1. EXAMINING A NORMATIVE MODEL OF STRESS USING CHOICE UNDER RISK
ZARMINA KHAN; BRYAN GRANT, MSC; JIM NEUFELD, PHD
ABSTRACT
METHODS
RESULTS
Novel research in the domain of decisional control has recently tested a mathematically-specified, normative model of coping with stress using choice under uncertainty to understand the cognitive underpinnings of choice and linked threat. The present research tested the same normative model under risk using the same methodology and a similar sample of undergraduate students. An ANOVA revealed that the three models, Individualized, Group, and Conditional, performed similarly. A correlation analysis also revealed individuals do not appear to differ on DC amenability based on individual differences.
Final sample: 26 participants, including 10 males and 16 females (Age M = 18.85, S.D. = 2.11)
PHASE 1: MEASURES
PHASE 2: LEARNING
Individuals learned the probabilities of each of 10 letters being paired with a stressor (an 85 db, one second burst of white noise)
PHASE 3: PRACTICE
Participants were presented with the rules of the DC framework
Within each architecture, there are two levels of choice: the top (bin) level and the bottom (element) level
With the various combinations of choice available at each of the two levels, a total of nine different architectures were presented
A green box indicates full choice, a red box indicates no choice, and a grey box indicates an uncertain choice
PHASE 4: TESTING
Participants completed three blocks of trials, with all nine architectures presented 12 times within each block. Letter selection was left to participants discretion
Two models of possible fit were explored:
Individualized: each individual’s subjective probability ratings
Conditional: objective probability ratings
ANOVA revealed no significant differences:
G2 values: Conditional (M = , SD = 63.57) and Individualized (M = , SD = 71.67)
Pearson 2 values: Conditional (M = , SD = ) and Individualized (M = , SD = )
A correlation analysis revealed relationships among various psychometric variables but not between model fit indexes and these variables
Desirability of Control
Need for Cognition
Intolerance of Uncertainty
Uncertainty Tolerance
Endler Multidimensional Anxiety
General Decision-Making Style
Letter stimuli J M B L Z P V A G D
Prob. of stressor
11%
22%
33%
40%
42%
44%
64%
67%
69%
71%
BACKGROUND
Purpose: test a formal model of coping with stress called decisional control (DC)
DC: a process whereby individuals who find themselves in multifaceted stressing situations make probabilistic judgments to reduce the occurrence of an adverse event (Lees & Neufeld, 1999)
Previous research: tested a formal, mathematically specified model under uncertainty (Grant, 2016), which involves situations in which a decision maker (DM) has prior experienced knowledge pertaining to a stressor’s occurrence
Present research: explore responding for choices under risk, in which a DM is provided prior knowledge regarding stressor occurrence instead of experienced knowledge
Research question: assuming that DM’s have correctly learned the probabilities of adverse event occurrence, we are investigating whether environmental experiences lead to noticeable model drift in decision-making over time
DOC
EMAS-PD
EMAS-SE
EMAS-NS
EMAS-DR
IUSTot
IUSF1
IUSF2
NFC
UTS
GDMS-D
GDMS-A
GDMS-S
GDMS-I
GDMS-R
GInd
PInd
GCon
-.44
-.28
.33
EMAS-AM
-.55
.51
.47
-.19
.21
-.05
.38
-.03
.35
.50
-.10
.14
.20
.27
.25
-.14
.91
-.24
.40
.65
.86
.60
-.09
.09
.26
.07
.48
.39
.45
.29
-.11
.62
.67
.17
-.49
.36
.53
.04
.34
.11
.13
-.02
.18
.00
.28
.15
.08
.05
.23
-.23
.46
.31
.43
.22
-.34
.30
-.15
.61
-.07
-.13
-.25
.24
.01
.80
-.16
.10
-.12
.02
.12
-.08
.16
.06
.94
-.04
.19
.87
PCon
-.01
.77
.95
CONCLUSIONS
Figure 1. In a NU condition, participants have only information at the element level and neither information or control at the bin level. They can select any letter within the group indicated, but the letter assigned to them is random within that group.
Individuals perform well when probabilities of stressor occurrence are known (i.e. under risk), and risky choices place less importance on subjective expected utilities than uncertain choices do
Individuals do not appear to differ on DC aptitude as a function of the dispositional characteristics examined
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