interim result was presented in INPRO Steering Committee held in Vienna in January Now the final report of the case study is just completed.
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

18. Evaluation Frame of INPRO PR
Five Basic Principles
User Requirements
UR1
UR2
UR3
UR4
UR5
Criterion (Indicator and Acceptance Limit)
1st Level Indicator
2nd Level Indicator
3rd Level Indicator
1st level indicator
2nd level indicator
1st level
indicator
1st level
indicator
1st level
indicator
The result of UR1 (red color) will be presented here.
Integration to higher level assessment is performed by DELPHI, which is a expert group discussion technique.
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

19. Basic Principles for proliferation resistance assessment
recommended by INPRO No
Basic Principles 1
Proliferation resistant features and measures should be provided in innovative nuclear energy systems to minimize the possibility of misuse of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons 2
Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential, and neither should be considered sufficient by itself. 3
Extrinsic proliferation resistance measures, such as control and verification measures will remain essential, whatever the level of effectiveness of intrinsic features. 4
From a proliferation resistance point of view, the development and implementation of intrinsic features should be encouraged. 5
Communication between stakeholders will be facilitated by clear, documented and transparent methodologies for comparison or evaluation/assessment of proliferation resistance.
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

20. User Requirements
User Requirements for proliferation resistance assessment recommended by INPRO No
User Requirements 1
Proliferation resistance features and measures should be implemented in the design, construction and operation of future nuclear energy systems to help ensure that future nuclear energy systems will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapons programme. 2
Future nuclear energy systems should incorporate complementary and redundant proliferation resistance features and measures that provide defence in depth. 3
The combination of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, compatible with other design considerations, should be optimized to provide cost-effective proliferation resistance. 4
Proliferation resistance should be taken into account as early as possible in the design and development of a nuclear energy system. 5
Effective intrinsic proliferation resistance features should be utilized to facilitate the efficient application of extrinsic measures.
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

21. Indicators (Barriers) of UR1
3rd level indicator
1st level indicator
2nd level indicator
Isotope content
Chemical form
Radiation field
Bulk and mass
Heat generation
Spontaneous neutron generation rate
Detectable radiation
Attractiveness of nuclear material for a nuclear weapons programme
Prevention or inhibition of the diversion of nuclear material
Diversion detectability
Effectiveness of prevention of diversion of nuclear material
Confidence
Prevention or inhibition of the undeclared production of direct-use material
Difficulty to modify fuel cycle facilities and process
Non-proliferation related treaties and convention
Export control
Commercial, legal or institutional arrangements that control access to NM and NES
Safeguards agreements, verification and response
States’ commitments, obligations and policies regarding non-proliferation and disarmament
Intrinsic Barriers
Extrinsic Barriers
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

22. Assessment Frame of Intrinsic Barriers of UR1
3rd level indicator
Key parameter
Evaluation scale of Acceptance Limit U W M S V
Isotope content
239Pu/Pu (wt%)
Chemical form
Radiation field
Dose (rem/hr)
Bulk and mass
Mass (kg)
Size (cm)
Heat generation
238Pu/Pu (wt%)
Spontaneous neutron generation rate
(240Pu+ 242Pu)/Pu (wt%)
Detectable radiation
Detectability
Diversion detectability
MUF
Effectiveness of prevention of diversion of nuclear material
Environment
Difficulty to modify fuel cycle facilities and process for undeclared production
Degree of difficulty
* U: Unacceptable, W: Weak, M: Moderate, S: Strong, V: Very strong
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

23. Assessment Frame of Extrinsic Barrier of UR1
3rd level indicator
Key parameter
Evaluation scale of Acceptance Limits U W M S V
Non-proliferation related treaties and convention
NPT
NW-free zone treaties
CTBT
Export control
Export control policies
Bilateral arrangements for supply and return of nuclear fuel
Bilateral agreements governing re-export of NES components
Commercial, legal or institutional arrangements that control access to NM and NES
Multi-national ownership
Management or control of a NES
Safeguards agreements, verification and response
Safeguards agreements pursuant to the NPT
State or regional systems for accounting and control
Safeguards approaches for the State’s or regional safeguard systems
An effective international response mechanism for violations
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

24. Examples of Qualitative Evaluation of UR 1
Isotope content
The 239Pu content of the process material in the DUPIC fuel fabrication facility is ~40%. Therefore the isotope content gets the score “Very Strong”.
Chemical form
The process materials in the DUPIC fuel fabrication facility have oxide forms with various physical types. They include the oxide powder, oxide pellet/rod and the fresh DUPIC fuel bundle. Therefore the chemical form gets the score “Strong” because it continues to maintain oxide form just like the spent fuel itself.
Radiation field
The radiation field of the DUPIC bundle is estimated to be 15 rem/hr, which corresponds to the score “Moderate”.
Bulk and mass
The fresh DUPIC bundle is 50 cm long and 10 cm in diameter. It can be judged that “Moderate” score for the fresh DUPIC fuel bundle may be got.
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

25. Examples of Qualitative Evaluation of UR 1
Heat generation
The DUPIC process material has 4.9% of 238Pu/Pu, which is “Moderate”.
Spontaneous neutron generation rate
The (240Pu+242Pu)/Pu of the DUPIC process material is ~50%, which corresponds to the score “Strong”.
Detectable radiation
The DUPIC fuel material can be passively detected because it contains high 244Cm.
The DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Monitor (DSNM) employs 3He detectors, which are effectively used for the surveillance of DFDF. Therefore this barrier gets the score “Very Strong”.
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

26. Example of Scoring for 3rd level Indicators of UR 1
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

27. Final Score for 1st level Indicators of UR 1
2nd level indicator
Importance
Evaluation scale of Acceptance Limit U W M S V
Score of 1st level evaluation
Confidence of the proliferation resistance
States’ commitments, obligations and policies regarding non-proliferation and disarmament
Unattractiveness of nuclear material for a nuclear weapons programme
Prevention or inhibition of the diversion of nuclear material
Prevention or inhibition of the undeclared production of direct-use material.
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

28. Conclusions
Development of proliferation resistant fuel cycle technology is an important issue for the sustainable growth of the nuclear energy.
The DUPIC and ACP are being developed as the main research initiatives for the proliferation resistant fuel cycle technology in Korea, and their achievements so far are promising to meet the goals.
Assessment of the proliferation resistance of the DUPIC fuel cycle is being performed as an INPRO case study according to the INPRO Methodology, and the results have proven the excellent proliferation resistant characteristics of the DUPIC technology.
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute