1. Secure PSK Authentication
July 2010
doc.: IEEE /0899r0
July 2010
Secure PSK Authentication
Date:
Authors:
Dan Harkins, Aruba Networks
Dan Harkins, Aruba Networks

2. July 2010
doc.: IEEE /0899r0
July 2010
Abstract
This presentation presents the problems with D0.1’s use of PSKs and a solution to them.
Dan Harkins, Aruba Networks
Dan Harkins, Aruba Networks

3. What’s the Problem? PSKs are being used for authentication in a PBSS
July 2010
What’s the Problem?
PSKs are being used for authentication in a PBSS
It is difficult to provision a “strong” PSK.
Strength is a function of entropy in the PSK.
For a character-based PSK there is approximately 1.5 bits of entropy per character.
Generating a key suitable for use with GCM implies a character string of around 100 characters.
Humans have a hard time entering a string of 20 characters repeatedly with a low probability of error.
Weak PSKs will be used because doing otherwise is prohibitive and problematic for operators and users.
Need a robust protocol to use PSKs properly, can’t just mandate all PSKs are uniformly random binary strings of sufficient length.
Dan Harkins, Aruba Networks

4. Okay, So What’s the Problem?
July 2010
Okay, So What’s the Problem?
The PSK is leaked when used in Draft 0.1
Using the PSK directly in the 4-Way Handshake has known and well-published problems. Cracking tools available on the Internet.
A PSKID, based on a hash of the PSK, is included in beacons.
Protocols using the PSK are susceptible to an off-line dictionary attack
An attacker has all information needed to run through a dictionary of potential passwords until the correct one is found.
This attack is not detectable by legitimate members of the PBSS.
Learning the PSK allows an attacker to recover all past and future traffic.
The strength of the PSK determines the strength of the GCM key and that’s not strong enough (see previous slide).
Dan Harkins, Aruba Networks

5. July 2010
What’s the Solution?
A protocol that uses a PSK that is resistant to attack
Each active attack leaks a single bit of information– whether the singular guess was correct or not. Passive attack is not possible.
Probability of guessing the PSK is 1/(S-x) after x guesses of the PSK from a pool of possible PSKs of size S.
Perfect Forward Secrecy is achieved.
A protocol which can produce a cryptographically strong key suitable for use with GCM
An entropy amplifier!
The strength of the PSK does not determine the strength of the GCM key.
A robust, misuse-resistant protocol
A protocol called SAE from the 11s draft
Dan Harkins, Aruba Networks

6. SAE Based upon the Dragonfly key exchange.
July 2010
SAE
Based upon the Dragonfly key exchange.
Secure against active, passive and dictionary attack
Uses public key cryptography to produce a strong GCM key that is authenticated with a (potentially weak) PSK.
An RSNA authentication protocol for
Uses authentication frames (not data frames).
Free, open source (BSD licensed) reference implementation available:
Dan Harkins, Aruba Networks

7. References 11-10-0884-00-00ad-secure-psk-authentication.doc July 2010
Dan Harkins, Aruba Networks